Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 31

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum peccatum originale contrahatur in anima ex carne ex aliquo appetitu et voluntate animae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum originale contrahatur in anima ex carne ex aliquo appetitu et voluntate animae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per rationem Augustini, quam facit in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum¹, ostendens, quod nullus potest ab alio fieri deterior, sed si fit deterior, hoc erit a se ipso. Ait enim sic: Si fit deterior, aut ergo a superiori, aut a pari, aut ab inferiori. Ab inferiori non potest; a pari non, quia ei non praevalet; a superiori non, quia ille aut esset bonus, aut malus. Si bonus: ergo nunquam faceret ipsum deteriorem. Si malus: ergo iam inferior est et deterior. Similiter arguitur in proposito; et ex hoc sequitur, quod anima non possit fieri mala, nisi cooperante voluntate propria.

2. Item, omne peccatum ab aliqua voluntate est; sola enim voluntas est peccati principium²: ergo originale peccatum, quod est in parvulo, aut est a voluntate propria, aut a voluntate aliena. Si a voluntate aliena, utpote Adae, cum in Adam non fuerimus nisi secundum quid, non esset originale peccatum in homine nisi secundum quid: ergo propter ipsum non deberemus aeternaliter visione Dei privari. Quodsi hoc falsum est, non ergo solum fuit a voluntate aliena. Restat igitur, quod contrahatur a voluntate propria.

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3. Item, superius non patitur ab inferiori nisi merito culpae, vel nisi ei se subiiciat mera voluntate; sed anima, cum unitur carni, ante unionem non habet culpam: ergo si inficitur a carne, hoc non est absque voluntaria subiectione ipsius animae.

4. Item, si Angelus intraret corpus infectum, non diceretur ex hoc contrahere originale: si igitur anima contrahit, hoc non est nisi propter aliquem appetitum, quem habet ad carnem.

5. Item, si anima innocens poneretur in igne infernali, nunquam arderet: ergo si non est magis activa caro quam ignis; si inficitur a carne, hoc non est nisi propter affectionem ipsius animae ad carnem: et si hoc verum est, originalis culpa contrahitur mediante appetitu animae et voluntate.

Sed contra:

1. Peccatum, quod contrahitur a voluntate animae, est peccatum actuale: ergo peccatum, quod parvuli contrahunt, non deberet dici peccatum originale, sed peccatum actuale.

2. Item, si peccatum originale esset a voluntate ipsius animae, ergo puniendum esset poena actuali: si ergo non punitur poena actuali, sed poena damni, sicut infra³ videbitur; ergo non videtur, quod a voluntate animae causetur.

3. Item, natura et voluntas sunt principia disparata, ita quod effectus, qui sunt a natura et qui sunt a proposito, sunt alii et alii⁴: si ergo originale peccatum eo ipso dicitur originale, quia est a natura, ergo non est a voluntate propria.

4. Item, peccatum, quod est a propria voluntate, est per proprium actum commissum; nullum autem peccatum per proprium actum commissum sine proprio actu dimittitur: ergo si originale contraheretur ex animae voluntate, nunquam in parvulis per baptismum deleretur. Quodsi hoc est contra fidem, restat, quod peccatum originale non contrahitur per animae voluntatem.

5. Item, si contrahitur per voluntatem, aut per naturalem, aut per deliberativam⁵. Non per deliberativam, quia in ipso instanti creationis unitur anima carni. Non per naturalem, quia naturalis voluntas semper est recta et sic movetur, secundum quod eam instituit auctor Deus: ergo nullo modo potest esse peccati principium: redit igitur idem quod prius.

Conclusio

Peccatum originale non contrahitur ab anima mediante appetitu deliberativo, sed mediante appetitu naturali, quem habet anima ad corpus, non quidem ut causa efficiente, sed ut causa sine qua non.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum originale contrahatur ex voluntate vel appetitu animae, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi. Contingit enim hoc taliter intelligere, quod spectat ad haeresis perversitatem; et taliter, ut spectet ad rationis probabilitatem; et tertio etiam modo, ut spectet ad fidei veritatem.

Cum enim duplex sit in anima appetitus, videlicet naturalis et deliberativus; si sic intelligatur, quod anima prius deliberet de carnis infectione, et ei coniungatur voluntarie et ex deliberatione, et ex hoc contrahat culpam originalem; sic intelligere haereticum est, pro eo quod doctores catholici⁶ dicunt, quod «anima creando infunditur et infundendo creatur». Et Apostolus ad Romanos nono⁷ de Iacob et Esau loquens dicit: Antequam aliquid boni vel mali egissent etc.

Est et alius in anima appetitus naturalis, et per hunc appetitum dupliciter potest intelligi contrahi originale. Uno modo, ut sic intelligatur contrahi ex carnis corruptione et appetitu animae, quod corruptio carnis est⁸ sicut materialis; sed naturalis appetitus animae ad corpus, qui est ad ipsam unionem et unionem antecedit natura, quamvis non antecedat tempore, se habeat in ratione efficientis eo modo, quo est dicere, peccatum habere causam efficientem; et sic dicatur contrahi originale peccatum a carne infecta mediante appetitu, per quem anima carni alligatur et quodam modo ei condescendit, ac per hoc ei se subiicit et subiiciendo pervertitur. Nec tamen ex hoc dicetur culpa illa esse acta, sed contracta⁹, nec personalis, sed naturalis, quia ille appetitus est appetitus naturalis; non tamen causat peccatum per se, sed cum corruptione carnis adiuncta, quae a primo parente propagatur. — Hoc etsi probabiliter esse dictum videatur, videtur tamen in hoc a veritate deviare, quod principalem causam contractionis originalis ponit ex parte animae, cum Sancti et doctores dicant, originale peccatum principaliter traduci a primo parente, a quo non propagamur nisi secundum carnem¹⁰.

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Alio modo potest intelligi, peccatum originale contrahi ab anima per naturalem appetitum ipsius animae ad carnem, ita ut principalis ratio ponatur ex parte carnis, et appetitus ille naturalis sit causa sine qua non; et hoc quidem habet veritatem, et necesse est ponere. Nunquam enim caro posset animam inficere, nisi anima haberet naturalem colligantiam ad ipsam. Naturalis autem colligantia non est nisi per appetitum ipsius animae ad corpus, per quem anima adeo alligatur carni, ut, sicut dictum fuit supra¹¹, nisi virtutem habeat, per quam carnem regat, necesse habet deorsum ferri cum carne, ac per hoc captivari in servitute peccati. — Et propter hoc simpliciter concedendum est, peccatum originale esse contractum, et nullo modo debet dici actum. Et hoc ipsum nomen indicat, quod dicitur peccatum originale, non actuale, dicitur naturale, non voluntarium. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur.

Ad obiecta:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non potest homo fieri malus ab alio; dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de alio agente, quod quidem est ita aliud, quod non est naturaliter alligatum ei quod debet fieri deterius. Sic autem non est in proposito; nam caro naturalem habet colligantiam cum spiritu per naturalem appetitum unius ad alterum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum originale aut est a voluntate propria, aut a voluntate aliena; dicendum, quod a voluntate aliena. — Ad illud vero quod subiungit, quod non fuimus nisi secundum quid in ipso Adam; dicendum, quod verum est, quia fuimus¹² in potentia causali; sed quemadmodum secundum quid reductum est ad simpliciter per operationem naturae — nam cum prius essemus in potentia, nunc sumus entes in actu — sic et originale peccatum prolis, quod erat secundum quid ante ipsius prolis generationem, in ipsa prolis propagatione ex¹³ unione animae ad corpus incipit esse peccatum simpliciter; nec requiritur ibi actualis vel nova deliberatio, sed sufficit ipsa propagatio et animae ad carnem coniunctio.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod superius non patitur ab inferiori etc.: dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his, inter quae non est naturalis colligantia; et ideo non habet locum in proposito, cum naturalis colligantia sit animae ad carnem, sicut dictum est supra¹⁴. — Posset tamen dici, quod Adam aliquo modo meruit; sed hoc melius patebit, cum agetur, qualiter salvatur divina iustitia in unione animae ad carnem.

Ad 4, 5. Ad duas ultimas rationes iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Nam si Angelus poneretur in carne infecta, et anima innocens poneretur in flamma; nec ille inficeretur, nec ista pateretur. Sed hoc non esset propter defectum appetitus deliberativi, sed propter hoc, quod non esset ibi appetitus, nec colligantia naturalis, et sine hac non potest anima a¹⁵ carne infici, sicut prius dictum est, quamvis haec non sit causa principalis. Consimilis enim appetitus naturalis salvaretur in anima ad carnem, si homo stetisset; et tamen anima nullam culpam contraheret.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether original sin is contracted in the soul from the flesh through some appetite and will of the soul.

Secondly it is asked whether original sin is contracted in the soul from the flesh through some appetite and will of the soul. And that it is so, seems [to follow]:

1. First, by the argument of Augustine, which he makes in the book Of Eighty-Three Questions¹, showing that no one can be made worse by another, but if he is made worse, this will be from himself. For he says thus: If he is made worse, then [it is] either from a superior, or from an equal, or from an inferior. From an inferior it cannot be; from an equal not, because it does not prevail over it; from a superior not, because that one would be either good or evil. If good: then it would never make it worse. If evil: then it is already inferior and worse. The same is argued in the matter at hand; and from this it follows that the soul cannot be made evil except with its own will cooperating.

2. Likewise, every sin is from some will; for the will alone is the principle of sin²: therefore original sin, which is in an infant, is either from its own will, or from another's will. If from another's will, namely Adam's, then since we were in Adam only in a certain respect, original sin would not be in man except in a certain respect: therefore on account of it we ought not to be eternally deprived of the vision of God. But if this is false, then it was not solely from another's will. It remains, therefore, that it is contracted from one's own will.

3. Likewise, a superior does not suffer from an inferior except by the desert of fault, or unless it subjects itself to it by mere will; but the soul, when it is united to the flesh, before the union has no fault: therefore if it is infected by the flesh, this is not without a voluntary subjection of the soul itself.

4. Likewise, if an angel were to enter an infected body, it would not be said on this account to contract original sin: if therefore the soul contracts it, this is only on account of some appetite which it has toward the flesh.

5. Likewise, if an innocent soul were placed in the infernal fire, it would never burn: therefore if the flesh is no more active than fire; [then] if it is infected by the flesh, this is only on account of the affection of the soul itself toward the flesh: and if this is true, original fault is contracted by means of the appetite and will of the soul.

On the contrary:

1. The sin which is contracted by the will of the soul is actual sin: therefore the sin which infants contract ought not to be called original sin, but actual sin.

2. Likewise, if original sin were from the will of the soul itself, then it would have to be punished with the punishment of sense: if therefore it is not punished with the punishment of sense, but with the punishment of loss, as will be seen below³; then it does not seem that it is caused by the will of the soul.

3. Likewise, nature and will are disparate principles, so that the effects which are from nature and those which are from purpose are diverse⁴: if therefore original sin is for that very reason called original, because it is from nature, then it is not from one's own will.

4. Likewise, the sin which is from one's own will is committed through one's own act; but no sin committed through one's own act is remitted without one's own act: therefore if original [sin] were contracted from the will of the soul, it would never be destroyed in infants through baptism. But if this is contrary to faith, it remains that original sin is not contracted through the will of the soul.

5. Likewise, if it is contracted through the will, [it is] either through the natural [will], or through the deliberative [will]⁵. Not through the deliberative, because in the very instant of creation the soul is united to the flesh. Not through the natural, because the natural will is always right and is so moved according as God the author instituted it: therefore in no way can it be the principle of sin: it returns, therefore, to the same as before.

Conclusio

Original sin is not contracted by the soul by means of the deliberative appetite, but by means of the natural appetite which the soul has toward the body, not indeed as an efficient cause, but as a cause without which not.

I respond: It must be said that when it is asked whether original sin is contracted from the will or appetite of the soul, this can be understood in three ways. For it happens that one understands this in such a way as pertains to the perversity of heresy; and in such a way as pertains to the probability of reason; and in a third way also, as pertains to the truth of faith.

For since there is a twofold appetite in the soul, namely the natural and the deliberative; if it be understood thus, that the soul first deliberates about the infection of the flesh, and is joined to it voluntarily and from deliberation, and from this contracts original fault; to understand it so is heretical, for the reason that the Catholic doctors⁶ say that «the soul is infused by being created and created by being infused». And the Apostle, speaking to the Romans, in the ninth chapter⁷, of Jacob and Esau, says: Before they had done anything good or evil etc.

There is also another appetite in the soul, the natural one, and through this appetite it can be understood in two ways that original sin is contracted. In one way, so that it be understood to be contracted from the corruption of the flesh and the appetite of the soul, [so] that the corruption of the flesh is⁸ as it were material; but the natural appetite of the soul toward the body, which is [ordered] to the union itself and precedes the union in nature, although it does not precede it in time, stands in the character of an efficient [cause] in that manner in which one says that sin has an efficient cause; and thus original sin is said to be contracted from the infected flesh by means of the appetite, through which the soul is bound to the flesh and in a certain way condescends to it, and through this subjects itself to it and by subjecting itself is perverted. Nor yet on this account will that fault be said to be enacted, but contracted⁹, nor personal, but natural, because that appetite is a natural appetite; yet it does not cause sin of itself, but with the corruption of the flesh joined to it, which is propagated from the first parent. — Although this seems to be said with probability, nevertheless it seems to deviate from the truth in this, that it places the principal cause of the contraction of original [sin] on the side of the soul, whereas the Saints and doctors say that original sin is principally derived from the first parent, from whom we are not propagated except according to the flesh¹⁰.

In another way it can be understood that original sin is contracted by the soul through the natural appetite of the soul itself toward the flesh, so that the principal ground is placed on the side of the flesh, and that natural appetite is the cause without which not; and this indeed holds the truth, and it is necessary to posit it. For the flesh could never infect the soul, unless the soul had a natural connection to it. But the natural connection is only through the appetite of the soul itself toward the body, through which the soul is so bound to the flesh that, as was said above¹¹, unless it have the virtue by which it may govern the flesh, it necessarily is borne downward with the flesh, and through this is taken captive in the servitude of sin. — And on account of this it is to be conceded without qualification that original sin is contracted, and in no way ought it to be called enacted. And this very name indicates it, that it is called original, not actual, sin; it is called natural, not voluntary. — Hence the arguments which are adduced for the second part are to be conceded.

To the objections:

To 1. But to that which is objected, that man cannot be made evil by another; it must be said that Augustine there speaks of another agent which is so other that it is not naturally bound to that which is to be made worse. But it is not so in the matter at hand; for the flesh has a natural connection with the spirit through the natural appetite of the one toward the other.

To 2. To that which is objected, that original sin is either from one's own will or from another's will; it must be said that [it is] from another's will. — But to that which it adds, that we were in Adam himself only in a certain respect; it must be said that this is true, because we were¹² in causal potency; but just as in a certain respect is reduced to without qualification through the operation of nature — for whereas before we were in potency, now we are beings in act — so also the original sin of the offspring, which was in a certain respect before the generation of the offspring itself, in the very propagation of the offspring begins, from¹³ the union of the soul to the body, to be sin without qualification; nor is there required there an actual or new deliberation, but the propagation itself and the conjunction of the soul to the flesh suffices.

To 3. To that which is objected, that a superior does not suffer from an inferior etc.: it must be said that this holds true in those things between which there is no natural connection; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand, since there is a natural connection of the soul to the flesh, as was said above¹⁴. — It could nevertheless be said that Adam in some way merited [it]; but this will appear better when it is treated how divine justice is preserved in the union of the soul to the flesh.

To 4, 5. To the last two arguments the response is already clear from what has been said. For if an angel were placed in infected flesh, and an innocent soul were placed in the flame; neither would the former be infected, nor would the latter suffer. But this would not be on account of the defect of the deliberative appetite, but on account of this, that there would not be there an appetite, nor a natural connection, and without this the soul cannot be infected by¹⁵ the flesh, as was said before, although this is not the principal cause. For a like natural appetite would be preserved in the soul toward the flesh, if man had stood [in innocence]; and yet the soul would contract no fault.

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Apparatus Criticus

Quaest. 3. seq. Verba: Si fit deterior etc. sententialiter tantum exhibent testimonium Augustini. Cfr. etiam 1. de Lib. Arb. c. 10. n. 20. seqq.; III. c. 1. n. 2. et c. 14. n. 39. seq., ubi et maior tertii arg. insinuatur.
Question 3, following. The words If he is made worse etc. give the testimony of Augustine only as to its sense. Cf. also On Free Will I, c. 10, n. 20 ff.; III, c. 1, n. 2, and c. 14, n. 39 f., where also the major of the third argument is implied.
Ut ostendit August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 2. et Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3., qui iam in praecedenti quaest. arg. 5. ad opposit. allegatus est.
As Augustine shows, On Free Will III, c. 1, n. 2, and Anselm, On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, c. 3, who was already cited in the preceding question, argument 5 to the contrary.
Dist. 33. a. 3. q. 1. seq.
Distinction 33, a. 3, q. 1, following.
Cfr. supra pag. 688, nota 4. et tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.
Cf. above, p. 688, note 4, and tome I, p. 714, note 3.
De hac divisione vide supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.
On this division see above, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3.
Ita Innocentius III. in Commentario in septem Psalmos poenitent., Ps. 50. Cfr. de Ecclesiasticis Dogmat. (inter opera August.) c. 14. et supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 2.
Thus Innocent III in the Commentary on the Seven Penitential Psalms, Ps. 50. Cf. On Ecclesiastical Dogmas (among the works of Augustine) c. 14, and above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2.
Vers. 14.
Verse 14.
Cod. N sit (addita etiam, sed superflue, paulo ante voci animae particula ita); lectio vere bona, quippe cum in subnexis etiam modus coniunctivus recurrat, scil. se habeat et dicatur, ubi Vat. et edd. 3, 4 solae exhibent modum indicativum, scil. se habet et dicitur.
Codex N [reads] sit (with the particle ita also added, but superfluously, a little before the word animae); a truly good reading, since indeed in what follows the subjunctive mood also recurs, namely se habeat and dicatur, where the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 alone exhibit the indicative mood, namely se habet and dicitur.
Cfr. supra pag. 191, nota 2. et infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp. — Superius post subiiciendo edd., excepta 1, addunt se.
Cf. above, p. 191, note 2, and below, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, argument 2 to the contrary. — Above, after subiiciendo (by subjecting), the editions, except for 1, add se (itself).
Vide quaest. praeced. et seq. et infra d. 33. a. 2. q. 1, ubi in peccato originali tria distinguntur.
See the preceding and following questions and below, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, where three things are distinguished in original sin.
Quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius pro per quem codd. F K W bb ee cum ed. 1 per quam. Paulo inferius pro in servitute peccati Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et plures codd. in servitutem peccati, quibus verbis alluditur ad illud Rom. 7, 23: Video autem aliam legem in membris meis... et captivantem me in lege peccati etc.
The preceding question. — A little above, in place of per quem (through which) codices F, K, W, bb, ee with edition 1 [read] per quam. A little below, in place of in servitute peccati (in the servitude of sin) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and several codices [read] in servitutem peccati (into the servitude of sin), by which words there is an allusion to that [text] of Rom. 7, 23: But I see another law in my members... and captivating me in the law of sin etc.
Cod. V bene addit in eo.
Codex V rightly adds in eo (in him).
Cod. aa et. Voculae ex in cod. C praemittitur vel, in cod. R et.
Codex aa [reads] et (and). To the little word ex (from) in codex C there is prefixed vel (or), in codex R et (and).
Hic in corp. et supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — De propos. q. vide infra d. 32. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — In fine solutionis cod. pro unione substituit coniunctione.
Here in the body and above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, following. — On the proposed question see below, d. 32, a. 3, q. 1, following. — At the end of the solution a codex substitutes coniunctione (conjunction) for unione (union).
Codd. H I V cum edd. 2, 3 in. Paulo inferius pro tamen codd. A F cum.
Codices H, I, V with editions 2, 3 [read] in. A little below, in place of tamen (yet) codices A, F [read] cum (with).

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