Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 36

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus

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DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

Cap. I.

Quaedam simul sunt peccatum et poena peccati, quaedam peccatum et causa peccati, alia vero peccatum et causa et poena peccati.

Sciendum est tamen, quaedam sic esse peccata, ut sint etiam poenae peccatorum. Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi quinquagesimi septimi¹: Supercecidit ignis, et non viderunt solem, ait: « Ignis superbiae et concupiscentiae et irae intelligitur. Istas poenas pauci vident; ideo eas maxime commemorat Apostolus in Epistola ad Romanos et enumerat multa, quae sunt peccata et poena peccati. Inter primum enim peccatum apostasiae et ultimam poenam ignis aeterni media quae sunt, et peccata sunt et poena peccati ». Gregorius quoque super Ezechielem² ait: « Contemnenti, qui non vult poenitere, ponit Deus offendiculum, ut scilicet gravius impingat. Peccatum enim, quod per poenitentiam citius non deletur, aut peccatum est et causa peccati, aut peccatum et poena peccati, aut peccatum simul et causa et poena peccati. Unde Moyses: Nondum sunt completa peccata Amorrhaeorum; et David inquit: Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum; et alius Propheta: Sanguis sanguinem tetigit, id est, peccatum peccato additum est. Paulus quoque ait: Propterea tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae etc.; et item: Ut impleant peccata sua semper. Ioanni quoque per Angelum dicitur: Qui in sordibus est sordescat adhuc ». — Ex his testimoniis colligitur, peccatum aliquod et peccatum esse et poenam peccati.

Cap. II.

An peccatum sit causa peccati, in quantum est peccatum.

Et ideo merito quaeritur, utrum, in quantum peccatum est, sit poena peccati. — Quod non videtur, cum omnis poena peccati iusta sit. Unde Augustinus in libro Retractationum³: « Omnis poena peccati iusta est et supplicium nominatur ». Si ergo peccatum, quod est peccatum et poena peccati, in quantum peccatum est, poena peccati est; cum omnis poena iusta de iustitia Dei veniat, videtur, in quantum peccatum est, iustum esse et a Deo provenire. — Ad quod illi respondent, peccatum sic dici poenam peccati, quia per peccatum, in quod merito praecedentis peccati homo labitur, deserente Deo, corrumpitur bona natura. Sicut ignis aeternus dicitur poena malorum, quia ea cruciantur; nec tamen ipse cruciatus malorum ignis est, sed per ignem fit in homine. Ita per peccatum corrumpitur natura, et imminuitur⁴ bonum naturae; et est ipsa imminutio et corruptio boni passio et poena; et non est essentialiter ipsum peccatum, per quod fit, sed ideo peccatum dicitur, ut praemissum est, quia per peccatum illico, ut peccat homo, fit in homine illa corruptio, quae tamen fit Deo auctore. Illa enim poena sive passio, quae est boni corruptio, a Deo est. Illius tamen, ut sic dicam, materia et causa est peccatum, quod a Deo non est⁵. Quod videtur Augustinus notasse et iuxta hunc sensum intellexisse, cum ait in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum⁶: « Praedestinatione Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturus. Sed praescivit Deus etiam quae non est ipse facturus, id est omnia mala, quia, etsi sunt quaedam, quae ita peccata sunt, ut etiam poenae sint peccati, secundum illud Apostoli: Tradidit illos Deus in passiones etc., non tamen peccatum Dei est, sed iudicium », scilicet poena. In Scriptura enim saepe nomine iudicii poena intelligitur. — Hic diligenter intendentibus insinuare videtur: ea quae peccata sunt et poenae peccati, non in quantum peccata sunt, sed in quantum poenae, Dei esse dicuntur⁷. Nam cum dixisset, Deum non esse facturum mala aliqua, id est peccata; quia posset ei obiici, quaedam peccata esse etiam poenas peccati — et poena peccati omnis iusta est, et ideo a Deo est — quasi determinando, secundum quid faciat ea, vel secundum quid non faciat, addidit reliqua. Iuxta vero praedictam intelligentiam peccata sane dicuntur poenae. Unde Apostolus appellat ea passiones ignominiae, quia, ut ait auctoritas⁸, « licet quaedam peccata sint, quae delectant, sunt tamen passiones naturae non nominandae », quia per ea corrumpitur natura.

Cap. III.

Quod non omne peccatum est poena peccati.

Et licet ex hoc sensu omne peccatum mortale possit dici poena, non tamen omne⁹ potest dici poena peccati. Poena enim peccati, ut praedictum est, est illud cuius causa est aliud praecedens peccatum. Nam peccatum sic dicitur poena peccati respectu praecedentis, sicut dicitur causa peccati respectu sequentis. Quo fit, ut idem peccatum et causa sit et poena peccati, sed alterius peccati poena et alterius causa. Ut enim Gregorius in Moralibus¹⁰ ait: « Peccatum, quod poenitentia non diluitur, suo pondere mox ad aliud trahit. Unde

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fit, ut non solum peccatum sit, sed et causa peccati, ex illo quippe culpa subsequens oritur. Peccatum vero, quod ex peccato oritur, non solum peccatum, sed et poena peccati est, quia iusto iudicio Deus cor peccantis obnubilat, ut praecedentis peccati merito etiam in alia cadat. Quem enim liberare noluit deserendo percussit ». Proinde, ut Augustinus¹¹ ait: « Praecedentis est haec poena peccati, et tamen etiam ipsa peccatum est ». « Iudicio enim iustissimi Dei traditi sunt, ut ait Apostolus de quibusdam — sive deserendo, sive alio modo explicabili, vel inexplicabili — in passiones ignominiae, ut crimina criminibus vindicarentur, et supplicia peccantium non tantum sint tormenta, sed et vitiorum incrementa ». Illa ergo peccata, quae enumerat Apostolus, quia de superbia sunt, non solum peccata, sed etiam supplicia sunt. — Ecce ex his iam fit perspicuum, quaedam peccata etiam poenas et causas peccati esse; et illud peccatum esse poenam peccati, quod causam praecedentem habet peccatum; atque illud peccatum esse causam peccati, quod est meritum sequentis culpae.

Cap. IV.

Utrum peccata aliqua essentialiter sint poenae peccati.

Sed cum ait, crimina criminibus vindicari, videtur insinuare, ea ipsa, quae peccata sunt, essentialiter esse poenas peccati, id est punitiones peccati. Ad hoc autem inquiunt illi, haec et similia dicta esse secundum rationem praedictam, et ideo intelligenda fore secundum praemissam expositionem. « Intelligentia enim dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi »¹². In nullo tamen praeiudicium fieri veritati putatur, si quis dicat, ipsa eadem, quae peccata sunt, essentialiter, ut ita dicam, esse poenas, id est punitiones peccatorum praecedentium, quae iustae sunt et a Deo sunt. Nec tamen, in quantum peccata, a Deo sunt, nec in quantum peccata sunt, poenae peccati sunt; et tamen, in quantum peccata sunt, privationes boni sunt; sed ut supra¹³ dictum est, causaliter et active dicuntur privationes.

Cap. V.

Quod, cum peccatum etiam sit poena peccati, peccatum est ab homine, poena a Deo.

Quod autem quaedam peccata poenae sint, et ipsa poena iusta sit et a Deo sit, evidenter tradit Augustinus, in libro Retractationum primo¹⁴ dicens, quaedam necessitate fieri ab homine, quae mala sunt, et eadem iusta poena peccati sunt. « Sunt, inquit, quaedam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi homo vult recte facere et non potest. Unde est illud Apostoli: Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago. Et illud: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. Haec enim invicem sibi adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis; sed haec omnia ex illa mortis damnatione sunt. Nam si non est ista poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt. Si enim non receditur ab eo modo, quo naturaliter factus est homo, cum haec facit, ea utique facit, quae debet. Si autem homo, quia ita est, non est bonus nec habet in potestate, ut sit bonus — sive non videndo, qualis esse debeat, sive videndo et non valendo esse, qualem se esse debere videt — poenam istam esse, quis dubitet? Omnis autem poena, si peccati poena est, iusta est et supplicium nominatur. Si autem iniusta est poena — quoniam poenam esse, nemo ambigit — iniusto aliquo dominante homini imposita est. Porro, quia de omnipotentia¹⁵ Dei et iustitia dubitare dementis est, iusta est haec poena et pro peccato aliquo impenditur. Non enim quisquam iniuste dominans aut surripere hominem potuit, veluti ignoranti Deo, aut extorquere invito tanquam invalidiori, ut hominem iniusta poena cruciaret. Relinquitur ergo, ut haec poena iusta de damnatione hominis veniat ». — His atque aliis pluribus testimoniis docetur, quaedam esse peccata et poenas peccati essentialiter.

Cap. VI.

De quibusdam, quae indubitanter peccata sunt et poenae, et in quantum eis patimur, peccata non sunt.

Praeterea, nullatenus ambigendum est, quaedam peccata absque ullo scrupulo poenas esse, ut invidia, quae est dolor alieni boni, et ira, quae etiam, non in quantum poenae sunt, peccata sunt; ita etiam de cupiditate et timore et aliis huiusmodi sentiendum est. Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum¹⁶ ait: « Omnis perturbatio passio; omnis cupiditas perturbatio: omnis ergo cupiditas passio. Omnis vero passio cum est in nobis, ipsa passione patimur. Omnis igitur cupiditas cum est in nobis, ipsa cupiditate patimur¹⁷, et in quantum cupiditas est, patimur. Omnis autem passio, in quantum ipsa patimur, non est peccatum; ita et de timore. Non enim consequens est, ut, si patimur timorem, ideo non sit peccatum, quia multa sunt peccata, quae patimur, sed non in quantum patimur eis ».

Illud autem diligenter est annotandum, quod supra¹⁸ positis verbis Augustini dicentis, quaedam necessitate facta esse improbanda et mala, videtur obviare quod Hieronymus ait in Explanatione fidei¹⁹; quod licet supra sit positum, tamen, ut perfectius sciatur, iterare non piget. « Exsecramur, inquit, eorum blasphemiam,

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qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo esse praeceptum, et mandata Dei non a singulis, sed ab omnibus in commune posse servari ». Et paulo post: « Et tam illos errare dicimus, qui cum Manichaeo dicunt, hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Ioviniano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare ». — Ecce Hieronymus dicit, errorem esse, si quis dicat, hominem vitare peccatum non posse. Qui autem dicit, quaedam necessitate fieri, quaedam dicit non posse vitari. Cum ergo id Augustinus dicat, videtur aut erroris esse quod tradit, aut non esse verum quod Hieronymus ait.

Ad quod dici potest, quia Augustinus secundum statum huius miseriae — ad quam pertinet ignorantia et difficultas, ut idem ait in libro de Libero Arbitrio²⁰, quae ex iusta damnatione descenderunt — illud tradidit, ubi et venialia peccata inclusit. Hieronymus vero tantum de mortalibus peccatis loquitur, quae unusquisque, gratia illuminatus, vitare valet; vel de homine secundum statum liberi arbitrii ante peccatum illud ait.

Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam, qui dicunt, omnes actus naturas²¹ esse, et in quantum sunt, bonos esse. In quo tractatu quaedam interseruimus, quae non ex eorum tantum persona accipienda sunt, quia ab omnibus catholice sapientibus absque haesitatione tenentur; atque auctoritatum testimoniis et rationibus eorundem traditionem munivimus, qui dicunt, omnes actus essentia sui, id est, in quantum sunt, esse bonos, quosdam vero, in quantum inordinate fiunt, peccata esse. Addunt quoque, quosdam non tantum essentia, sed etiam genere bonos esse, ut reficere esurientem, qui actus est de genere operum²² misericordiae; quosdam vero actus absolute ac perfecte bonos dicunt, quos non solum essentia vel genus, sed etiam causa et finis commendat, ut sunt illi qui ex bona voluntate proveniunt et bonum finem metiuntur.

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XXXVI.

Chapter I.

Certain things are at once sin and the penalty of sin, certain ones sin and the cause of sin, and others sin and both the cause and the penalty of sin.

It must be known, however, that certain things are so sins that they are also the penalties of sins. Whence Augustine, on that passage of the fifty-seventh Psalm¹, Fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun, says: "It is understood of the fire of pride and concupiscence and anger. Few see these penalties; therefore the Apostle especially commemorates them in the Epistle to the Romans and enumerates many things which are sins and the penalty of sin. For between the first sin of apostasy and the last penalty of eternal fire, the things that are in between are both sins and the penalty of sin." Gregory too, on Ezekiel², says: "On the one who despises and is unwilling to repent, God places a stumbling-block, that he may strike the more grievously. For sin which is not the sooner blotted out through penance is either sin and the cause of sin, or sin and the penalty of sin, or at once sin and the cause and the penalty of sin. Whence Moses: The sins of the Amorrhites are not yet complete; and David says: Add iniquity upon their iniquity; and another Prophet: Blood has touched blood, that is, sin has been added to sin. Paul too says: Therefore God delivered them up to passions of ignominy etc.; and likewise: That they may always fill up their sins. To John too it is said through the Angel: He who is in filth, let him be filthy still." — From these testimonies it is gathered that some sin is both a sin and the penalty of sin.

Chapter II.

Whether sin is the cause of sin, insofar as it is sin.

And therefore it is rightly asked whether, insofar as it is sin, it is the penalty of sin. — This does not seem to be so, since every penalty of sin is just. Whence Augustine in the book of Retractations³: "Every penalty of sin is just and is called a punishment." If, therefore, the sin which is sin and the penalty of sin, insofar as it is sin, is the penalty of sin; since every just penalty comes from the justice of God, it seems that, insofar as it is sin, it is just and comes from God. — To which those men respond that sin is so called the penalty of sin because through sin, into which a man falls by the merit of a preceding sin, with God deserting, the good nature is corrupted. Just as eternal fire is called the penalty of the wicked, because they are tormented by it; yet the torment itself of the wicked is not fire, but comes to be in man through fire. So through sin nature is corrupted, and the good of nature is diminished⁴; and that very diminution and corruption of good is a passion and a penalty; and it is not essentially the sin itself, through which it comes to be, but it is called sin, as was premised, because through sin, the moment a man sins, there comes to be in man that corruption, which nevertheless comes to be with God as author. For that penalty or passion, which is the corruption of good, is from God. Yet its matter and cause, so to say, is the sin, which is not from God⁵. Which Augustine seems to have noted and to have understood according to this sense, when he says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints⁶: "By predestination God foreknew the things which He Himself was going to do. But God also foreknew the things which He Himself is not going to do, that is, all evils, because, although there are certain things which are so sins that they are also penalties of sin, according to that saying of the Apostle, God delivered them up to passions etc., yet it is not God's sin, but His judgment" — namely the penalty. For in Scripture by the name of judgment a penalty is often understood. — Here he seems to suggest to those attending diligently that the things which are sins and penalties of sin are said to be of God, not insofar as they are sins, but insofar as they are penalties⁷. For when he had said that God would not do any evils, that is sins; since it could be objected to him that certain sins are also penalties of sin — and every penalty of sin is just, and therefore is from God — as if determining according to what He does them, or according to what He does not do, he added the rest. But according to the aforesaid understanding sins are rightly called penalties. Whence the Apostle calls them passions of ignominy, because, as the authority⁸ says, "although there are certain sins which give delight, they are nevertheless passions of nature not to be named," because through them nature is corrupted.

Chapter III.

That not every sin is the penalty of sin.

And although from this sense every mortal sin can be called a penalty, yet not every one⁹ can be called the penalty of sin. For the penalty of sin, as has been said, is that whose cause is another preceding sin. For sin is so called the penalty of sin in respect of the preceding one, as it is called the cause of sin in respect of the following one. Whence it comes about that the same sin is both the cause and the penalty of sin, but the penalty of one sin and the cause of another. For as Gregory in the Morals¹⁰ says: "Sin which is not washed away by penance soon by its own weight draws toward another. Whence

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it comes about that it is not only sin, but also the cause of sin, since from it the following fault arises. But sin which arises from sin is not only sin, but also the penalty of sin, because by His just judgment God darkens the heart of the sinner, so that by the merit of the preceding sin he falls also into another. For whom He was unwilling to free, by deserting He struck." Hence, as Augustine¹¹ says: "This is the penalty of the preceding sin, and yet it too is sin." "For by the judgment of the most just God they were delivered up, as the Apostle says of certain men — whether by deserting, or in some other way explicable or inexplicable — to passions of ignominy, that crimes might be punished by crimes, and that the punishments of sinners might be not only torments, but also increases of vices." Therefore those sins which the Apostle enumerates, because they are of pride, are not only sins, but also punishments. — Behold, from these things it now becomes clear that certain sins are also penalties and causes of sin; and that that sin is the penalty of sin which has a preceding sin as its cause; and that that sin is the cause of sin which is the merit of a following fault.

Chapter IV.

Whether any sins are essentially penalties of sin.

But when he says that crimes are punished by crimes, he seems to suggest that those very things which are sins are essentially penalties of sin, that is, punishments of sin. But to this those men say that these and similar things are said according to the aforesaid reasoning, and therefore are to be understood according to the foregoing exposition. "For the understanding of the things said is to be derived from the causes of the speaking"¹². Yet it is judged that no prejudice is done to the truth if anyone says that those same things which are sins are essentially, so to say, penalties, that is, punishments of preceding sins, which are just and are from God. Yet neither, insofar as they are sins, are they from God, nor, insofar as they are sins, are they penalties of sin; and yet, insofar as they are sins, they are privations of good; but as has been said above¹³, they are called privations causally and actively.

Chapter V.

That, since sin is also the penalty of sin, sin is from man, the penalty from God.

But that certain sins are penalties, and that this penalty is just and is from God, Augustine evidently hands down, saying in the first book of Retractations¹⁴ that certain things which are evil come to be by necessity from man, and these same are the just penalty of sin. "There are, he says, certain things done by necessity, things to be reproved, where a man wills to act rightly and cannot. Whence comes that saying of the Apostle: I do not the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, that I do. And that other: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these are mutually opposed to one another, so that you do not the things that you will; but all these things are from that condemnation of death. For if this is not a penalty of man, but nature, these are not sins at all. For if there is no departure from the mode in which man was naturally made, when he does these things, he assuredly does the things which he ought. But if man, because he is so, is not good nor has it in his power to be good — whether by not seeing what he ought to be, or by seeing and not being able to be what he sees he ought to be — who would doubt that this is a penalty? But every penalty, if it is the penalty of sin, is just and is called a punishment. But if the penalty is unjust — since no one doubts that it is a penalty — it has been imposed on man by some unjust one dominating him. Moreover, since to doubt of the omnipotence¹⁵ and justice of God is the mark of a madman, this penalty is just and is paid out for some sin. For no one unjustly dominating could either steal man away, as though God were ignorant, or wrest him away unwilling, as though from one less strong, so as to torment man with an unjust penalty. It remains, therefore, that this just penalty comes from the condemnation of man." — By these and many other testimonies it is taught that certain things are sins and penalties of sin essentially.

Chapter VI.

Concerning certain things which are undoubtedly sins and penalties, and insofar as we suffer them, are not sins.

Moreover, it is in no way to be doubted that certain sins are without any scruple penalties, such as envy, which is grief at another's good, and anger, which also, not insofar as they are penalties, are sins; so too must we think concerning cupidity and fear and other such things. Whence Augustine in the book of the Eighty-three Questions¹⁶ says: "Every disturbance is a passion; every cupidity is a disturbance: therefore every cupidity is a passion. But every passion, when it is in us, we suffer by that very passion. Therefore every cupidity, when it is in us, we suffer by that very cupidity¹⁷, and insofar as it is cupidity, we suffer. But every passion, insofar as we suffer it, is not sin; so too concerning fear. For it does not follow that, if we suffer fear, therefore it is not sin, because there are many sins which we suffer, but not insofar as we suffer them."

But it must be diligently noted that to the words of Augustine set down above¹⁸, saying that certain things done by necessity are to be reproved and are evil, there seems to be opposed what Jerome says in the Explanation of the Faith¹⁹; which, although it was set down above, yet, that it may be more perfectly known, it is no burden to repeat. "We execrate, he says, the blasphemy of those

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who say that something impossible has been commanded to man by God, and that the commandments of God can be kept not by individuals, but by all in common." And a little after: "And we say that those err who with Manichaeus say that man cannot avoid sin, as much as those who with Jovinian assert that man cannot sin." — Behold, Jerome says that it is an error if anyone says that man cannot avoid sin. But he who says that certain things come to be by necessity, says that certain things cannot be avoided. Since, therefore, Augustine says this, it seems either that what he hands down is erroneous, or that what Jerome says is not true.

To which it can be said that Augustine handed that down according to the state of this misery — to which pertain ignorance and difficulty, as the same one says in the book On Free Choice²⁰, which have descended from a just condemnation — wherein he also included venial sins. But Jerome speaks only of mortal sins, which each one, illumined by grace, is able to avoid; or he says that of man according to the state of free choice before sin.

Diligently enough have we set forth the opinion of those who say that all acts are natures²¹, and, insofar as they are, are good. In which treatment we have interspersed certain things which are not to be taken from their person only, since they are held by all who are catholically wise without hesitation; and by the testimonies of authorities and by reasons we have fortified the tradition of those who say that all acts by their own essence, that is, insofar as they are, are good, but that certain ones, insofar as they come to be in a disordered way, are sins. They add too that certain ones are good not only by essence, but also by genus, as to feed the hungry, which act is of the genus of works²² of mercy; and certain acts they call absolutely and perfectly good, which not only essence or genus, but also cause and end commend, such as are those which proceed from a good will and are measured by a good end.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 9. Enarrat. n. 18. — Locus Scripturae est Rom. 1, 23. seqq. — Pro poena peccati edd. 1, 8 poenae peccati.
Verse 9. Commentary, n. 18. — The scriptural passage is Romans 1, 23 ff. — For the penalty of sin editions 1, 8 read penalties of sin.
Libr. I. hom. 11. n. 23. 24. 25. Vide etiam XXV. Moralium, c. 9. n. 22. 23. Loci Scripturae: Gen. 15, 16; Ps. 68, 28; Osee 4, 2; Rom. 1, 26; I. Thes. 2, 16; Apoc. 22, 11.
Book I, homily 11, nn. 23, 24, 25. See also Morals XXV, c. 9, nn. 22, 23. Scriptural passages: Genesis 15, 16; Psalm 68, 28; Hosea 4, 2; Romans 1, 26; I Thessalonians 2, 16; Apocalypse 22, 11.
Libr. I. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.
Book I, c. 9, n. 5, and On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51.
Ed. 1 minuatur et minutio; paulo superius edd. 1, 8 eo cruciantur pro ea cruciantur, quae etiam infra pro Illius tamen habent Illius autem.
Edition 1 reads is lessened and lessening; a little above, editions 1, 8 read by it they are tormented for by them they are tormented, which also below, for Yet its, read But its.
Aliam sententiam Magister hic c. 4. satis approbat; quae communis est posterioribus (cfr. Comment. hic a. 1. q. 1.).
The Master sufficiently approves another opinion here in c. 4; which is common among the later writers (cf. the Commentary here, a. 1, q. 1).
Cap. 10. n. 19 (cum interpolationibus). Locus Apostoli est Rom. 1, 26.
Chapter 10, n. 19 (with interpolations). The passage of the Apostle is Romans 1, 26.
Vat. cum paucis edd. et codd. omittit dicuntur.
The Vatican edition with a few editions and codices omits are said.
Glossa ad Rom. 1, 26. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 7 eos passiones pro ea passiones.
Gloss on Romans 1, 26. — A little above, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4, 7 reads them, passions for them passions.
Edd. 1, 8 addunt peccatum.
Editions 1, 8 add sin.
Libr. XXV. c. 9. n. 22.
Book XXV, c. 9, n. 22.
Libr. V. contra Iulian. c. 3. n. 10. Seq. locus est ibi et aliqua ex parte I. Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophet. c. 24. n. 51, ubi alluditur ad Rom. 1, 26. — Pro iustissimi Dei edd. 1, 8 iustissimo Dei, contra originale, et infra pro enumerat codd. A B C E meminerat.
Book V, against Julian, c. 3, n. 10. The following passage is there and in part in On the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets I, c. 24, n. 51, where allusion is made to Romans 1, 26. — For of the most just God editions 1, 8 read to the most just God, against the original, and below, for enumerates, codices A, B, C, E read had recalled.
Hilarius, IV. de Trin. n. 14.
Hilary, On the Trinity IV, n. 14.
Dist. XXXV. c. 3. — Supra pro praeiudicium fieri Vat. cum multis edd. praeiudicium factum, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.
Distinction XXXV, c. 3. — Above, for prejudice is done the Vatican edition with many editions reads prejudice was done, against the codices and editions 1, 8.
Cap. 9. n. 5. Cfr. etiam III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. — Loci Scripturae sunt Rom. 7, 15, et Gal. 5, 17.
Chapter 9, n. 5. Cf. also On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51. — The scriptural passages are Romans 7, 15, and Galatians 5, 17.
Codd. potentia, contra edd. et originale.
The codices read power, against the editions and the original.
Quaest. 77.
Question 77.
Edd., excepta 6, addunt ea, refragantibus codd. A B C E et originali.
The editions, except edition 6, add it, against codices A, B, C, E and the original.
Hic c. 5.
Here, c. 5.
Symboli explanatio ad Damasum (inter opera Hieronymi); vide supra d. XXVIII. c. 4.
The Explanation of the Creed to Damasus (among the works of Jerome); see above, Distinction XXVIII, c. 4.
Cap. 18. n. 51; de Dono perseverant. c. 11. n. 27; I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5.
Chapter 18, n. 51; On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 11, n. 27; Retractations I, c. 9, n. 5.
Vat. et edd. 1, 8 cum cod. C addunt bonas. — De hac re actum est supra d. XXXV. c. 3.
The Vatican edition and editions 1, 8 with codex C add good. — This matter was treated above, Distinction XXXV, c. 3.
Codd. omnes operis.
All the codices read of the work. ---

Dist. 36, Divisio Textus→