Dist. 14
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14
# DISTINCTIO XIV.
Cap. I. Si anima Christi habuit sapientiam parem cum Deo, et si omnia scit, quae Deus.
Hic quaeri opus est, cum anima Christi esset sapiens sapientia gratuita, utrum habuerit sapientiam aequalem Deo sive omnium rerum scientiam habuerit vel habeat, id est, utrum omnia sciat, quae Deus scit. — Quibusdam placet, quod nec parem cum Deo habeat scientiam nec omnia sciat, quae Deus, quia in nullo creatura aequatur Creatori. Cum igitur anima illa creatura sit, in nullo aequatur Creatori, ergo nec in sapientia. Non ergo habet aequalem cum Deo sapientiam nec scit omnia, quae Deus. Item, si anima illa aequalem habet cum Deo sapientiam, non ergo Deus in omni bono maiorem habet sufficientiam quam eius creatura. — Inducunt etiam auctoritates ad idem probandum. Aitp. 294 enim Prophetap294-1 ex persona hominis assumti: Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, et non potero ad eam. Quod exponens Cassiodorus ait: « Veritas humanae conditionis ostenditur, quia homo assumtus divinae substantiae non potest aequari in scientia, vel in alio ». Apostolusp294-2 etiam ait: Nemo novit quae sunt Dei, nisi Spiritus Dei, qui solus scrutatur omnia, etiam profunda Dei. His aliisque pluribus rationibus et auctoritatibus nituntur qui animam Christi asserunt nec parem cum Deo habere scientiam, nec omnia scire, quae Deus, quia si omnia scit, quae Deus, scit ergo creare mundum, scit etiam creare se ipsam.
Quibus respondentes dicimus, animam Christi per sapientiam gratis datam in Verbo Dei, cui unita est quodp294-3 etiam perfecte intelligit, omnia scire, quae Deus scit, sed non omnia posse, quae potest Deus, nec ita clare ac perspicue omnia capit, ut Deus; et ideo non aequatur Creatori suo in scientia, etsi omnia sciat, quae et ipse; nec eius sapientia aequalis est sapientiae Dei, quia illa multo est dignior digniusque et perfectius omnia capit quam illius animae sapientia. Ergo et in scientia maiorem habet sufficientiam Deus quam anima illa, quae dignior est omni creatura. Illud vero Apostoli, quod inducunt: Nemo novit quae Dei sunt nisi Spiritus Dei, qui solus scrutatur omnia, pro nobis facit. Mox enim addit Apostolusp294-4: Nos autem Spiritum Dei habemus, ut per Spiritum, quem habebat, Dei profunda se scire ostenderet. Sed anima illa prae omnibus Spiritum Dei habuit, cui Spiritus non est datus ad mensuram, ut ait Ioannes Evangelista. Dona igitur Spiritus sancti sine mensura habuit, ergo et sapientiam. Omnia ergo scivit anima illa. Si enim quaedam scivit, quaedam non, non sine mensura scientiam habuit; sed sine mensura scientiam habuit: scit igitur omnia. Fulgentiusp294-5 etiam in sermone quodam multa inducit, quibus asserit, animam illam rerum omnium scientiam habere, utens auctoritate Apostoli dicentis: In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Quod etiam ratione probari potest sic: nihil scit aliquis, quod eius anima ignorat; sed Christus secundum omnium concessionem omnia scit: ergo anima eius omnia scit. — Ad id vero quod dicunt: si omnia scit, ergo scit creare mundum vel se ipsam; respondemus, quod scientiam habet creandi mundum, sed non potentiam, et creandi animam; et scit, quomodo Deus sep294-6 ipsam creaverit: habet ergo scientiam sui creatae, sed non sui creandae, quia non est creanda, sed creata.
Cap. II. Quare Deus non dedit illi animae potentiam omnium, ut scientiam.
Si vero quaeritur, quare Deus non ei dederit potentiam faciendi omnia, ut scientiam; responderi potest, quia naturaliter capax est scientiae; et ideo id ei congrue datum est sine mensura, cuius ipsa naturaliter capax est. Non est autem ei datum posse facere omnia, quae Deus facitp294-7, ne omnipotens, et per hoc Deus putaretur. Verumtamen forte nec potentiam faciendi omnia ei Deus praestare potuit, etsi potentiam faciendi aliqua, quae non facere potest. Scit igitur anima Christi omnia, quae Deus, in Verbo Dei, quod liquidius et praesentius omni creaturae contemplatur ut ei unita, in quo etiam Angeli et quae Dei sunt et quae futura sunt cognoscunt.
Sed si anima illa non habet tantam potentiam, quantam et Deus, nec homo assumtus tantam potentiam, quantam et Deus; quomodo ergo intelligitur illud Ambrosii super Lucamp294-8, ubi Angelus de nascituro Filio Virginis ait: Hic erit magnus et Filius Altissimi vocabitur? Non ideo, inquit, erit magnus, quod ante partum Virginis magnus non fuerit, sed quia potentiam, quam Dei Filius naturaliter habet, homo erat ex tempore accepturus, ut una sit persona homo et Deus. — Ecce aperte dicit, quod homo erat accepturus ex tempore potentiam, quam habuit Dei Filius naturaliter. Sed si homo accepturus erat illam potentiam, ergo vel persona, vel natura hominis; sed persona non, quia semper habuit et habet: ergo natura; si natura: ergo anima. Nam de carne constat, quod accipere non posset. — Ad quod dicimus, illud esse accipiendum de persona, sed non in quantum est Dei, immo in quantum est hominis persona. Una est enim persona Dei et hominis, Filii Dei et filii hominis, quae, in quantum est Dei persona, semper et naturaliter omnipotentiam habuit, sed in quantum est hominis, non semper fuit. Illa ergo persona, quae semper fuerat Dei, futura erat hominis persona; et secundum hoc, quod futura erat hominis persona, acceptura erat ex tempore potentiam, quam naturaliter et semper habuerat, in quantum Dei persona. — Secundum hanc distinctionem illud et similia sane accipi possunt. Quae distinctio in pluribus quaestionum articulis est necessaria adversus quorumdam perplexam verbositatemp294-9. Sed cum de rebus constat, in verbis frustra habetur controversia.
# DISTINCTION XIV.
Chapter I. Whether the soul of Christ had wisdom equal to God, and whether it knows all things that God knows.
Here it is necessary to ask, since the soul of Christ was wise with a gratuitous wisdom, whether it had wisdom equal to God, that is, whether it had or has knowledge of all things, that is, whether it knows all things that God knows. — Some hold that it has neither knowledge equal to God nor knows all things that God does, because in nothing is a creature made equal to the Creator. Since therefore that soul is a creature, it is in nothing made equal to the Creator, and therefore not in wisdom either. It does not, then, have wisdom equal to God, nor does it know all things that God knows. Likewise, if that soul has wisdom equal to God, then God does not have, in every good, a greater sufficiency than his creature. — They also bring forward authorities to prove the same. For the Prophetp294-1 says, in the person of the man assumed: Wonderful is thy knowledge made above me, and I shall not be able to reach it. Expounding which, Cassiodorus says: « The truth of the human condition is shown, because the man assumed cannot be made equal to the divine substance in knowledge, or in anything else ». The Apostlep294-2 also says: No one knows the things that are of God, except the Spirit of God, who alone searches all things, even the deep things of God. By these and many other reasons and authorities they rely who assert that the soul of Christ neither has knowledge equal to God, nor knows all things that God knows, because if it knows all things that God knows, then it knows how to create the world, it knows also how to create itself.
Responding to whom we say that the soul of Christ, through the wisdom freely given in the Word of God, to which it is united in such a way thatp294-3 it also understands perfectly, knows all things that God knows, but cannot do all things that God can do, nor does it grasp all things as clearly and distinctly as God; and therefore it is not made equal to its Creator in knowledge, even though it knows all things that he does; nor is its wisdom equal to the wisdom of God, because that wisdom is far more worthy and grasps all things more worthily and more perfectly than the wisdom of that soul. Therefore in knowledge too God has a greater sufficiency than that soul, which is more worthy than every creature. But that text of the Apostle which they bring forward: No one knows the things that are of God except the Spirit of God, who alone searches all things, makes for our side. For soon the Apostlep294-4 adds: But we have the Spirit of God, that through the Spirit, which he had, he might show that he knew the deep things of God. But that soul above all others had the Spirit of God, to whom the Spirit was not given by measure, as John the Evangelist says. Therefore it had the gifts of the Holy Spirit without measure, and therefore wisdom too. That soul, then, knew all things. For if it knew some things and not others, it did not have knowledge without measure; but it did have knowledge without measure: therefore it knows all things. Fulgentiusp294-5 also, in a certain sermon, brings forward many things by which he asserts that that soul has knowledge of all things, using the authority of the Apostle, who says: In whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Which can also be proved by reason thus: no one knows anything that his soul is ignorant of; but Christ, by the concession of all, knows all things: therefore his soul knows all things. — But to that which they say: if it knows all things, then it knows how to create the world or itself; we respond that it has the knowledge of creating the world, but not the power, and of creating a soul; and it knows how God created itp294-6: it has therefore knowledge of itself as created, but not of itself as to-be-created, because it is not to-be-created, but created.
Chapter II. Why God did not give to that soul the power of all things, as he gave knowledge.
But if it is asked why God did not give it the power of doing all things, as he gave knowledge; it can be answered that it is naturally capable of knowledge; and therefore that, of which it is naturally capable, was fittingly given to it without measure. But it was not given to it to be able to do all things that God doesp294-7, lest it should be thought omnipotent, and through this God. Nevertheless perhaps God could not even bestow on it the power of doing all things, although the power of doing some things, which it cannot do. The soul of Christ therefore knows all things that God knows, in the Word of God, which it contemplates more clearly and more presently than every creature, as being united to it, in which also the Angels know both the things that are of God and the things that are to come.
But if that soul does not have as great a power as God, nor the man assumed as great a power as God; how then is that saying of Ambrose on Lukep294-8 to be understood, where the Angel says of the Son to be born of the Virgin: He shall be great and shall be called the Son of the Most High? He shall not, he says, be great because before the Virgin's bearing he was not great, but because the man was to receive in time the power which the Son of God has naturally, so that there might be one person, man and God. — Behold, he plainly says that the man was to receive in time the power which the Son of God had naturally. But if the man was to receive that power, then either the person or the nature of the man [was to receive it]; but not the person, because it always had and has it: therefore the nature; if the nature: therefore the soul. For concerning the flesh it is established that it could not receive it. — To which we say that this is to be understood of the person, but not insofar as it is of God, rather insofar as it is the person of the man. For the person of God and of man, of the Son of God and the son of man, is one, which, insofar as it is the person of God, always and naturally had omnipotence, but insofar as it is of man, did not always exist. That person, therefore, which had always been God's, was to be the person of the man; and according to this, that it was to be the person of the man, it was to receive in time the power which it had naturally and always had, insofar as it was the person of God. — According to this distinction that saying and the like can be soundly understood. Which distinction is necessary in many articles of the questions against the perplexed verbosityp294-9 of certain men. But when there is agreement about the things, there is vain controversy in words.
- Psalm. 138, 6; et Cassiod. Exposit. in Psalter. loc. cit. ad v. 5. — Quoad doctrinam cfr. Hugo a S. Victore Sum. Sent. tr. I. c. 16, et opusculum de Sapientia animae Christi.Psalm 138:6; and Cassiodorus, Exposition on the Psalter, at the cited place, on v. 5. — On the doctrine cf. Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sententiarum, tr. I, c. 16, and the opusculum On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ.
- Epist. I. Cor. 2, 11. 10. — Inferius post scire, quae Deus edd., excepta I, adiiciunt scit, et deinde codd. A B C et ed. 5 post omnia scit omittunt quae Deus.Epistle, I Corinthians 2:11, 10. — Below, after scire, quae Deus, the editions, except I, add scit, and then codices A B C and ed. 5, after omnia scit, omit quae Deus.
- Vat. et ed. 4 unde, et pro etiam codd. A D et edd. I, 8 et.The Vatican edition and ed. 4 read unde, and for etiam codices A D and editions I, 8 read et.
- Loc. cit. v. 12. — Locus seq. est Ioan. 3, 34.At the cited place, v. 12. — The following passage is John 3:34.
- Epist. 14. ad Ferrandum, q. 3. n. 29. Locus Scripturae est Coloss. 2, 3.Epistle 14, to Ferrandus, q. 3, n. 29. The Scripture passage is Colossians 2:3.
- Edd. 1, 8 omittunt se.Editions 1, 8 omit se.
- Edd. I, 8 fecit, ne anima, addentes anima. Porro ante in Verbo Dei solae edd., excepta I, repetunt scit.Editions I, 8 read fecit, ne anima, adding anima. Further, before in Verbo Dei, the editions alone, except I, repeat scit.
- Apud Lyranum ad hunc locum Luc. I, 32, sub nomine Ambrosii; invenitur autem apud Bedam, homil. in Annunt. — Supra post assumtus edd. I, 8 omittunt tantam potentiam.In Lyra at this passage, Luke 1:32, under the name of Ambrose; it is found, however, in Bede, homily on the Annunciation. — Above, after assumtus, editions I, 8 omit tantam potentiam.
- Cod. D volubilitatem.Codex D reads volubilitatem [volubility].