Bonaventure

Le note numerate qui sotto corrispondono ai richiami nel corpo latino qui sopra e nella traduzione inglese. — The numbered footnotes below correspond to the markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation.

Cap. I. De periurio.

Nunc de periurio videamus. Periurium est mendacium iuramento firmatum. Hic quaeritur, utrum sit periurium, ubi non est mendacium. Quod quibusdam videtur ex auctoritate Hieronymi¹ dicentis: « Advertendum est, quod iusiurandum tres habet comites: veritatem, iudicium et iustitiam; si ista defuerint, non erit iuramentum, sed periurium. Ubi autem falsum iuratur, veritas deest ». Si ergo falsum iuretur, etsi non sit ibi intentio fallendi, videtur esse periurium, quia deest veritas.

Cap. II. An sit periurium quod non est mendacium.

Quibusdam placet, non esse periurium, ubi non est mendacium, et sicut dicitur aliquando falsum sine mendacio, ita iuratur falsum sine periurio. Falsum forte dixit Apostolus², cum se venturum ad Corinthios promisit; nec tamen, sicut ei imponebatur, culpam mendacii contraxit, quia sic animo sentiebat. Et si iuramento illud confirmasset, non periurium incurrisset, quia, quantum in ipso fuit, verum dixit; et si iurationem addidisset, quantum in se foret, verum iurasset, etsi aliter evenerit, quam dixit. Ideo, sicut quis non est mendax, nisi aliter sentiat animo, quam dicit, sive ita sit, sive non; ita videtur quibusdam, neminem periurum constitui, nisi aliter sentiat animo, quam loquitur, sive ita sit, sive non.

Cap. III. De triplici modo periurii.

Sed melius creditur et ille peierare, qui falsum, voluntate fallendi, iurat; et qui verum, putans falsum, iurat; et qui falsum, putans verum, quod falsum est, iurat. Unde Augustinus³: « Homines falsum iurant, vel cum fallunt, vel cum falluntur: aut putat homo, verum esse quod falsum est, et temere iurat; aut scit vel putat, falsum esse, et tamen pro vero iurat, et nihilominus cum scelere iurat. Distant autem ista periuria duo, quae commemoravi. Fac illum iurare, qui verum esse putat pro quo iurat; verum putat esse, et tamen falsum est: non ex animo iste peierat, sed fallitur. Hoc pro vero habet, quod falsum est; non pro

falsa re sciens iurationem interponit. Da alium qui scit, falsum esse, et dicit, verum esse; et iurat, tanquam verum sit, quod scit falsum esse; videtis, quam ista detestanda sit bellua. Fac alium qui putat, falsum esse, et iurat, tanquam verum sit; et forte verum est — verbi gratia, ut intelligatis, pluit in illo loco; interrogas hominem, et dicit pluisse; et tunc pluit ibi, sed putat non pluisse — periurus est. Interest, quemadmodum verbum procedat ex animo; ream linguam non facit nisi rea mens ». — His evidenter traditur, quod tripliciter peierat homo, ut supra diximus, dum vel sciens falsum iurat, vel putans falsum quod verum est, iurat, vel existimans verum quod falsum est, iurat. — Sed hoc extremum non videtur esse periurium, vel si periurium nominetur, eo quod falsum iuratur, non videtur esse reus periurii qui sic iurat, quia non est mens eius rea, et ideo nec lingua. — Immo eius mens rea est, dum iurare praesumit quod perspicue verum non deprehendit. Non ergo omne periurium mendacium est, nec omnis qui peierat, mentitur; sed omnis mentiendo iurans peierat, et omnis qui falsum iurat, sive mentiens, sive non, peierat.

Cum vero quis iurat quod verum est, existimans esse falsum; quaeritur, quid sit ibi periurium. Ipsa significatio vocis vera est; quia verum nescienter loquitur. Non igitur ipsa significatio vel falsum vel mendacium est, quia vera est; et quod verum est periurium non videtur esse. — Ad hoc dicimus, loqui sic, scilicet contra mentem, sub attestatione iuramenti esse periurium. Mentiri ergo, adhibita iuratione, periurium est. Periurium ergo est vel iurando loqui falsum cum intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui falsum sine intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui verum cum intentione fallendi. — Hic opponitur: si omnis qui falsum iurat, peierat; tunc qui alicui promittit dare sub certo termino aliquid, quod tamen non faciet, ex quo iuravit, peieravit, quia falsum iuravit. Non enim ita futurum erat, ut iuravit. — Ad hoc dici potest, quia non omnis qui iurat quod falsum est, ex quo iurat, periurus est, sicut iste, de quo agimus; sed ex quo propositum mutat, vel terminum transgreditur, iuratio talis fit periurium reatu.

Cap. IV. An iuratio sit malum.

Si autem quaeratur, utrum iurare sit malum; dicimus, aliquando malum esse, aliquando non. Sponte enim et sine necessitate iurare, vel falsum iurare peccatum grande est. Ex necessitate autem iurare, scilicet vel ad asserendam innocentiam, vel ad foedera pacis confirmanda, vel ad persuadendum auditoribus quod est eis utile, malum non est, quia necessarium est. Unde Augustinus⁴: « Iuramentum faciendum est in necessariis, cum pigri sint homines credere quod eis est utile. Iuratio non est bona, non tamen mala, cum est necessaria », id est, non est appetenda sicut bona, nec tamen fugienda tanquam mala, cum est necessaria. « Non est enim contra praeceptum Dei iuratio, sed ita intelligitur Dominus prohibuisse a iuramento, ut, quantum in ipso est, quisque non iuret — quod multi faciunt, in ore habentes iurationem tanquam magnum atque suave aliquid — Apostolus enim novit praeceptum Domini, et tamen iuravit⁵ ». Prohibemur ergo iurare vel cupiditate, vel delectatione iurandi. « Quod ergo Christus ait in Evangelio: Ego dico vobis, non iurare omnino; ita intelligitur praecepisse, ne quisquam sicut bonum appetat iuramentum et assiduitate iurandi labatur in periurium ». Quod vero addidit: « Sit sermo vester: est, est; non, non; bonum est et appetendum. Quod autem amplius est a malo est, id est, si iurare cogeris, scias, de necessitate venire infirmitatis eorum quibus aliquid suades; quae infirmitas utique malum est, unde nos quotidie liberari precamur dicentes: Libera nos a malo. Ideoque non dixit: quod amplius est malum est. Tu enim non facis malum, qui bene uteris iuratione, sed a malo est illius qui aliter non credit », id est ab infirmitate, quae aliquando poena est, aliquando poena et culpa. Ibi ergo Dominus prohibuit malum, suasit bonum, indulsit necessarium.

Cap. V. De iuramento, quod fit per creaturas.

Quaeritur etiam, utrum liceat iurare per creaturam. Quod non videtur, cum in Lege⁶ scriptum sit: Reddes autem Domino iuramenta tua; et Christus in Evangelio praecipiat, non iurare omnino, nec per caelum nec per terram nec per Ierosolymam nec per caput tuum. « Iudaeis quasi parvulis concessum fuit iurare per Creatorem, et praeceptum, ut, si iurare contingeret, non nisi per Creatorem iurarent, non per creaturam; quia iurantes per Angelos et elementa creaturas venerabantur honore; et melius erat hoc exhiberi Deo quam creaturis ». Infirmis ergo illud prohibuit, sanctis vero, qui in creaturis Creatorem venerabantur tantum, non prohibuit. Unde Ioseph⁷ per salutem Pharaonis iuravit, « Dei iudicium in eo veneratus, quo positus erat in infimis ». Christus vero ita per creaturas iurare prohibuit, ne vel aliquid divinum in eis crederetur, pro quo reverentia eis deberetur; vel ne per eas iurantes falsum homines se iuramento non teneri putarent.

Cap. VI. Quae iuratio sit gravior, an quae fit per Deum, an quae fit per creaturas, vel per Evangelium.

Si autem quaeritur, quis magis teneatur, an qui per Deum, an qui per Evangelium, vel per creaturas iurat; dicimus: qui per Deum, quia per eum haec sancta facta sunt. Unde Chrysostomus⁸: « Si qua causa fuerit, modicum videtur facere qui iurat per Deum; qui vero per Evangelium, maius aliquid fecisse videtur. Quibus dicendum est: Stulti, Scripturae propter Deum factae sunt, non Deus propter Scripturas »; ita et creaturae factae sunt propter Deum.

Cap. VII. Quid est dicere: per Deum.

Hic quaeritur, quid sit dicere: per Deum iuro; hoc est testem adhibere Deum. Iuravit enim Apostolus⁹ dicens: Testis est mihi Deus; ac si dixisset: per Deum ita est. Unde Augustinus: « Ridiculum est putare hoc: si dicas: per Deum, iuras; si dicas: testis est Deus, non iuras. Quid est enim per Deum nisi testis est Deus; aut quid est testis est Deus nisi per Deum? Quid est autem iurare nisi ius Deo reddere, quando per Deum iuras »? ius scilicet veritatis et non falsitatis. Item¹⁰: « Ecce dico caritati vestrae: et qui per lapidem iurat falsum periurus est »; quia non lapidem, qui non audit, sed eius Creatorem adhibet testem. Hoc est ergo iurare per quamlibet creaturam, scilicet Creatorem eius testem adhibere.

« Est etiam quoddam genus iuramenti gravissimum, quod fit per exsecrationem, ut cum homo dicit: si illud feci, illud patiar, vel illud contingat filiis meis ». Secundum quem modum accipitur etiam interdum, cum aliquis iurando dicit: per salutem meam, vel per filios meos, et huiusmodi. Obligat enim haec Deo. Unde Augustinus: « Cum quis ait: per salutem meam, salutem suam Deo obligat. Cum dicit: per filios meos, oppignerat eos Deo, ut hoc eveniat in caput eorum, quod exit de ore ipsius: si verum, verum; si falsum, falsum. Et sicut per hoc iurans aliquando hoc Deo obligat, ita per Deum iurans ipsum adhibet testem ». In omni ergo iuratione aut Deus testis adhibetur, aut creatura Deo obligatur et oppigneratur, ut hoc sit iurare, scilicet Deum testem adhibere, vel Deo aliquid oppignerare. Hoc est ergo iurare per quamlibet creaturam, scilicet Creatorem eius testem adhibere¹¹.

Cap. VIII. De illis qui iurant per falsos deos.

Post haec quaeritur, utrum fide eius utendum sit, qui per daemonia vel idola iuraverit. De hoc Augustinus scribens ad Publicolam¹² ait: « Te prius considerare volo, utrum, si quispiam per deos falsos iuraverit et fidem non servaverit, non tibi videtur bis peccasse. Bis utique peccavit, quia iuravit, per quos non debuit; et contra pollicitam fecit fidem, quod non debuit. Ideoque qui utitur fide illius, quem constat iurasse per deos falsos, et utitur non ad malum, sed ad bonum, non peccato illius se sociat, quo per daemonia iuravit, sed bono pacto eius, quo fidem servavit. Et sine dubitatione minus malum est per deos falsos iurare veraciter, quam per Deum verum fallaciter. Quanto enim per quod iuratur magis sanctum est, tanto magis est poenale periurium ».

Cap. IX. Quod iuramentum vel promissio contra Deum facta non est tenenda.

Nunc superest videre, utrum omne iuramentum implendum sit. Si enim quis aliquid iuraverit contra fidem et caritatem, quod observatum peiorem vergat in exitum, potius est mutandum quam adimplendum. Unde Ambrosius¹³: « Est contra officium nonnunquam promissum solvere sacramentum, ut Herodes fecit ». Item Isidorus: « In malis promissis rescinde fidem, in turpi voto muta decretum. Quod incaute vovisti ne facias; impia est promissio, quae scelere adimpletur ». Idem: « Non est observandum sacramentum, quo malum incaute promittitur, ut si quis adulterae perpetuam fidem cum ea permanendi polliceatur. Tolerabilius est enim non implere sacramentum quam permanere in stupro ». Item Beda¹⁴: « Si quid nos incautius iurare contigerit, quod observatum peiorem vergat in exitum, libere illud salubriori consilio mutandum noverimus; ac magis, instante necessitate, peierandum esse nobis, quam pro vitando periurio in aliud crimen gravius esse divertendum. Denique iuravit David¹⁵ per Deum occidere Nabal, virum stultum; sed ad primam intercessionem Abigail, feminae prudentis, remisit minas, revocavit ensem in vaginam, nec aliquid culpae se tali periurio contraxisse doluit ». Item Augustinus¹⁶: « Quod David iuramentum per sanguinis effusionem non implevit, maior pietas fuit. Iuravit David temere, sed non implevit iurationem maiori pietate ». — Ex his aliisque pluribus ostenditur, quaedam iuramenta non observanda esse. Et qui sic iurat vehementer peccat; cum autem mutat, bene facit; qui autem non mutat dupliciter peccat: et quia iniuste iuravit, et quia facit quod non debet.

Cap. X. Si est periurus qui non facit quod incaute iurat.

Qui vero mutat, utrum periurus debeat dici, solet quaeri. Beda supra¹⁷ tale iuramentum vocavit periurium. Ioannes etiam Apocrisarius¹⁸ orientalium sedium dixit: « Sermo patris nostri Sophronii significat, quod melius est, iurantem peierare quam servare sacramentum in fractione sanctarum imaginum ». Sed periurium dicitur tale iuramentum non observatum, et peierare dicitur qui non implet, quia falsum iurat, non quia inde reus sit, quod non observat, sed quia iuravit iniustum, ex quo reus est, sicut ille qui peierat.

Cap. XI. De illis qui verborum calliditate iurant.

Hoc etiam sciendum est, quod « quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus tamen, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille cui iuratur, intelligit. Dupliciter autem reus fit, qui et nomen Dei in vanum assumit et proximum in dolo capit¹⁹ ».

Cap. XII. De illo qui cogit aliquem iurare.

Quaeritur etiam, si peccet qui hominem iurare cogit. De hoc Augustinus²⁰ ait: « Qui exigit iurationem, multum interest, si nescit, illum iuraturum falsum, an scit. Si enim nescit, et ideo dicit: iura mihi, ut fides ei sit; non est peccatum, tamen humana tentatio est²¹. Si vero scit, eum fecisse, et cogit eum iurare, homicida est ». Idem: « Qui provocat hominem ad iurationem et scit, eum falsum iurare, vincit homicidam; quia homicida corpus occisurus est, ille animam, immo duas animas, et eius quem iurare provocavit, et suam ». Sancta Synodus decrevit, nisi pro pace facienda, ut omnes fideles ieiuni ad sacramenta accedant²².

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Ch. I. On perjury.

Let us now consider perjury. Perjury is a falsehood confirmed by an oath. Here it is asked whether there is perjury where there is no falsehood. This seems so to some from the authority of Jerome¹, who says: « It must be noted that an oath has three companions: truth, judgment, and justice; if these are lacking, there will not be an oath, but perjury. But where what is false is sworn, truth is lacking ». If therefore something false is sworn, even though there be no intention of deceiving, it seems to be perjury, because truth is lacking.

Ch. II. Whether there is perjury which is not a falsehood.

It is the view of some that there is no perjury where there is no falsehood, and that, just as something false is sometimes said without a falsehood, so what is false is sworn without perjury. The Apostle² perhaps said something false when he promised that he would come to the Corinthians; nor yet, as was charged against him, did he incur the fault of a falsehood, because he so felt in his mind. And if he had confirmed it with an oath, he would not have incurred perjury, because, as far as it lay in him, he spoke the truth; and if he had added an oath, as far as it was in himself, he would have sworn the truth, even though it turned out otherwise than he said. Therefore, just as a man is not a liar unless he feels otherwise in his mind than he says, whether it be so or not; so it seems to some that no one is made a perjurer unless he feels otherwise in his mind than he speaks, whether it be so or not.

Ch. III. On the threefold mode of perjury.

But it is better believed that he too perjures himself who swears what is false, with the will to deceive; and he who swears what is true, thinking it false; and he who swears what is false, thinking it true, while it is false. Hence Augustine³: « Men swear what is false either when they deceive or when they are deceived: either a man thinks that to be true which is false, and rashly swears; or he knows or thinks it to be false, and yet swears it as true, and nonetheless swears it with wickedness. Now these two perjuries which I have mentioned differ. Suppose a man swears who thinks that to be true for which he swears; he thinks it to be true, and yet it is false: this man does not perjure himself from his mind, but is deceived. He holds that for true which is false; not

falsely does he knowingly interpose an oath upon a matter. Take another who knows it to be false, and says it to be true; and swears, as though it were true, what he knows to be false; you see how detestable a monster this is. Take another who thinks it to be false, and swears as though it were true; and perhaps it is true — for example, that you may understand, it rained in such a place; you question a man, and he says it rained; and at that time it did rain there, but he thinks it did not rain — he is a perjurer. It matters in what way the word proceeds from the mind; nothing makes the tongue guilty except a guilty mind ». — By these things it is plainly handed down that a man perjures himself in three ways, as we have said above, when he either knowingly swears what is false, or swears thinking false what is true, or swears reckoning true what is false. — But this last does not seem to be perjury, or, if it be named perjury, since what is false is sworn, he who so swears does not seem to be guilty of perjury, because his mind is not guilty, and therefore neither is his tongue. — On the contrary, his mind is guilty, since he presumes to swear what he does not clearly perceive to be true. Therefore not every perjury is a falsehood, nor does everyone who perjures himself lie; but everyone who swears while lying perjures himself, and everyone who swears what is false, whether lying or not, perjures himself.

But when someone swears what is true, reckoning it to be false; it is asked what the perjury is there. The very signification of the utterance is true; because he unknowingly speaks the truth. Therefore the signification itself is neither false nor a falsehood, because it is true; and what is true does not seem to be perjury. — To this we say that to speak thus, namely against one's mind, under the attestation of an oath, is perjury. To lie, therefore, with an oath employed, is perjury. Perjury therefore is either to speak what is false while swearing with the intention of deceiving, or to speak what is false while swearing without the intention of deceiving, or to speak what is true while swearing with the intention of deceiving. — Here it is objected: if everyone who swears what is false perjures himself; then he who promises someone to give a certain thing within a fixed term, which nevertheless he will not do, has, from the fact that he swore, perjured himself, because he swore what is false. For it was not going to be so, as he swore. — To this it can be said that not everyone who swears what is false is, from the fact that he swears, a perjurer, like this man of whom we are speaking; but from the fact that he changes his purpose, or transgresses the term, such an oath becomes perjury in guilt.

Ch. IV. Whether an oath is an evil.

But if it be asked whether to swear is an evil; we say that it is sometimes an evil, sometimes not. For to swear willingly and without necessity, or to swear what is false, is a great sin. But to swear out of necessity, namely either to assert one's innocence, or to confirm covenants of peace, or to persuade hearers of what is useful to them, is not an evil, because it is necessary. Hence Augustine⁴: « An oath is to be made in necessary matters, since men are slow to believe what is useful to them. An oath is not good, yet not evil, when it is necessary », that is, it is not to be sought as good, nor yet shunned as evil, when it is necessary. « For an oath is not against the precept of God, but the Lord is understood to have forbidden swearing in such wise that, as far as it lies in oneself, each should not swear — which many do, having an oath in their mouth as some great and pleasant thing — for the Apostle knew the Lord's precept, and yet swore⁵ ». We are therefore forbidden to swear either from cupidity or from delight in swearing. « As for what Christ says in the Gospel: I say to you, do not swear at all; it is understood that he so commanded, lest anyone should seek an oath as a good and through assiduity in swearing slip into perjury ». But as for what he added: « Let your speech be: yes, yes; no, no; that is good and to be sought. But what is more than this is from evil, that is, if you are compelled to swear, know that it comes from the necessity of the infirmity of those whom you are persuading of something; which infirmity is certainly an evil, whence we daily pray to be freed, saying: Deliver us from evil. And therefore he did not say: what is more is evil. For you do not do evil, you who use an oath well, but it is from the evil of him who otherwise does not believe », that is, from the infirmity which is sometimes a punishment, sometimes a punishment and a fault. There, therefore, the Lord forbade the evil, urged the good, allowed the necessary.

Ch. V. On the oath which is made by creatures.

It is also asked whether it is lawful to swear by a creature. This does not seem so, since in the Law⁶ it is written: But you shall render to the Lord your oaths; and Christ in the Gospel commands not to swear at all, neither by heaven nor by earth nor by Jerusalem nor by your head. « To the Jews, as to little children, it was conceded to swear by the Creator, and commanded that, if it should happen that they swear, they should swear only by the Creator, not by a creature; because those swearing by Angels and the elements were venerating creatures with honor; and it was better that this be rendered to God than to creatures ». To the weak, therefore, he forbade it, but to the holy, who in creatures venerated only the Creator, he did not forbid it. Hence Joseph⁷ swore by the welfare of Pharaoh, « venerating the judgment of God in him, by which he was set over those in the lowest places ». But Christ forbade swearing by creatures in such wise lest anything divine be believed in them, on account of which reverence would be owed to them; or lest men, swearing falsely by them, should think themselves not bound by the oath.

Ch. VI. Which oath is graver, whether that which is made by God, or that which is made by creatures, or by the Gospel.

But if it be asked who is more bound, whether he who swears by God, or he who swears by the Gospel, or by creatures; we say: he who swears by God, because through him these holy things were made. Hence Chrysostom⁸: « If there be some cause, he who swears by God seems to do a small thing; but he who swears by the Gospel seems to have done something greater. To these it must be said: Fools, the Scriptures were made for the sake of God, not God for the sake of the Scriptures »; and so too creatures were made for the sake of God.

Ch. VII. What it is to say: by God.

Here it is asked what it is to say: I swear by God; this is to bring forward God as witness. For the Apostle⁹ swore, saying: God is my witness; as if he had said: by God it is so. Hence Augustine: « It is ridiculous to think this: if you say: by God, you swear; if you say: God is witness, you do not swear. For what is « by God » except « God is witness »; or what is « God is witness » except « by God »? But what is to swear except to render right to God, when you swear by God »? the right, namely, of truth and not of falsehood. Likewise¹⁰: « Behold, I say to your charity: even he who swears falsely by a stone is a perjurer »; because he brings forward as witness not the stone, which does not hear, but its Creator. This therefore is to swear by any creature whatsoever, namely to bring forward its Creator as witness.

« There is also a certain most grievous kind of oath, which is made by execration, as when a man says: if I have done that, may I suffer that, or may that befall my children ». According to which mode it is also sometimes taken, when someone says in swearing: by my welfare, or by my children, and the like. For these things bind one to God. Hence Augustine: « When someone says: by my welfare, he binds his welfare to God. When he says: by my children, he pledges them to God, so that this may come upon their head, which goes forth from his mouth: if true, true; if false, false. And just as one swearing by this sometimes binds this to God, so one swearing by God brings God himself forward as witness ». In every oath, therefore, either God is brought forward as witness, or a creature is bound and pledged to God, so that this is to swear, namely to bring forward God as witness, or to pledge something to God. This therefore is to swear by any creature whatsoever, namely to bring forward its Creator as witness¹¹.

Ch. VIII. On those who swear by false gods.

After these matters it is asked whether the good faith of one who has sworn by demons or idols is to be used. On this Augustine, writing to Publicola¹², says: « I wish first to consider with you whether, if anyone has sworn by false gods and has not kept faith, it does not seem to you that he has sinned twice. He certainly sinned twice, because he swore by those by whom he ought not; and he acted against the faith he had promised, which he ought not. And therefore he who uses the good faith of one who, it is established, has sworn by false gods, and uses it not for evil but for good, does not associate himself with that man's sin, by which he swore by demons, but with the good pact of his, by which he kept faith. And without doubt it is a lesser evil to swear truthfully by false gods than to swear deceitfully by the true God. For the more holy that by which one swears is, the more punishable is the perjury ».

Ch. IX. That an oath or promise made against God is not to be kept.

Now it remains to see whether every oath is to be fulfilled. For if anyone has sworn something against faith and charity, which, if observed, would tend toward a worse outcome, it is rather to be changed than fulfilled. Hence Ambrose¹³: « It is sometimes against duty to discharge a promised oath, as Herod did ». Likewise Isidore: « In evil promises rescind your faith, in a base vow change your decision. What you have incautiously vowed, do not do; impious is the promise which is fulfilled by a crime ». The same: « An oath is not to be observed by which an evil is incautiously promised, as if someone should pledge to an adulteress perpetual faith of remaining with her. For it is more tolerable not to fulfill the oath than to remain in fornication ». Likewise Bede¹⁴: « If it should happen that we have sworn somewhat too incautiously something which, if observed, would tend toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is to be freely changed by more wholesome counsel; and rather, when necessity presses, that we must perjure ourselves than that, to avoid perjury, we should turn aside into another, graver crime. Finally, David¹⁵ swore by God to kill Nabal, a foolish man; but at the first intercession of Abigail, a prudent woman, he relaxed his threats, returned the sword to its sheath, and did not grieve that he had contracted any fault by such perjury ». Likewise Augustine¹⁶: « That David did not fulfill his oath through the shedding of blood was the greater piety. David swore rashly, but did not fulfill the oath with greater piety ». — From these and many other things it is shown that certain oaths are not to be observed. And he who so swears sins gravely; but when he changes, he does well; while he who does not change sins doubly: both because he swore unjustly, and because he does what he ought not.

Ch. X. Whether he is a perjurer who does not do what he incautiously swears.

But whether he who changes ought to be called a perjurer is wont to be asked. Bede above¹⁷ called such an oath perjury. John the Apocrisarius¹⁸ of the Eastern sees also said: « The word of our father Sophronius signifies that it is better for one swearing to perjure himself than to keep the oath in the breaking of the holy images ». But such an oath not observed is called perjury, and he is said to perjure himself who does not fulfill it, because he swears what is false, not because he is therein guilty in that he does not observe it, but because he swore what is unjust, from which he is guilty, like him who perjures himself.

Ch. XI. On those who swear by craftiness of words.

This too is to be known, that « by whatever craft of words a man swears, God nevertheless, who is witness of the conscience, takes it just as he to whom it is sworn understands it. But he becomes doubly guilty who both takes the name of God in vain and entraps his neighbor by deceit¹⁹ ».

Ch. XII. On him who compels someone to swear.

It is also asked whether he sins who compels a man to swear. On this Augustine²⁰ says: « He who exacts an oath, it matters much whether he does not know that the man is going to swear falsely, or whether he knows. For if he does not know, and therefore says: swear to me, that I may have assurance; it is not a sin, yet it is a human temptation²¹. But if he knows that the man has done it, and compels him to swear, he is a murderer ». The same: « He who provokes a man to an oath and knows that he is swearing falsely surpasses a murderer; because a murderer is going to kill the body, but that man the soul — nay, two souls: both that of the one whom he provoked to swear, and his own ». The holy Synod decreed that, except for the sake of making peace, all the faithful should approach the sacraments fasting²².

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