Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 15
Quaestio III. Utrum defectus in Christo fuerint a natura, an a voluntate.
Tertio quaeritur de huiusmodi defectibus quantum ad causalitatem, et est quaestio, utrum in Christo fuerint a natura, an a voluntate. Et quod non a voluntate, sed a natura, videtur.
Ad oppositum. 1. Sapientiae primop334-1: Deus mortem non fecit; si non fecit mortem, ergo pari ratione nec defectum ordinatum ad mortem: ergo si in Christo fuit talis defectus, videtur, quod non fuerit ex voluntate assumentis, sed ex defectu naturae assumtae.
2. Item, defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientemp334-2; sed voluntas assumentis non ponitur causa deficiens alicuius: ergo tales defectus non potuerunt esse a voluntate assumentis; et fuerunt ex voluntate assumentis, vel ex conditione naturae assumtae: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod inest alicui a sua naturali origine inest ei per naturamp334-3; sed huiusmodi defectus insunt Christo a sua prima origine: ergo videtur, quod insint ei a natura.
4. Item, illud in quo proles assimilatur parenti, est naturale proli, pro eo quod « natura est vis insita rebus, ex similibus similia procreans »p334-4; sed Christus in defectu passibilitatis assimilatur Matri suae, a qua traxit originem: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi defectus et poenalitates sint ei naturales.
5. Item, per naturam prius fuit illud corpus formatum, quam esset unitump334-5; sed corpus illud statim, ut fuit formatum, fuit passibile, vel impassibile; et constat, quod non impassibile: ergo passibilitatem prius per naturam habuit, quam uniretur animae Christi, vel ipsi divinitati: ergo videtur, quod talis passibilitas non fuit a voluntate assumentis. Si tu dicas, quod hoc fuit a voluntate Spiritus sancti, qui fuit fabricator et sanctificator illius corporisp334-6; obiicitur, quod gratia Spiritus sancti simul stat cum passibilitate et poena. Si ergo Spiritus sanctus superveniens compatiebatur secum passibilitatem, videtur, quod potius defectum passibilitatis sustinuerit, quam causaverit: igitur defectus huiusmodi in Christo non ex voluntate, sed ex natura fuerunt.
Sed contra: Fundamenta. 1. Magister in litterap334-7: « Ex sola voluntate miserationis in se transtulit veram infirmitatem, sicut accepit veram carnem »: ergo etc.
2. Item, omnes defectus et poenalitates, quae in Christo fuerunt, per assumtionem fuisse dicuntur; sed assumere est actus voluntatis, non naturaep334-8: ergo poenalitates illae fuerunt in Christo non naturaliter, sed voluntarie.
3. Item, qualitas corporis principaliter attribuenda est principio effectivo; sed Spiritus sanctus fuit principale principium effectivum corporis Christi: ergo qualitas passibilitatis magis debet attribui Spiritui sancto quam naturae. Sed Spiritus sanctus est operans per voluntatem: ergo tales defectus fuerunt in Christo a voluntate.
4. Item, poenalitas non sequitur secundum legem communem nisi naturam vitiatam et corruptam per culpam; sed caro Christi immunis fuit ab omni foeditate culpaep334-9: ergo immunis fuit ab omni defectu passibilitatis: ergo si defectus passibilitatis habuit, hoc non fuit a natura, sed a voluntate.
5. Item, quod est in nobis a natura generantium dicitur esse contractum: ergo si huiusmodi defectus essent in Christo a natura generantis, essent ergo in ipso contracti. Si ergo hoc non concediturp334-10, Christum defectus tales a natura contraxisse; videtur, quod illos non habuit a natura, sed a voluntate.
Conclusio.
Defectus, qui fuerunt in Christo, non fuerunt ex necessitate contracti, sed ex voluntate assumti, voluntate divina praeveniente, sed non infligente, et voluntate creata concomitante.
Conclusio 1. Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in litterap334-11, ex alia et alia causa sunt isti defectus in nobis et in Christo; in nobis enim sunt ex necessitate contracti, sed in Christo sunt ex voluntate assumti. — Explicatur. Et hoc patet sic. Nos enim istos defectus a parentibus trahimus propter legem propagationis et legem concupiscentiae, quae militat in illis membrisp334-12; nam passibilis generat passibilem, et habens legem concupiscentiae in membris generat filium subiectum concupiscentiae, ex reatu cuius concupiscentiae insunt proli omnes poenalitates. Et
propterea dicuntur istae poenalitates in nobis contractae, quasi ex concursu duorum tractae, videlicet propagationis naturae et corruptionis concupiscentiaep335-1. — Aliter in Christo. In Christo autem secus est; ipse enim neutro modo fuit propagatus, nec secundum propagationem legis naturalis nec secundum corruptionem libidinis; sed Spiritus sanctus, adveniens in ipsam Virginem et ipsam fecundans, carnem eius ab omni foeditate corruptionis purificavit, passibilitatem tamen reliquit. Ex illa autem carne sapientia Patris, scilicet ipse Filius Dei, aedificavit sibi corpus immaculatump335-2, et illud corpus univit sibi et animae rationali, quae quidem immunitatem habuit a culpa et in se et in carne coniuncta. Et sicut immunitatem habuit a reatu culpae, sic secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae immunitatem habere debuisset a passibilitate miseriae. Quod ergo in carne illa remansit poenalitas, hoc fuit ex dispensationep335-3 ipsius assumentis, concurrente simul acceptione illius animae rationalis, quae in primo instanti suae creationis habuit usum cognitionis, et placuit sibi tali corpori uniri propter salutem generis humani. — Conclusio 2. Et sic patet, quod tales defectus in Christo fuerunt non necessitate generationis, sed voluntate dispensationis, voluntate, inquam, divina praeveniente, sed voluntate creata concomitante. Conclusio 3. Dico autem, ipsos fuisse a voluntate divina non tanquam ab infligente de novo, sed tanquam a relinquente et acceptante, cum in eius potestate et arbitrio esset defectus illos excludere. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus mortem non fecit; patet responsio: quia Deus illum defectum mortalitatis carni Christi non inflixit de novo, sed non abstulit, cum caro haberet illum a suo originali principio. Notandum. Ideo talis defectus non dicitur esse a voluntate assumentis sicut ab efficiente, sed sicut a suscipientep335-4, cum posset excludere.
2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem; similiter patet responsio: quia tales defectus non habent ortum ab actione Dei agentis, sed potius ex defectu naturae ipsius Virginis concipientis. Notandum. Magis tamen attribuitur voluntati, quam attribuatur naturae, propter hoc quod in illius corporis constitutione plus fuit per virtutem supernaturalem quam per naturalem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud est a natura, quod est a naturali origine; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur aliquid esse a naturali origine, ita quod praepositio non solum dicat concomitantiam, sed etiam causamp335-5. Huiusmodi autem defectus infuerunt Christo in principio suae originis, non tamen fuerunt secundum propagationem naturalem. Secundum enim naturalem propagationem tales defectus ortum habent a natura vitiata, in quantum natura illa agit quodam modo naturaliter, et quodam modo vitiose; hoc autem non habet veritatem in generatione Christi, quae fuit praeter vitium et supra naturam.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in passibilitate assimilabatur Matri; dicendum, quod etsi aliquo modo assimilaretur ei, nihilominus tamen in modo et causa reperitur differentia. Nam Virgo passibilitatem habet pro reatu peccati originalis ex necessitate contractop335-6; Christus vero passibilitatem habuit absque aliquo reatu in ipso reperto, exp335-7 sola dispensatione divina. Et ideo non dicuntur omnino fuisse in Christo a natura, nec tamen fuerunt omnino praeter naturam; de natura enim Matris erat talem filium generare.
5. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod illud corpus prius fuit formatum quam unitum; dicendum, quod etsi prius fuerit secundum naturam vel secundum ordinem intelligendi, tempore tamen simul fuit formatio et unio; utrumque autem, scilicetp335-8 formationem et unionem, praecessit voluntas Verbi tale corpus formantis et assumentis, et voluntas animae utrumque concomitata est. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod defectus passibilitatis in carne praecesserit actum sive imperium voluntatis. Operatio enim ipsius Spiritus sancti in Virgine, quae quidem fuit secundum voluntatem Verbi, fecit ipsam carnis conceptionem et purgationem ab omni foeditatep335-9 prius naturaliter, quam uniretur animae; et cum tali purgatione non debet stare poenalitas secundum legem communem, secundum quam immunis a culpa debet esse immunis a poena. — Unde quod ipse subiungit, quod purgatio simul stat cum passibilitate; dicendum, quod etsi aliqua purgatio simul possit stare cum passibilitate, sicut purgatio, quae est a peccatis prius perpetratis; illa tamen puritas, quae fuit in Christo, stare non potuisset cum poenalitate, nisi intervenisset Dei dispensatio et voluntatis Christi acceptio. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.
I. Manifesta est conclusio, quod praedicti defectus « in nobis sunt ex necessitate contracti, sed in Christo sunt ex voluntate assumti » (hic in corp.). Nam illud proprie dicitur contrahi, quod « simul cum sua causa ex necessitate trahitur... Et ideo illi proprie dicuntur hos defectus contrahere, qui ex debito peccati hos defectus incurrunt » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 14. a. 3.). Nihilominus hi defectus consequebantur naturam humanam et principia eius naturalia, nec fuerunt « a voluntate divina tanquam infligente de novo, sed tanquam a relinquente » (hic in corp.), « cum caro haberet illum (defectum mortis) a suo originali principio » (hic ad 1. et cfr. ad 2.). Huic doctrinae consentit S. Thom. (loc. cit. a. 3.) docens, Christum assumsisse necessitatem naturalem (non necessitatem coactionis) his defectibus subiacendi, quatenus « haec necessitas causatur ex principiis carnis humanae ». Plura de hac necessitate patiendi et moriendi vide infra d. 16. a. 1. q. 3.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 1. praecipue ad 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. locc. citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. in principio.
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Question III. Whether the defects in Christ were from nature or from will.
Thirdly it is asked concerning defects of this kind as to their causality, and the question is whether in Christ they were from nature or from will. And that [they were] not from will, but from nature, [thus] it seems.
To the opposite. 1. Wisdom, chapter onep334-1: God made not death; if he made not death, then by parity of reasoning neither a defect ordered to death: therefore if such a defect was in Christ, it seems that it was not from the will of the one assuming, but from a defect of the assumed nature.
2. Likewise, a defect has no efficient cause, but a deficient onep334-2; but the will of the one assuming is not posited as a deficient cause of anything: therefore such defects could not be from the will of the one assuming; and they were [either] from the will of the one assuming, or from the condition of the assumed nature: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, what belongs to something from its natural origin belongs to it by naturep334-3; but defects of this kind belong to Christ from his first origin: therefore it seems that they belong to him by nature.
4. Likewise, that in which the offspring is made like to the parent is natural to the offspring, by reason of the fact that « nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like things from like »p334-4; but Christ in the defect of passibility is made like to his Mother, from whom he drew his origin: therefore it seems that defects and penalties of this kind are natural to him.
5. Likewise, by nature that body was first formed before it was unitedp334-5; but that body, as soon as it was formed, was passible or impassible; and it is agreed that [it was] not impassible: therefore it had passibility by nature before it was united to Christ's soul, or to the divinity itself: therefore it seems that such passibility was not from the will of the one assuming. If you say that this was from the will of the Holy Spirit, who was the maker and sanctifier of that bodyp334-6; it is objected that the grace of the Holy Spirit stands together with passibility and penalty. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit coming upon [it] suffered passibility along with itself, it seems that it rather sustained the defect of passibility than caused it: therefore defects of this kind in Christ were not from will, but from nature.
On the contrary: Fundamenta. 1. The Master in the textp334-7: « From the will of mercy alone he transferred into himself true infirmity, just as he took true flesh »: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, all the defects and penalties that were in Christ are said to have been [in him] through assumption; but to assume is an act of will, not of naturep334-8: therefore those penalties were in Christ not naturally, but voluntarily.
3. Likewise, the quality of a body is principally to be attributed to its effective principle; but the Holy Spirit was the principal effective principle of Christ's body: therefore the quality of passibility ought rather to be attributed to the Holy Spirit than to nature. But the Holy Spirit operates through will: therefore such defects were in Christ from will.
4. Likewise, a penalty does not follow according to the common law except [upon] a nature vitiated and corrupted through fault; but Christ's flesh was immune from all foulness of faultp334-9: therefore it was immune from all defect of passibility: therefore if he had a defect of passibility, this was not from nature, but from will.
5. Likewise, what is in us from the nature of those who generate is said to be contracted: therefore if defects of this kind were in Christ from the nature of the one generating, they would therefore be contracted in him. If, therefore, it is not grantedp334-10 that Christ contracted such defects from nature, it seems that he had them not from nature, but from will.
Conclusio.
The defects that were in Christ were not contracted by necessity, but assumed by will, the divine will going before, but not inflicting, and the created will accompanying.
Conclusion 1. I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the textp334-11, from one and another cause are these defects in us and in Christ; for in us they are contracted by necessity, but in Christ they are assumed by will. — It is explained. And this is plain thus. For we draw these defects from our parents on account of the law of propagation and the law of concupiscence, which wars in those membersp334-12; for a passible [parent] generates a passible [offspring], and one having the law of concupiscence in his members generates a son subject to concupiscence, from the guilt of which concupiscence all penalties belong to the offspring. And
therefore these penalties in us are called contracted, as drawn from the concurrence of two things, namely the propagation of nature and the corruption of concupiscencep335-1. — Otherwise in Christ. In Christ, however, it is otherwise; for he was propagated in neither mode, neither according to the propagation of natural law nor according to the corruption of lust; but the Holy Spirit, coming upon the Virgin herself and making her fruitful, purified his flesh from all foulness of corruption, yet left passibility. From that flesh, however, the Wisdom of the Father, namely the Son of God himself, built for himself an immaculate bodyp335-2, and united that body to himself and to the rational soul, which indeed had immunity from fault both in itself and in the conjoined flesh. And just as it had immunity from the guilt of fault, so according to the order of divine justice it ought to have had immunity from the passibility of misery. That, therefore, penalty remained in that flesh, this was from the dispensationp335-3 of the one assuming, with the acceptance of that rational soul concurring at the same time, which in the first instant of its creation had the use of cognition, and it pleased him to be united to such a body for the salvation of the human race. — Conclusion 2. And so it is plain that such defects were in Christ not by the necessity of generation, but by the will of dispensation — by the will, I say, divine [and] going before, but by a created will accompanying. Conclusion 3. And I say that they were from the divine will not as from one inflicting anew, but as from one leaving [them] and accepting [them], since it was in his power and choice to exclude those defects. — Hence the reasons that are for this side are to be granted.
Solution of the opposing arguments. 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God made not death; the response is plain: because God did not inflict that defect of mortality anew upon Christ's flesh, but did not take it away, since the flesh had it from its original principle. Note. Therefore such a defect is not said to be from the will of the one assuming as from an efficient [cause], but as from one receiving [it]p335-4, since he could exclude [it].
2. To that which is objected secondly, that a defect has no efficient cause, but a deficient one; likewise the response is plain: because such defects do not take their rise from the action of God acting, but rather from a defect of the nature of the conceiving Virgin herself. Note. Yet it is attributed more to will than it is attributed to nature, on account of the fact that in the constitution of that body there was more by supernatural power than by natural.
3. To that which is objected, that that is from nature which is from a natural origin; it must be said that this does not hold true, unless something be understood to be from a natural origin in such a way that the preposition denotes not only concomitance, but also causep335-5. But defects of this kind were in Christ at the beginning of his origin, yet they were not [there] according to natural propagation. For according to natural propagation such defects take their rise from a vitiated nature, inasmuch as that nature acts in a certain manner naturally, and in a certain manner viciously; but this does not hold true in the generation of Christ, which was beyond vice and above nature.
4. To that which is objected, that Christ in passibility was made like to his Mother; it must be said that, even if he were made like to her in some way, nonetheless a difference is found in the mode and the cause. For the Virgin has passibility on account of the guilt of original sin contracted by necessityp335-6; but Christ had passibility without any guilt found in him, fromp335-7 the divine dispensation alone. And therefore they are not said to have been in Christ altogether from nature, nor yet were they altogether beyond nature; for it was of the Mother's nature to generate such a son.
5. To that, then, which is objected, that that body was first formed before it was united; it must be said that, even if it were first [so] according to nature or according to the order of understanding, in time nonetheless the formation and the union were simultaneous; but both, namelyp335-8 the formation and the union, were preceded by the will of the Word forming and assuming such a body, and the will of the soul accompanied both. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the defect of passibility in the flesh preceded the act or command of the will. For the operation of the Holy Spirit himself in the Virgin, which indeed was according to the will of the Word, brought about the very conception of the flesh and the purgation from all foulnessp335-9 first naturally, before it was united to the soul; and with such a purgation a penalty ought not to stand according to the common law, according to which one immune from fault ought to be immune from penalty. — Hence as to what he himself adds, that purgation stands together with passibility; it must be said that, even if some purgation can stand together with passibility, such as the purgation that is from sins previously committed, that purity nonetheless which was in Christ could not have stood together with penalty, unless the dispensation of God and the acceptance of Christ's will had intervened. And so the response to the questions raised is plain.
I. The conclusion is manifest, that the aforesaid defects « in us are contracted by necessity, but in Christ are assumed by will » (here in the body). For that is properly said to be contracted which « is drawn by necessity together with its cause... And therefore those are properly said to contract these defects who from the debt of sin incur these defects » (St. Thomas, S. III. q. 14. a. 3). Nonetheless these defects followed upon human nature and its natural principles, nor were they « from the divine will as inflicting [them] anew, but as leaving [them] » (here in the body), « since the flesh had it (the defect of death) from its original principle » (here at [reply] 1 and cf. at [reply] 2). With this doctrine St. Thomas agrees (loc. cit. a. 3), teaching that Christ assumed a natural necessity (not a necessity of coercion) of being subject to these defects, inasmuch as « this necessity is caused from the principles of human flesh ». More concerning this necessity of suffering and dying, see below d. 16. a. 1. q. 3.
II. Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 5. m. 1, especially at [reply] 3. — Scotus, in both his Writings, III. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; S. in the places cited. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 4. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1, at the beginning.
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- Vers. 13.Verse 13.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 2. Ibid. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — Vide de minori, in qua Vat. pro deficiens substituit deficientis. Paulo inferius Vat. inter et fuerunt ponit tamen.Cf. II Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 2. Ibid. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — See [it] in the minor [premise], in which the Vatican [edition] for deficiens substitutes deficientis. A little below, the Vatican [edition] places tamen between et fuerunt.
- Vide supra pag. 108, nota 3.See above p. 108, note 3.
- Cfr. supra pag. 188, nota 1. — Mox pro in defectu edd. ex defectu. In fine solut. pro sint multi codd. sunt, cod. F fuerunt.Cf. above p. 188, note 1. — Presently, for in defectu the editions [read] ex defectu. At the end of the solution, for sint many codices [read] sunt, codex F fuerunt.
- Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. ad 4.Cf. above d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2, at [reply] 4.
- De quo supra lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1. in fine, et d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro obiicitur, quod codd. A G H I L U V Z bb obiicitur, quia. Paulo inferius pro compatiebatur secum passibilitatem edd. compatiebatur se cum passibilitate et pro causaverit (aliqui codd. creaverit) cum aliquot codd. curaverit.Concerning which [see] above the text of the Master, d. III. c. 1, at the end, and d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Thereupon, for obiicitur, quod, codices A G H I L U V Z bb [read] obiicitur, quia. A little below, for compatiebatur secum passibilitatem the editions [read] compatiebatur se cum passibilitate; and for causaverit (some codices creaverit) with several codices [read] curaverit.
- Hic c. 1.Here c. 1.
- Cfr. supra d. 3. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Cod. U pro poenalitates semper passibilitates.Cf. above d. 3. a. 1. q. 1, in the body. — Codex U for poenalitates [reads] always passibilitates.
- Ut ostensum est supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq.As was shown above d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1 and following.
- Vide hic corp. quaest.See here [in] the body of the question.
- Hic c. 1.Here c. 1.
- Respicitur illud Iac. 4, 1: Unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne hinc? ex concupiscentiis vestris, quae militant in membris vestris? Cfr. II. Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.Reference is made to that [passage] of James 4, 1: Whence wars and contentions among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences, which war in your members? Cf. II Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.
- Cod. K addit quae militant in illis membris.Codex K adds which war in those members.
- Respicitur illud Proverb. 9, 1: Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum. — Mox pro sibi et animae edd. sibi cum anima, cod. K sibi et cum anima, codd. G I L T aa sibi et anima.Reference is made to that [passage] of Proverbs 9, 1: Wisdom hath built herself a house. — Presently, for sibi et animae the editions [read] sibi cum anima, codex K sibi et cum anima, codices G I L T aa sibi et anima.
- Cod. W ex sola dispensatione.Codex W [reads] from the dispensation alone.
- Cod. U (N a secunda manu) sustinente.Codex U (N by a second hand) [reads] sustinente [from one sustaining].
- Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.Cf. above d. 1. a. 2. q. 3, in the body.
- De hac falsa opinione vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2, scholion.Concerning this false opinion, see above d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, 2, the scholion.
- Edd. sed ex; cod. A et ex.The editions [read] sed ex; codex A et ex.
- Edd. et multi codd. perperam secundum. Paulo inferius pro et voluntas animae utrumque concomitata est multi codd. perperam et voluntatis animae utrumque communicata est.The editions and many codices wrongly [read] secundum. A little below, for et voluntas animae utrumque concomitata est many codices wrongly [read] et voluntatis animae utrumque communicata est.
- Edd. addunt immunem. Pro purgationem non pauci codd. praepurgationem, edd. 1, 2 propagationem. Paulo superius pro in Virgine codd. A C D H I K L aa in Virginem.The editions add immunem. For purgationem not a few codices [read] praepurgationem, editions 1, 2 propagationem. A little above, for in Virgine codices A C D H I K L aa [read] in Virginem.