Bonaventure

## DUBIUM CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. unicum.

In parte ista pauca circa litteram quaerenda sunt, pro eo quod satis patent, his visis quae praedicta sunt. Dubitari tamen potest de illa distinctione, quam facit ibi Magister: Hic distinctione opus est, an de natura intelligatur etc. Videtur enim, quod distinctio illa nulla sit, quia, ex quo natura illa fuit unita, non potuit non esse unita; sed natura illa unita¹ peccare non potuit: ergo non videtur, quod aliquo modo peccare potuerit. — Item, anima illa beata est et non potest non esse beata: ergo si beata anima simpliciter et absolute non potest peccare, videtur similiter, quod nec anima Christi: ergo nulla videtur opus esse distinctione.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum intellectum quaestionis, quem attendit quaestionem proponens, nullam oportet facere distinctionem, propter hoc quod quaestio est de anima Christi unita, utrum habuerit vertibilitatem arbitrii; verumtamen Magister ex abundanti distinguit ad removendum importunitatem sophistice opponentium; et rationabiliter satis. Cum quaeritur², utrum ille homo peccare potuerit; cum verbum possendi sit praeteriti temporis, indeterminate potest extendere se ad omne praeteritum: ergo ad tempus ante unionem, vel ad tempus post unionem. Si ad tempus ante unionem, cum ante unionem possibile fuerit, illum hominem creari, et tamen Verbo non uniri; possibile fuit, quod haberet liberi arbitrii vertibilitatem, et ita quod peccare potuerit. Si autem pro tempore post unionem, peccare non potuit, quia non potuit non esse beatus, aut non esse Deus, quorum neutrum patitur, in Christo aliquod esse peccatum³. Et sic patet totum.

Doubt (the only one).

In this part few things are to be inquired concerning the text, for the reason that they are sufficiently clear, these things having been seen which have been said before. Nevertheless it can be doubted concerning that distinction which the Master there makes: Here there is need of a distinction, whether it be understood of the nature etc. For it seems that that distinction is null, because, since that nature was united, it could not not be united; but that united nature¹ could not sin: therefore it does not seem that it could in any way sin. — Likewise, that soul is blessed and cannot not be blessed: therefore if a blessed soul simply and absolutely cannot sin, it seems likewise that neither [can] the soul of Christ: therefore no distinction seems to be needed.

I respond: It must be said that, according to the understanding of the question which the one proposing the question has in view, no distinction need be made, on account of this, that the question is about the united soul of Christ, whether it had mutability of choice; nevertheless the Master, out of abundance, distinguishes in order to remove the importunity of those who object sophistically; and reasonably enough. When it is asked² whether that man could sin; since the verb to be able is of past tense, it can extend itself indeterminately to all that is past: therefore to the time before the union, or to the time after the union. If to the time before the union, since before the union it was possible that that man be created and yet not united to the Word; it was possible that he should have the mutability of free choice, and so that he could sin. But if for the time after the union, he could not sin, because he could not not be blessed, or not be God, neither of which permits there to be any sin in Christ³. And thus the whole [matter] is clear.