Dist. 37
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37
DISTINCTIO XXXVII.
Cap. I.
Quod aliqui putant, malos actus nullo modo esse a Deo.
Sunt autem et alii plurimi, longe aliter de peccato et de actu sentientes; asserunt enim, voluntatem malam et actum malum peccata esse et nulla ratione bona, nec secundum aliquam rationem ex Deo auctore esse, quia sine Deo fiunt. Sine eo namque, ut ait Evangelista, factum est nihil, id est peccatum, quod dicitur esse nihil, non quia non sit actio, vel voluntas mala, quae aliquid est, sed quia a vero esse separat homines et ad malum trahit, et sic ad non-esse deducit. « Qui enim a summi boni participatione recedunt, quod solum vere ac proprie est, merito non esse dicuntur1 ». Ideoque Augustinus dicit super Ioannem2, « peccatum nihil esse, nihilque fieri homines, cum peccant ». Hac igitur ratione astruunt, peccatum nihil esse, quia a vero esse hominem elongat; voluntatemque malam atque actionem, sive locutionem malam peccatum esse dicunt, quia praevaricatio et inobedientia haec sunt et contra legem Dei fiunt; quae tamen sunt, sed ab homine, vel a diabolo, non a Deo. Nullatenus enim haec a Deo esse dicunt, sive in quantum sunt, sive alio modo.
Illa quoque Augustini verba, quibus dicit3 omne quod est, in quantum est, bonum esse et Deum habere auctorem, de natura sive de substantiis tantum accipienda fore tradunt. Substantiae vero nomine atque naturae dicunt significari substantias ipsas, et ea quae naturaliter habent, scilicet, quae concreata sunt eis, sicut anima naturaliter habet intellectum et ingenium et voluntatem et huiusmodi; quod ex verbis Augustini praemissis colligitur, ubi bonum4 hominem appellat bonam naturam, et malum hominem malam naturam. — Secundum hanc ergo assertionem vel acceptionem mali actus non sunt naturae vel substantiae, nec etiam boni actus; quod utique videtur Augustinus innuere in libro primo Retractationum5, distinguens inter substantias sive naturas, et bonas actiones sive malas. Aperiens enim, quomodo intelligendum sit quiddam in libro de Vera Religione ab eo traditum, ait: « Hoc de substantiis atque naturis dictum est. Inde enim disputabatur, non de bonis actionibus atque peccatis ». — Aperte hic videtur dividere inter naturas sive substantias, et actiones sive peccata. Ideoque asserunt praefati doctores, actiones interiores vel exteriores non esse naturas vel substantias, quae, si malae sunt, peccata sunt neque a Deo sunt. Quod vero mali actus non sint naturae, Augustinus videtur notare in prima responsione contra Pelagianos6, ita dicens: « Opera diaboli, quae vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res ». Idem in quarta responsione: « Omne malum natura non est, sed actus, accidens alicui ex defectu boni. Quam ob rem quod natura non est Deus non fecit, quia natura est omne quod fecit ». Item: « Omne quod natura bonum est, Deus ex nihilo fecit, non diabolus ».
Ex quo colligitur, res aliquas esse, quae a Deo non sunt, eisque homines mali sunt. Quod nihilominus et ipsi concedunt, innitentes verbis Augustini superius positis, qui in Enchiridio7, determinans illa verba Prophetae: Vae! his qui dicunt bonum malum, dicit, « de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus hoc esse intelligendum ». Sunt ergo aliquae res, quibus homines mali sunt. Id autem, quo homo fit deterior, a Deo non est, quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum8, « Deo auctore non fit homo deterior ». Non est igitur Deus auctor rerum, quibus homo deterior fit; at sunt aliquae res, ut dictum est, quibus homines mali fiunt: sunt igitur aliquae res, quae a Deo non sunt, quia peccata ipsae sunt. Ideoque Scriptura in pluribus contestatur locis9, Deum non esse auctorem malorum, id est eorum, quae peccata sunt.
Cap. II.
Ex quo sensu dictum sit: Deus non est auctor mali.
In hoc autem verbo superiorum sententiae recte opponitur, qui dicunt, Deum non esse auctorem eorum, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, sed in quantum sunt; et in quantum mala sunt, dicunt, ea nihil esse. Quid igitur mirum, si Deus dicitur non esse auctor eorum, in quantum nihil sunt, cum nihil nullus auctor existere queat? Ideoque, cum dicitur Deus esse auctor omnium quae sunt, bonorum isti subintelligi volunt. Bona autem illa esse dicunt, quae naturaliter sunt; ea vero naturaliter esse dicunt, non solum quae substantiae sunt, vel concreata10 substantiis, qualiter supra acceperunt, sed et omnia quae naturam non privant bono. Et ita secundum eosdem multiplex in Scripturis fit intelligentia, ubi de natura sive substantia, vel de his quae naturaliter sunt, sermo occurrit. Sed super illum locum Psalmi: Non est substantia, ita Augustinus11 de substantia disseruit, ut praemissae sententiae videatur consentire, dicens: « Substantia intelligitur illud quod sumus, quidquid sumus, homo, pecus, terra, sol; omnia ista substantiae sunt, eo ipso quo sunt. Naturae ipsae substantiae dicuntur; nam quod nulla est substantia nihil omnino est: substantia ergo est aliquid esse ». « Deus fecit hominem substantiam, sed per iniquitatem lapsus est homo a substantia, in qua factus est; iniquitas quippe ipsa non est substantia. Non enim iniquitas est natura, quam formavit Deus, sed iniquitas est perversio, quam fecit homo ». « Naturae omnes per ipsum factae sunt; iniquitas per ipsum facta non est, quia iniquitas non est substantia. In illo hymno trium puerorum universa creatura laudans Deum commemoratur. Laudant enim omnia Deum, sed quae fecit Deus. Laudat ibi serpens Deum, sed non avaritia. Omnia reptilia ibi nominata sunt, sed non aliqua vitia. Vitia enim ex nobis et ex nostra voluntate habemus, et vitia non sunt substantia ». — Intendant diligenter his verbis praemissarum assertores sententiarum, et percipere poterunt rationem et causam dictorum, ubi Scriptura de natura vel substantia mentionem facit. — Illarum vero sententiarum iudicium prudentis lectoris, cui utriusque sententiae
notitiam plenarie dedimus, arbitrio relinquimus, ad ea quae adhuc nobis supersunt tractanda festinantes.
Cum igitur in hoc omnes consentiant catholici tractatores, scilicet quod Deus non est auctor malorum; cavendum est tamen, ne malorum nomine poenas, sicut peccata, generaliter includas. Poenarum enim Deus auctor est, sicut ipse per Prophetam12 ait: Non est malum in civitate, quod Dominus non fecerit. Item alibi ex persona sua ait: Ego sum Deus, creans malum et faciens bonum. — Ecce hic dicitur creasse et fecisse malum; sed mali nomine poena intelligitur, non peccatum; sicut e converso, cum dicitur Deus non esse auctor malorum, nomine mali peccata intelliguntur. Ideoque Augustinus, qui dixerat in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum13, quod Deus auctor mali non sit, in primo libro Retractationum, quomodo id intelligendum sit, aperit dicens: « Videndum est, ne male intelligatur quod dixi: Deus auctor mali non est, qui et omnium quae sunt auctor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt; et ne hinc putetur, non ab illo esse poenam malorum, quae utique malum est his qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, sicut dictum est: Deus mortem non fecit, cum alibi scriptum sit: Mors et vita a Domino est. Malorum ergo poena, quae a Deo est, malum est quidem malis, sed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam iustum est, ut mali puniantur; et utique bonum est omne quod iustum est ». — Sic ergo dicitur Deus non fecisse mortem, quia non fecit illud, pro quo mors infligitur, id est peccatum. Audisti, lector, causam dictorum, ex qua sana intelligentia firmatur14, cum dicitur: Deus non est auctor mali, et: Deus mortem non fecit.
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DISTINCTION XXXVII.
Chapter I.
That certain men hold that evil acts are in no way from God.
But there are also very many others, who think far otherwise concerning sin and concerning the act; for they assert that the evil will and the evil act are sins and in no respect good, nor are from God as author according to any account, because they come to be without God. For without Him, as the Evangelist says, was made nothing, that is, sin, which is said to be nothing, not because it is not an action, or an evil will, which is something, but because it separates men from true being and draws them toward evil, and thus leads them to non-being. "For those who recede from participation in the highest good, which alone truly and properly is, are deservedly said not to be1." And therefore Augustine says, on John2, that "sin is nothing, and that men become nothing when they sin." By this reasoning, therefore, they maintain that sin is nothing, because it estranges man from true being; and they say that the evil will and the action, or evil speech, is sin, because these are transgression and disobedience and come to be against the law of God; which nevertheless are, but from man, or from the devil, not from God. For in no way do they say that these are from God, whether insofar as they are, or in any other way.
Those words also of Augustine, by which he says3 that everything that is, insofar as it is, is good and has God as author, they hand down as to be taken only of nature or of substances. And by the name of substance and of nature they say that there are signified the substances themselves, and the things which they have naturally, namely those which are con-created with them, as the soul naturally has intellect and natural disposition and will and the like; which is gathered from the words of Augustine premised above, where he calls a good4 man a good nature, and an evil man an evil nature. — According to this assertion, therefore, or acceptation, evil acts are not natures or substances, nor are good acts either; which indeed Augustine seems to suggest in the first book of Retractations5, distinguishing between substances or natures, and good actions or evil ones. For in disclosing how a certain thing handed down by him in the book On True Religion is to be understood, he says: "This was said of substances and natures. For it was being disputed thence, not of good actions and sins." — Here he plainly seems to divide between natures or substances, and actions or sins. And therefore the aforesaid doctors assert that actions interior or exterior are not natures or substances, which, if they are evil, are sins and are not from God. But that evil acts are not natures, Augustine seems to note in the first response against the Pelagians6, saying thus: "The works of the devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things." The same one in the fourth response: "Every evil is not nature, but an act, accidental to something from a defect of good. Wherefore what is not nature God did not make, because nature is everything that He made." Likewise: "Everything that is by nature good, God made out of nothing, not the devil."
From which it is gathered that there are certain things which are not from God, and by which men are evil. Which nevertheless they themselves also concede, relying on the words of Augustine set down above, who in the Enchiridion7, in determining those words of the Prophet, Woe to those who call good evil, says that "this is to be understood of the very things by which men are evil, not of the men." There are, therefore, certain things by which men are evil. But that by which a man becomes worse is not from God, because, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions8, "with God as author a man does not become worse." God, therefore, is not the author of the things by which a man becomes worse; but there are certain things, as has been said, by which men become evil: there are, therefore, certain things which are not from God, because they themselves are sins. And therefore Scripture testifies in many places9 that God is not the author of evils, that is, of those things which are sins.
Chapter II.
In what sense it is said: God is not the author of evil.
But to this saying of the opinion of the foregoing there are rightly opposed those who say that God is not the author of the things which are evil, insofar as they are evil, but insofar as they are; and insofar as they are evil, they say that they are nothing. What wonder, therefore, if God is said not to be the author of them, insofar as they are nothing, since no one can exist as the author of nothing? And therefore, when God is said to be the author of all things which are, these men wish good things to be understood. And they say that those things are good which naturally are; but those things they say to be naturally, not only those which are substances, or con-created10 with substances, in the way they took it above, but also all things which do not deprive nature of good. And so according to the same men there comes to be a manifold understanding in the Scriptures, where there occurs speech concerning nature or substance, or concerning those things which naturally are. But on that passage of the Psalm: There is no substance, Augustine11 thus discoursed concerning substance, so that he seems to consent to the aforesaid opinion, saying: "Substance is understood to be that which we are, whatever we are, man, beast, earth, sun; all these are substances, by the very fact that they are. The natures themselves are called substances; for what is no substance is nothing at all: substance therefore is to be something." "God made man a substance, but through iniquity man fell away from the substance in which he was made; for iniquity itself is not a substance. For iniquity is not a nature, which God formed, but iniquity is a perversion, which man made." "All natures were made through Him; iniquity was not made through Him, because iniquity is not a substance. In that hymn of the three boys every creature praising God is commemorated. For all things praise God, but the things which God made. The serpent there praises God, but not avarice. All creeping things are there named, but not any vices. For vices we have from ourselves and from our own will, and vices are not a substance." — Let the asserters of the aforesaid opinions attend diligently to these words, and they will be able to perceive the reason and the cause of the things said, where Scripture makes mention of nature or substance. — But the judgment of those opinions we leave to the discretion of the prudent reader, to whom
we have fully given the knowledge of each opinion, hastening on to those things which still remain to us to be treated.
Since, therefore, in this all the catholic treaters agree, namely that God is not the author of evils; yet it must be guarded against, lest under the name of evils you generally include penalties, as you do sins. For of penalties God is the author, as He Himself says through the Prophet12: There is no evil in the city, which the Lord has not done. Likewise elsewhere He says in His own person: I am God, creating evil and making good. — Behold, here He is said to have created and made evil; but by the name of evil a penalty is understood, not sin; just as, conversely, when God is said not to be the author of evils, by the name of evil sins are understood. And therefore Augustine, who had said in the book of the Eighty-three Questions13 that God is not the author of evil, in the first book of Retractations discloses how this is to be understood, saying: "It must be seen that what I said be not ill understood: God is not the author of evil, who is also the author of all things which are, because insofar as they are, so far they are good; and lest from this it be thought that the penalty of the wicked is not from Him, which assuredly is an evil to those who are punished. But I said this thus, as it is said: God did not make death, although it is written elsewhere: Death and life are from the Lord. The penalty therefore of the wicked, which is from God, is indeed an evil to the evil, but it is among the good works of God, since it is just that the evil be punished; and assuredly everything that is just is good." — Thus, therefore, God is said not to have made death, because He did not make that on account of which death is inflicted, that is, sin. You have heard, reader, the cause of the things said, from which a sound understanding is confirmed14, when it is said: God is not the author of evil, and: God did not make death.
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- Gregor., XIV. Moral. c. 18. 22. Superius respicitur Ioann. 1, 3.Gregory, Morals XIV, c. 18, 22. Above, reference is made to John 1, 3.
- Tract. I. n. 13.Tractate I, n. 13.
- Vide d. XXXV. c. 3.See Distinction XXXV, c. 3.
- Dist. XXXIV. c. 4. Immediate post solummodo codd. omittunt hic bonum, et iterum bonam.Distinction XXXIV, c. 4. Immediately after, only the codices here omit good, and again good [nature].
- Cap. 13. n. 8, ubi agitur de loco ex libro de Vera Relig. c. 41. n. 78.Chapter 13, n. 8, where the passage from the book On True Religion, c. 41, n. 78, is treated.
- Libr. I. Hypognost. c. 5. n. 7. Seq. locus ibid. IV. c. 1. n. 1; tertius ibid. paulo superius.Hypognosticon, Book I, c. 5, n. 7. The following passage is ibid. IV, c. 1, n. 1; the third ibid. a little above.
- Cap. 19. n. 6, ubi respicitur Isai. 5, 20. Vide d. XXXIV. c. 5.Chapter 19, n. 6, where reference is made to Isaiah 5, 20. See Distinction XXXIV, c. 5.
- Quaest. 3.Question 3.
- Cfr. Deut. 32, 4; Isai. 33, 9.Cf. Deuteronomy 32, 4; Isaiah 33, 9.
- Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 concreta.The codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 read concreated.
- Enarrat. serm. 1. n. 5. super Ps. 68, 3, ubi etiam seqq. loci. Hymnus trium puerorum est Dan. 3, 24. seqq.Commentary, sermon 1, n. 5, on Psalm 68, 3, where also the following passages occur. The hymn of the three boys is Daniel 3, 24 ff.
- Amos 3, 6; seq. locus Isai. 45, 6. 7. Vulgata: Ego Dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum.Amos 3, 6; the following passage is Isaiah 45, 6, 7. The Vulgate: I am the Lord, and there is none other, forming the light and creating the darkness, making peace and creating evil.
- Quaest. 21; alius locus est I. Retract. c. 26. Duo loci Scripturae sunt Sap. 1, 13, et Eccli. 11, 14.Question 21; the other passage is Retractations I, c. 26. The two scriptural passages are Wisdom 1, 13, and Ecclesiasticus 11, 14.
- Ed. 1 formatur.Edition 1 reads is formed. ---