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Dist. 40

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
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DISTINCTIO XL.

Cap. Unicum. An ex fine omnes actus pensari debeant, ut ex affectu vel fine omnes sint boni, vel mali.

Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur, utrum et ipsi ex fine, sicut voluntas, pensari debeant boni, vel mali. Licet enim, secundum quosdam, omnes boni sint, in quantum1 sunt; non tamen absolute dicendi sunt omnes boni, nec omnes remunerabiles, sed quidam simpliciter mali dicuntur, sicut et alii boni. Nam simpliciter ac vere boni sunt illi actus, qui bonam habent causam et intentionem, id est, qui voluntatem bonam comitantur et ad bonum finem tendunt. Mali

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vero simpliciter dici debent qui perversam habent causam et intentionem. Unde Ambrosius2 ait: «Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit». Et Augustinus super Psalmum trigesimum primum: «Nemo computet bona opera sua ante fidem. Ita enim mihi videntur esse ut magnae vires et cursus celerrimus praeter viam; quia ubi fides non erat, bonum opus non erat. Bonum enim opus intentio facit, intentionem fides dirigit. Non valde attendas, quid homo faciat, sed quid, cum facit, attendat, quo lacertos optimae gubernationis dirigat». — His testimoniis insinuari videtur, ex affectu et fine opera bona esse, vel mala. Quibus consonat quod Veritas in Evangelio3 ait: Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere. Nomine arboris non natura humanae mentis, sed voluntas intelligitur, quae si mala fuerit, non bona, sed mala opera facit; si vero bona fuerit, bona, non mala opera facit.

Sed quaeritur, utrum omnia opera hominis ex affectu et fine sint bona, vel mala. — Quibusdam4 ita videtur esse, qui dicunt, omnes actus esse indifferentes, ut nec boni nec mali per se sint, sed ex intentione bona bonus, et ex mala malus sit omnis actus. Secundum quos quilibet actus potest esse bonus, si bona intentione geratur. — Aliis autem videtur, quod quidam actus in se mali sint, ita ut non possint esse nisi peccata, etiam si bonam habeant causam; et quidam in se boni, ita ut, etsi malam habeant causam, non tamen boni esse desinant. Quod testimonio Augustini5 confirmant, qui dicit, bonum aliquando non bene fieri: «Quod enim quis invitus vel necessitate facit non bene facit», quia non bona facit intentione, ut ait Augustinus super Ioannem. «Servilis, inquit, timor non est in caritate, in quo quamvis credatur Deo, non tamen in Deum, etsi fiat bonum, non tamen bene». «Nemo enim invitus bene facit, etiamsi bonum est quod facit». — Ecce habes, quod aliquis non bene facit illud quod bonum est; facit ergo quod bonum est intentione non bona. Ideo asserunt illi, quaedam opera esse talia, quae sic bona sunt, quod mala esse non possunt, quocumque modo fiant, sicut e converso quaedam sic sunt mala, ut non possint esse bona, quacumque ex causa fiant; alia autem esse opera, quae ex fine vel ex causa bona sunt, vel mala; et ad illa referunt Sanctorum testimonia, quibus vel affectu, vel intentione iudicium operum pensari dicunt: tripartitam edunt isti differentiam actuum.

Sed Augustinus evidentissime docet in libro contra Mendacium6, omnes actus secundum intentionem et causam iudicandos bonos, vel malos, praeter quosdam, qui ita sunt mali, ut nunquam possint esse boni, etiam si bonam videantur habere causam. «Interest, inquit, plurimum, qua causa, quo fine, qua intentione quid fiat. Sed ea quae constat esse peccata, nullo bonae causae obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. Ea quippe opera hominum, si causas habuerint7 bonas, vel malas, nunc sunt bona, nunc mala, quae non sunt per se ipsa peccata, sicut victum praebere pauperibus bonum est, si fit causa misericordiae cum recta fide; et concubitus coniugalis, quando fit causa generandi, si ea fide fiat, ut gignantur regenerandi. Haec rursus mala sunt, si malas habent causas, velut si iactantiae causa pascitur pauper, aut lasciviae causa cum uxore concumbitur, aut filii generantur, non ut Deo, sed ut diabolo nutriantur. Cum vero opera ipsa8 peccata sunt, ut furta, stupra, blasphemiae, quis dicat, causis bonis esse facienda, vel peccata non esse, vel, quod est absurdius, iusta peccata esse? Quis dicat: furemur divitibus, ut habeamus quid demus pauperibus, aut falsa testimonia proferamus, non ut inde innocentes laedantur, sed potius salventur? Duo enim bona hic sunt: ut inops alatur, et innocens non puniatur. Aut quis dicat, adulterium esse faciendum, ut per illam, cum qua fit, homo de morte liberetur? Testamenta etiam vera cur non supprimimus et falsa supponimus, ne hereditates habeant qui nihil boni agunt, sed hi potius qui indigentes adiuvant? Cur non fiant illa mala propter haec bona, si propter haec bona nec illa sunt mala?» «Cur non ab immundis meretricibus, quae ditant stupratores, rapiat divitias vir bonus, ut indigentibus eas largiatur, cum nullum malum malum sit, si pro bono fiat9»? «Quis hoc dicat, nisi qui res humanas moresque conatur et leges subvertere? Quod enim facinus non dicatur recte fieri posse, nec impune tantum, verum etiam gloriose, ut in eo non timeatur supplicium, sed speretur et praemium, si semel concesserimus10, in malis actibus non quid fiat, sed quare fiat, esse quaerendum, ut quaecumque pro bonis fiunt causis, nec ipsa mala esse iudicentur? At iustitia merito punit eum qui dicit, se subtraxisse superflua diviti, ut praeberet pauperi; et falsarium, qui alienum corrumpit testamentum, ut is esset heres, qui faceret eleemosynas largas, non ille qui nullas; et eum qui se fecisse adulterium ostendit, ut per illam, cum qua fecit, hominem de morte liberaret». — Sed «dicet aliquis: ergo aequandus est fur quilibet furi, qui voluntate misericordiae furatur. Quis hoc dixerit? Sed horum duorum non ideo quisquam est bonus, quia peior est unus. Peior enim est qui concupiscendo, quam qui miserando furatur. Sed si furtum omne peccatum est, ab omni furto abstinendum est. Quis enim dicat, esse peccandum, etiamsi aliud sit gravius, aliud levius peccatum? Nunc autem quaerimus, quis actus peccatum sit, vel non; non, quid gravius sit, vel levius». — In-

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tende, lector, propositis verbis tota mentis consideratione, quae non inutilem habent exercitationem; et dignosces, quis actus sit peccatum, qui scilicet malam habet causam; nec ille tantum, quia sunt nonnulli actus, qui, etsi bonam habeant causam, tamen peccata sunt, ut supra positum est. — Ex quo consequi videtur, quia non semper ex fine iudicatur voluntas sive actio mala, sicut in illis quae per se peccata sunt. Illa enim cum quis gesserit pro aliqua bona causa, bonum videtur habere finem; nec ex fine voluntas est mala, nec ex voluntate actio fit mala, sed ex actione voluntas fit prava. In quibus aliqui ponunt actum Iudaeorum, qui crucifigendo Christum arbitrabantur, se obsequium praestare Deo11; quia bonum finem dicunt eos sibi posuisse, scilicet Dei obsequium, et tamen voluntatem eorum et actionem perversam fore asserunt. — De bonis autem nulla fit exceptio in praemissis verbis Augustini, quin omnis voluntas bona ex fine sit bona, et ex fine et voluntate omnis actio bona, bona est. Sed non omnis mala voluntas ex fine mala est, nec omnis mala actio ex fine et voluntate mala est, et omnis quae habet malam causam, mala est, sed non omnis quae bonam habet causam, bona est. Ideoque cum ex affectu dicitur nomen imponi operi, in bonis operibus generaliter vera est haec regula, sed in malis excipiuntur illa quae per se mala sunt. — Omnia igitur hominis opera secundum intentionem et causam iudicantur bona, vel mala, exceptis his, quae per se mala sunt, id est, quae sine praevaricatione fieri nequeunt.

Quae tamen quidam contendunt nunquam habere bonam causam. Qui enim aliena furatur, ut pauperibus tribuat, non pro bono, ut aiunt, furatur. Non enim bonum est aliena pauperibus dare12. Qui enim de rapina sacrificium Deo offert, ut ait auctoritas, idem facit, ac si filium in conspectu patris victimet, vel sacrificium canis Deo offerat. Abominabilis nempe Deo est impiorum oblatio. Ita etiam et hominem per adulterium a morte liberare malum esse dicunt. Etsi enim bonum sit hominem a morte liberare, tamen sic liberare malum esse asserunt. Ideoque Augustinus in superioribus dicunt temperasse sermonem cauteque locutum, ubi ait: Ea quae constat esse peccata, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda. Non enim simpliciter dixit bono fine et bona intentione, sed addidit, quasi et velut; quia talia non fiunt bono fine et bona intentione, sed intentione, quae videtur bona, et fine, qui putatur bonus, sed non est. Nec ideo excepit13 Augustinus ista, ut aiunt, quin causas habeant malas, sed quia causas habent, quae videntur bonae, sunt tamen malae.

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XL.

Sole Chapter. Whether all acts ought to be weighed from their end, so that from affection or end all are good, or evil.

After these things, it seems that, concerning acts, it must be added whether they too, like the will, ought to be weighed as good, or evil, from their end. For although, according to some, all are good insofar as1 they are, nevertheless not all are to be called good absolutely, nor are all rewardable, but some are called simply evil, just as others are good. For simply and truly good are those acts which have a good cause and intention, that is, which accompany a good will and tend toward a good end. But the evil

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ought simply to be called those which have a perverse cause and intention. Hence Ambrose2 says: «Your affection imposes a name upon your work». And Augustine on the thirty-first Psalm: «Let no one reckon his good works before faith. For they seem to me to be like great strength and a most swift running off the road; because where there was no faith, there was no good work. For intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention. Attend not greatly to what a man does, but to what, when he does it, he aims at — toward what end he directs the sinews of his best governance». — By these testimonies it seems to be implied that works are good, or evil, from affection and end. With these agrees what the Truth says in the Gospel3: A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruits, nor a bad tree bring forth good fruits. By the name of tree is understood not the nature of the human mind, but the will, which, if it be evil, does not good but evil works; but if it be good, does good, not evil works.

But it is asked whether all the works of man are good, or evil, from affection and end. — To some4 it seems to be so, who say that all acts are indifferent, so that they are neither good nor evil of themselves, but every act is good from a good intention and evil from an evil one. According to whom any act can be good, if it be carried out with a good intention. — But to others it seems that certain acts are of themselves evil, so that they cannot be anything but sins, even if they have a good cause; and certain ones of themselves good, so that, even if they have an evil cause, they nevertheless do not cease to be good. Which they confirm by the testimony of Augustine5, who says that a good thing is sometimes not done well: «For what one does unwillingly or by necessity he does not do well», because he does not do it with a good intention, as Augustine says on John. «Servile fear, he says, is not in charity, in which, although one believe God, nevertheless [he believes] not unto God; even if a good thing be done, nevertheless it is not done well». «For no one does well unwillingly, even though what he does is good». — Behold, you have it, that someone does not do well that which is good; he does therefore what is good with an intention that is not good. Therefore those men assert that certain works are such that they are good in such a way that they cannot be evil, in whatever manner they be done; just as, conversely, certain ones are evil in such a way that they cannot be good, from whatever cause they be done; but that other works are good, or evil, from their end or from their cause; and to these they refer the testimonies of the Saints, by which they say the judgment of works is weighed either by affection or by intention: these men set forth a threefold difference of acts.

But Augustine teaches most evidently in the book against Lying6 that all acts are to be judged good, or evil, according to intention and cause, except certain ones which are so evil that they can never be good, even if they seem to have a good cause. «It matters very much, he says, from what cause, with what end, with what intention a thing be done. But those which are agreed to be sins are by no means to be done under the pretext of any good cause, with any as-it-were good end, with any seemingly good intention. For those works of men, if they have had7 good causes, or evil ones, are now good, now evil, which are not in themselves sins, just as to provide sustenance to the poor is good, if it be done for the cause of mercy with right faith; and conjugal intercourse, when it is done for the cause of begetting, if it be done with that faith, that those to be regenerated may be begotten. These again are evil, if they have evil causes, as if a poor man be fed for the cause of vainglory, or for the cause of lasciviousness one lies with one's wife, or children are begotten not that they may be nourished for God, but for the devil. But when the works themselves8 are sins, such as thefts, fornications, blasphemies, who would say that they are to be done from good causes, or that they are not sins, or — what is more absurd — that they are just sins? Who would say: let us steal from the rich, that we may have what to give to the poor, or let us bring forth false testimonies, not that the innocent may thereby be harmed, but rather be saved? For here there are two goods: that the needy be fed, and that the innocent be not punished. Or who would say that adultery is to be committed, that through her with whom it is done a man may be freed from death? Why do we not also suppress true wills and substitute false ones, lest those who do nothing good should have inheritances, but rather those who help the needy? Why should not those evils be done for the sake of these goods, if for the sake of these goods those are not even evil?» «Why should not a good man seize riches from the unclean harlots who enrich fornicators, that he may bestow them on the needy, since no evil would be evil, if it were done for a good end9»? «Who would say this, but one who endeavors to subvert human affairs and morals and laws? For what crime would not be said to be able to be done rightly — not only with impunity, but even gloriously, so that in it punishment is not feared, but even reward is hoped for — if once we have conceded10 that in evil acts it is not what is done, but why it is done, that must be inquired, so that whatever things are done for good causes should not themselves be judged evil? But justice deservedly punishes the man who says that he took away superfluities from the rich, that he might furnish them to the poor; and the forger, who corrupts another's will, that he might be heir who would make large almsgivings, not he who would make none; and the man who shows that he committed adultery, that through her with whom he committed it he might free a man from death». — But «someone will say: therefore any thief is to be equated with the thief who steals from a will of mercy. Who would say this? But of these two, no one is good for the reason that one is worse. For worse is he who steals from covetousness than he who steals from compassion. But if all theft is a sin, one must abstain from all theft. For who would say that one must sin, even though one sin be graver, another lighter? But now we are inquiring which act is a sin, or not; not, which is graver, or lighter». — At-

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tend, reader, with the whole consideration of your mind to the words set forth, which have no useless exercise; and you will distinguish which act is a sin, namely that which has an evil cause; and not only that one, because there are some acts which, even if they have a good cause, are nevertheless sins, as was set down above. — From which it seems to follow that the will or action is not always judged evil from its end, as in those which are sins in themselves. For those, when one has done them for some good cause, seem to have a good end; nor is the will evil from its end, nor does the action become evil from the will, but from the action the will becomes depraved. Among these some place the act of the Jews, who in crucifying Christ thought that they were rendering service to God11; because they say that these set for themselves a good end, namely the service of God, and yet they assert that their will and action were perverse. — But concerning good things no exception is made in the foregoing words of Augustine, but that every good will is good from its end, and from end and will every good action is good. But not every evil will is evil from its end, nor is every evil action evil from end and will; and every one which has an evil cause is evil, but not every one which has a good cause is good. And therefore, when it is said that the name is imposed on the work from affection, in good works this rule is generally true, but in evil ones those are excepted which are evil in themselves. — All the works of man, therefore, are judged good, or evil, according to intention and cause, excepting those which are evil in themselves, that is, which cannot be done without transgression.

Yet certain ones contend that these never have a good cause. For he who steals what is another's, that he may distribute to the poor, does not, as they say, steal for a good end. For it is not good to give to the poor what belongs to another12. For he who offers to God a sacrifice from plunder, as the authority says, does the same as if he were to immolate a son in the sight of his father, or were to offer to God the sacrifice of a dog. For the oblation of the impious is abominable to God. So too they say that to free a man from death through adultery is evil. For although it be good to free a man from death, nevertheless to free him thus they assert to be evil. And therefore they say that Augustine in the foregoing tempered his speech and spoke cautiously, where he says: Those which are agreed to be sins are to be done with no as-it-were good end, with no seemingly good intention. For he did not say simply with a good end and a good intention, but added, as-it-were and seemingly; because such things are not done with a good end and a good intention, but with an intention which seems good, and with an end which is thought good, but is not. Nor did Augustine therefore except13 these, as they say, in such a way that they do not have evil causes, but because they have causes which seem good, yet are evil.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Refragantibus codd. et ed. 1, in aliis edd. additur naturaliter.
    Against the codices and edition 1, in the other editions naturaliter ["naturally"] is added.
  2. Libr. I. de Officiis, c. 30. n. 147. Locus August. est II. Enarrat., serm. ad plebem n. 4. Contra originale et edd. 1, 8 post quia ubi in Vat. aliisque edd. additur ipsa.
    Book I On Duties, c. 30, n. 147. The passage of Augustine is Enarrationes II, sermon to the people, n. 4. Against the original and editions 1, 8, after quia ubi in the Vatican and other editions ipsa is added.
  3. Matth. 7, 18. Cfr. Glossa ibid., et August., Enchirid. c. 15. n. 4.
    Matthew 7:18. Cf. the Gloss on the same place, and Augustine, Enchiridion c. 15, n. 4.
  4. Cfr. Hugo, I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 4.
    Cf. Hugh, On the Sacraments I, part VI, c. 4.
  5. Libr. 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19; de Spiritu et lit. c. 14. n. 26. Seq. locus est Tract. 41. super Ioan. n. 10, sed tantum sententialiter; tertius locus est 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19.
    Confessions I, c. 12, n. 19; On the Spirit and the Letter c. 14, n. 26. The following passage is Tract. 41 on John, n. 10, but only as to the sense; the third passage is Confessions I, c. 12, n. 19.
  6. Cap. 7. n. 18.
    Chapter 7, n. 18.
  7. Edd. 1, 8 habeant, et paulo superius sola Vat. cum originali sicut pro si; denique inferius ante mala codd. ADE repetunt sunt.
    Editions 1, 8 read habeant, and a little above only the Vatican edition with the original reads sicut for si; finally below, before mala, the codices ADE repeat sunt.
  8. Edd. addunt per se, contra codd. et originale. Infra post proferamus, non pro ut inde codd. et ed. 5 unde. Denique Vat. ante salventur addit nocentes.
    The editions add per se, against the codices and the original. Below, after proferamus, for non... ut inde the codices and edition 5 read unde. Finally the Vatican edition adds nocentes before salventur.
  9. Ibid. paulo inferius, sicut et seq. locus et tertius, quartus est ibid. c. 8. n. 19.
    Ibid. a little below, as also the following passage; and the third and fourth are ibid. c. 8, n. 19.
  10. Ita codd., ed. 6 et originale, in aliis consenserimus.
    So the codices, edition 6, and the original; in the others consenserimus.
  11. Ioan. 16, 2.
    John 16:2.
  12. Vat. erogare, refragantibus codd. BCD et edd. 1, 8. — In sequentibus respicitur Eccli. 34, 24, Isai. 66, 3 (in quo textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. falso habet carnis pro canis) et Prov. 21, 27.
    The Vatican edition reads erogare, against the codices BCD and editions 1, 8. — In what follows there is reference to Sirach 34:24, Isaiah 66:3 (in which text the Vatican edition with several editions wrongly has carnis for canis) and Proverbs 21:27.
  13. Vat. cum paucis edd. accepit.
    The Vatican edition with a few editions reads accepit. ---
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