Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page, so the markers reset per page; they are rendered continuously here as 1, 2, …. Entries 1–9 are p.688 nn.1–9; entries 10–16 are p.689 footer notes. Page 690 carries no footnote apparatus (the Solutio tail and the SCHOLION fill it).

Articulus III. De duratione caritatis per comparationem ad praemium.

Consequenter quaeritur de duratione caritatis per comparationem ad ipsum praemium. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est, utrum per gloriam contingat, caritatis habitum evacuari.

Secundum est, utrum contingat, caritatis habitum in patria dilatari.

Tertium est, utrum contingat, caritatis ordinem in patria immutari.

Quaestio I. Utrum contingat, caritatis habitum in patria evacuari.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum contingat, caritatis habitum in patria evacuari. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio¹: Caritas nunquam excidit; ibi Glossa: «Nec in hoc saeculo nec in futuro, etsi opera eius cessent».

2. Item, actus caritatis est diligere Deum propter se et super omnia, et ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente²; sed iste actus magis competit statui gloriae quam viae: ergo habitus caritatis maxime competit statui glorioso; et si hoc, tunc non evacuatur in illo.

3. Item, ipsius caritatis sive amoris est unire, iuxta illud quod dicit beatus Dionysius³: «Amorem dicimus unitivam vim»; sed magis unimur in patria quam in via: ergo etc.

4. Item, amoris est assimilare, iuxta illud quod dicit Hugo de sancto Victore⁴, quod «anima in eius quod diligit imaginem transformatur»; sed magis erimus similes in patria quam nunc, secundum illud primae Ioannis tertio: Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus: si ergo statui gloriae maxime competit perfectio assimilationis, videtur, quod et maxime competat illi statui habere habitum caritatis.

Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio⁵: Cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est; illud autem est ex parte, quod est imperfectum; sed caritas viae est imperfecta, quia ignis est in Sion et caminus in Ierusalem, secundum quod dicitur in Isaia: ergo videtur, quod habitus caritatis evacuetur in patria.

2. Item, cessante causa, cessat effectus, ergo evacuata causa, evacuatur effectus; sed «fides generat spem, spes generat caritatem»: cum igitur in patria evacuetur habitus fidei et spei, ut supra⁶ ostensum fuit; videtur similiter, quod evacuetur habitus caritatis.

3. Item, quod ordinat ad aliquem finem et terminum cessat, cum perventum est ad illum; sed caritas est pondus inclinans animam et elevans eam, ut tendat sursum⁷: cum igitur anima sursum per gloriam fuerit collocata, videtur, quod iam amplius non habeat caritatis habitum.

4. Item, quanto maior est unio animae ad Deum, tanto anima perfectius beatificatur; sed magis unitur quod unitur immediate, quam quod unitur per medium: ergo si anima perfecte beatificatur in gloria, videtur, quod inter animam et Deum non sit ponere caritatem mediam⁸: videtur ergo, quod cesset habitus caritatis, superveniente complemento beatitudinis.

Conclusio.

Habitus caritatis in patria non evacuatur, sed consummatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio caritas in patria non evacuatur, sed consummatur, secundum quod expresse dicit Apostolus⁹. Ad cuius intelligentiam est notandum, quod quaedam est dispositio, quae respectu dispositi habet oppositionem, quaedam vero est, quae simpliciter disponit; et prima quidem per adventum eius, ad quod disponit, evacuatur; secunda vero perficitur et consummatur. Et huiusmodi est evidens exemplum. Nam primo modo disponit medius color ad extremos, et tepiditas ad frigiditatem; et superveniente extremo, medius color tollitur, propter hoc

quod medium non tantum ad extremum disponebat, sed etiam repugnabat. Secundo modo disponit transparentia ad lumen. Nam superveniente lumine, transparentia et pervietas non tollitur, sed magis perficitur et decoratur.

Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est in ipsarum virtutum habitibus, quae disponunt ad gloriae complementum. Nam quaedam disponunt sic, quod habent aliquo modo oppositionem, sicut fides et spes, quae dicunt ipsius crediti et sperati absentiam et carentiam, quorum opposita sunt in gloria, scilicet visio aperta et tentio firma: et ideo necesse est, hos habitus tolli et evacuari per adventum gloriae¹⁰. — Et est alia dispositio, quae non habet rationem oppositionis, sed tantum dispositionis; et talis dispositio est caritas, quae ad gloriam disponit, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, non tamen habet repugnantiam ad ipsam, immo conformitatem expressam. Et ideo quantum ad habitum non evacuatur, sed dum tollitur imperfectio, ipse habitus perficitur et consummatur.

Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, quare caritas magis conformatur complemento gloriae quam alius habitus virtutis theologicae; huius potest triplex ratio assignari, quarum una attenditur penes qualitatem ipsorum habituum, altera vero penes dignitatem potentiarum, tertia vero penes largitatem divinorum munerum. — Quantum ad differentem qualitatem habituum ratio sumitur talis: quia dilectio est respectu absentis et praesentis; visio vero et tentio non est nisi respectu habiti et praesentis: exspectatio vero et credulitas est tantummodo respectu non habiti et absentis: et ideo tam actus quam habitus ipsius caritatis statui patriae et viae est communis: et per hoc magis conformis est caritas viae caritati patriae, quam habitus credendi habitui videndi, vel quam exspectatio tentioni.

Penes dignitatem ipsarum potentiarum attenditur ratio sic: quia, sicut vult Bernardus, de Amore Dei¹¹, «ubi deficit intellectus, ibi proficit affectus». Et Dionysius septimo de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo de sapientia¹² dicit, quod multo altius ascendit affectus noster et vis affectiva quam vis cognitiva. Ait enim sic: «Oportet agnoscere, nostrum intellectum quandam habere potentiam ad intelligendum, per quam videt intelligibilia, unitionem vero excedentem intellectus naturam, per quam coniungitur ad ea quae sunt ultra se». Et quoniam altius

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elevatur ipsa vis unitiva in homine, ideo habet quandam praecipuam excellentiam dignitatis, et habitus ipsam perficiens est aliis habitibus maior et excellentior ac per hoc statui gloriae conformior.

Penes largitatem divinorum etiam munerum ratio sumitur: quia viris sanctis Dominus largitatem suae benignitatis quodam modo communicat et praegustare facit dulcedinem aeternae refectionis, ut in tribulationibus non succumbant et in vastitate eremi prae ariditate et inopia refectionis non deficiant. Cum ergo sapere caelestia non possit nisi gustus dispositus secundum dispositionem illi statui convenientem; divinae largitatis munus hoc requisivit, ut gustui nostro daretur habitus et dispositio, secundum quam statui gloriae esset conformis. Haec autem dispositio est habitus caritatis, per quam dispositi sumus ad spiritualia degustanda, secundum quod vult magister Hugo¹³. Ideo caritatis habitus non evacuatur, sed magis consummatur in patria. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod perfectum evacuat illud quod est ex parte; dicendum, quod ex parte dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter, secundum quod dupliciter dicitur esse aliquid secundum quid. Uno modo dicitur aliquid secundum quid, quod tantum deficit ab eo quod est simpliciter, sicut albus secundum pedem est albus secundum quid. Alio modo dicitur aliquid secundum quid, quod non tantum deficit, sed etiam repugnat, sicut homo mortuus respectu hominis¹⁴. Sic et aliquid dicitur ex parte dupliciter: uno modo, secundum quod sonat in imperfectionem; alio modo, secundum quod sonat in imperfectionem et oppositionem. Et primo modo potest dici caritas ex parte; et quod sic est ex parte, non evacuatur, sed consummatur et quodam modo integratur, ut quasi totum ex partibus conficiatur. Secundo autem modo habitus fidei et spei est ex parte; et hoc modo dicit Apostolus illud quod est ex parte fore evacuandum, cum venerit id quod perfectum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cessante causa, cessat effectus: dicendum, quod fides et spes non dicuntur esse causa caritatis, nisi quia disponunt ad actum eius¹⁵, et hoc non simpliciter, sed secundum statum viae; nam in statu patriae ipsa visio disponit ad diligendum perfecte. Et ideo ratio illa non valet, quia nec proprie est causa nec secundum omnem statum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordinans ad aliquid cessat, obtento eo, ad quod disponebat et inclinabat; dicendum, quod illud est verum de eo quod solum habet rationem viae; caritas autem non tantummodo est dispositio ad tendendum et eundum in caelum, sed etiam ad quiescendum. Sicut enim lapis eodem pondere, quo movetur ad terram, quiescit ibi, cum ad terram pervenerit; sic et suo modo intelligendum est in pondere amoris sive in habitu caritatis: et de eo, quod isto modo ordinat et inclinat aliquid in finem, nec oportet, ipsum cessare in finis et termini assecutione.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est beatificatio, ubi perfectior est unio; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quod obiicit, quod perfectius uniretur Deus animae, si uniretur absque caritate; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia anima non est disposita ad hoc, quod uniatur Deo per gloriam, nisi interveniat habitus, quo ipsi conformetur et quo elevetur et quodam modo fortiter alligetur¹⁶. Unio enim beatitudinis est per cognitionem et amorem; unde sicut habitus diligendi non facit ad dilectionis diminutionem, immo potius ad perfectionem; sic etiam non facit ad illius unionis imperfectionem, sed potius ad perfectionem et complementum. Unde quod dicit, quod magis unitur quod unitur sine medio quam cum medio; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de medio, quod facit distare, non autem de eo, quod facit approximare et ad unionem magis reddit habilem, cuiusmodi est vinculum caritatis.

Article III. On the duration of charity by comparison to the reward.

Next it is asked about the duration of charity by comparison to the reward itself. And concerning this three things are asked.

The first is, whether through glory it happens that the habit of charity is emptied out.

The second is, whether it happens that the habit of charity is enlarged in the fatherland.

The third is, whether it happens that the order of charity is changed in the fatherland.

Question I. Whether it happens that the habit of charity is emptied out in the fatherland.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it happens that the habit of charity is emptied out in the fatherland. And that it is not seems true.

1. The first to the Corinthians, 13¹: Charity never falls away; there the Gloss: "Neither in this world nor in the future, even though its works cease."

2. Likewise, the act of charity is to love God for His own sake and above all things, and with the whole heart and with the whole soul and with the whole mind²; but this act befits the state of glory more than that of the way: therefore the habit of charity most befits the glorious state; and if this, then it is not emptied out in it.

3. Likewise, it belongs to charity itself, or love, to unite, according to that which blessed Dionysius says³: "We call love a uniting power"; but we are more united in the fatherland than on the way: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it belongs to love to assimilate, according to that which Hugh of St. Victor says⁴, that "the soul is transformed into the image of that which it loves"; but we shall be more like in the fatherland than now, according to that of the first of John 3: When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: if therefore the perfection of assimilation most befits the state of glory, it seems that it most befits that state also to have the habit of charity.

On the contrary: 1. The first to the Corinthians, 13⁵: When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be emptied out; but that is in part which is imperfect; but the charity of the way is imperfect, because there is a fire in Sion and a furnace in Jerusalem, according to what is said in Isaiah: therefore it seems that the habit of charity is emptied out in the fatherland.

2. Likewise, when the cause ceases, the effect ceases, therefore when the cause is emptied out, the effect is emptied out; but "faith generates hope, hope generates charity": since therefore in the fatherland the habit of faith and of hope is emptied out, as was shown above⁶; it seems likewise that the habit of charity is emptied out.

3. Likewise, that which orders to some end and term ceases when one has arrived at it; but charity is a weight inclining the soul and raising it, that it may tend upward⁷: since therefore the soul has been set on high through glory, it seems that it no longer has the habit of charity.

4. Likewise, the greater the union of the soul to God, the more perfectly the soul is beatified; but that is more united which is united immediately than that which is united through a medium: therefore if the soul is perfectly beatified in glory, it seems that between the soul and God there is not to be placed an intervening charity⁸: it seems therefore that the habit of charity ceases when the completion of beatitude supervenes.

Conclusion.

The habit of charity in the fatherland is not emptied out, but consummated.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt charity in the fatherland is not emptied out, but consummated, according to what the Apostle expressly says⁹. For the understanding of this it must be noted that one disposition has opposition with respect to that which is disposed, but another is one which simply disposes; and the first indeed is emptied out by the coming of that to which it disposes; but the second is perfected and consummated. And there is an evident example of this kind. For in the first way an intermediate color disposes to the extremes, and tepidity to coldness; and when the extreme supervenes, the intermediate color is taken away, on account of this

that the intermediate not only disposed to the extreme, but also was repugnant. In the second way transparency disposes to light. For when light supervenes, transparency and clearness are not taken away, but rather perfected and adorned.

In this way too it must be understood in the habits of the virtues themselves, which dispose to the completion of glory. For some dispose in such a way that they have in some manner opposition, like faith and hope, which bespeak the absence and lack of the very thing believed and hoped for, whose opposites are in glory, namely open vision and firm holding: and therefore it is necessary that these habits be taken away and emptied out by the coming of glory¹⁰. — And there is another disposition, which has not the character of opposition, but only of disposition; and such a disposition is charity, which disposes to glory as the imperfect to the perfect, yet has no repugnance to it, but rather express conformity. And therefore as to habit it is not emptied out, but while the imperfection is taken away, the habit itself is perfected and consummated.

But if the reason of this be asked, why charity is conformed more to the completion of glory than another habit of a theological virtue; of this a threefold reason can be assigned, of which one is regarded with respect to the quality of the habits themselves, another with respect to the dignity of the powers, the third with respect to the largesse of the divine gifts. — As to the differing quality of the habits the reason is taken thus: because love is with respect to the absent and the present; but vision and holding are only with respect to what is had and present: but expectation and believing are only with respect to what is not had and absent: and therefore both the act and the habit of charity itself are common to the state of the fatherland and of the way: and through this the charity of the way is more conformed to the charity of the fatherland than the habit of believing to the habit of seeing, or than expectation to holding.

With respect to the dignity of the powers themselves the reason is regarded thus: because, as Bernard holds, On the Love of God¹¹, "where the intellect fails, there affection profits." And Dionysius, in the seventh [chapter] of the Divine Names, in the chapter on wisdom¹², says that our affection and the affective power ascends much higher than the cognitive power. For he says thus: "It must be acknowledged that our intellect has a certain power for understanding, by which it sees intelligibles, but a union exceeding the nature of the intellect, by which it is joined to those things which are beyond it." And because

the uniting power itself is raised higher in man, therefore it has a certain special excellence of dignity, and the habit perfecting it is greater and more excellent than the other habits, and through this more conformed to the state of glory.

With respect to the largesse of the divine gifts too the reason is taken: because to holy men the Lord in a certain manner communicates the largesse of His benignity and makes them foretaste the sweetness of the eternal refreshment, that in tribulations they may not succumb and in the wasteness of the desert they may not fail through the dryness and want of refreshment. Since therefore one cannot savor heavenly things unless the taste be disposed according to a disposition befitting that state; the gift of the divine largesse required this, that there should be given to our taste a habit and disposition according to which it should be conformed to the state of glory. And this disposition is the habit of charity, by which we are disposed to taste spiritual things, according to what Master Hugh holds¹³. Therefore the habit of charity is not emptied out, but rather consummated in the fatherland. — And the reasons which are on this side are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected first to the contrary, that the perfect empties out that which is in part; it must be said that something is said to be "in part" in two ways, according as something is said in two ways to be "in a certain respect." In one way something is said [to be] in a certain respect, which only falls short of that which is simply, as a man white as to the foot is white in a certain respect. In another way something is said [to be] in a certain respect, which not only falls short, but also is repugnant, as a dead man with respect to a man¹⁴. So too something is said to be "in part" in two ways: in one way, according as it sounds toward imperfection; in another way, according as it sounds toward imperfection and opposition. And in the first way charity can be said [to be] in part; and that which is in part in this way is not emptied out, but consummated and in a certain manner integrated, so that the whole is as it were made up out of its parts. But in the second way the habit of faith and of hope is in part; and in this way the Apostle says that what is in part is to be emptied out, when that which is perfect shall come.

2. To that which is objected, that when the cause ceases, the effect ceases: it must be said that faith and hope are not said to be the cause of charity, except because they dispose to its act¹⁵, and this not simply, but according to the state of the way; for in the state of the fatherland vision itself disposes to loving perfectly. And therefore that reasoning does not hold, because it is neither properly a cause nor [a cause] according to every state.

3. To that which is objected, that what orders to something ceases when one has obtained that to which it disposed and inclined; it must be said that that is true of that which has only the character of the way; but charity is not only a disposition for tending and going into heaven, but also for resting. For just as a stone, by the same weight by which it is moved toward the earth, rests there when it has reached the earth; so too in its own manner it must be understood in the weight of love or in the habit of charity: and of that which in this manner orders and inclines something to an end, it is not necessary that it cease at the attainment of the end and term.

4. To that which is objected, that the beatification is greater where the union is more perfect; it must be said that this is true; but as to what it objects, that God would be more perfectly united to the soul if He were united without charity; it must be said that this is false: because the soul is not disposed for this, that it be united to God through glory, unless there intervene a habit by which it is conformed to Him and by which it is raised and in a certain manner strongly bound¹⁶. For the union of beatitude is through cognition and love; whence just as the habit of loving does not make for a diminishing of love, but rather for perfection; so also it does not make for an imperfection of that union, but rather for perfection and completion. Whence as to what he says, that that which is united without a medium is more united than that which is with a medium; it must be said that that holds true of a medium which makes [things] stand apart, but not of that which makes [them] approach and renders [the soul] more apt for union, of which kind is the bond of charity.