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Dist. 21, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus
p. 446

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nemo tollit animam meam, sed ego pono eam a me ipso. Si ergo nemo potuit animam suam tollere, nemo potuit eum per violentiam occidere: ergo ipse non fuit mortuus per alienam violentiam, sed per propriam potentiam: ergo fuit homicida sui ipsius.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Dominus in isto verbo non vult excludere violentiam crucifigentium respectu naturae, sed respectu voluntatis divinae. Et in hoc vult ostendere, quod nemo posset ipsum occidere, nisi ipse vellet mortem sustinere secundum dispositionem voluntatis suae. Unde ponere animam ibi non est per exsecutionem, sed per voluntariam permissionem. Et sic patet illudp446-9.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Caro animam posuit, quando exspiravit. Videtur enim, quod potius deberet dicere e converso, quod anima posuit carnem, quia plus habet virtutem anima super carnem, quam caro super animam. — Item, in resurrectione potius dicitur anima resumsisse carnem, quam caro animam: ergo in morte potius deberet dici animap447-1 posuisse carnem, quam e converso.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod magis dicitur de carne, quod posuerit animam, quam e converso, non quia caro virtutem habuitp447-2 super animam, sed quia, carne remanente, anima a carne discessit; et quia per animam intelligitur vita, quae magis habet rationem pretii; et quoniam etiam anima praesidebat carni: ideo magis de carne dicitur deponi, quam e converso.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Non enim dicitur caro posuisse animam, quasi hocp447-3 caro propria virtute fecerit; sed quia virtus divina aderat unita carni, sine cuius permissione anima non poterat deponi de carnep447-4.

p. 447

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Idem patiebatur et non patiebatur, moriebatur et non moriebatur. Hoc enim videtur falsum: quia principium primum est in Prima Philosophiap447-5, quod «impossibile est, simul et semel de uno et eodem dici duo contradictorie opposita»: ergo si haec est vera: Christus moriebatur, haec simpliciter erit falsa: Christus non moriebatur. Si tu dicas, quod non est ibi contradictio, quia hoc attribuitur ei secundum diversas naturas, et ad hoc, quod sit contradictio, oportet, quod opposita non solum attribuantur eidem, sed etiam secundum idemp447-6; hoc non solvit, quia si aliquis diceret, Petrum esse album, quia est albus secundum corpus, et non esse album, quia non est albus secundum animam; nihil diceret. Prima enim esset simpliciter vera, secunda simpliciter falsa: ergo si haec est vera secundum humanitatem: Christus est mortuus; ista erit simpliciter falsa: Christus non est mortuus. — Item, haec absque dubio est vera: Christus homo est passus et mortuus; si ergo est communicatio idiomatum, haec erit vera: Deus est mortuus: ergo Christus, homo et Deus, est mortuus. Si igitur haec est vera omni modo: Christus est mortuus, erit opposita eius simpliciter falsa.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio illud quod convenit Christo secundum naturam humanam etp447-7 secundum divinam, simpliciter et vere potest ei attribui. Unde vere dicitur: Christus est creator omnium, Christus natus est de Virgine; vere etiam dicitur: Christus est mortalis, Christus est immortalis. Quamvis autem aliquid conveniat Christo secundum naturam assumtam, quod non convenit ei secundum naturam divinam; non potest tamen simpliciter removeri ab eo, quia plus tollit negatio, quam ponat affirmatiop447-8. Et ideo affirmativae concedendae sunt tanquam verae; negativae vero negandae sunt tanquam falsae, nisi proponantur vel intelligantur cum addita determinatione. Unde haec est vera: Christus non est mortuus secundum Deitatem; haec autem simpliciter prolata: Christus non est mortuus, falsa est. — Ambrosiusp447-9 autem et Magister praedictas locutiones intelligunt cum determinatione adiuncta, quod patet per finem auctoritatis. Praeterea, ex hoc ipso quod proponit istas simul: «moriebatur et non moriebatur», arctatur pars affirmativa ad humanam naturam et negativa ad divinam. Ideo non est ibi contradictio, quia non est secundum idem. — Et per hoc patet satis responsio ad obiectap447-10.

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English Translation
p. 446

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part are questions concerning the text, and first there is inquiry concerning what he says: No one takes away my soul, but I lay it down of myself. If, then, no one could take away his soul, no one could kill him by violence: therefore he was not put to death by another's violence, but by his own power: therefore he was the slayer of his very self.

I respond: It must be said that the Lord in this word does not wish to exclude the violence of the crucifiers with respect to nature, but with respect to the divine will. And in this he wishes to show that no one could kill him, unless he himself willed to undergo death according to the disposition of his own will. Hence to lay down the soul there is not by execution, but by voluntary permission. And thus that is made clear.p446-9

Doubt II.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says: The flesh laid down the soul, when it expired. For it seems that he ought rather to say the opposite, namely that the soul laid down the flesh, because the soul has more power over the flesh than the flesh over the soul. — Likewise, in the resurrection the soul is rather said to have taken up the flesh again than the flesh the soul: therefore in death it ought rather to be said that the soulp447-1 laid down the flesh than the converse.

I respond: It must be said that it is rather said of the flesh that it laid down the soul than the converse — not because the flesh had powerp447-2 over the soul, but because, the flesh remaining, the soul departed from the flesh; and because by the soul life is understood, which has more the character of a thing of price; and because also the soul presided over the flesh: therefore it is rather said of the flesh that it is laid down than the converse.

And by this the reply to the objections is made clear. For the flesh is not said to have laid down the soul as though itp447-3 did this by its own proper power; but because the divine power was present, united to the flesh, without whose permission the soul could not be laid down from the flesh.p447-4

p. 447

Doubt III.

Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says: The same one was suffering and not suffering, dying and not dying. For this seems false: because the first principle in First Philosophyp447-5 is that «it is impossible that two things contradictorily opposed be said at one and the same time of one and the same thing»: therefore if this is true: Christ was dying, this will be simply false: Christ was not dying. If you should say that there is no contradiction there, because this is attributed to him according to diverse natures, and that for there to be a contradiction it is required that the opposites be attributed not only to the same thing, but also according to the same respectp447-6; this does not resolve it, because if someone should say that Peter is white, because he is white according to the body, and is not white, because he is not white according to the soul; he would say nothing. For the first would be simply true, the second simply false: therefore if this is true according to humanity: Christ is dead; that will be simply false: Christ is not dead. — Likewise, this is without doubt true: Christ as man suffered and died; if, then, there is a communication of idioms, this will be true: God is dead: therefore Christ, man and God, is dead. If, then, this is true in every mode: Christ is dead, its opposite will be simply false.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt that which belongs to Christ according to the human nature andp447-7 according to the divine can be attributed to him simply and truly. Hence it is truly said: Christ is the creator of all things, Christ was born of the Virgin; it is also truly said: Christ is mortal, Christ is immortal. But although something may belong to Christ according to the assumed nature which does not belong to him according to the divine nature; nevertheless it cannot be simply removed from him, because negation takes away more than affirmation posits.p447-8 And therefore the affirmatives are to be conceded as true; but the negatives are to be denied as false, unless they are proposed or understood with an added determination. Hence this is true: Christ is not dead according to the Deity; but this, simply uttered: Christ is not dead, is false. — Now Ambrosep447-9 and the Master understand the aforesaid locutions with an adjoined determination, which is clear from the end of the authority. Moreover, by the very fact that he proposes these together: «was dying and was not dying», the affirmative part is restricted to the human nature and the negative to the divine. Therefore there is no contradiction there, because it is not according to the same respect. — And by this the reply to the objections is sufficiently made clear.p447-10

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra d. 20. dub. 3. — Huius dubii solutionem habes etiam apud B. Albert., hic a. 2, apud S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Cf. above, d. 20, dub. 3. — The solution of this doubt you have also in B. Albert, here a. 2, in St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  2. In cod. N adiectum est Christi, in edd. ipsa.
    In codex N Christi ("of Christ") is added; in the editions, ipsa ("it").
  3. Codd. A G H L T V habuerit. Paulo superius pro posuerit edd. cum aliquot codd. posuit.
    Codices A G H L T V read habuerit. A little above, for posuerit the editions with some codices read posuit.
  4. Pro quasi hoc edd. propter hoc quod. In fine edd. habent deponi a carne, codd. C X deponere carnem.
    For quasi hoc the editions read propter hoc quod. At the end the editions have deponi a carne ("to be laid down from the flesh"), codices C X deponere carnem ("to lay down the flesh").
  5. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et Richard. a Med., hic d. 16. q. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, to [objection] 1, and Richard of Mediavilla, here d. 16, q. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
  6. Vide Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 9. seqq. (III. c. 3. seqq.), ubi principium contradictionis monstratur.
    See Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 9 ff. (III, c. 3 ff.), where the principle of contradiction is demonstrated.
  7. Cfr. supra pag. 205, nota 5.
    Cf. above, p. 205, note 5.
  8. Edd. etiam, perperam. Mox pro ei cod. W eidem.
    The editions read etiam ("also"), wrongly. Presently, for ei codex W reads eidem.
  9. Cfr. supra d. 11. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. et 4. nec non q. 3. ad 4. — Pro ab eo edd. ab ea.
    Cf. above, d. 11, a. 2, q. 2, to [objections] 3 and 4, as also q. 3, to [objection] 4. — For ab eo the editions read ab ea.
  10. Ex quo textus huius dubii (in lit. Magistri, c. 2.) sumtus est. — Paulo inferius pro Praeterea edd. primo.
    From whom the text of this doubt (in the text of the Master, c. 2) is taken. — A little below, for Praeterea the editions read primo.
  11. Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Cf. concerning this doubt B. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, to [objection] 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
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