Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 32
Quaestio V. Utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Ioannis tertio1: Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret; sed qui dat aliquid pro aliquo magis diligit illud, pro quo dat, quam illud quod commutat: si ergo Deus Filium suum dedit pro salute generis humani, videtur, quod magis genus humanum quam Christum dilexerit.
2. Item, Christus homo est bonitatis finitae, genus2 humanum, cum sit multiplicabile de se in personas innumerabiles, habet quodam modo bonitatem infinitam; sed quod plus habet de ratione boni plus habet a Deo diligi: ergo videtur, quod Deus magis diligat totum humanum genus quam illum hominem solum.
3. Item, «propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis3»; sed Filius Dei incarnatus fuit propter genus humanum salvandum, et humana illa natura fuit assumta pro redimenda tota natura humana: ergo magis diligebat Deus ipsam naturam, propter quam carnem assumsit, quam illam quam assumsit: ergo idem quod prius.
4. Item, stultus est qui commutat rem maioris valoris pro re minoris valoris: si ergo Deus in redimendo genus humanum non usus est stultitia, immo potius sapientia; non perdidit, sed lucratus est: ergo maius bonum fuit illud quod redemit, quam illud per quod redemit. Et quod magis est bonum magis diligit: si ergo Deus humanum genus per Christum redemit, videtur, quod magis ipsum genus totum quam Christum dilexerit.
Sed contra: 1. Ad Philippenses secundo4: Dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen; sed secundum dignitatem communicati nominis attenditur praerogativa amoris: ergo si Christo etiam secundum humanam naturam nomen super omne nomen communicavit, videtur, quod ipsum super omnia dilexerit.
2. Item, Ioannis tertio5: Datus est ei spiritus non ad mensuram: si ergo aliis omnibus datur spiritus ad mensuram, et secundum quod Deus excellentius spiritum tribuit, secundum hoc eminentius diligit: videtur ergo, quod magis dilexerit Christum quam totum genus humanum.
3. Item, aut Deus appretiabatur illum hominem tantum quantum genus humanum totum, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum; si non: ergo non reputavit sufficiens pretium: ergo per mortem Christi non fuit ei satisfactum. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, quia abundantissime satisfactum fuit Deo per mortem Filii sui; videtur, quod maioris pretii fuit Christus quam totum genus humanum.
4. Item, in infinitum maius est esse Deum quam habere Deum; sed Deus sic dilexit Christum, quod fecit ipsum esse Deum, alios vero sic diligit, quod facit eos suum habitaculum6: ergo in infinitum plus dilexit Christum quam totum genus humanum.
Conclusio.
Deus plus dilexit Christum quam totum genus humanum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Christus nominat7 personam in duabus naturis, quarum una est nobilitatis et dignitatis infinitae, et ipsa persona in se; et natura unita ratione personae habet quandam nobilitatem et dignitatem singularem et inaestimabilem. Ergo absque omni calumnia potest concedi et dici, quod Deus magis dilexerit et diligat Christum quam totum genus humanum. Et hoc satis expresse colligitur ex verbis Anselmi8, ubi ostendit, quod vita illius hominis praeponderabat toti mundo, immo etiam mille mundis. — Propterea rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carius habetur illud quod emitur, quam pretium, quo emitur; dicendum, quod illud est verum, quando pretium ab emente omnino alienatur et transfertur in domi- p. 706 nium alienum; sic autem non est in proposito, quia Pater non tradebat Christum sine spe rehabendi ipsum, immo sic tradidit eum ad mortem temporalem, ut sine morae dispendio suscitaret eum ad vitam immortalem. Unde quamvis Christus vitam suam pro nobis posuerit, non tamen illam amisit; quia eadem virtute, qua animam posuit volendo pati, ipsam resumsit volendo resurgere9.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod genus humanum est bonitatis infinitae, cum sit in infinitum multiplicabile; respondendum est per interemptionem10 utriusque. Quamvis enim genus humanum sit in infinitum multiplicabile, quantum est de se, per generationis successionem, si tempus et motus in infinitum duraret; tamen, quantumcumque multiplicetur, semper est actu finitum et bonitatis finitae. Humana vero natura in Christo ratione gratiae unionis, per quam datur spiritus non ad mensuram, quodam modo habet immensitatis dignitatem, ob quam totum genus humanum excedit quasi improportionabiliter. Et ideo ad illam rationem respondendum est per interemptionem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis; dicendum, quod illud verum est, secundum quod propter dicit habitudinem causae finalis principalis, non prout dicit habitudinem rationis inducentis. Humanum vero genus respectu incarnationis et nativitatis Christi non fuit ratio finaliter movens, sed quodam modo inducens. Non enim Christus ad nos finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum, quia non caput propter membra, sed membra propter caput. Ratio tamen inducens ad tantum bonum fuit nostrae reparationis remedium, sicut in principio huius tertii libri11 fuit ostensum. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod genus humanum sit melius, quia minus bonum potest inducere ad faciendum maius bonum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod stultus est mercator, qui emit rem carius, quam valeat; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem nisi in eo mercatore, qui habet indigentiam pretii et potius intendit in mercando se ipsum ditare quam alienam inopiam relevare. Non sic autem est in Deo, qui dives est in misericordia12 et bonorum nostrorum non indiget; qui non mercatur propter suam utilitatem augendam, sed propter nostram inopiam relevandam; qui etiam non mercatur ad suae utilitatis promotionem, sed potius ad liberalitatis ostensionem. Et propterea maiori pretio voluit nos redimere, quam nos valeremus, ut, eius liberalitatem circa nos cognoscentes, ex totis praecordiis eidem adhaereremus, ut eum diligeremus et pretiositatem etiam nostram ex tanti pretii immensitate melius cognosceremus. — Praeterea, Deus non redimebat ab alio, sed a se ipso. Manus enim misericordiae redimebat a manu iustitiae, in qua redemptione non tantum considerabatur pretiositas rei emptae, sed etiam dignitas ipsius iustitiae, cui illatum fuerat damnum et offensa. Et quia offensio divinae iustitiae immensae quandam habebat immensitatem; ideo, quamvis homo redemptus non esset valoris infiniti, necessarium tamen fuit, ipsum redimi pretio multo maioris et immensioris valoris, quam sit valor generis humani13.14
---
Question V. Whether God loved the human kind more than Christ.
Fifthly it is asked, whether God loved the human kind more than Christ. And that [He did], seems to be the case:
1. John, chapter three1: So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son; but he who gives something for the sake of something loves that more, for the sake of which he gives, than that which he exchanges: if therefore God gave His Son for the salvation of the human kind, it seems that He loved the human kind more than Christ.
2. Likewise, Christ the man is of finite goodness, [whereas] the human kind2, since it is of itself multipliable into innumerable persons, has in a certain way an infinite goodness; but what has more of the formal character of the good has more of being loved by God: therefore it seems that God loves the whole human kind more than that man alone.
3. Likewise, «on account of which each thing [is so], that too [is so] the more3»; but the Son of God was incarnate for the saving of the human kind, and that human nature was assumed for the redeeming of the whole human nature: therefore God loved more that nature itself, on account of which He assumed flesh, than that which He assumed: therefore the same as before.
4. Likewise, he is foolish who exchanges a thing of greater value for a thing of lesser value: if therefore God in redeeming the human kind did not use foolishness, but rather wisdom; He did not lose, but gained: therefore that which He redeemed was a greater good than that through which He redeemed. And what is more good He loves more: if therefore God redeemed the human kind through Christ, it seems that He loved that whole kind more than Christ.
On the contrary: 1. To the Philippians, chapter two4: He gave Him a name which is above every name; but the prerogative of love is attended to according to the dignity of the name communicated: therefore if He communicated to Christ, even according to His human nature, a name above every name, it seems that He loved Him above all things.
2. Likewise, John, chapter three5: The Spirit was given to Him not by measure: if therefore to all others the Spirit is given by measure, and according as God more excellently bestows the Spirit, accordingly He more eminently loves: it seems therefore that He loved Christ more than the whole human kind.
3. Likewise, either God valued that man as much as the whole human kind, or not. If so, I have what I propose; if not: therefore He did not reckon [it] a sufficient price: therefore by the death of Christ satisfaction was not made to Him. But if this is manifestly false, because most abundantly satisfaction was made to God by the death of His Son; it seems that Christ was of greater price than the whole human kind.
4. Likewise, it is infinitely greater to be God than to have God; but God so loved Christ that He made Him to be God, whereas others He so loves that He makes them His dwelling-place6: therefore He loved Christ infinitely more than the whole human kind.
Conclusion.
God loved Christ more than the whole human kind.
I respond: It must be said that "Christ" names7 a person in two natures, of which one is of infinite nobility and dignity, namely the person in itself; and the united nature, by reason of the person, has a certain singular and inestimable nobility and dignity. Therefore without any calumny it can be conceded and said that God loved and loves Christ more than the whole human kind. And this is gathered sufficiently expressly from the words of Anselm8, where he shows that the life of that man outweighed the whole world, indeed even a thousand worlds. — Therefore the reasons which are adduced for this side are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected, that what is bought is held more dear than the price by which it is bought; it must be said that this is true when the price is wholly alienated from the buyer and transferred into the dominion of another; but it is not so in the case at hand, because the Father did not hand over Christ without hope of having Him back again, but rather He so handed Him over to temporal death that without the loss of delay He might raise Him to immortal life. Hence although Christ laid down His life for us, yet He did not lose it; because by the same power by which He laid down His soul in willing to suffer, He took it up again in willing to rise9.
2. To that which is objected, that the human kind is of infinite goodness, since it is infinitely multipliable; the response must be made by the negation10 of both. For although the human kind is infinitely multipliable, as far as it is of itself, through the succession of generation, if time and motion were to endure infinitely; yet, however much it be multiplied, it is always actually finite and of finite goodness. But the human nature in Christ, by reason of the grace of union, through which the Spirit is given not by measure, has in a certain way the dignity of immensity, on account of which it exceeds the whole human kind almost disproportionately. And therefore to that reason the response must be made by negation.
3. To that which is objected: «on account of which each thing [is so], that too [is so] the more»; it must be said that that is true insofar as on account of expresses the relation of a principal final cause, not insofar as it expresses the relation of an inducing reason. But the human kind, with respect to the incarnation and nativity of Christ, was not a reason finally moving, but in a certain way inducing. For Christ is not finally ordered to us, but we are finally ordered to Him, because the head [is] not on account of the members, but the members on account of the head. Yet the reason inducing to so great a good was the remedy of our reparation, as was shown at the beginning of this third book11. But from this it does not follow that the human kind is better, because a lesser good can induce to the doing of a greater good.
4. To that which is objected last, that the merchant is foolish who buys a thing more dearly than it is worth; it must be said that this holds true only in the case of that merchant who has need of the price and intends rather, in trading, to enrich himself than to relieve another's want. But it is not so in God, who is rich in mercy12 and has no need of our goods; who does not trade for the increasing of His own advantage, but for the relieving of our want; who also does not trade for the promotion of His own advantage, but rather for the showing of His liberality. And therefore He willed to redeem us at a greater price than we were worth, so that, knowing His liberality toward us, we might cleave to Him with our whole heart, so that we might love Him and might also better know our own preciousness from the immensity of so great a price. — Moreover, God did not redeem from another, but from Himself. For the hand of mercy redeemed from the hand of justice, in which redemption there was considered not only the preciousness of the thing bought, but also the dignity of justice itself, to which damage and offense had been brought. And because the offense of the immense divine justice had a certain immensity; therefore, although the redeemed man was not of infinite value, it was nevertheless necessary that he be redeemed at a price of much greater and more immense value than is the value of the human kind13.14
---
- Vers. 16.Verse 16.
- Vat. sed genus, edd. 1, 2 ergo genus, complures codd. ergo tantum, omissa voce genus.The Vatican edition [reads] sed genus, editions 1, 2 ergo genus, very many codices ergo tantum, the word genus being omitted.
- Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — In conclus. pro ipsum naturam edd. ipsam humanam naturam.Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 2. — In the conclusion, for ipsum naturam the editions [read] ipsam humanam naturam.
- Vers. 9: Donavit illi nomen etc. Cfr. supra pag. 244, nota 5. — In conclus. ante communicavit Vat. supplet Deus.Verse 9: He bestowed on Him a name etc. Cf. above, p. 244, note 5. — In the conclusion, before communicavit the Vatican edition supplies Deus.
- Vers. 31. Vide supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.Verse 31. See above, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2.
- Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. Pro sic diligit cod. Z dz diligit; multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt sic ante diligit.Cf. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, in the body. For sic diligit codex Z [reads] dz diligit; many codices and editions 1, 2 omit sic before diligit.
- De vi nominis Christi vide supra d. 18. dub. 2.On the force of the name Christ see above, d. 18, dub. 2.
- Liber II. Cur Deus homo, c. 14.Book II of Why God Became Man, c. 14.
- Respicitur Ioan. 10, 18; cfr. supra d. 21. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. et dub. 1. seq.Reference is made to John 10:18; cf. above, d. 21, a. 1, q. 1, reply to 1, and dub. 1 ff.
- Vide supra pag. 640, nota 2.See above, p. 640, note 2.
- Dist. 1. a. 2. q. 2. — Superius pro ratio finaliter movens cod. Z ratio finalis et movens. In fine solut. pro maius bonum cod. K magis bonum.Dist. 1, a. 2, q. 2. — Above, for ratio finaliter movens codex Z [reads] ratio finalis et movens. At the end of the solution, for maius bonum codex K [reads] magis bonum.
- Eph. 2, 4. — Subinde respicitur Ps. 15, 2: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. — Supra in principio solutionis pro quam valeat cod. A quam valet. Inferius voci liberalitatis codd. U V praemittunt suae, et non ita multo post pro valeremus et adhaereremus cod. Z substituit valeamus et adhaereamus.Eph. 2:4. — Thereupon reference is made to Ps. 15:2: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods. — Above, at the beginning of the solution, for quam valeat codex A [reads] quam valet. Below, before the word liberalitatis codices U V prefix suae, and not much later for valeremus and adhaereremus codex Z substitutes valeamus and adhaereamus.
- Cfr. August., Serm. 130. n. 2. seqq.Cf. Augustine, Sermon 130, n. 2 ff.
- Cfr. supra d. 19. dub. 4. et d. 20. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.Cf. above, d. 19, dub. 4, and d. 20, q. 3. — See the scholion to the preceding question.