Dist. 32, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 32
# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de situ huius partis. Cum enim agere de dilectione Dei spectet ad primum librum1, videtur, quod tractatus iste male in hoc tertio situetur. Quodsi tu dicas, quod Magister hoc facit, quia eadem est dilectio, qua nos diligimus Deum, et qua Deus diligit nos; tunc obiicitur, quod tota ista pars, quae est de caritate, male hic situetur. Si enim caritas non est habitus virtutis, sed potius donum increatum2, quod est Spiritus sanctus; videtur, quod de ipsa non debeat determinari inter alias virtutes.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ordo situationis istius capituli attenditur secundum opinionem Magistri, qua posuit, sicut tangit in littera3, quod eadem est dilectio, qua Deus diligit nos, et qua nos diligimus Deum. Et si tu obiicias, quod tunc non debuit determinare de caritate inter alias virtutes; respondetur pro ipso, quod hoc non fecit, quia caritas sit species virtutis, sed quia caritas est radix virtutum. In dono enim amoris, quod est Spiritus sanctus, ceteri virtutum habitus donantur4. — Potest etiam aliter dici, quod hic per accidens introducitur illud capitulum. Quia enim dilectio Dei est exemplar nostrae dilectionis, ideo ad maiorem evidentiam introducitur hic tractatus de ipsa; vel certe, ut assignetur hic differentia dilectionis divinae ad dilectionem nostram, sive praecellentia; quia, cum dilectio nostra sit affectio ordinata, dilectio Dei non est nisi divina substantia vel usia5.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod dilectio Dei est divina usia. Si ergo6 dilectio Dei est substantia et essentia, ergo videtur, quod Deum diligere est Deum esse: cum ergo Deus non sit aliud a se, videtur, quod nec aliud a se diligat. — Item, Deus incipit aliquem diligere: ergo si dilectio eius7 est eius essentia, videtur, quod Deus incipiat esse. — Item, nullum aeternum est temporale, et nullum temporale aeternum; sed dilectio Dei, qua diligit viros iustos, est temporalis, Dei substantia8 est aeterna: ergo Dei dilectio non est divina substantia.
Respondeo: Ad haec et consimilia breviter est dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de dilectione Dei: aut a parte principalis significati, aut a parte connotati. Si loquamur de ipsa quantum ad principale significatum, sic est Dei essentia et est quid aeternum, nec est aliud quam Deus. Si vero loquamur quantum ad connotatum, sic connotat quid temporale et habet respectum ad extrinsecum9, quod est a Deo diversum et quod non est Dei substantia, sed cuius Dei substantia est causa; et quantum ad hoc currunt illa tria obiecta. Et sic patet responsio ad omnia10.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Absit, ut Deus aliquem temporaliter diligat. Videtur enim falsum. Aliquis enim, qui modo est malus, incipit esse bonus; sed Deus malos odit et bonos diligit: ergo cum iste desinat esse malus in tempore et incipiat esse bonus; videtur, quod Deus istum temporaliter desinat odire et incipiat ipsum diligere. — Item, in Deo idem est velle quod facere, sicut dicit Augustinus, et in libro primo11 fuit habitum: ergo idem est velle alicui bonum et facere ei bonum; sed Deus temporaliter alicui bonum facit: ergo videtur, quod temporaliter ei bonum velit, ergo temporaliter diligit.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est dilectio electionis et dilectio approbationis. Prima est aeterna, sicut et voluntas Dei; secunda vero ratione connotati potest esse ex tempore. Et de prima intelligit Augustinus, ipse autem opponit de secunda. — Vel aliter. Hoc quod est temporaliter potest referri ad verbum diligendi ratione actus principalis, vel ratione connotati. Si ratione actus principalis, sic est falsum. Hic est enim actus divinae voluntatis, qui est aeternus: et hoc modo intelligit Augustinus, sicut patet per litteram sequentem. Ait enim sic12: « Absit, ut Deus temporaliter aliquem diligat quasi nova dilectione, quae in ipso ante non erat ». Si autem intelligatur quantum ad connotatum, sic concedi potest, quod Deus temporaliter aliquem diligit; et in hoc sensu opponit.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod de non electis non est simpliciter concedendum, quod eos dilexerit: quia omnem hominem, quem Deus diligit in tempore, ab aeterno dilexit, cum dilectio Dei sit causa omnis boni; sed multi praesciti sunt, qui habent praesentem iustitiam et gratiam, quam eis Deus ab aeterno praeparavit et dare disposuit: ergo videtur, quod ab aeterno eos dilexerit.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum Deus magis diligat peccatorem praedestinatum quam iustum praescitum. Et quod magis peccatorem praedestinatum, videtur: quoniam sapientis est magis considerare finem et exitum rei quam initium vel progressum; sed Deus istum peccatorem, qui tamen est praedestinatus, scit ipsum futurum amicum suum finaliter, alium vero minime: ergo magis diligit eum. — Praeterea, isti vult dare aeternam beatitudinem et proponit quod est summum Bonum, alii vero non: ergo magis diligit peccatorem praedestinatum quam iustum praescitum. — Sed contra hoc est: quia iste peccator magis est Deo dissimilis quam iustus: ergo minus est amabilis. — Item, iste magis diligit Deum: ergo magis a Deo diligitur, cum Deus magis diligat diligentes se13.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut tactum est prius14, est dilectio approbationis, et est dilectio electionis. Dilectio approbationis, cum sit temporalis, respicit statum praesentem; dilectio vero praeelectionis, cum sit aeterna, respicit illum statum, in quo homo debet aeternaliter permanere. Et quoniam reprobi, etsi boni sint, non tamen finaliter permanere in bono dicuntur; ideo non vult Magister, quod a Deo aeternaliter diligantur, nisi verbum diligendi15 ratione propria distrahatur. Unde Magister bene concedit cum determinatione; sine vero determinatione dicit eam non esse concedendam, quia eius intellectus falsitati appropinquat.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod quaerebatur consequenter, quia quantum ad dilectionem temporalem, quae respicit statum praesentis iustitiae, magis diligit Deus iustum praescitum; quantum vero ad alium modum diligendi magis diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, si tamen est dicere ibi magis. — Quodsi quaeras, simpliciter loquendo, quem magis diligit; respondendum est, quod simpliciter magis diligit eum quem praedestinat, quam eum quem reprobat, quia non est quaestio de homine quantum ad qualitatem culpae, sed quantum ad ordinem naturae respectu gratiae et gloriae16.
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# DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is a doubt about the placement of this part. For since to treat of the love of God belongs to the first book1, it seems that this treatise is ill-placed in this third [book]. But if you say that the Master does this because the love by which we love God and that by which God loves us are the same, then it is objected that the whole of this part, which is about charity, is ill-placed here. For if charity is not a habit of virtue, but rather an uncreated gift2, which is the Holy Spirit, it seems that it ought not to be determined among the other virtues.
I respond: It must be said that the order of placing this chapter is regarded according to the opinion of the Master, by which he held, as he touches on in the text3, that the love by which God loves us and that by which we love God are the same. And if you object that then he ought not to have determined about charity among the other virtues, it is answered on his behalf that he did not do this because charity is a species of virtue, but because charity is the root of the virtues. For in the gift of love, which is the Holy Spirit, the other habits of the virtues are given4. — It can also be said otherwise, that this chapter is introduced here incidentally. For since the love of God is the exemplar of our love, this treatise about it is introduced here for greater clarity; or indeed, that the difference of divine love from our love, that is, its preeminence, may be assigned here; because, since our love is an ordered affection, the love of God is nothing other than the divine substance or usia5.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the love of God is the divine usia. If therefore6 the love of God is substance and essence, then it seems that to love God is to be God: since therefore God is not other than himself, it seems that he loves nothing other than himself either. — Likewise, God begins to love someone: therefore if his love7 is his essence, it seems that God begins to be. — Likewise, nothing eternal is temporal, and nothing temporal eternal; but the love of God by which he loves just men is temporal, [whereas] God's substance8 is eternal: therefore God's love is not the divine substance.
I respond: To these and similar [objections] it must be said briefly that there are two ways of speaking about the love of God: either from the side of the principal signified, or from the side of the connoted. If we speak of it as to the principal signified, thus it is the essence of God and is something eternal, nor is it other than God. But if we speak of it as to the connoted, thus it connotes something temporal and has a respect to something extrinsic9, which is diverse from God and which is not the substance of God, but of which God's substance is the cause; and as regards this, those three objections run their course. And thus the response to all of them is clear10.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Far be it that God should love anyone temporally. For it seems false. For someone who is now evil begins to be good; but God hates the evil and loves the good: therefore since this man ceases to be evil in time and begins to be good, it seems that God temporally ceases to hate this man and begins to love him. — Likewise, in God to will is the same as to do, as Augustine says, and it was held in the first book11: therefore to will good to someone and to do good to him are the same; but God temporally does good to someone: therefore it seems that he temporally wills good to him, therefore he loves [him] temporally.
I respond: It must be said that there is a love of election and a love of approbation. The first is eternal, just as the will of God is also; but the second, by reason of the connoted, can be from time. And Augustine understands [it] of the first, but he himself raises the objection about the second. — Or otherwise. This [word] temporally can be referred to the word of loving by reason of the principal act, or by reason of the connoted. If by reason of the principal act, thus it is false. For this is an act of the divine will, which is eternal: and in this way Augustine understands [it], as is clear from the following text. For he speaks thus12: « Far be it that God should love anyone temporally as if with a new love, which was not in him before ». But if it is understood as to the connoted, thus it can be conceded that God loves someone temporally; and in this sense he raises the objection.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that of the non-elect it is not to be simply conceded that he loved them: because every man whom God loves in time, he loved from eternity, since the love of God is the cause of every good; but there are many who are foreknown [but not elect] who have present justice and grace, which God prepared for them from eternity and disposed to give: therefore it seems that he loved them from eternity.
Along with this it is asked whether God loves the predestined sinner more than the foreknown just man. And that [he loves] the predestined sinner more, seems [to be the case]: since it belongs to the wise to consider more the end and outcome of a thing than its beginning or progress; but God knows that this sinner, who is nevertheless predestined, will be his friend finally, but the other not at all: therefore he loves him more. — Furthermore, to this one he wills to give eternal beatitude and sets before him what is the highest Good, but not to the other: therefore he loves the predestined sinner more than the foreknown just man. — But against this is: that this sinner is more unlike God than the just man: therefore he is less lovable. — Likewise, this [just man] loves God more: therefore he is loved more by God, since God loves more those who love him13.
I respond: It must be said that, as was touched on before14, there is a love of approbation and a love of election. The love of approbation, since it is temporal, regards the present state; but the love of pre-election, since it is eternal, regards that state in which a man ought to remain eternally. And since the reprobate, even if they are good, are nevertheless not said to remain finally in the good, therefore the Master does not wish that they be loved by God eternally, unless the word of loving15 be drawn out according to its proper meaning. Hence the Master rightly concedes [it] with a qualification; but without the qualification he says it is not to be conceded, because the understanding of it approaches falsity.
And through this the response is clear to that which was asked consequently, that as to temporal love, which regards the state of present justice, God loves the foreknown just man more; but as to the other mode of loving he loves the predestined sinner more, if indeed one may speak of more there. — But if you ask, speaking simply, whom he loves more, it must be answered that simply he loves more the one whom he predestines than the one whom he reprobates, because the question is not about the man as to the quality of fault, but as to the order of nature with respect to grace and glory16.
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- In quo nempe agitur de Deo eiusque attributis. — Inferius pro quod Magister edd. cum multis codd. substituunt quod magis, refragantibus codd. A H K bb (aa a secunda manu).In which, namely, there is treatment of God and his attributes. — Below, for quod Magister the editions with many codices substitute quod magis, the codices A H K bb opposing (aa by a second hand). (p.708 n.4; picked-up footer hand-off from a1-q6, anchored to the Dub. I body.)
- Sic codd. A V (N a secunda manu), alii codd. et edd. creatum. Mox pro debeat cod. A deberet, codd. K N X et edd. 1, 2 debet, cod. U debeatur, codd. B C D E G H I L T V aa debetur.Thus codices A V (N by a second hand); other codices and editions [read] creatum. Soon, for debeat codex A [reads] deberet, codices K N X and editions 1, 2 debet, codex U debeatur, codices B C D E G H I L T V aa debetur. (p.708 n.5.)
- Hic c. 1. — Pro qua ponit codd. A G Z quam posuit.Here, chapter 1. — For qua ponit codices A G Z [read] quam posuit. (p.708 n.6.)
- Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Superius voci virtutum edd. praefigunt omnium.Cf. Book 1, Sent. d. 18, q. 1. — Above, to the word virtutum the editions prefix omnium. (p.708 n.7.)
- Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., hic circa lit.Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, here, on the text. (p.708 n.8.)
- Cod. A enim. Mox edd. voci substantia praeponunt divina.Codex A [reads] enim. Soon the editions prefix divina to the word substantia. (p.708 n.9.)
- Cod. A Dei.Codex A [reads] Dei. (p.708 n.10.)
- Fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam Dei dilectio; cod. T omittit Dei substantia est aeterna: ergo.Almost all codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] Dei dilectio; codex T omits Dei substantia est aeterna: ergo [God's substance is eternal: therefore]. (p.708 n.11.)
- Ita codd. V Z bb, alii codd. et edd. extrinsecus.Thus codices V Z bb; other codices and editions [read] extrinsecus. (p.709 n.1.)
- Cfr. supra q. 1, et 1. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. — Vide de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 31. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic circa lit.Cf. above, q. 1, and Book 1, Sent. d. 30, q. 1. — See on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. 1, q. 31, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here, a. 1; St. Thomas, here, on the text. (p.709 n.2.)
- Dist. 45, tam in lit. Magistri, c. 4, quam in Comment. a. 2 q. 1. seq., ubi Augustini testimonia ex l. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 2. n. 4, et IV. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2. afferuntur. Ceterum quae hic Augustino attribuuntur potius respondent verbis in illa Glossa allatis ex Cassiodoro super Ps. 144, 17. (loc. cit. q. 2. fundam. 2.): Deo hoc est velle quod facere, quia ex eius voluntate res habent esse.Dist. 45, both in the text of the Master, c. 4, and in the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1 ff., where the testimonies of Augustine from the book On Genesis against the Manichees c. 2, n. 4, and On the Trinity IV, c. 1, n. 2 are adduced. For the rest, what is here attributed to Augustine corresponds rather to the words adduced in that Gloss from Cassiodorus on Ps. 144, 17 (loc. cit., q. 2, fundam. 2): In God to will is the same as to do, because things have their being from his will. (p.709 n.3.)
- Libr. V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo superius pro Hic est enim... qui edd. Hoc enim est... quod.Book V, On the Trinity, c. 16, n. 17. See here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little above, for Hic est enim... qui the editions [read] Hoc enim est... quod. (p.709 n.4.)
- Prov. 8, 17: Ego diligentes me diligo.Prov. 8, 17: I love those who love me. (p.709 n.5.)
- Dub. praeced. — Non ita multo post pro debet cod. V habet, et item pro dicuntur cod. A debent.The preceding doubt. — Not much further on, for debet codex V [reads] habet, and likewise for dicuntur codex A debent. (p.709 n.6.)
- In textu huius dubii. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.In the text of this doubt. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. (p.709 n.7.)
- Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 32. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic a. 5. quaestiunc. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3.Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. 1, q. 32, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here, a. 1; St. Thomas, here, a. 5, little-question 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 4, little-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 2, q. 3. (p.709 n.8.)