Dist. 6, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 6
ARTICULUS III.
De ordine et de praelatione post casum.
Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur, qualiter daemones sint post lapsum ordinati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum sit inter eos ordinum distinctio. Secundo, utrum inter malos angelos sit praelatio.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum in daemonibus sit distinctio ordinum.
Quaeritur ergo, utrum inter eos sit distinctio ordinum. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Apostolus ad Ephesios ultimo1 vocat eos principatus et potestates, et alii Sancti nominibus aliorum ordinum: ergo videtur, quod si tenuerunt nomen et non frustra, quod aliquo modo tenuerunt rem, et ita, quod ordines sint distincti in eis.
2. Item, a natura sua sunt conditi distincti et perfecti et ordinati; sed Dionysius2 dicit, «quod habent sibi naturaliter data integerrima»: ergo adhuc manet inter eos ordo.
3. Item, nihil in universo est inordinatum, quamvis sit inordinatum in se, quia foedari non potest3: ergo daemones suo modo sunt ordinati, ut Angeli: ergo et inter eos est ordo.
4. Item, natura Angelorum, quantum erat de se, habilis erat ad ordines, et gratia adveniens perfecisset ordines, quia data eis fuisset secundum naturalium strenuitatem4: ergo cum similiter per maiorem naturalium strenuitatem fuerit ordo et maioritas in culpa, videtur, quod similiter per culpam non auferatur ordo, sed magis perficiatur.
CONTRA: 1. Hugo de sancto Victore5: «Omnes in eandem malitiam consenserunt et unum ordinem perversae societatis effecerunt»: ergo non est inter eos ordinum distinctio.
2. Item, «malum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis6»; sed per peccatum facti sunt mali, ergo inordinati: ergo non est inter eos ordo, cum omnes sint mali.
3. Item, maior est deordinatio in culpa sive per culpam quam in poena — nam poena reducit culpam ad ordinem aliquem — sed in suppliciis non est ordo naturae: ergo nec in existentibus in peccatis. Probatio minoris: Iob decimo7: Ubi nullus ordo, sed sempiternus horror inhabitat; loquitur de loco poenarum.
4. Item, quanto melior est natura, tanto maior est in ea culpa8: ergo quanto aliquis superior per naturam, tanto inferior per culpam, quia maior culpa facit peiorem: ergo culpa pervertit totum ordinem naturae et aufert omnino ordinem gratiae: ergo nullus ordo est inter eos.
CONCLUSIO.
Post lapsum inter daemones remanet ordinum distinctio, sed imperfecta et perversa.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod de Angelis est loqui quantum ad statum triplicem, scilicet gloriae et naturae institutae et lapsae. Quantum ad statum gloriae est in eis ponere ordinum distinctionem perfectam; quantum ad statum naturae9, ordinum distinctionem, sed imperfectam; quantum ad statum culpae, ordinum distinctionem, sed imperfectam et perversam: imperfectam, propter privationem gratiae, quae habilitatem naturae perficit; perversam, propter praesentiam culpae, quae, quamvis substantiam naturalium non corrumpat, tamen foedat et deordinat. Et illud manifestum est, si attendatur10.
Nam illi qui meliora habuerunt naturalia, illi gravius peccaverunt et peccant, tum propter hoc quod ardentius appetierunt, tum quia magis ingrati fuerunt, tum etiam quia modo acrius vexant. Ratione nobilitatis naturae praecellunt in ordine naturae, et praecellunt in magnitudine culpae, et quantum ad hoc deteriores sunt, et ideo inferiores esse debent11.
Concedo ergo, quod inter daemones est ordo secundum praecellentiam naturalium, sed tamen perversus adiunctione culparum. Concedo igitur rationes probantes, quod in eis sit aliquis ordo, licet tenuis, ut visum est.
Ad illud tamen quod ultimo obiicitur, quod culpa consonat naturae; dicendum, quod illa consonantia magis est discordantia quam consonantia. Nam magnitudo culpae facit in veritate minus, quanto maior est; et ita in magna natura non servat dignitatem ordinis, immo magis pervertit, quia magnificari in culpa est deteriorari12 in natura bene condita sive instituta. — Quod enim Dionysius dicit, quod habent data integerrima; verum est quantum ad substantiam, non quantum ad habilitatem ad operationem determinatam.
Quae vero ad oppositum opponuntur concedenda sunt, eo quod verum concludunt, scilicet quod non est in eis ordo perfectus, immo magis perversus. Et sic patent omnia.
SCHOLION.
I. Circa utramque huius articuli quaestionem antiqui doctores satis consentiunt. — Attendendum est, quod in quaest. 2. solut. 3. 4. illa praelatio negatur quoad ius et restringitur ad praelationem de facto, et quidem usquedum durat status ministerii; de quo plura vide infra d. 9. q. 6. Quod autem negatur, dictam praelationem esse de iure, intelligendum est ex parte voluntatis daemonum iniustae et indignae, non ex parte eorum naturae et divinae ordinationis.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 37. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 4; S. 1. q. 109. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 9. a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 6. q. 26. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3, d. 9. q. 3. dub. lat. 2. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. ante finem.
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ARTICLE III.
Of the order and of the precedence after the fall.
It is consequently asked in the third place, in what manner the demons are ordered after the fall. And concerning this two [things] are asked. First it is asked, whether there is among them a distinction of orders. Secondly, whether there is precedence among the evil angels.
QUESTION I.
Whether there is a distinction of orders among the demons.
It is asked, therefore, whether there is among them a distinction of orders. And that [there is] so, it seems [thus].
1. The Apostle, to the Ephesians, last [chapter]1, calls them principalities and powers, and the other Saints [call them] by the names of the other orders: therefore it seems that, if they kept the name and not in vain, then in some manner they kept the thing, and thus that the orders are distinct in them.
2. Likewise, from their own nature they were created distinct and perfect and ordered; but Dionysius2 says «that they have the things given them by nature most intact»: therefore there still remains an order among them.
3. Likewise, nothing in the universe is disordered, although it may be disordered in itself, because it cannot be befouled3: therefore the demons in their own manner are ordered, like the Angels: therefore there is an order among them too.
4. Likewise, the nature of the Angels, as far as it was of itself, was apt for the orders, and grace coming would have perfected the orders, because it would have been given to them according to the vigor of [their] natural [endowments]4: therefore since likewise by the greater vigor of natural [endowments] there was order and greatness in fault, it seems that likewise by fault the order is not taken away, but rather perfected.
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Hugh of Saint Victor5: «All consented to the same malice and made one order of a perverse fellowship»: therefore there is not among them a distinction of orders.
2. Likewise, «evil is the corruption of mode, species, and order6»; but by sin they became evil, therefore disordered: therefore there is not an order among them, since all are evil.
3. Likewise, the disordering is greater in fault, or through fault, than in punishment — for punishment reduces fault to some order — but in punishments there is not an order of nature: therefore neither in [things] existing in sins. Proof of the minor: Job, tenth [chapter]7: Where there is no order, but everlasting horror dwells; he speaks of the place of punishments.
4. Likewise, the better the nature, the greater the fault [is] in it8: therefore the higher anyone [is] by nature, the lower [he is] by fault, because a greater fault makes [one] worse: therefore fault perverts the whole order of nature and takes away altogether the order of grace: therefore there is no order among them.
CONCLUSION.
After the fall there remains among the demons a distinction of orders, but imperfect and perverse.
I RESPOND: It must be said that one must speak of the Angels as regards a threefold state, namely of glory and of nature instituted and fallen. As regards the state of glory one must posit in them a perfect distinction of orders; as regards the state of nature9, a distinction of orders, but imperfect; as regards the state of fault, a distinction of orders, but imperfect and perverse: imperfect, on account of the privation of grace, which perfects the aptitude of nature; perverse, on account of the presence of fault, which, although it does not corrupt the substance of the natural [endowments], yet befouls and disorders [them]. And that is manifest, if it be attended to10.
For those who had the better natural [endowments], those sinned and sin the more grievously, both because they desired the more ardently, and because they were the more ungrateful, and also because they now harass the more sharply. By reason of the nobility of nature they excel in the order of nature, and they excel in the greatness of fault, and as regards this they are the worse, and therefore ought to be the lower11.
I concede, therefore, that there is among the demons an order according to the preeminence of natural [endowments], but yet perverse by the adjoining of faults. I concede therefore the reasons proving that there is among them some order, though slight, as has been seen.
To that, however, which is objected last, that fault is consonant with nature; it must be said that that consonance is rather a discordance than a consonance. For the greatness of fault makes [it] in truth less, the greater it is; and thus in a great nature it does not preserve the dignity of order, but rather perverts [it], because to be magnified in fault is to be worsened12 in a nature well constituted or instituted. — For what Dionysius says, that they have the things given [them] most intact; is true as regards substance, not as regards aptitude for a determinate operation.
But those [things] which are objected to the contrary are to be conceded, because they conclude truly, namely that there is not in them a perfect order, but rather a perverse one. And thus all [things] are clear.
SCHOLION.
I. On both questions of this article the ancient doctors sufficiently agree. — It is to be attended to, that in question 2, solutions 3 and 4, that precedence is denied as regards right and is restricted to precedence in fact, and indeed as long as the state of ministry lasts; on which see more below, d. 9, q. 6. But that which is denied, that the said precedence is by right, is to be understood on the part of the will of the demons, which is unjust and unworthy, not on the part of their nature and the divine ordination.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 37, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here the single question, a. 4; Summa 1, q. 109, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, II Sentences d. 9, a. 6; Summa p. II, tr. 6, q. 26, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3, d. 9, q. 3, dub. lat. 2, 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. — Biel, II Sentences d. 9, q. 1, before the end.
- Vers. 12. — In fine argumenti multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt distincti; codd. F K legunt et ita videtur, quod ordines sint inter eos.Verse 12. — At the end of the argument many codices with edition 1 omit distincti; codices F K read et ita videtur, quod ordines sint inter eos (and thus it seems that the orders are among them).
- De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Vide supra pag. 122, nota 8. — Pro probatione maioris citari solet Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 15. (c. 1.): Natura enim causa ordinis est omnibus.On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 23. See above, p. 122, note 8. — For the proof of the major [premise] there is wont to be cited Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 15 (c. 1): For nature is the cause of order to all things.
- Sicut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 3; d. 46. q. 6; d. 47. q. 3.As was shown, I Sentences d. 44, a. 1, q. 3; d. 46, q. 6; d. 47, q. 3.
- Cfr. infra d. 9. q. 2. seq., ubi hoc specialiter probatur. — Vat. paulo inferius post per maiorem addit vel minorem et subinde ante maioritas praemittit minoritas sive.Cf. below, d. 9, q. 2 f., where this is specially proved. — The Vatican edition a little below, after per maiorem, adds vel minorem, and thereupon before maioritas prefixes minoritas sive.
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. V. c. 30. Cfr. supra pag. 150, nota 3.On the Sacraments, bk. I, p. V, c. 30. Cf. above, p. 150, note 3.
- August., de Natura boni contra Manich. c. 4.Augustine, On the Nature of the Good against the Manichees, c. 4.
- Vers. 22.Verse 22.
- Vide supra pag. 161, nota 4.See above, p. 161, note 4.
- Supple cum codd. I aa institutae.Supply, with codices I aa, institutae (instituted).
- Cod. aa melius sic prosequitur: natura illorum. Qui meliora habuerunt naturalia gravius peccaverunt etc.Codex aa continues thus, better: natura illorum. Qui meliora habuerunt naturalia gravius peccaverunt etc. (their nature. Those who had the better natural [endowments] sinned the more grievously, etc.).
- Plures codd. cum ed. 1 deberent, Vat. debuerunt.Several codices with edition 1 [read] deberent (ought [imperf.]), the Vatican edition debuerunt (ought [perf.]).
- Codd. T Y deordinari. Paulo inferius non pauci codd. omittunt data, pro quo Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. substituit naturalia.Codices T Y [read] deordinari (to be disordered). A little below, not a few codices omit data, for which the Vatican edition with one or another codex substitutes naturalia.