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Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
p. 210

ARTICULUS I.

De assumtione corporum quoad corporis et spiritus unionem.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum Angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod Angeli habeant corpora sibi naturaliter unita:

1. Primo auctoritate. Augustinus octavo de Civitate Dei1, ubi definiens daemones dicit: «Daemones sunt genere animalia, mente rationalia, animo passiva, corpore aerea, duratione aeterna»: si ergo eadem est natura bonorum spirituum et malorum, patet etc.

2. Item, Gregorius in homilia de Epiphania2: «Iudaeis tanquam ratione utentibus rationale animal, id est Angelus, nuntiare debuit»; sed omne animal habet corpus naturaliter sibi unitum: si ergo Angelus est animal, ergo etc.

3. Item, Bernardus in Canticum homilia tertia3: «Liquet, omnem spiritum creatum corporeo prorsus indigere solatio»; sed Angelus habet omne illud quo naturaliter indiget: cum ergo sit spiritus creatus, habet sibi corpus naturaliter unitum.

4. Item, ad hoc est ratio. Quanto substantia est nobilior, tanto in potentiis est multiplicior; sed Angelus est nobilior substantia quam anima: ergo si anima nata est vivificare corpus, multo magis et Angelus. Sed4 habet illud naturaliter sibi unitum, ad quod vivificandum naturaliter est aptus natus: ergo etc.

5. Item, nobiliori modo vivit quod vivit et influit vitam, quam quod non influit; influentia5 enim signum perfectionis est et complementi: ergo si Angelus est ita nobile vivens, sicut anima, et anima potest aliquid vivificare, ergo et Angelus. Sed non potest vivificare nisi corpus naturaliter sibi unitum: ergo etc.

Ad oppositum: 1. Damascenus6 definiens Angelum dicit, quod «Angelus est substantia intellectualis, incorporea»: ergo Angelus non habet corpus sibi unitum, quia, si haberet corpus naturaliter sibi unitum, sicut homo dicitur esse corporeus, ita et Angelus.

2. Item, Dionysius7 in pluribus locis dicit, quod Angeli sunt «divinae mentes et spiritualia lumina, immateriales et incorporei».

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus sic. Tanto substantia nobilior8, quanto Deo est similior; sed Deus omnino caret corpore: ergo substantia spiritualis omnino carens corpore est nobilior inter substantias creatas: ergo vel est eam ponere in universo, vel in universo deficiet nobilissima creatura; et tunc universum esset acephalum9, quod est inconveniens.

4. Item, si aliquid componitur ex diversis naturis, et alteram illarum est reperire per se, contingit similiter per se reperire et reliquam10; sed homo componitur ex substantia spirituali et corporali: cum ergo sit reperire substantiam pure corp. 211poralem, per se est reperire substantiam pure spiritualem; hanc autem dicimus Angelum: ergo Angelus non habet corpus.

5. Item, quia homo componitur ex corpore et anima, cum peccavit, effectus est passibilis et mortalis: ergo si Angelus haberet corpus sibi unitum, sicut et homo, videtur saltem, quod Angeli, qui peccaverunt, sint mortales; quod si plane falsum est, manifestum est etc.

Conclusio.

Angeli boni et mali non habent corpora nec naturaliter sibi unita, nec inseparabiliter alligata.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod circa istam quaestionem dubitaverunt aliquando magni doctores, utrum scilicet Angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita; unde super hoc dubie loquitur tam Augustinus quam Bernardus11. Sed nunc satis certitudinaliter tenetur, et Richardus affirmat, quod Angeli sunt naturaliter incorporei, nec habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita. — De hoc tamen plures dubitant, utrum daemones habeant corpora sibi inseparabiliter alligata, in quibus torqueantur. — Sed satis planum est, quod sicut boni Angeli non habent corpora nisi voluntarie assumta, sic nec mali. Et huius signum est, sicut dicit Richardus, quod corpus modicae quantitatis a maxima multitudine daemonum aliquando obsidetur, sicut legitur Marci quinto12 de illo qui dixit: Legio mihi nomen est. «Legio enim, ut idem Richardus dicit, continet sex millia sexcentos sexaginta sex»; unde, si daemones corpora haberent, cum suis corporibus nullo modo possent subintrare corpus ita modicum.

Propter quod satis probabiliter dici potest, quod non solum non habent corpora sibi naturaliter unita, verum etiam nec boni nec mali habent inseparabiliter alligata, quantum est de lege communi. Nec obstat eorum cruciatus, quia, sicut in quarto libro13 ostendetur, spiritus absque corpore secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae potest ab igne materiali puniri. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ad hanc partem.

Ad argumenta: 1. Ad illud vero Augustini, quod inducitur, octavo de Civitate Dei; dicendum, quod ibi loquitur Augustinus secundum opinionem Apuleii; et frequenter circa hanc materiam plus loquitur secundum opinionem aliorum quam secundum sententiam suam.

2. Ad illud Gregorii, quod Angelus est animal; dicendum, quod aliquid esse animal dupliciter dicitur: aut ratione formae, aut ratione operationis animali debitae. Ibi autem dicitur Angelus animal non ratione formae, sed potius ratione operationis consequentis. — Vel aliter. Esse animal dupliciter potest dici: vel secundum veritatem, vel secundum ostensionem sive apparentiam. Gregorius autem loquitur secundo modo, quia Angelus apparet esse animal, cum assumit corpus. Ipse autem obiicit secundum primum modum accipiendi animal.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Bernardo, quod omnis spiritus creatus indiget corporeo solatio; dicendum, quod indigere corpore potest esse dupliciter: aut propter se, aut propter alios. Spiritus indigens propter se est spiritus brutalis, vel humanus; et de hoc verum est, quod habet corpus naturaliter sibi unitum. Spiritus vero indigens propter alios est spiritus angelicus; et iste non habet corpus sibi naturaliter unitum, sed assumtum voluntarie, ut ministret aliis. Unde Bernardus14: «Angelici spiritus ad ea capienda, quae bonam faciunt creaturam, nullo modo suis corporibus adiuvantur». Et ideo non habent ea coniuncta propter indigentiam supplendam in se ipsis, sed in nobis; et quia hanc supplent ad tempus, ideo non habent ea unita simpliciter, sed ad tempus.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantia nobilior est, quae multiplicior est in potentiis; dicendum, quod verum est de illis potentiis, quae simpliciter attestantur perfectioni. Potentia autem vivificandi corpus, etsi quodam modo sit perfectionis, nihilominus tamen coniunctam15 habet quandam indigentiam et imperfectionem, et ideo ab illa substantia, quae perfectissima est inter creaturas, est aliena; haec autem est substantia angelica, nec de hac potentia concludit ratio supradicta.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod influens vitam et habens vitam nobilius est quam habens tantum; dicendum, quod aliquid communicare sive dare vitam alii potest dupliciter: aut per modum efficientis, et hoc simpliciter perfectionis est, et sic competit soli Deo; aut per modum informantis, et sic non est simpliciter perfectionis, immo perfectionis cum imperfectione iunctae. Et ideo neutrum convenit Angelo, quia perfectio sua maior est, quam sit perfectio vivificantis per modum formae, et minor, quam sit perfectio dantis vitam per modum causae. Et loquor de vita, quae competit substantiae rationali.

p. 212
Scholion

I. Quaestio haec omnino differt ab alia, utrum Angeli et daemones aliquo modo compositi sint ex principio materiali et forma, de qua actum est supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. — Quod autem etiam Angeli subtile aliquod et aethereum corpus naturaliter habeant unitum, fuit opinio nonnullorum antiquorum Patrum; et ipse magnus S. Augustinus in hac quaestione decidenda animum non parum habebat perplexum. Sed posteriores theologi, praesertim post Concil. Lateran. IV. (a. 1215), omnino conveniunt in solutione negativa.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 34. m. 1. — Scot. apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 31. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 1; S. p. I. q. 51. a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 49; de Potent. q. 6. a. 6; de Spirit. Creaturis, a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aigid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1.

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English Translation
p. 210

ARTICLE I.

On the assumption of bodies as regards the union of body and spirit.

QUESTION I.

Whether the Angels have bodies naturally united to themselves.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the Angels have bodies naturally united to themselves:

1. First, by authority. Augustine, [book] eight, On the City of God1, where, defining the demons, he says: «Demons are, by genus, animals; in mind, rational; in soul, passive; in body, aerial; in duration, eternal»: if therefore the nature of the good spirits and of the evil is the same, it is plain etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the homily On the Epiphany2: «To the Jews, as using reason, a rational animal — that is, an Angel — had to announce [the news]»; but every animal has a body naturally united to itself: if therefore an Angel is an animal, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Bernard On the Canticle, homily three3: «It is clear that every created spirit altogether needs a corporeal solace»; but the Angel has all that of which he naturally has need: since therefore he is a created spirit, he has a body naturally united to himself.

4. Likewise, for this there is a reason. The nobler a substance is, the more manifold it is in [its] potencies; but the Angel is a nobler substance than the soul: therefore if the soul is fitted by nature to give life to a body, much more so the Angel. But4 he has that naturally united to himself, to which by his nature he is born apt to give life: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that which lives and infuses life lives in a nobler mode than that which does not infuse [life]; for an infusion5 is a sign of perfection and of completeness: therefore if the Angel is a living thing so noble as the soul, and the soul can give life to something, therefore so can the Angel. But he cannot give life save to a body naturally united to himself: therefore etc.

On the opposite side: 1. [John] Damascene6, defining an Angel, says that «an Angel is an intellectual, incorporeal substance»: therefore the Angel does not have a body united to himself, because, if he had a body naturally united to himself, just as a man is said to be corporeal, so also [would be] the Angel.

2. Likewise, Dionysius7 in many places says that the Angels are «divine minds and spiritual lights, immaterial and incorporeal».

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reasonings thus. A substance is so much the nobler8, by how much the more it is like to God; but God altogether lacks a body: therefore a spiritual substance altogether lacking a body is the noblest among created substances: therefore either it must be posited in the universe, or in the universe the noblest creature will be wanting; and then the universe would be headless [acephalum]9, which is unfitting.

4. Likewise, if anything is composed out of diverse natures, and one of them is to be found per se, it likewise befalls [one] to find per se the other10; but man is composed out of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: since therefore there is to be found a purely corp. 211poreal substance, per se there is to be found a purely spiritual substance; and this we call an Angel: therefore the Angel does not have a body.

5. Likewise, since man is composed of body and soul, when he sinned he became passible and mortal: therefore if an Angel had a body united to himself, like a man, it would seem at least that the Angels who sinned are mortal; and since this is plainly false, it is manifest etc.

Conclusion.

The good and evil Angels have bodies neither naturally united to themselves nor inseparably bound [to themselves].

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that concerning this question great doctors once had their doubts — namely whether the Angels have bodies naturally united to themselves; whence on this point both Augustine and Bernard11 speak doubtfully. But now it is held with sufficient certainty — and Richard [of St Victor] affirms [it] — that the Angels are naturally incorporeal, and do not have bodies naturally united to themselves. — Yet on this many still doubt, whether the demons have bodies inseparably bound to themselves, in which they are tormented. — But it is plain enough that just as the good Angels do not have bodies save those voluntarily assumed, so also [is it] with the evil. And a sign of this is, as Richard says, that a body of small quantity is sometimes besieged by a vast multitude of demons, as is read in Mark, [chapter] five12, of him who said: Legion is my name. «For a Legion, as the same Richard says, contains six thousand six hundred and sixty-six»; whence, if the demons had bodies, they could in no way enter into so small a body with their own bodies.

For which [reason] it can be said with sufficient probability that not only do they not have bodies naturally united to themselves, but also neither the good nor the evil have [bodies] inseparably bound [to themselves], so far as it pertains to the common law. Nor does their torment stand in the way, because, as will be shown in book four13, a spirit without a body can, according to the order of divine justice, be punished by material fire. — The arguments for this side must therefore be conceded.

To the arguments: 1. To that [text] of Augustine which is adduced, On the City of God, [book] eight; it must be said that Augustine there speaks according to the opinion of Apuleius; and frequently in this matter he speaks more according to the opinion of others than according to his own judgment.

2. To that of Gregory — that the Angel is an animal — it must be said that for something to be an animal can be said in two ways: either by reason of form, or by reason of an operation due to an animal. There [in Gregory] the Angel is called an animal not by reason of form, but rather by reason of an operation which follows. — Or otherwise: to be an animal can be said in two ways: either according to truth, or according to manifestation or appearance. Now Gregory is speaking in the second way, because the Angel appears to be an animal when he assumes a body. But [the objection] objects according to the first way of taking [the term] animal.

3. To that which is objected from Bernard, that every created spirit needs a corporeal solace; it must be said that to need a body can be in two ways: either on account of itself, or on account of others. A spirit needing [a body] on account of itself is the brutal or the human spirit; and of this [kind] it is true that it has a body naturally united to itself. But a spirit needing [a body] on account of others is the angelic spirit; and this [spirit] does not have a body naturally united to itself, but [a body] voluntarily assumed, to minister to others. Whence Bernard14: «The angelic spirits, for receiving those things which make the creature good, are in no way aided by their bodies». And so they do not have them joined [to themselves] for the sake of supplying a need in themselves, but in us; and because they supply this [need] for a time only, they do not have them united simply, but for a time.

4. To that which is objected — that the substance is nobler which is the more manifold in [its] potencies — it must be said that this is true of those potencies which simply attest to perfection. But the potency of giving life to a body, although in some way it is of perfection, nevertheless has a certain need and imperfection conjoined15 [to it], and is therefore alien to that substance which is the most perfect among creatures; but this [most perfect substance] is the angelic substance, nor does the aforesaid reasoning conclude [anything] concerning [the angelic substance] from this potency.

5. To that which is objected — that what infuses life and has life is nobler than what only has [life] — it must be said that to communicate or to give life to another can [be done] in two ways: either by way of an efficient [cause], and this is simply of perfection, and so belongs to God alone; or by way of an informing [cause], and this is not simply of perfection, but rather a perfection joined with imperfection. And so neither [of these] befits the Angel, because his perfection is greater than is the perfection of one who gives life by way of form, and lesser than is the perfection of one who gives life by way of a cause. And I speak of the life which befits a rational substance.

p. 212
Scholion

I. This question is altogether distinct from the other [question] — whether the Angels and demons are in some way composed out of a material and a formal principle — concerning which it was treated above, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1. — That, however, the Angels also have a certain subtle and ethereal body naturally united [to themselves], was the opinion of some among the ancient Fathers; and the great St. Augustine himself, in deciding this question, had a mind not a little perplexed. But the later theologians, especially after the IV Lateran Council (a. 1215), agree altogether in the negative solution.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 34, m. 1. — Scotus, apud Jerome of Montefortino, t. II, q. 31, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 1; Summa p. I, q. 51, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 49; De Potentia q. 6, a. 6; De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 7. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 16, ubi ex Apuleii libro de Deo Socratis illa daemonum definitio affertur; in originali substituitur tempore pro duratione. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    C. 16, where that definition of demons is brought forward from Apuleius's book On the God of Socrates; in the original [the text] substitutes tempore [in time] for duratione [in duration]. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  2. Hom. 10. in Evang. n. 1.
    Homily 10 On the Gospels, n. 1.
  3. Serm. 3. n. 6.
    Sermon 3, n. 6.
  4. Supple cum cod. cc et ed. 1 Angelus. Paulo superius verbis nata est cod. aa praemittit apta. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 32. (c. 3.).
    Supply with cod. cc and ed. 1 Angelus [Angel]. A little above, to the words nata est [is fitted by nature] cod. aa prefixes apta [apt]. — On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 32 (c. 3).
  5. Ed. 1 cum cod. cc influere; cod. aa influere enim vitam signum etc.
    Ed. 1 with cod. cc [reads] influere [to infuse]; cod. aa [reads] influere enim vitam signum [for to infuse life [is] a sign] etc.
  6. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 3.
    [John Damascene,] Book II, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3.
  7. De Div. Nom. c. 4. §§ 1. 2. 22. et c. 7. § 2. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 83, nota 1.
    On the Divine Names c. 4, §§ 1, 2, 22, and c. 7, § 2. Cf. also above, p. 83, note 1.
  8. Cod. K interserit sicut dicit Gregorius, de quo cfr. XX. Moral. c. 16. n. 41; magis autem respondet locus Richardi a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 23.
    Cod. K inserts sicut dicit Gregorius [as Gregory says], concerning whom cf. Morals XX, c. 16, n. 41; but the passage of Richard of St Victor, IV On the Trinity, c. 23, corresponds more [closely].
  9. Ex Graeco ἀκέφαλον i. e. sine capite. Richard. a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 25, probans incorporeitatem Angelorum ait: Quod ergo est in operatione humana humani corporis effigies sine capite, hoc esse videtur in operatione divina universitatis fabrica sine optimo genere creaturae.
    From the Greek ἀκέφαλον, i. e. without a head. Richard of St Victor, IV On the Trinity, c. 25, proving the incorporeity of the Angels, says: That, therefore, which in the human operation is the effigy of a human body without a head, this is seen to be in the divine operation the fabric of the universe without [its] best kind of creature.
  10. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 37. (c. 3.), ubi docet, quod si contingit dare aliquod, quod movet et movetur, et aliquod, quod tantum movetur, rationabile etiam est dare aliquod, quod tantum movet et non movetur. — Plures codd. cum ed. 1 reliqua.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 37 (c. 3), where he teaches that if it befalls [one] to grant something which both moves and is moved, and something which is only moved, it is also reasonable to grant something which only moves and is not moved. — Several codices with ed. 1 [read] reliqua [the remaining things].
  11. De sententia Augustini cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq.; de Bernardi opinione vide Serm. 5. in Cant. n. 2. seqq. — Ea quae mox ex Richardo allegantur, habentur IV. de Trin. c. 25. — Vat. et Magister et Richardus affirmant.
    On the judgment of Augustine cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1 ff.; on Bernard's opinion see Sermon 5 On the Canticle, n. 2 ff. — Those things which are presently adduced from Richard are found IV On the Trinity, c. 25. — The Vatican edition [reads] et Magister et Richardus affirmant [both the Master and Richard affirm].
  12. Vers. 9.
    Verse 9.
  13. Dist. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.
    [Book IV,] Distinction 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.
  14. Serm. 5. in Cant. n. 4, ubi textus originalis beatam spiritualem pro bonam.
    Sermon 5 On the Canticle, n. 4, where the original text [reads] beatam spiritualem [blessed spiritual] for bonam [good].
  15. Vat. propter coniunctum scil. corpus.
    The Vatican edition [reads] propter coniunctum, namely [the] body. ---
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