Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 13, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 13

Textus Latinus

p. 291

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Christus est caput, in quo sunt omnes sensus, in Sanctis vero quasi solus tactus. Sed contra: Origenes super Leviticum^p291-1 distinguit quinque sensus spirituales, correspondentes quinque corporalibus. Et ibidem dicit, quod omnes illi sensus sunt in viris sanctis et spiritualibus: ergo nihil dicit, quod in Sanctis est solus tactus. — Item, in spiritualibus tactus est sensus nobilior et perfectior, pro eo quod magis iungit de proximo ei, in quo est summa nobilitas, utpote Deo: ergo videtur, quod multo magis quam tactus deberent alii sensus in viris sanctis reperiri.

Est igitur quaestio, quid Augustinus hic vocet quinque sensus spirituales. Et iuxta hoc, quid sint sensus spirituales, et qualiter distinguantur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sensus nominat usum alicuius potentiae existentis in re vivente et a re vivente secundum naturam^p291-2. Per hunc etiam modum in spiritualibus sensus dicit usum donorum gratuitorum, quae quidem dona sunt eo vitalia, quo sunt gratuita. — Potest igitur sensus accipi large, pro quocumque usu gratiae perfecto et evidenti. Et sic accipit Augustinus in littera^p291-3, cum dicit, quod in Christo fuerunt «omnes sensus, in aliis vero solus tactus»; quia Christus habuit dona gratiarum quantum ad habitus et eorum usus in omnimoda plenitudine numerositatis et perfectionis; alii vero habent, quantum sufficit ad usum vitae spiritualis. Et quia tactus est sensus maxime necessarius vitae^p291-4, ideo dicit, quod in aliis Sanctis est solus tactus. Unde sicut animal perfectum excedit animalia imperfecta in nobilitate vitae et integritate sensuum; sic Christus in gratiae plenitudine excellentiam habet respectu omnium Sanctorum.

Alio modo sensus potest dici stricte; et sic sensus spiritualis dicitur usus gratiae interior respectu ipsius Dei secundum proportionem ad quinque sensus. Et sic accipit Origenes et Bernardus^p291-5, qui distinguunt quinque sensus interiores, quorum numerum

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facile est assignare. Quilibet enim illorum sensuum, sicut vult Bernardus, radicem habet in intellectu et affectu, pro eo quod cognitionem experimentalem dicant. Sed quidam se magis tenent ex parte intellectus, ut visus et auditus; quidam ex parte affectus, ut odoratus, gustus et tactus. Et sufficientia patet sic: quia ex parte intellectus contingit dupliciter circa cognitionem alicuius exerceri: aut proprio intuitu, et sic est visus; aut aliena excitatione sive instructione, et sic auditus. — Circa affectionem vero triplicem contingit reperire statum: aut in remotione, et sic odoratus; aut in approximatione, et sic gustus; aut in unione, et sic tactus, qui est perfectior inter omnes sensus et spiritualior propter hoc, quod maxime unit ei qui est summus spiritus; propter quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios sexto^p292-1: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est. — Ex his patet littera et responsio ad quaesita. Aliter enim Augustinus accipit sensus quam Origenes et Bernardus. Patet etiam illud quod ultimo quaerebatur^p292-2.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Sanctis dat Deus spiritum ad mensuram. Contra, Iacobi primo^p292-3: Qui dat omnibus affluenter etc.; Glossa: «Omnia dat omnibus non in mensura»: ergo etc. — Item, eadem largitate et liberalitate dat gratiam membris, qua dat gratiam capiti; sed primum fecit largitate immensa: ergo et secundum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur Deus dare spiritum non ad mensuram sive non in mensura, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quia fiat privatio mensurae respectu doni dati; et sic accipit Augustinus, cum dicit^p292-4, quod Sanctis non convenit illud quod dicitur de Christo, quod datus sit ei spiritus non ad mensuram. Alio modo potest intelligi privatio mensurae respectu largitatis ipsius impartientis; et sic intelligitur illa Glossa praedicta, quoniam non intendit dicere, quod gratia collata unicuique sit sine mensura, cum dicat Apostolus^p292-5: Unicuique, sicut mensus est Deus mensuram fidei; sed hoc vult dicere, quod illa gratia confertur ex liberalitate immensa, cuius signum est, quod omnibus dat affluenter et non improperat. Et sic patet responsio ad obiecta. — Posset etiam dici, quod Augustinus intelligit respectu singularis personae, sed praedicta Glossa respectu totius Ecclesiae; et ideo non est controversia, quoniam in Ecclesia est plenitudo numerositatis, quae excedit mensuram cuiuslibet Sancti, sicut dictum est supra^p292-6.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Acceperunt de plenitudine non secundum essentiam, sed secundum similitudinem. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quoniam secundum hoc posset dici, quod accepimus de plenitudine gratiae Petri secundum similitudinem; habuimus enim gratiam similem ei. — Item, huic expositioni videtur littera sequens in textu Evangelii^p292-7 repugnare, cum additur: Lex per Moysen data est, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est; sed Moyses illam eandem Legem communicavit aliis, quam suscepit: ergo Christus eandem gratiam. — Item, nos participamus carni et sanguini eius per veritatem et substantiam^p292-8: ergo pari ratione et gratiae; aut si non, quaeritur: quare non?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquis accipere de aliquo, de potest importare habitudinem partis ad totum, sicut^p292-9 aliquis accipit de vino, quod est in dolio; vel potest importare habitudinem principiati ad principium, sicut, si aliquis accendat candelam ad ignem alterius candelae, dicitur accepisse de eius lumine. In utraque autem harum comparationum haec praepositio de importat aliquam unitatem et convenientiam; sed in prima notat convenientiam in substantia et natura, in secunda vero notat convenientiam in conformitate quadam, quae attenditur secundum aliquod commune^p292-10. — Quoniam ergo gratia Christi non fuit transfusa in nos per decisionem partis a parte, sed efficaciam habuit, ut Deus nobis consimilem gratiam daret merito gratiae Christi; hinc est, quod Magister dicit, nos accepisse de gratia Christi; non quantum ad essentiam, sed quantum ad similitudinis convenientiam, nolens per hoc excludere redundantiam et influentiam gratiae capitis, sed volens auferre divisionem et transmutationem gratiae ab uno subiecto in aliud, ne falso intelligatur illud verbum evangelicum. — Nec est simile de Lege et corpore Christi respectu gratiae, quia tam Lex quam Christi corpus potest transferri de manu in manum, non

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sic gratia de subiecto in subiectum^p293-1. Et per hoc patet totum.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sane potest dici, ipsum secundum hominem a conceptione accepisse gratiae plenitudinem; quoniam super illud Lucae quarto^p293-2: Hodie impleta est Scriptura, dicit Glossa: «Prae omnibus Sanctis unctus est unctione spirituali, quando descendit super eum Spiritus sanctus in specie columbae»: sed hoc fuit, quando iam erat triginta annorum: ergo non ab ipsa conceptione. — Item, si ab ipsa conceptione habuit plenitudinem, frustra ergo descendit super eum Spiritus sanctus, dum baptizatur a Ioanne, sicut dicitur Lucae tertio et Matthaei tertio^p293-3.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de plenitudine secundum existentiam^p293-4 et secundum apparentiam et secundum redundantiam. Dico ergo, quod in Christo ab instanti conceptionis fuit plenitudo secundum existentiam, quia omnem habuit gratiae perfectionem. — Secundum autem apparentiam fuit in descensu columbae, ubi testimonium habuit de supernis, quod ipse esset unigenitus Filius Dei; et tunc apparuit, quod omni gratia plenus fuit, cum Spiritus sanctus in columbae specie super eum requievit. Unde in temporibus retroactis per opera exteriora apparebat proficere, sed tunc apparuit omni bono repletus esse^p293-5. — Secundum redundantiam fuit ex tunc et deinceps, quia ex tunc aliquos sanctificavit et verba vitae disseminavit et nostrae postmodum reparationis mysterium consummavit. — Et sic patet, quod non est controversia, quoniam illa Glossa intelligitur quantum ad redundantiam, vel apparentiam; non sic littera praesens.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de illa responsione Magistri, qua explanat verba Ambrosii, ultimo capitulo dicens: Proficiebat humanus sensus in eo secundum ostensionem et aliorum hominum opinionem. Videtur enim insufficienter dicere, quod ita possit dici de sensu Dei, quod proficiebat secundum ostensionem. — Item, non videtur ista expositio sufficere ad intellectum Ambrosii, quia Ambrosius vult probare duas naturas et duos sensus in Christo, per hoc quod Christus proficiebat. Si ergo veritas naturae non probatur nisi per veritatem profectus^p293-6, omnino videtur velle intelligere Ambrosius, quod Christus profecerit veraci profectu.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio Magister veritatem dicit; sed aliquid plus voluit dicere Ambrosius, non tamen tantum voluit dicere, quantum verba sonare videntur. Videtur enim in his verbis sensisse, quod Christus secundum humanam naturam habuit ignorantiam, quae expulsa fuit per scientiam acquisitam. Propter quod sciendum, quod non vult illud dicere, sed hoc vult dicere, quod sensus exterior profecerit veraciter quantum ad cognitionem experientiae. Unde si dicat, illum puerum ignorasse, non est aliud dicere quam inexpertum esse; et per hoc satis probatur veritas humanae naturae, quia talis experientia competit ei secundum naturam assumtam. Sed haec melius erunt manifestanda, cum agetur de Christi scientia, quod quidem fiet in distinctione proxima^p293-7.

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English Translation

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that which he says: Christ is the head, in whom are all the senses, but in the Saints as it were touch alone. But on the contrary: Origen on Leviticus^p291-1 distinguishes five spiritual senses, corresponding to the five bodily ones. And in the same place he says that all those senses are in holy and spiritual men: therefore he does not say that in the Saints there is touch alone. — Likewise, among the spiritual senses touch is the nobler and more perfect sense, for the reason that it joins one more closely to that one in which is the highest nobility, namely God: therefore it seems that much more than touch ought the other senses to be found in holy men.

It is therefore a question what Augustine here calls the five spiritual senses. And in connection with this, what the spiritual senses are, and how they are distinguished.

I respond: It must be said that "sense" names the use of some power existing in a living thing and from a living thing according to nature^p291-2. In this same way too, among spiritual things "sense" means the use of the gratuitous gifts, which gifts indeed are vital in the very respect in which they are gratuitous. — "Sense," therefore, can be taken broadly, for any perfect and evident use of grace. And thus does Augustine take it in the text^p291-3, when he says that in Christ there were «all the senses, but in the others touch alone»; because Christ had the gifts of graces with respect to the habits and their uses in every kind of fullness of multitude and of perfection; but the others have them only insofar as suffices for the use of the spiritual life. And because touch is the sense most necessary to life^p291-4, therefore he says that in the other Saints there is touch alone. Hence, just as a perfect animal exceeds imperfect animals in the nobility of life and the integrity of the senses; so Christ in the fullness of grace has excellence with respect to all the Saints.

In another way "sense" can be said strictly; and thus the spiritual sense is called the interior use of grace with respect to God himself according to a proportion to the five senses. And thus do Origen and Bernard^p291-5 take it, who distinguish five interior senses, the number of which

it is easy to assign. For each of those senses, as Bernard holds, has its root in the intellect and the affection, for the reason that they express an experiential cognition. But some of them hold more on the side of the intellect, as sight and hearing; some on the side of the affection, as smell, taste, and touch. And their sufficiency is shown thus: because on the side of the intellect it happens that one is occupied about the cognition of something in two ways: either by one's own intuition, and thus there is sight; or by another's prompting or instruction, and thus hearing. — But concerning the affection one happens to find a threefold state: either in remoteness, and thus smell; or in approach, and thus taste; or in union, and thus touch, which is the more perfect among all the senses and the more spiritual on account of this, that it most of all unites one to him who is the highest spirit; on account of which it is said in First Corinthians, chapter six^p292-1: He who clings to God is one spirit. — From these things the text and the response to what was asked are clear. For Augustine takes "senses" otherwise than Origen and Bernard. That also is clear which was asked in the last place^p292-2.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that to the Saints God gives the spirit by measure. On the contrary, James, chapter one^p292-3: Who gives to all abundantly etc.; the Gloss: «He gives all things to all not in measure»: therefore etc. — Likewise, with the same bounty and liberality he gives grace to the members, with which he gives grace to the head; but the first he did with immense liberality: therefore the second also.

I respond: It must be said that when God is said to give the spirit not by measure or not in measure, this can be understood in two ways: either because there comes to be a privation of measure with respect to the gift given; and thus Augustine takes it, when he says^p292-4 that there does not apply to the Saints that which is said of Christ, that the spirit was given to him not by measure. In another way the privation of measure can be understood with respect to the liberality of the bestower himself; and thus is that aforesaid Gloss understood, since it does not intend to say that the grace conferred on each is without measure, since the Apostle says^p292-5: To each one, according as God has meted out the measure of faith; but it means to say that that grace is conferred out of immense liberality, the sign of which is that he gives to all abundantly and does not upbraid. And thus the response to the objections is clear. — It could also be said that Augustine understands it with respect to the singular person, but the aforesaid Gloss with respect to the whole Church; and therefore there is no controversy, since in the Church there is a fullness of multitude, which exceeds the measure of any single Saint, as was said above^p292-6.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: They have received of the fullness not according to essence, but according to likeness. For it seems false to say it, since according to this it could be said that we have received of the fullness of Peter's grace according to likeness; for we have had grace like to his. — Likewise, to this exposition the text following in the text of the Gospel^p292-7 seems to be opposed, when it is added: The Law was given through Moses, grace and truth came to be through Jesus Christ; but Moses communicated that same Law to others, which he received: therefore Christ the same grace. — Likewise, we participate in his flesh and blood through truth and substance^p292-8: therefore by parity of reasoning also in grace; or if not, it is asked: why not?

I respond: It must be said that when someone is said to receive of something, of can import the relation of a part to the whole, as^p292-9 one receives of the wine that is in the cask; or it can import the relation of the originated to its principle, as, if someone kindles a candle at the fire of another candle, he is said to have received of its light. But in each of these comparisons this preposition of imports some unity and agreement; but in the first it notes an agreement in substance and nature, while in the second it notes an agreement in a certain conformity, which is regarded according to something common^p292-10. — Since, therefore, the grace of Christ was not transfused into us by a cutting off of part from part, but had efficacy, so that God should give us a grace conformed to him by the merit of Christ's grace; hence it is that the Master says that we have received of the grace of Christ; not as to essence, but as to agreement of likeness, not intending by this to exclude the redundance and influence of the grace of the head, but intending to remove the division and transmutation of grace from one subject into another, lest that evangelical word be falsely understood. — Nor is the case the same regarding the Law and the body of Christ with respect to grace, because both the Law and the body of Christ can be transferred from hand to hand, not

so grace from subject to subject^p293-1. And by this the whole is clear.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: It can rightly be said that he, according to the man, received the fullness of grace from conception; since upon that text of Luke, chapter four^p293-2: Today is the Scripture fulfilled, the Gloss says: «Before all the Saints he was anointed with a spiritual anointing, when the Holy Spirit descended upon him in the form of a dove»: but this was when he was already thirty years old: therefore not from conception itself. — Likewise, if from conception itself he had the fullness, then in vain did the Holy Spirit descend upon him while he is baptized by John, as is said in Luke, chapter three, and Matthew, chapter three^p293-3.

I respond: It must be said that one may speak of fullness according to existence^p293-4 and according to manifestation and according to redundance. I say therefore that in Christ from the instant of conception there was fullness according to existence, because he had every perfection of grace. — But according to manifestation it was at the descent of the dove, where he had testimony from on high that he himself was the only-begotten Son of God; and then it appeared that he was full of every grace, when the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove rested upon him. Hence in past times he appeared through exterior works to make progress, but then it appeared that he was filled with every good^p293-5. — According to redundance it was from that time and thenceforth, because from that time he sanctified some and disseminated the words of life and afterward consummated the mystery of our reparation. — And thus it is clear that there is no controversy, since that Gloss is understood as to redundance, or manifestation; not so the present text.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that response of the Master, by which he explains the words of Ambrose, saying in the last chapter: The human sense in him made progress according to manifestation and the opinion of other men. For it seems to be said insufficiently, that it could thus be said of the sense of God, that it made progress according to manifestation. — Likewise, this exposition does not seem to suffice for the understanding of Ambrose, because Ambrose wishes to prove two natures and two senses in Christ, through this, that Christ made progress. If therefore the truth of the nature is not proved except through the truth of progress^p293-6, it seems altogether that Ambrose means to understand that Christ made progress by a true progress.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt the Master speaks the truth; but Ambrose wished to say something more, yet did not wish to say so much as the words seem to sound. For he seems in these words to have meant that Christ according to his human nature had an ignorance, which was expelled through acquired knowledge. On account of which it must be known that he does not mean to say that, but he means to say this, that the exterior sense made progress truly as to the cognition of experience. Hence if he says that that boy was ignorant, it is nothing other than to say that he was inexperienced; and by this the truth of the human nature is sufficiently proved, because such experience belongs to him according to the assumed nature. But these things will be better made clear when treatment is made of Christ's knowledge, which indeed will be done in the next distinction^p293-7.

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Apparatus Criticus

Homil. 3. n. 7. Exponens ibi verba Lev. 5, 16: Partem quintam ponet supra, ait: Quinque numerus frequenter, immo pene semper pro quinque sensibus accipitur. Scire ergo debemus, hoc modo istos quinque sensus in sanctis actibus posse restitui, ut si forte praesumsimus abuti eis in saecularibus actibus... restituamus nunc et ipsos quinque sanctis actibus religiosisque ministeriis, et alios his quinque addamus, qui sunt interioris hominis sensus, per quos vel mundi corde effecti Deum videmus, vel aures habemus ad audienda ea quae docet Iesus etc. — Paulo inferius pro ergo nihil dicit edd. ergo male dicit.
Homily 3, n. 7. Expounding there the words of Lev. 5, 16: He shall put a fifth part above, he says: The number five frequently, indeed almost always, is taken for the five senses. We ought therefore to know that in this way these five senses can be restored in holy acts, so that if perhaps we have presumed to abuse them in secular acts... we may now restore these five also to holy acts and religious ministries, and add to these five others, which are the senses of the interior man, through which either, being clean of heart, we see God, or have ears for hearing the things that Jesus teaches, etc. — A little below, for ergo nihil dicit the editions read ergo male dicit.
Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 13. et 52. seqq. (c. 2. et 5.), ubi quod hic de sensu dicitur, largiore modo accepto, insinuatur de ipso stricte sumto, sive prout est potentia organica.
Cf. Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 13 and 52 ff. (cc. 2 and 5), where what is here said of sense, taken in the broader way, is intimated of it taken strictly, or as it is an organic power.
Hic, in principio.
Here, at the beginning.
Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 17. seqq. et 27. seqq. (c. 2. seq.), nec non III. text. 60. seqq. (c. 12. seq.).
Cf. Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 17 ff. and 27 ff. (c. 2 f.), and also III, text 60 ff. (c. 12 f.).
Serm. 10. de Diversis, n. 1. seqq., et de Natura et dignitate amoris (inter Bernardi opera, sed verus eius auctor est Guilelmus, abbas S. Theoderici), c. 6. n. 15; c. 7. n. 16. seqq. et c. 10. n. 28. seqq. — Paulo superius pro interior codd. M O interius.
Sermon 10 on Various Subjects, n. 1 ff., and On the Nature and Dignity of Love (among Bernard's works, but its true author is William, abbot of St. Thierry), c. 6, n. 15; c. 7, n. 16 ff., and c. 10, n. 28 ff. — A little above, for interior codices M O read interius.
Vers. 17. — Paulo ante pro unit ei edd. cum paucis codd. unitur ei, et dein pro propter quod cod. K propter hoc quidem.
Verse 17. — A little before, for unit ei the editions, with a few codices, read unitur ei, and then for propter quod codex K reads propter hoc quidem.
Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
Vers. 5. — Glossam, quae est interlinearis, Lyranus sic affert: Quia dona eius non sunt ad mensuram.
Verse 5. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, Lyra cites thus: Because his gifts are not by measure.
In Ioan. Evang. tr. 14. n. 10. Cfr. supra pag. 278, nota 1.
On John's Gospel, tract 14, n. 10. Cf. above, p. 278, note 1.
Rom. 12, 3: Unicuique, sicut Deus divisit mensuram fidei. Cfr. II. Cor. 10, 13. — Voci mensuram edd. praemittunt secundum, et deinde pro sed hoc substituunt sed hic.
Rom. 12, 3: To each one, as God has apportioned the measure of faith. Cf. II Cor. 10, 13. — Before the word mensuram the editions prefix secundum, and then for sed hoc substitute sed hic.
Supra a. 1. q. 3, et d. 4. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — De hoc dubio vide S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Above, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — On this doubt see St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
Ioan. 1, 17. — Pro repugnare, edd., omissis (etiam in codd. G H) verbis in textu Evangelii, exhibent contradicere, cod. G esse contraria.
John 1, 17. — For repugnare, the editions, omitting (also in codices G H) the words in textu Evangelii, present contradicere, codex G esse contraria.
Cfr. I. Cor. 10, 16.
Cf. I Cor. 10, 16.
Cod. A sicuti si; edd. sic: sicut cum aliquis dicitur accipere de vino. Paulo inferius pro de eius lumine edd. de lumine alterius candelae.
Codex A sicuti si; the editions thus: sicut cum aliquis dicitur accipere de vino. A little below, for de eius lumine the editions read de lumine alterius candelae.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 2.
Cf. I Sentences, d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
Quia gratia est accidens (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. seq.), et nullum accidens transire potest de subiecto in subiectum, ut Boeth. docet, de quo videsis tom. I. pag. 462, nota 11. — De hoc dub. cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., hic circa lit. (ubi est haec sententia: «Quod sumitur ibi similitudo active, in quantum scil. Christus sibi alios assimilat in gratia... quod alii [v. gr. Petro] non convenit»); Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
Because grace is an accident (II Sentences, d. 26, q. 3 f.), and no accident can pass from subject to subject, as Boethius teaches, on which see vol. I, p. 462, note 11. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here a. 5; St. Thomas, here on the text (where this opinion is found: «That the likeness is taken there actively, namely insofar as Christ assimilates others to himself in grace... which does not belong to others [e.g. to Peter]»); Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
Vers. 21. — Glossa sumta est ex Beda, in hunc loc.
Verse 21. — The Gloss is taken from Bede, on this passage.
Luc. 3, 21. seq.; Matth. 3, 16. seq.
Luke 3, 21 f.; Matt. 3, 16 f.
Pro existentiam edd. hic et paulo inferius perperam excellentiam.
For existentiam the editions here and a little below wrongly read excellentiam.
Nota hic quod Hug. a S. Vict., Qq. in Epist. ad Phil. q. 9, bene ait: Tunc res dicitur fieri, quando innotescit. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 62, nota 7. et d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. ad 1. — Mox post deinceps cod. F adiicit exstitit, et subinde pro aliquos cod. K substituit alios. Post pauca pro mysterium edd. ministerium.
Note here that Hugh of St. Victor, Questions on the Epistle to the Philippians, q. 9, well says: A thing is then said to come to be, when it becomes known. Cf. also above, p. 62, note 7, and d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, ad 1. — Soon after deinceps codex F adds exstitit, and thereupon for aliquos codex K substitutes alios. A little later, for mysterium the editions read ministerium.
Cod. K profectionis, edd. perfectionis.
Codex K profectionis, the editions perfectionis.
Art. 3. q. 2. — Cod. bb addit dante Domino. — De ut. huius dubii vide etiam B. Albert., hic a. 10. seqq.; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
Art. 3, q. 2. — Codex bb adds dante Domino. — On the usefulness of this doubt see also Bl. Albert, here a. 10 ff.; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text. ---

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