Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXXV.

Cap. I.

Quid sit peccatum.

Post haec videndum est, quid sit peccatum. — Peccatum est, ut ait Augustinus¹, « omne dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, quod fit contra legem Dei ». Idem in libro de Duabus Animabus: « Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat ». In utraque assignatione de actuali peccato agitur et mortali, non veniali. Ex prima descriptione ostenditur peccatum esse voluntas mala, sive locutio et operatio prava, id est actus malus tam interior quam exterior; ex altera vero tantum ostenditur esse actus interior; voluntas enim, ut in superioribus² dictum est, motus animi est — actus ergo interior est. Ambrosius quoque in libro de Paradiso³ ait: « Quid est peccatum nisi praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia praeceptorum »? « Ergo in praevaricante peccatum est, sed in mandante culpa non est ». « Non enim consisteret peccatum, si interdictio non fuisset. Non consistente autem peccato, non solum malitia, sed etiam virtus fortasse non esset, quae, nisi aliqua malitiae fuissent semina, vel subsistere, vel eminere non posset ». — Ecce praevaricationem legis et inobedientiam definit Ambrosius esse peccatum.

Cap. II.

De peccato.

Quocirca, diversitatis huius verborum occasione de peccato plurimi diversa senserunt. — Alii enim dixerunt, voluntatem malam tantum esse peccatum et non actus exteriores; alii, voluntatem et actus; alii neutrum, dicentes, omnes actus esse bonos et a Deo et ex Deo auctore esse, malum autem nihil esse, ut ait Augustinus super Ioannem⁴: « Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, id est peccatum, quod nihil est; et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant ». Supra etiam dixit Augustinus, quod malum est privatio boni vel corruptio boni; quod etiam in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum⁵ ait: « Summum malum nullum modum habet, caret enim omni bono; at modus aliquid boni est: non igitur est, quia nulla specie continetur, totumque hoc nomen mali de speciei privatione repertum est ». Idem in Dogmatibus ecclesiasticis⁶ dicitur: « Malum vel malitiam non esse a Deo creatam, sed a diabolo inventam, qui et ipse bonus creatus est ». Idem etiam in libro contra Manichaeos, quid sit peccare, ostendit dicens: « Peccare quid aliud est, nisi in veritatis praeceptis vel in ipsa veritate errare? Quod si non voluntate faciunt peccatores, iniuste iudicantur ». Quid igitur in hac tanta varietate tenendum, quidve dicendum?

Sane dici potest et libere tradi debet, peccatum esse actum malum interiorem et exteriorem, scilicet malam cogitationem, locutionem et operationem; praecipue tamen in voluntate consistit peccatum, ex qua tanquam ex arbore mala procedunt opera mala tanquam fructus mali⁷.

Cap. III.

Utrum malus actus, in quantum peccatum est, sit corruptio vel privatio boni.

Quidam autem, diligenter attendentes verba Augustini, quibus supra et in aliis Scripturae locis utitur, non indocte tradunt, voluntatem malam et actus malos, in quantum sunt, vel in quantum actus sunt, bona esse; in quantum vero mala sunt, peccata esse; qui voluntatem et actum quemcumque bonam Dei naturam esse dicunt, in quantum actus est, vel voluntas, et ex Deo auctore esse; in quantum vero inordinate et contra legem Dei fit et fine debito caret, peccatum est, et ita, in quantum peccatum est, nihil est. Nulla enim substantia est, nulla natura est.

Quod autem voluntas omnis et actio bonum sit, in quantum est, ex eo probant, quod ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum⁸: « Deus boni tantummodo causa est; quocirca mali auctor non est, quia omnium quae sunt, auctor est, quae, in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt ». Idem probans, nihil casu fieri in mundo, ait in eodem: « Quidquid casu fit, temere fit; quidquid temere fit, non fit providentia. Si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non providentia universus mundus administratur; si non providentia universus mundus administratur, aliqua natura vel substantia est, quae ad opus providentiae non pertinet. Omne autem quod est, in quantum est, bonum est. Summe enim est illud bonum, cuius participatione sunt cetera bona; et omne quod mutabile est, non per se, sed boni illius participatione, in quantum est, bonum est, quod divinam etiam providentiam vocamus. Nihil igitur casu fit in mundo ». — His testimoniis innituntur ad ostendendum, omne quod est, in quantum est, bonum esse. Unde idem Augustinus in libro primo de Doctrina christiana⁹ ait: « Ille summe ac primitus est, qui omnino incommutabilis est; et cetera quae sunt, nisi ab illo esse non possunt, et in tantum bona sunt, in quantum acceperunt, ut sint ».

Ex praedictis colligitur atque infertur, quia, si mala voluntas et mala actio est, in quantum est, bona est. Sed quis est qui diffitetur, malam voluntatem esse et malam actionem? Mala igitur voluntas sive actio, in quantum est, bonum est, et in quantum voluntas est, vel actio, bonum similiter est; sed ex vitio mala est, quod vitium a Deo non est neque aliquid est. Quod Augustinus notasse videtur in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum dicens: « Vitium est voluntatis, quo est homo deterior; quod vitium longe abest a voluntate Dei, ut ratio docet ». — Ex hoc loco probant, voluntatem, in quantum vitiosa est, non esse a Deo; et in quantum vitiosa est, peccatum est; et peccatum est, ut aiunt, in quantum non habet ordinem nec finem debitum. Ita et actio, in quantum ex malo procedit, et ordinem non habet et ad malum tendit.

Item et aliter probant, omnem actum interiorem vel exteriorem, in quantum est, esse bonum; quia non esset actus malus, nisi esset res bona, quia non est aliqua res mala, nisi eadem res bona sit. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio¹⁰: « Omnis natura bonum est, nec res aliqua mala esset, si res ipsa, quae mala est, natura non esset. Non igitur potest esse malum nisi aliquod bonum. Quod cum dici videatur absurde, connexio tamen ratiocinationis nos compellit hoc dicere ». — Ex praemissis testimoniis asserunt, omnes actus, in quantum sunt, esse res bonas, nec aliquid esse malum, id est peccatum, nisi idem quoque secundum aliquid bonum sit; et omnium quae sunt, in quantum sunt, Deum auctorem praedicant, et eius voluntate omnia esse quaecumque sunt, quae¹¹, in quantum sunt, naturae sunt.

Quibus opponitur: si omnia quae sunt, in quantum sunt, bona sunt et naturae sunt: ergo adulterium et homicidium et similia, in quantum sunt, bona sunt et naturae sunt, et Deo volente fiunt. Quod si est, tunc illi qui faciunt illa, bona agunt; quod penitus absurdum est. — His vero sic illi respondent: dicunt equidem, adulterium, homicidium et huiusmodi non simpliciter actus denotare, sed actuum vitia; actusque ipsos adulterii et homicidii, in quantum sunt, vel in quantum actus sunt, a Deo esse et bonas naturas esse; sed non in quantum adulterium et homicidium sunt. Et ideo non sequi dicunt, si actus, qui homicidia et adulteria sunt, a Deo sunt, quod homicidia et adulteria a Deo sint¹².

Item aliter eis opponitur: si aliquid non est malum, quod non sit natura vel res bona, quomodo igitur peccata sunt, non credere in Deum, non ire ad ecclesiam et huiusmodi, cum ista non sint naturae, immo omnino non sint? Non est enim aliquid vel res aliqua non ire ad ecclesiam, vel non credere et huiusmodi. — Ad quod dicunt, his atque huiusmodi dictionibus, quae videntur privationes simpliciter notare et nihil

ponere, quia per negationem dicuntur, vere aliqua poni, actusque per eas significari. Non credere enim in Christum incredulitatem dicunt, et nomine incredulitatis malum mentis actum significari. Ita etiam, cum dicitur: non ire ad ecclesiam malum est, non-euntis contemptus significatur, id est voluntas mala vel propositum; hoc est enim declinare a bono, et ideo malum est, sicut e converso declinare a malo bonum est. Sicut ergo declinatio a malo aliquid ponit, scilicet voluntatem et propositum vitandi malum — non enim potest esse bonum quod omnino nihil est — ita declinatio a bono quod¹³ est significat, scilicet voluntatem et propositum mali. Et secundum hoc vera est et generalis illa peccati mortalis descriptio, quam supra¹⁴ posuit Augustinus.

Potest etiam quaeri ab eisdem, cum peccatum sit, ut supra dictum est, privatio vel corruptio boni, et omnis actus malus sit peccatum; utrum sit privatio vel corruptio boni, in quantum peccatum est, vel non. Si enim, in quantum peccatum est, corruptio boni est, cum corruptio vel privatio boni poena sit homini; in quantum igitur peccatum est, poena est. Quod si est, tunc, in quantum peccatum est, bonum esse videtur et a Deo esse. Si autem non, in quantum peccatum est, corruptio est, quaeritur ergo, secundum quid corruptio sit. Si enim corruptio est, et non in quantum peccatum est; cum non sit nisi bonum, praeterquam in eo quod peccatum est: ergo in quantum bonum est, corruptio vel privatio boni est. — Ad quod etiam ipsi dicunt, actum malum, non in quantum est neque in quantum bonum est, esse privationem vel corruptionem boni, sed in quantum peccatum est; non tamen, in quantum peccatum est, poena est, vel aliquid, quod a Deo sit. Ut enim ex verbis praemissis Augustini colligitur, peccatum dicitur corruptio vel privatio active, non passive. Nam ideo malum vel peccatum dicitur corruptio boni, quia naturam bonam qualicumque privat bono. Nam si non privat aliquo bono, non nocet, ut supra¹⁵ Augustinus ait; nocet autem: adimit ergo bonum. Non autem nocet, nisi in quantum peccatum est: ergo in quantum peccatum est, privat bono. Itaque in quantum peccatum est, privatio est vel corruptio boni.

Cap. IV.

Quomodo peccatum possit corrumpere bonum, cum nihil sit.

Sed cum nihil sit, in quantum peccatum est, quomodo potest bonum corrumpere vel adimere? Augustinus te hoc docet in libro de Natura et gratia¹⁶ dicens: « Abstinere a cibo non est aliqua substantia; tamen substantia corporis, si omnino abstineatur a cibo, languescit et frangitur; sic non est substantia peccatum, eo tamen natura animae corrumpitur ».

Peccatum vero, id est culpa, proprie animae corruptio est. — Si autem quaeritur, in quo possit corrumpi anima; in parabola¹⁷ illius qui incidit in latrones, qui eum spoliaverunt et vulneraverunt, clarescit. Incidit enim homo in latrones, quando per peccatum in potestatem diaboli traditur; et tunc per peccatum exspoliatur gratuitis bonis, id est virtutibus, et in naturalibus bonis vulneratur, quae sunt ratio, intellectus, memoria et ingenium et huiusmodi, quae per peccatum obtenebrantur et vitiantur. Per peccatum etiam privatur illo bono, cuius participatione cetera bona sunt; quo tanto magis privatur, quanto magis se ab eo elongat.

Cap. V.

Qualiter homo se elongat a Deo.

Ab eo autem se elongat homo per peccatum, non loci distantia, quia ubique totus et praesens est omnibus, et « omnia in ipso sunt, ut ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum¹⁸, et ipse locus non est. Locus tamen Dei abusive dicitur templum Dei, non quod eo contineatur, sed quod ei praesens sit et inhabitans; id autem anima munda intelligitur ». Per peccatum igitur non secundum locum aliquis longe fit a Deo, sed in eo longe fit, quod ab eius similitudine recedit, et tanto longius, quanto fit dissimilior. « Illa autem, ut Augustinus ait in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quae participatione similia sunt Deo, recipiunt dissimilitudinem. At ipsa similitudo nullo modo ex aliqua parte potest esse dissimilis. Unde fit, ut, cum similitudo Patris Filius sit, ex nulla parte Patri possit esse dissimilis, cuius participatione similia sunt quaecumque Deo similia sunt; et illa possunt recipere dissimilitudinem ». Nihil est autem, quod hominem adeo Deo dissimilem faciat, quemadmodum peccatum. Cum autem peccatum sit corruptio vel privatio boni, quae est in anima, est etiam privatio et corruptio boni corporis, sicut corpus hominis privavit beneficio illius immortalitatis et impassibilitatis, quam habuit ante peccatum.

Cap. VI.

An poena sit privatio boni.

Quaeri autem solet, utrum et poena sit privatio vel corruptio boni. — Ad quod facile responderi potest, si praedicta ad memoriam revocentur. Diximus enim supra, privationem vel corruptionem boni accipi active, vel passive, id est secundum efficientiam, vel effectum. Ideoque privatio vel corruptio boni dicitur et peccatum et poena; sed peccatum secundum efficientiam, quia privat vel corrumpit bonum; poena autem secundum effectum, id est secundum passionem, quae est effectus peccati. Aliud est enim culpa, aliud poena; alterum est Dei, id est poena, alterum diaboli vel hominis, id est culpa.

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DISTINCTION XXXV.

Chapter I.

What sin is.

After these things it must be seen what sin is. — Sin is, as Augustine¹ says, "every word, or deed, or desire, which is done against the law of God." The same, in the book On the Two Souls: "Sin is the will to retain or to pursue what justice forbids." In each definition there is treatment of actual and mortal sin, not venial. From the first description it is shown that sin is an evil will, or a depraved speech and action, that is, an evil act both interior and exterior; but from the other it is shown to be only an interior act; for the will, as has been said above², is a motion of the mind — it is therefore an interior act. Ambrose too, in the book On Paradise³, says: "What is sin but the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?" "Therefore in the one transgressing there is sin, but in the one commanding there is no fault." "For sin would not exist if there had been no prohibition. But if sin did not exist, not only would there be no malice, but perhaps no virtue either, which, unless there had been certain seeds of malice, could neither subsist nor stand out." — Behold, Ambrose defines sin to be the transgression of the law and disobedience.

Chapter II.

On sin.

Wherefore, on the occasion of this diversity of words, very many have thought diverse things about sin. — For some have said that only the evil will is sin and not the exterior acts; others, the will and the acts; others, neither, saying that all acts are good and are from God and from God as author, but that evil is nothing, as Augustine says on John⁴: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing, that is, sin, which is nothing; and men become nothing when they sin." Above, also, Augustine said that evil is the privation of good or the corruption of good; which also in the book of the Eighty-three Questions⁵ he says: "The highest evil has no measure, for it lacks all good; but measure is something of good: therefore it is not, since it is contained under no species, and this whole name of 'evil' is found from the privation of species." The same is said in the Ecclesiastical Dogmas⁶: "That evil or malice was not created by God, but invented by the devil, who himself also was created good." The same also, in the book against the Manichees, shows what it is to sin, saying: "What else is it to sin, but to err in the precepts of truth or in truth itself? But if sinners do not act by will, they are unjustly judged." What, therefore, in this great variety is to be held, and what is to be said?

Soundly it can be said, and ought freely to be handed down, that sin is an evil act, interior and exterior, namely an evil thought, speech, and action; chiefly, however, sin consists in the will, from which, as from an evil tree, evil works proceed as evil fruits⁷.

Chapter III.

Whether an evil act, insofar as it is sin, is a corruption or privation of good.

But some, diligently attending to the words of Augustine, which he uses above and in other places of Scripture, not unlearnedly hand down that an evil will and evil acts, insofar as they are, or insofar as they are acts, are good; but insofar as they are evil, are sins; who say that any will and act whatever is a good nature of God, insofar as it is act or will, and is from God as author; but insofar as it comes to be in a disordered way and against the law of God and lacks its due end, it is sin, and so, insofar as it is sin, it is nothing. For it is no substance, it is no nature.

But that every will and action is good, insofar as it is, they prove from this, that Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions⁸: "God is the cause of good only; wherefore He is not the author of evil, because He is the author of all things which are, which, insofar as they are, to that extent are good." The same, proving that nothing happens by chance in the world, says in the same place: "Whatever happens by chance, happens at random; whatever happens at random, does not happen by providence. If, therefore, some things happen by chance in the world, the whole world is not administered by providence; if the whole world is not administered by providence, there is some nature or substance which does not pertain to the work of providence. But everything that is, insofar as it is, is good. For that good is supremely, by participation in which other things are good; and everything that is mutable is good, not of itself, but by participation in that good, insofar as it is — which we also call divine providence. Nothing therefore happens by chance in the world." — By these testimonies they rest their proof that everything which is, insofar as it is, is good. Whence the same Augustine, in the first book On Christian Doctrine⁹, says: "He is supremely and primarily, who is altogether immutable; and the other things which are cannot be except from Him, and they are good to that extent in which they have received that they be."

From the foregoing it is gathered and inferred that, if an evil will and an evil action is, then insofar as it is, it is good. But who is there who denies that there is an evil will and an evil action? Therefore an evil will or action, insofar as it is, is good, and insofar as it is will or action, it is likewise good; but from its defect it is evil, which defect is not from God nor is it anything. Which Augustine seems to have noted in the book of the Eighty-three Questions, saying: "Defect belongs to the will, by which a man is made worse; which defect is far from the will of God, as reason teaches." — From this place they prove that the will, insofar as it is vitiated, is not from God; and insofar as it is vitiated, it is sin; and it is sin, as they say, insofar as it does not have its due order and end. So too the action, insofar as it proceeds from evil, both lacks order and tends toward evil.

Likewise they prove also in another way that every act, interior or exterior, insofar as it is, is good; because there would be no evil act unless there were a good thing, for there is no evil thing unless the same thing be good. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion¹⁰: "Every nature is good, nor would any thing be evil, if the thing itself, which is evil, were not a nature. There cannot therefore be evil except some good. And although this seems to be said absurdly, yet the connection of reasoning compels us to say this." — From the premised testimonies they assert that all acts, insofar as they are, are good things, nor is anything evil, that is, sin, unless the same be also good according to something; and of all things which are, insofar as they are, they proclaim God to be the author, and that by His will all things are whatever they are, which¹¹, insofar as they are, are natures.

To which it is objected: if all things which are, insofar as they are, are good and are natures: therefore adultery and homicide and the like, insofar as they are, are good and are natures, and come to be by God's willing. And if this is so, then those who do them act well; which is utterly absurd. — But to this those men respond thus: they say indeed that adultery, homicide, and the like do not signify acts simply, but the defects of acts; and that the acts themselves of adultery and homicide, insofar as they are, or insofar as they are acts, are from God and are good natures; but not insofar as they are adultery and homicide. And therefore they say it does not follow, if the acts which are homicides and adulteries are from God, that homicides and adulteries are from God¹².

Likewise in another way it is objected to them: if nothing is evil that is not a nature or a good thing, how then are these sins, not to believe in God, not to go to church, and the like, since these are not natures, nay, are altogether not? For not to go to church, or not to believe, and the like, is not anything or any thing. — To which they say that, by these and suchlike expressions, which seem simply to denote privations and to posit nothing,

Chapter III (continued).

because they are spoken by way of negation, truly something is posited, and acts are signified by them. For not to believe in Christ they call incredulity, and by the name of incredulity an evil act of the mind is signified. So too, when it is said that not to go to church is evil, the contempt of the one not going is signified, that is, an evil will or purpose; for this is to turn away from good, and therefore it is evil, just as, conversely, to turn away from evil is good. As, therefore, turning away from evil posits something, namely the will and purpose of avoiding evil — for that cannot be good which is altogether nothing — so turning away from good signifies something that¹³ is, namely the will and purpose of evil. And according to this, that general description of mortal sin which Augustine set down above¹⁴ is true.

It can also be asked by the same men, since sin is, as has been said above, the privation or corruption of good, and every evil act is sin, whether it is the privation or corruption of good insofar as it is sin, or not. For if, insofar as it is sin, it is the corruption of good, since the corruption or privation of good is a penalty to man, then insofar as it is sin, it is a penalty. And if this is so, then, insofar as it is sin, it seems to be good and to be from God. But if not, insofar as it is sin, it is corruption, then it is asked according to what it is corruption. For if it is corruption, and not insofar as it is sin; since there is nothing but good, except in that which is sin: therefore insofar as it is good, it is corruption or privation of good. — To which those same men also say that an evil act, not insofar as it is nor insofar as it is good, is the privation or corruption of good, but insofar as it is sin; yet not, insofar as it is sin, is it a penalty, or anything that is from God. For, as is gathered from the premised words of Augustine, sin is called corruption or privation actively, not passively. For evil or sin is called the corruption of good for this reason, that it deprives a good nature of some good. For if it does not deprive of some good, it does not harm, as Augustine says above¹⁵; but it does harm: therefore it takes away good. But it does not harm except insofar as it is sin: therefore insofar as it is sin, it deprives of good. And so insofar as it is sin, it is privation or corruption of good.

Chapter IV.

How sin can corrupt good, since it is nothing.

But since it is nothing, insofar as it is sin, how can it corrupt or take away good? Augustine teaches you this in the book On Nature and Grace¹⁶, saying: "To abstain from food is not any substance; yet the substance of the body, if it altogether abstain from food, grows faint and is broken; thus sin is not a substance, yet by it the nature of the soul is corrupted."

But sin, that is fault, is properly the corruption of the soul. — But if it is asked in what the soul can be corrupted; it becomes clear in the parable¹⁷ of him who fell among robbers, who despoiled and wounded him. For man falls among robbers when through sin he is handed over into the power of the devil; and then through sin he is despoiled of the gratuitous goods, that is, the virtues, and is wounded in his natural goods, which are reason, intellect, memory, and wit and the like, which through sin are darkened and vitiated. Through sin also he is deprived of that good by participation in which the other goods are; and he is deprived of it the more, the more he removes himself far from it.

Chapter V.

How man removes himself far from God.

Now man removes himself far from God through sin, not by distance of place, since He is everywhere whole and present to all, and "all things are in Him, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions¹⁸, and He Himself is not a place. Yet the place of God is, by misuse, called the temple of God, not because He is contained by it, but because He is present to it and inhabits it; and this is understood to be a clean soul." Through sin, therefore, one becomes far from God, not according to place, but he becomes far in this, that he recedes from His likeness, and so much the farther, the more dissimilar he becomes. "But those, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions, which by participation are like God, receive dissimilarity. But likeness itself can in no way and in no part be dissimilar. Whence it comes about that, since the Son is the likeness of the Father, He can in no part be dissimilar to the Father, by participation in whom whatever things are like God are like; and those things can receive dissimilarity." But there is nothing that makes a man so dissimilar to God as sin does. And since sin is the corruption or privation of good, which is in the soul, it is also the privation and corruption of the good of the body, just as the body of man was deprived of the benefit of that immortality and impassibility which it had before sin.

Chapter VI.

Whether penalty is the privation of good.

It is usually asked whether penalty too is the privation or corruption of good. — To which it can easily be answered, if the foregoing be recalled to memory. For we said above that the privation or corruption of good is taken actively, or passively, that is, according to efficiency, or effect. And therefore the privation or corruption of good is called both sin and penalty; but sin according to efficiency, because it deprives or corrupts good; and penalty according to effect, that is, according to the passion which is the effect of sin. For one thing is fault, another penalty; the one is of God, that is, penalty, the other of the devil or of man, that is, fault.

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