Dist. 39
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 39
DISTINCTIO XXXIX.
Cap. I. Quare voluntas dicitur peccatum, cum sit de naturalibus, quorum nullum aliud peccatum est.
Hic autem oritur quaestio satis necessaria, ex superioribus causam trahens. Dictum est enim supra1 voluntatem inesse naturaliter homini, sicut intellectus et memoria. Quae autem homini naturalia sunt, quantumcumque vitientur, bona tamen esse non desinunt, quia non valet vitium bonitatem, in qua Deus eam fecit, penitus consumere, ut, verbi gratia, intellectus vel ratio et ingenium ac memoria, etsi vitiis et peccatis obnubilentur et corrumpantur, bona tamen sunt nec peccata nominantur, sicut Augustinus de ratione, quae est imago Dei, in qua facti sumus, evidenter ostendit in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate2: «Haec est, inquit, imago, in qua homines sunt creati, qua ceteris animalibus praesunt; quae creatura, in rebus creatis excellentissima, cum a Deo iustificatur, a deformi forma in formosam mutatur formam. Erat enim etiam inter vitia natura bona». Haec autem imago ratio est vel intellectus. Cum ergo voluntas de naturalibus sit, quare ipsa non semper bonum est, etsi aliquando vitiis subiaceat? — Ad hoc facile respondent qui dicunt, omnia quae sunt, in quantum sunt, bona esse, quia et ipsam voluntatem, in quantum est, vel in quantum voluntas est, ut supra3 posuimus, bonum esse asserunt, sed in quantum inordinata est, mala est et peccatum. — Ubi potest ab eis rationabiliter quaeri: si voluntas, in quantum inordinata est, peccatum est, quare ergo intellectus, ratio et ingenium et huiusmodi, cum inordinata sunt, peccata non sunt? Inordinata vero sunt, sicut voluntas, cum ad rectum finem non tendunt, eorumque actus praevaricationes existunt. — Ad quod illi dicunt, voluntatis nomine aliquando vim, scilicet naturalem potentiam volendi, aliquando actum ipsius vis significari. Vis autem ipsa, naturaliter animae insita, nunquam peccatum est, sicut nec vis memorandi vel intelligendi; sed actus huius vis, qui et voluntas dicitur, tunc peccatum est, quando inordinatus est.
Cap. II. Quare actus voluntatis sit peccatum, si actus aliarum potentiarum non sunt peccata.
Sed adhuc quaeritur, quare huius naturalis potentiae actus peccatum sit, si aliarum potentiarum actus peccata non sunt, scilicet potentiae memorandi, cuius actus est memorare, et potentiae intelligendi, cuius actus est intelligere. — Ad quod et ipsi dicunt, quia alterius generis est actus ille voluntatis quam actus memoriae vel intellectus. Hic enim actus est ad aliquid adipiscendum, vel non amittendum4, qui non potest esse de malis, quin sit malus. Velle enim mala malum est, sed intelligere vel memorare mala malum non est; quamvis eorum quidam etiam hos actus esse malos interdum non improbe asserant. Memorat enim interdum quis malum, ut faciat, et quaerit intelligere verum, ut sciat impugnare. — Ecce qualiter solvitur praemissa quaestio ab his, qui tradunt, omnia esse bona, in quantum sunt. Qui vero dicunt, voluntates malas peccata esse et nullo modo bona; brevius respondent dicentes, actum voluntatis non esse de naturalibus, sed vim ipsam et potentiam volendi, quae semper bonum
est et in omnibus est, etiam in parvulis, in quibus nondum est eius actus.
Cap. III. Ex quo sensu dicitur naturaliter omnis homo velle bonum.
Praeterea quaeri solet, quomodo intelligendum sit quod ait Ambrosius, exponens illud verbum Apostoli5: Non enim quod volo, illud ago, sed quod nolo, illud facio. Dicit enim, quod «homo, subiectus peccato, facit quod non vult, quia naturaliter vult bonum. Sed voluntas haec semper caret effectu, nisi gratia Dei adiuvet et liberet». Si homo subiectus est peccato, vult quidem malum et operatur, quia servus est peccati et eius voluntatem, sicut supra6 dixit Augustinus, libenter facit; quomodo ergo naturaliter vult bonum? An est eadem voluntas, id est idem motus, qua libenter peccato servit, et qua naturaliter vult bonum? Si non est eadem voluntas, quae ergo istarum est, quae, cum homo iustificatur, a servitute peccati liberatur? Ut enim superius7 disseruimus, gratia Dei voluntatem hominis liberat et adiuvat, quae voluntatem hominis praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam. Sed quae est illa voluntas? An illa quae naturaliter vult bonum, an quae libenter servit peccato, si tamen duae sunt voluntates? — Proposita est quaestio profunda, quae varia a diversis expositione determinatur. — Alii enim dicunt, duos esse motus: unum, quo vult bonum naturaliter. Quare naturaliter et quare naturalis dicitur? Quia talis fuit motus naturae humanae in prima conditione, in qua creati sine vitio sumus, quae proprie natura dicitur. Fuit enim homo creatus in voluntate rectus. Unde in Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus8 scriptum est: «Firmissime tene, primos homines bonos et rectos esse creatos cum libero arbitrio, quo possent, si vellent, propria voluntate peccare; eosque non necessitate, sed propria voluntate peccasse». Recte igitur dicitur homo naturaliter velle bonum, quia in recta et bona voluntate conditus est. Superior enim scintilla rationis, quae etiam, ut ait Hieronymus9, «in Cain non potuit exstingui», bonum semper vult et malum odit. — Alium autem dicunt esse motum mentis, quo mens, relicta superiorum lege, subiicit se peccatis eisque oblectatur. Iste motus, ut aiunt, antequam alicui adsit gratia, dominatur in homine et regnat alterumque deprimit motum; uterque tamen ex libero arbitrio est. Veniente autem gratia, ille malus motus eliditur, et alter naturaliter bonus liberatur et adiuvatur, ut efficaciter bonum velit. Ante gratiam vero, licet naturaliter velit homo bonum, non tamen absolute concedi oportet, bonam habere voluntatem, sed potius malam. — Alii autem dicunt, unam esse voluntatem, id est unum motum, quo naturaliter vult homo bonum et ex vitio vult malum eoque delectatur; et in quantum vult bonum, naturaliter bonus est, in quantum malum vult, malus est.
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DISTINCTION XXXIX.
Chap. I. Why the will is called sin, since it is among the natural things, of which none other is sin.
But here arises a question quite necessary, drawing its cause from the foregoing. For it has been said above1 that the will is in man naturally, just as intellect and memory are. But the things which are natural to man, however much they may be vitiated, nevertheless do not cease to be good, because vice is not able utterly to consume the goodness in which God made it; so that, for example, the intellect or reason and natural disposition and memory, even if they be obscured and corrupted by vices and sins, are nevertheless good, nor are they called sins; as Augustine clearly shows concerning reason, which is the image of God, in which we were made, in the fifteenth book On the Trinity2: «This, he says, is the image in which men were created, by which they are set over the other animals; which creature, the most excellent among created things, when it is justified by God, is changed from a deformed form into a comely form. For even among vices the nature was good». But this image is reason or intellect. Since, therefore, the will is among the natural things, why is it not always good, even though it sometimes is subject to vices? — To this they easily respond who say that all things which are, insofar as they are, are good; because they assert that the will itself also, insofar as it is, or insofar as it is will, as we set down above3, is good, but insofar as it is disordered, is evil and sin. — Here it can reasonably be asked of them: if the will, insofar as it is disordered, is sin, why then are intellect, reason, and natural disposition and the like, when they are disordered, not sins? And they are disordered, just as the will is, when they do not tend to the right end, and their acts become transgressions. — To which they say that by the name of will sometimes is signified the power, namely the natural power of willing, sometimes the act of that power. But the power itself, naturally implanted in the soul, is never sin, just as neither is the power of remembering or of understanding; but the act of this power, which is also called will, is then sin, when it is disordered.
Chap. II. Why the act of the will is sin, if the acts of the other powers are not sins.
But it is still asked why the act of this natural power is sin, if the acts of the other powers are not sins, namely of the power of remembering, whose act is to remember, and of the power of understanding, whose act is to understand. — To which they themselves also say that that act of the will is of another kind than the act of memory or of intellect. For this act is for the obtaining, or not losing, of something4, which cannot be concerned with evils without being evil. For to will evils is evil, but to understand or to remember evils is not evil; although some of them not without reason sometimes assert that even these acts are evil. For sometimes one remembers an evil in order to do it, and seeks to understand the truth in order to know how to attack it. — Behold how the foregoing question is solved by those who hold that all things are good insofar as they are. But those who say that evil wills are sins and in no way good, respond more briefly, saying that the act of the will is not among the natural things, but the power itself and the faculty of willing, which is always good
and is in all, even in little ones, in whom there is not yet its act.
Chap. III. In what sense it is said that every man naturally wills the good.
Moreover it is wont to be asked how that is to be understood which Ambrose says, expounding that word of the Apostle5: For the good which I will, I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do. For he says that «man, subject to sin, does what he wills not, because he naturally wills the good. But this will is always without effect, unless the grace of God assist and free». If man is subject to sin, he indeed wills and works evil, because he is a servant of sin and willingly does its will, as Augustine said above6; how then does he naturally will the good? Is it the same will, that is the same motion, by which he willingly serves sin, and by which he naturally wills the good? If it is not the same will, which then of these is it which, when man is justified, is freed from the servitude of sin? For as we discussed above7, the grace of God frees and assists the will of man, which prepares the will of man to be assisted and assists it once prepared. But which is that will? Is it that which naturally wills the good, or that which willingly serves sin, if indeed there are two wills? — A profound question has been proposed, which is determined by various ones with a varied exposition. — For some say that there are two motions: one, by which he wills the good naturally. Why is it called naturally and why natural? Because such was the motion of human nature in the first condition, in which we were created without vice, which is properly called nature. For man was created upright in will. Hence in the Ecclesiastical Dogmas8 it is written: «Hold most firmly that the first men were created good and upright with free choice, by which they could, if they willed, sin by their own will; and that they sinned not by necessity, but by their own will». Rightly therefore is man said naturally to will the good, because he was established in a right and good will. For the higher spark of reason, which also, as Jerome says9, «could not be extinguished in Cain», always wills the good and hates the evil. — But they say there is another motion of the mind, by which the mind, having abandoned the law of the higher [part], subjects itself to sins and delights in them. This motion, as they say, before grace is present to anyone, dominates in man and reigns and depresses the other motion; yet each is from free choice. But when grace comes, that evil motion is struck down, and the other, naturally good, is freed and assisted, that it may efficaciously will the good. But before grace, although man naturally wills the good, nevertheless it ought not absolutely to be conceded that he has a good will, but rather an evil one. — But others say that there is one will, that is one motion, by which man naturally wills the good and from vice wills the evil and delights in it; and insofar as he wills the good, he is naturally good, insofar as he wills the evil, he is evil.
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- Dist. XXXVII. c. 1.Distinction XXXVII, c. 1.
- Cap. 8. n. 14.Chapter 8, n. 14.
- Dist. XXXV. c. 3.Distinction XXXV, c. 3.
- Praeter Vat. et ed. 6, aliae edd. admittendum, quod etiam nos supra d. XXVI. c. 2. recepimus. Cum autem in ed. Maurina S. Augustinus, de Duabus Animabus, c. 10. n. 14, et 1. Retract. c. 15. n. 3, constanter utatur voce amittendum atque dicat: Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum; hic sequimur istam lectionem, quam etiam Nicolai in sua edit. Magistri 1659 rectam esse iudicat. Quoad rem cfr. d. XXXV. c. 3, et de eo quod sequitur d. XXXVII. c. 1.Besides the Vatican edition and edition 6, the other editions read admittendum ["to be admitted"], which we too adopted above at d. XXVI, c. 2. But since in the Maurist edition St. Augustine, On the Two Souls, c. 10, n. 14, and Retractations I, c. 15, n. 3, consistently uses the word amittendum ["to be lost"] and says: The will is a motion of the soul, with no one compelling, toward either not losing or obtaining something; here we follow that reading, which Nicolai too in his edition of the Master, 1659, judges to be correct. As to the matter, cf. d. XXXV, c. 3, and concerning what follows, d. XXXVII, c. 1.
- Rom. 7, 19. Verbotenus legitur in Glossa, quae incipit v. 15. et sumta est ex Comment. in Epistolas S. Pauli, qui falso tribuitur S. Ambrosio (inter Opera Ambros. in hunc locum).Rom. 7:19. It is read word for word in the Gloss, which begins at v. 15 and is taken from the Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, which is falsely attributed to St. Ambrose (among the works of Ambrose, on this passage).
- Dist. XXV. c. 7. — Paulo inferius post idem motus et servit, et Vat. et plures edd. bis ponunt quo pro qua, et iterum post istarum est ponunt qua pro quae, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.Distinction XXV, c. 7. — A little below, after idem motus and servit, et, the Vatican edition and several editions twice put quo for qua, and again after istarum est put qua for quae, against the codices and edition 1.
- Dist. XXVI. c. 1.Distinction XXVI, c. 1.
- Vat. cum paucis edd., refragantibus codd. et ceteris edd., habet libro de Fide ad Petrum; et revera in hoc (c. 21. n. 68.), non in illo, locus cit. invenitur.The Vatican edition with a few editions, against the codices and the rest of the editions, reads in the book On Faith, to Peter; and in fact in this (c. 21, n. 68), not in that, the cited passage is found.
- Super Ezech. 1, 7, et est etiam in Glossa ordinaria. — Inferius Vat. cum paucis edd. post malum addit semper, et post motum omittit mentis.On Ezekiel 1:7, and it is also in the Ordinary Gloss. — Below, the Vatican edition with a few editions adds semper after malum, and after motum omits mentis. ---