Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus

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Articulus II. De persona redemptoris et mediatoris.

Quaestio II. Secundum quam naturam Christus sit mediator.

Secundo quaeritur, secundum quam naturam Christus sit mediator. Et quod secundum humanam, ostenditur:

1. Auctoritate Augustini, in nono de Civitate Dei^p409-6: « Mediatorem inter nos et Deum mortalitatem oportuit habere transeuntem et beatitudinem permanentem »; sed utrumque horum competit Christo secundum humanam naturam: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritate Magistri in littera^p409-7: « Mediator dicitur secundum humanitatem, non secundum Divinitatem ».

3. Item, medium debet esse inter extrema, ergo mediator Dei et hominum debet esse infra Deum et supra homines; sed Christus secundum divinam naturam non est inferior Deo: ergo secundum divinam naturam non potest esse mediator: est igitur solum mediator secundum naturam assumtam.

4. Item, medium debet habere differentiam cum^p409-8 extremis; sed Christus secundum Divinitatem est omnino unum cum Patre: ergo non videtur, quod secundum Divinitatem habeat rationem mediatoris.

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5. Item, una est offensa totius Trinitatis, sicut una est maiestas^p410-1; sed ei fit satisfactio, cui facta est offensa: ergo necesse est, quod satisfactio fiat toti Trinitati; et si hoc, ita fit satisfactio Filio, sicut Patri. Sed constat, quod alterius et alterius naturae est satisfactionem offerre et satisfactionem suscipere: si ergo Christus satisfacit, secundum quod homo, et eo ipso est mediator, quo satisfacit; videtur, quod sit mediator solum secundum humanam naturam.

Ad oppositum:

1. Sed contra hoc est auctoritas, quam Magister adducit in littera^p410-2: « Si Christus secundum vos, o haeretici, unam tantum habet naturam, unde medius erit. Nisi ita sit medius, ut Deus sit propter naturam Divinitatis, et homo propter naturam humanitatis »: ergo esse mediatorem competit Christo secundum utramque naturam.

2. Item, Christus est mediator non per privationem, sed per positionem; sed medium per positionem est medium per participationem utriusque^p410-3: ergo Christus non potest esse mediator Dei et nostri nisi per hoc, quod est Deus et homo: ergo mediator est secundum utramque naturam.

3. Item, nunquam medium iungit extrema nisi per hoc, quod habet coniunctionem^p410-4 cum utroque: ergo Christus nunquam nos reconciliaret Deo, nisi esset Deus et homo: redit ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, nihil tenet rationem medii, secundum id quod^p410-5 tenet rationem extremi; sed Christus tenet rationem extremi secundum humanam naturam, quia humana natura reconciliata est Deo: ergo non est mediator praecise secundum illam.

5. Item, si Christus est mediator secundum humanam naturam, hoc non potest esse, nisi quia^p410-6 in quadam proprietate communicat nobiscum, in quadam cum Deo; sed Angeli boni et angeli mali in aliqua proprietate nobiscum conveniunt, in aliqua cum Deo: ergo possunt dici mediatores inter nos et Deum. Si ergo mediatores non dicuntur, videtur, quod mediatio non conveniat Christo secundum convenientiam proprietatum, sed secundum participationem duarum naturarum: ergo ita convenit Christo esse mediatorem secundum divinam naturam, sicut secundum humanam.

Conclusio.

Christus est medius vel ratione utriusque naturae, vel ratione humanitatis; sed mediator est secundum naturam humanam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod differt dicere esse medium et esse mediatorem. Medium namque dicit communicantiam^p410-7 cum extremis. Mediator autem non tantum dicit communicantiam, sed etiam dicit officium reconciliationis. Aliter igitur respondendum est, cum quaeritur, qualiter Christus sit medius inter humanam naturam et divinam; aliter, cum quaeritur, qualiter^p410-8 sit mediator.

Si enim quaeratur, qualiter sit medius; responderi potest, quod medium inter duas naturas potest aliquid dici tripliciter: aut ita, quod in eo concurrant duae naturae, sicut in natura^p410-9 tertia; aut ita, quod in eo concurrant duae naturae, sicut in persona; aut ita, quod in eo concurrant proprietates duabus naturis conformes. — Primo modo accipiendo medium, nihil potest esse medium inter humanam naturam et divinam, nec Christus nec aliud, quia non potest ex humana natura et divina constitui aliquod tertium. Secundo modo accipiendo medium, sic Christus est medium inter humanam naturam et divinam, in quantum est una persona in duabus naturis, non ratione humanae naturae tantum, nec ratione divinae, sed ratione utriusque^p410-10. Tertio modo accipiendo medium, Christus est medium inter Deum et homines secundum humanitatem, in quantum habet mortalitatem simul et beatitudinem: mortalitatem, inquam, in qua communicat cum hominibus; beatitudinem, inquam, in qua communicat cum Deo^p410-11.

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Si vero quaeratur, qualiter et secundum quam naturam Christus sit mediator; cum mediator dicat officium reconciliationis, et mediator debeat differre ab illis quos reconciliat, et Christus secundum divinam naturam sit ille cui fit reconciliatio, dicendum, quod non potest esse mediator secundum divinam naturam, sed secundum humanam, in qua potest reconciliare secundum diversas proprietates, in quibus communicat cum Deo et cum homine^p411-1. Habebat enim iustitiam et innocentiam, in qua communicat cum Deo, et mortalitatem, in qua communicat cum homine; et dum mors coniungitur iustitiae, in eodem confoederatur homo peccator et mortalis Deo iusto et immortali. Reconciliati enim sumus Deo per mortem hominis innocentis^p411-2. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod Christus est mediator secundum humanam naturam.

Ad oppositorum:

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Christus est medius propter naturam Divinitatis et humanitatis; iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Non enim est idem dicere esse mediatorem et esse medium; veruntamen mediator esse non posset, nisi esset medius. Quod enim simul et semel sit beatus et mortalis, hoc habet, quia homo et Deus; utraque tamen istarum duarum proprietatum convenit ei secundum humanam naturam, ita quod mortalitas convenit humanae naturae in se, et beatitudo competit ei, in quantum est unita divinae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mediator debet participare naturam utriusque extremi; dicendum, quod et medium et mediator non dicitur solum per participationem utriusque naturae, sicut prius dictum est, sed etiam per convenientiam in proprietate. Et Christus secundum humanam naturam habet proprietates convenientes divinae naturae pariter et humanae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod medium non iungit extrema nisi per convenientiam, quam habet cum eis; dicendum, quod iam patet responsio, quia convenientia secundum proprietatem est illa quae potest extrema conciliare, maxime quando extrema coniungi habent per illud medium et perduci ad conformitatem voluntatis, non ad conformitatem naturae. Per Christum enim homo reconciliatur Deo, ut sit beatus, et ita, ut fiat de mortali immortalis, de peccatore iustus, de misero beatus, non ut^p411-3 reconciliatus fiat Deus, quamvis ipse Christus sit Deus.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus est extremum secundum naturam humanam; dicendum, quod falsum est; nam humana natura in Christo nunquam indiguit reconciliatione; unde non erat reconciliata, sed reconcilians, secundum quod dicitur secundae ad Corinthios quinto^p411-4: Deus erat in Christo sibi reconcilians mundum. Alterius enim conditionis erat natura humana in aliis hominibus, alterius in Christo; in aliis enim erat peccatrix, in Christo erat immunis ab omni culpa.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si mediator dicitur propter convenientiam in proprietatibus, quod daemon debet dici mediator; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia non habet proprietates mediatori convenientes, secundum quod exponit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei nono^p411-5 aliquantulum prolixe, sed tamen utiliter. Ait enim sic: « Mediatorem inter Deum et hominem mortalitatem oportuit habere transeuntem et beatitudinem permanentem, ut per id quod transit, congrueret morituris, et ad id quod permanet, transferret ex mortuis. Boni igitur Angeli inter miseros et mortales et beatos et immortales medii esse non possunt, quia illi quoque beati et immortales sunt; possunt autem medii esse mali angeli, quia immortales sunt cum ipsis et miseri cum istis. His contrarius est mediator bonus, quia adversus horum immortalitatem et miseriam et mortalis ad tempus existere voluit et beatus in aeternitate persistere potuit ». — Et quod sint contrarii, hoc ipse ostendit amplius consequenter^p411-6: « Ad hoc interponit se medius immortalis et miser, ut ad immortalitatem beatam transire non sinat. Ad hoc autem se interponit mortalis et beatus, ut, morte transacta, ex mortuis faceret immortales ». — Et sic patet, quomodo convenientia proprietatum in Christo faciat ad officium boni mediatoris, in daemone vero faciat ad contrarium. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.

Scholion

I. Nomen mediatoris proprie respicit officium reconciliationis, quo quis inter dissidentes intercedit; unde bene dicit auctor, quod differat esse medius, scilicet secundum substantiam, et esse mediator, scilicet secundum operationem. Vulgo tamen eodem nomine mediatoris utrumque in Christo significatur (cfr. S. Thom., S. III. q. 26. a. 1. 2.) — Fide constat, Christum esse Dei et hominum mediatorem, et quidem ipsum solum esse perfectum mediatorem, « in quantum per suam mortem humanum genus Deo reconciliavit... Nihil tamen prohibet, aliquos alios secundum quid dici mediatores inter Deum et homines, prout scilicet cooperantur ad unionem hominum cum Deo dispositive, vel ministerialiter » (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 1.).

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II. Ariani, ipsum Filium Dei esse minorem Patre asserentes, Christum secundum personam divinam medium et mediatorem esse blasphemabant. Saeculo XVI. occasione cuiusdam controversiae inter Stancarum et Osiandrum, Regiomontanae universitatis professores, duo alii extremi errores inter Protestantes acri certamine defensi sunt. Stancarus enim docuit, Christum non nisi secundum humanam praecise naturam esse mediatorem; pro qua sententia profert testimonia (sed male intellecta) Petri Lombardi et aliorum Scholasticorum, quos mirifice exaltat super omnes suae aetatis theologos. Sed adversarii eius, inter quos fuit Calvinus, in oppositum abrepti sunt errorem, docentes, Christum fuisse mediatorem secundum utramque naturam, vel etiam secundum quod est aeternum Verbum (de hac controversia cfr. Petavius, XII. de Incarnat. c. 3. 4.). Sed Catholici concorditer docent, neque humanitatem in abstracto neque Divinitatem, neque Verbum aeternum in se, neque Christum praecise ratione divinae naturae dici posse mediatorem, sed tantum prout Christus est hic homo, coniunctus Deo in persona Verbi, vel etiam, ut aliqui dicunt, prout divina persona dicitur composita, id est subsistens in utraque natura.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 6. a. 2. § 1. 2. — Scoti locos collectos vide apud Hieron. de Montefortino t. IV. q. 26. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. 3; S. locc. citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. 4.

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English Translation

Article II. On the person of the redeemer and mediator.

Question II. According to which nature Christ is the mediator.

Secondly it is asked, according to which nature Christ is the mediator. And that it is according to the human [nature] is shown:

1. By the authority of Augustine, in the ninth book of On the City of God^p409-6: « The mediator between us and God ought to have a passing mortality and a permanent blessedness »; but both of these befit Christ according to the human nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same point is shown by the authority of the Master in the text^p409-7: « He is called mediator according to humanity, not according to Divinity ».

3. Likewise, a middle must be between extremes, therefore the mediator of God and men must be below God and above men; but Christ according to the divine nature is not below God: therefore according to the divine nature he cannot be a mediator: he is therefore a mediator only according to the assumed nature.

4. Likewise, a middle must have a difference with^p409-8 the extremes; but Christ according to Divinity is altogether one with the Father: therefore it does not seem that according to Divinity he has the character of a mediator.

5. Likewise, there is one offense against the whole Trinity, just as there is one majesty^p410-1; but satisfaction is made to him to whom the offense was done: therefore it is necessary that satisfaction be made to the whole Trinity; and if this, then satisfaction is made to the Son just as to the Father. But it is established that it belongs to one nature and to another to offer satisfaction and to receive satisfaction: if therefore Christ makes satisfaction insofar as he is man, and by that very fact is mediator by which he makes satisfaction; it seems that he is mediator only according to the human nature.

On the contrary:

1. But against this is the authority which the Master adduces in the text^p410-2: « If Christ, according to you, O heretics, has only one nature, whence will he be middle. Unless he is so middle that he is God by reason of the nature of Divinity, and man by reason of the nature of humanity »: therefore to be mediator befits Christ according to both natures.

2. Likewise, Christ is mediator not by privation, but by position; but a middle by position is a middle by participation in both^p410-3: therefore Christ cannot be mediator of God and of us except by this, that he is God and man: therefore he is mediator according to both natures.

3. Likewise, a middle never joins extremes except by this, that it has a conjunction^p410-4 with each: therefore Christ would never reconcile us to God unless he were God and man: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, nothing holds the character of middle according to that by which^p410-5 it holds the character of extreme; but Christ holds the character of extreme according to the human nature, because the human nature was reconciled to God: therefore he is not mediator precisely according to it.

5. Likewise, if Christ is mediator according to the human nature, this cannot be except because^p410-6 in a certain property he has in common with us, and in a certain [property] with God; but good Angels and bad angels agree with us in some property, and in some with God: therefore they can be called mediators between us and God. If therefore they are not called mediators, it seems that mediation does not befit Christ according to the agreement of properties, but according to participation in the two natures: therefore it befits Christ to be mediator according to the divine nature just as according to the human.

Conclusion.

Christ is middle either by reason of both natures, or by reason of humanity; but he is mediator according to the human nature.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that it differs to say to be a middle and to be a mediator. For middle asserts a sharing-in-common^p410-7 with the extremes. But mediator not only asserts a sharing-in-common, but also asserts the office of reconciliation. Therefore it must be answered otherwise when it is asked how Christ is a middle between the human nature and the divine; otherwise when it is asked how^p410-8 he is a mediator.

For if it be asked how he is a middle; it can be answered that a middle between two natures can be said to be something in three ways: either thus, that in it two natures concur, as in a third nature^p410-9; or thus, that in it two natures concur, as in a person; or thus, that in it concur properties conformed to the two natures. — Taking middle in the first way, nothing can be a middle between the human nature and the divine, neither Christ nor anything else, because there cannot be constituted out of the human nature and the divine any third thing. Taking middle in the second way, thus Christ is a middle between the human nature and the divine, insofar as he is one person in two natures, not by reason of the human nature alone, nor by reason of the divine, but by reason of both^p410-10. Taking middle in the third way, Christ is a middle between God and men according to humanity, insofar as he has mortality together with blessedness: mortality, I say, in which he has in common with men; blessedness, I say, in which he has in common with God^p410-11.

But if it be asked how and according to which nature Christ is a mediator; since mediator asserts the office of reconciliation, and a mediator must differ from those whom he reconciles, and Christ according to the divine nature is the one to whom reconciliation is made, it must be said that he cannot be mediator according to the divine nature, but according to the human, in which he can reconcile according to the diverse properties in which he has in common with God and with man^p411-1. For he had justice and innocence, in which he has in common with God, and mortality, in which he has in common with man; and while death is joined to justice, in the same [Christ] sinful and mortal man is confederated with the just and immortal God. For we are reconciled to God by the death of an innocent man^p411-2. — Therefore the reasons showing that Christ is mediator according to the human nature must be granted.

To the objections to the contrary:

1. To that which is objected, that Christ is middle by reason of the nature of Divinity and of humanity; the response is already clear from the things that have been said. For it is not the same to say to be a mediator and to be a middle; nevertheless he could not be a mediator unless he were a middle. For that he is at once and simultaneously blessed and mortal, this he has because he is man and God; yet both of these two properties befit him according to the human nature, so that mortality befits the human nature in itself, and blessedness belongs to it insofar as it is united to the divine.

2. To that which is objected, that the mediator must participate in the nature of each extreme; it must be said that both middle and mediator are not said only by participation in both natures, as was said before, but also by agreement in property. And Christ according to the human nature has properties agreeing with the divine nature equally and with the human.

3. To that which is objected, that the middle does not join extremes except by the agreement which it has with them; it must be said that the response is already clear, because the agreement according to property is that which can reconcile the extremes, especially when the extremes are to be joined through that middle and led to conformity of will, not to conformity of nature. For through Christ man is reconciled to God, that he may be blessed, and so, that of a mortal he becomes immortal, of a sinner just, of a wretched one blessed, not that^p411-3 the reconciled one becomes God, although Christ himself is God.

4. To that which is objected, that Christ is an extreme according to the human nature; it must be said that it is false; for the human nature in Christ never needed reconciliation; whence it was not reconciled, but reconciling, according to what is said in second Corinthians, chapter five^p411-4: God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. For the human nature was of one condition in other men, of another in Christ; for in others it was sinful, in Christ it was free from all fault.

5. To that which is objected, that if a mediator is said [to be such] on account of agreement in properties, then a demon must be called a mediator; it must be said that it is not alike, because it does not have properties agreeing with a mediator, according to what Augustine expounds in the ninth book of On the City of God^p411-5 somewhat at length, but nevertheless usefully. For he speaks thus: « The mediator between God and man ought to have a passing mortality and a permanent blessedness, that by that which passes he might be suited to those about to die, and to that which permanently remains he might transfer them from the dead. Therefore the good Angels cannot be middles between the wretched and mortal and the blessed and immortal, because they too are blessed and immortal; but the bad angels can be middles, because they are immortal with the former and wretched with the latter. Contrary to these is the good mediator, because against their immortality and wretchedness he willed both to exist as mortal for a time and was able to persist as blessed in eternity ». — And that they are contrary, this he himself shows further on consequently^p411-6: « To this end the immortal and wretched [mediator] interposes himself, that he may not allow [the soul] to pass over to blessed immortality. But to this end the mortal and blessed one interposes himself, that, death being accomplished, he might make immortals from the dead ». — And so it is clear how the agreement of properties in Christ contributes to the office of a good mediator, but in the demon contributes to the contrary. And so the response to the things asked is clear.

Scholion

I. The name mediator properly regards the office of reconciliation, by which someone intervenes between those who are at variance; whence the author rightly says that to be a middle differs — namely according to substance — and to be a mediator — namely according to operation. Commonly, however, both are signified in Christ by the same name of mediator (cf. St. Thomas, Summa III, q. 26, a. 1, 2). — It is established by faith that Christ is the mediator of God and of men, and indeed that he alone is the perfect mediator, « insofar as by his death he reconciled the human race to God... Nothing, however, prevents some others from being called mediators in a certain respect between God and men, namely insofar as they cooperate toward the union of men with God dispositively or ministerially » (St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 1).

II. The Arians, asserting that the Son of God himself is less than the Father, blasphemously held Christ to be middle and mediator according to the divine person. In the sixteenth century, on the occasion of a certain controversy between Stancarus and Osiander, professors of the University of Königsberg, two other extreme errors were defended among the Protestants in fierce contention. For Stancarus taught that Christ is mediator only according to the human nature precisely; for which opinion he brings forward testimonies (but badly understood) of Peter Lombard and of other Scholastics, whom he marvelously exalts above all the theologians of his age. But his adversaries, among whom was Calvin, were carried away into the opposite error, teaching that Christ was mediator according to both natures, or even according to what he is as the eternal Word (concerning this controversy cf. Petavius, XII, On the Incarnation, c. 3, 4). But Catholics teach with one accord that neither humanity in the abstract nor Divinity, nor the eternal Word in itself, nor Christ precisely by reason of the divine nature, can be called mediator, but only insofar as Christ is this man, conjoined to God in the person of the Word, or even, as some say, insofar as the divine person is said to be composite, that is, subsisting in both natures.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 18, m. 6, a. 2, § 1, 2. — For the collected passages of Scotus see Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. IV, q. 26, a. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 3, sub-question 2, 3; St. [Thomas] at the places cited. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3, 4.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cap. 15. n. 1. — Pro Mediatorem multi codd. Mediator. Subinde edd. inter Deum et mortalitatem inserunt et, quod et in textu origin. habetur.
[On the City of God IX,] chapter 15, n. 1. — For Mediatorem many codices [read] Mediator. Thereupon the editions insert et between Deum and mortalitatem, which is also found in the original text.
Hic c. 7. Ibid. et duo seqq. argg. insinuantur.
Here [in the text of the Master] chapter 7. There also the two following arguments are intimated.
Vat. ab.
The Vatican edition [reads] ab ["from"].
Cfr. supra d. 9. dub. 2. — In conclus. arg. pro satisfacit codd. AHKT bis satisfecit.
Cf. above, d. 9, dubium 2. — In the conclusion of the argument, for satisfacit codices AHKT [read] twice satisfecit.
Hic c. 7, et sumta est ex Vigilio Taps., V. contra Eutycheten n. 15.
Here [in the text] chapter 7, and it is taken from Vigilius of Thapsus, Against Eutyches V, n. 15.
Vide dictum Aristot., supra pag. 19, nota 6. allegatum. — Edd. plenius utriusque extremi, et subinde potuit pro potest. Mox pro nostri codd. A G H K L T aa noster, cod. Z nostrum.
See the saying of Aristotle adduced above on page 19, note 6. — The editions [read] more fully utriusque extremi ["of each extreme"], and thereupon potuit for potest. Soon, for nostri codices A G H K L T aa [read] noster, codex Z nostrum.
Edd. communicationem.
The editions [read] communicationem.
Edd. secundum illud, secundum quod.
The editions [read] secundum illud, secundum quod.
Ita codd. AKZbb, in aliis et edd. deest quia.
Thus codices AKZbb; in the others and in the editions quia is lacking.
Edd. cum nonnullis codd. hic et paulo inferius convenientiam.
The editions, with some codices, [read] here and a little below convenientiam.
Cod. F quo modo. Paulo inferius pro si enim quaeratur cod. A si autem quaeratur.
Codex F [reads] quo modo. A little below, for si enim quaeratur codex A [reads] si autem quaeratur.
Vat. in una natura, et paulo post cum edd. 1, 2 pariter in una persona. Pro in natura tertia edd. 1, 2 in una materia. Infra codd. G H V bis accipiendi pro accipiendo.
The Vatican edition [reads] in una natura, and a little later, with editions 1, 2, likewise in una persona. For in natura tertia editions 1, 2 [read] in una materia. Below, codices G H V [read] twice accipiendi for accipiendo.
Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. — Post divinae edd. repetunt tantum.
Cf. above, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — After divinae the editions repeat tantum.
Vide hic fundam. 1. et infra solut. ad 1. — Edd., omisso inquam, verbo communicat praemittunt maxime.
See here fundamentum 1 and below the solution to [objection] 1. — The editions, omitting inquam, prefix maxime to the verb communicat.
August., X. Confess. c. 43. n. 68: In quantum enim homo, in tantum mediator; in quantum autem Verbum, non medius, quia aequalis Deo et Deus apud Deum et simul cum Spiritu sancto unus Deus. Idem dicit in Enarrat. Ps. 103. serm. 4. n. 8.
Augustine, Confessions X, c. 43, n. 68: For insofar as he is man, so far is he mediator; but insofar as he is the Word, he is not a middle, because [he is] equal to God and God with God and together with the Holy Spirit one God. He says the same in the Enarration on Psalm 103, sermon 4, n. 8.
Rom. 5, 10: Reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius. Cfr. supra pag. 42, nota 8.
Romans 5:10: We are reconciled to God by the death of his Son. Cf. above, page 42, note 8.
Codd. AKPQbb hic repetunt homo. In initio solut. pro iungit codd. 1 L aa coniungit.
Codices AKPQbb here repeat homo. At the beginning of the solution, for iungit codices 1 L aa [read] coniungit.
Vers. 19. — Paulo ante pro reconciliata cod. Z reconcilianda. In fine solut. cod. U in Christo vero erat, codd. F G I L N T V Z aa in Christo enim erat.
Verse 19. — A little before, for reconciliata codex Z [reads] reconcilianda. At the end of the solution codex U [reads] in Christo vero erat, codices F G I L N T V Z aa in Christo enim erat.
Cap. 15. n. 1. In exposit. August. Vat. cum textu origin. pro inter miseros et mortales et beatos et immortales habet inter miseros mortales et beatos immortales, et paulo inferius qui adversus pro quia adversus. — Aliquanto superius versus initium solut. edd. voci mediatori praefigunt bono.
[On the City of God IX,] chapter 15, n. 1. In the exposition of Augustine the Vatican edition, with the original text, for inter miseros et mortales et beatos et immortales has inter miseros mortales et beatos immortales, and a little below qui adversus for quia adversus. — Somewhat higher, toward the beginning of the solution, the editions prefix bono to the word mediatori.
Loc. cit. n. 2, ubi textus origin. post transire non sinat sic prosequitur: quoniam persistit quod impedit, id est ipsa miseria. Ad hoc autem se interposuit mortalis et beatus, ut mortalitate transacta etc. — In fine testimonii post faceret immortales edd. ex August. addunt: quod in se resurgendo monstravit, et ex miseris beatos, unde nunquam ipse discessit. Alius est ergo medius malus, qui separat amicos; alius bonus, qui reconciliavit [ed. oper. August. reconciliat] inimicos. — Ante testimon. Aug. pro hoc ipse codd. AKZ hoc ipsum.
At the place cited, n. 2, where the original text, after transire non sinat, continues thus: because that persists which impedes, that is, wretchedness itself. But to this end the mortal and blessed one interposed himself, that, mortality being accomplished etc. — At the end of the testimony, after faceret immortales, the editions add from Augustine: which he showed in himself by rising again, and [made] blessed from the wretched, whence he himself never departed. There is therefore one evil middle, who separates friends; another good [middle], who reconciled [the edition of Augustine's works: reconciles] enemies. — Before Augustine's testimony, for hoc ipse codices AKZ [read] hoc ipsum.

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