Dist. 7
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 7
DISTINCTIO VII.
Cap. I. Deinde quae singulis sententiis adversari videntur, ponit.
(Locutiones ambiguae secundum 1. opinionem.) Secundum primam vero dicitur: Deus factus homo, et homo factus Deus, quia Deus coepit esse quaedam substantia rationalis, quae ante non fuerat; et illa substantia coepit esse Deus, et hoc gratia, non natura, vel meritis habuit. Unde recte dicitur Christus, (Obiicitur.) in quantum homo, praedestinatus esse Filius Dei1. — Huic autem sententiae opponitur: si illa substantia coepit esse Deus, et Deus illa; quaedam igitur substantia est Deus, quae non semper fuit Deus; et quaedam substantia est Deus, quae non est divina substantia; (Conceditur.) et Deus est aliquid, quod non semper fuit. — Quod et illi concedunt, Origenis2 testimonio innitentes, qui ait: «Factus est sine dubio id quod prius non erat; sed addidit: secundum carnem; secundum Deum vero erat prius, et non erat quando non erat». — Aliis quoque pluribus modis illi sententiae potest opponi; quibus supersedemus, exercitationis studium lectori relinquentes et ad alia properantes.
(Secundum 2. opinionem.) In secunda vero sententia huius dictionis3 talis videtur ratio, ut, cum dicitur: Deus factus est homo, intelligatur coepisse esse subsistens ex duabus naturis, vel tribus substantiis; et e converso, homo factus est Deus, quia subsistens in duabus naturis coepit esse Deus; vel potius homo factus est Deus, et e converso dicitur, quia Deus assumsit hominem, et homo assumtus est a Deo. Unde Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate4: «Talis fuit illa susceptio, quae hominem faceret Deum, et Deum hominem». Variatur autem intelligentia, cum dicitur: Deus est homo, et homo est Deus. Dicitur enim Deus esse persona subsistens in duabus et ex duabus naturis, et persona subsistens in duabus et ex duabus naturis dicitur esse Deus, id est Verbum, vel natura divina. Potest enim praedicari persona simplex, vel5 natura de persona composita. Non (Damascenus.) est autem, ut ait Ioannes Damascenus6, idem dicere naturam, vel personam. Determinant etiam auctoritates, quae primae (Determinant auctoritates 1. opinionis.) conveniunt sententiae et huic videntur contradicere, ut, cum legitur7: homo ille assumtus a Verbo in singularitate personae, vel, factus una persona cum Verbo, de natura humana intelligatur, quae Verbo unita est in singularitate personae, id est, ita quod eadem persona, quae prius erat et simplex erat, sine incremento numeri8 et immutata permansit, licet composita. Compositionis vero huius ratio non alia dicitur quam ratione, quam sit in aliis hominibus, quia huius ex tribus, aliorum ex duabus substantiis est compositio. Negant quoque, naturam humanam esse personam, vel Dei Filium; et sicut unum eundemque dicunt esse hominem et Deum, et filium hominis et Filium Dei; ita unum et idem, non aliud et aliud, sicut nec alium et alium.
(Opposita auctoritates Augustini.) Sed his videntur adversari quae subditis continentur capitulis. Ait enim Augustinus super Ioannem9: «Aliud est Verbum, aliud homo; sed Verbum caro factum est, id est homo; non itaque alia Verbi, alia est hominis persona, quoniam utrumque est Christus et una persona». Idem ad Felicianum10: «Aliud Dei Filius, aliud hominis filius; sed non alius». Item: «Dei Filius aliud de Patre, aliud de Matre». Idem in libro primo de Trinitate11: «Cum Filius sit et Deus et homo, alia substantia Deus, alia homo». (Explicantur.) Haec autem in hunc modum determinant: quia, cum dicitur: aliud Verbum Dei, aliud homo, sive alia substantia Deus, alia homo; alterius naturae significatur Christus esse, in quantum est homo, et alterius,
(Damascenus.) in quantum est Deus; et aliud natura, qua est homo, aliud natura, qua est Deus. Ut enim ait Ioannes Damascenus1b: «Inconverse et inalterabiliter unitae sunt ad invicem naturae, neque divina distante a propria simplicitate, neque humana aut conversa in deitatis naturam, aut in non-existentiam conversa2b, neque ex duabus una facta composita natura. Composita enim natura neutri earum, ex quibus componitur naturis, homousia, id est consubstantialis, esse potest, ex alteris perficiens alterum, ut corpus ex quatuor elementis compositum nec ignis nominatur nec aër nec terra nec aqua, nec horum alicui homousion dicitur. Si igitur secundum haereticos Christus unius compositae naturae post unionem exstitit, ex simplici natura conversus est in compositam, et neque Patri simplicis naturae existenti neque Matri est homousios; et neque Deus neque homo denominabitur3b, sed Christus solum; et erit hoc nomen, scilicet Christus, non personae ipsius nomen, sed unius secundum ipsos compositae naturae. Nos autem Christum non unius compositae naturae dogmatizamus, et hoc nomen, scilicet Christus, personae4b dicimus non monotropos, id est uno modo dictum, sed duarum naturarum esse significativum, scilicet deitatis et humanitatis. Ex deitate autem et humanitate Deum perfectum et hominem perfectum eundem et esse et dici ex duabus et in duabus naturis, confitemur». — Sic ergo dicitur aliud esse Filius Dei, aliud filius hominis, quia alterius est substantiae vel naturae, in quantum est Filius Dei, et alterius, in quantum est filius hominis, non quod ipse Filius Dei et hominis sit duo illa diversa, id est duae diversae naturae.
(Hilarius.) Aperte enim Hilarius in libro nono de Trinitate5b ait: «Cum non aliud sit filius hominis, neque aliud Filius Dei — Verbum enim caro factum est — et cum ille qui Filius Dei est, ipse et hominis sit filius; requiro, quis in hoc filio hominis glorificatus sit». — Evidenter dicit, non aliud esse Filium Dei et aliud filium hominis. Ex quo praemissa roboratur et approbatur determinatio.
(Iterum Augustinus opponitur.) Quod etiam dictum est: utrumque est Christus et una persona, movere potest lectorem; sicut et illud quod Augustinus dicit in libro primo de Trinitate6b: «Quia forma Dei formam servi accepit, utrumque Deus, utrumque homo. Sed utrumque Deus propter accipientem Deum, et utrumque homo propter acceptum hominem». Et illud quod idem ait in libro de Bono perseverantiae7b: «Qui fidelis est eo veram naturam humanam credit, suscipiente Deo Verbo, ita sublimatam, ut qui suscepit et quod suscepit una esset in Trinitate persona, assumtione illa ineffabiliter faciente illa unius in Deo et homine veritatem». Si autem qui suscepit et quod suscepit una est persona: ergo natura humana cum Verbo una est persona. — Sed haec omnia (Respondent.) ex tali sensu dicta fore tradunt, ut utrumque dicatur esse Christus et una persona, quia in utroque unus Christus et una persona subsistit. Ita etiam susceptum cum suscipiente dicitur una persona, quia susceptum suscipienti est sociatum in unitate personae, id est ita, quod unitas personae permansit, non ita, ut caro et anima sint Deus, quia, ut ait Hieronymus8b, (Hieronym. et Ambros.) «Verbum est Deus, et non caro assumta». Et Ambrosius in libro tertio de Spiritu sancto9b ait: «Aliud est quod assumsit, et aliud quod assumtum est».
(Aliud dictum dicitur.) Est autem et aliud, quod huic sententiae plurimum videtur obviare. Ait enim Augustinus in libro (August. obiicitur.) contra Maximinum10b: «Christus una persona est geminae substantiae, quia et Deus et homo est. Nec tamen Deus, vel homo pars huius personae dici potest; alioquin Filius Dei Deus, antequam susciperet formam servi, non erat totus et crevit, cum homo divinitati eius accessit». — Ecce, Deum dicit non esse partem illius personae. Unde videtur illa persona non constare ex Deo et homine. — Ad quod etiam illi dicunt, illam (Respondent.) personam non ita constare ex Deo et homine, quasi totum ex partibus. Ita enim partes alicuius totius conveniunt, ut ex illis quod non erat constituatur. Non autem sic humana et divina natura in Christo uniuntur. (Dubium 1.) Inexplicabilis enim est istius unionis, quae non est partium, ratio. — Quidam tamen nomine Dei ibi personam significari putant, quia de tribus agebat personis, quarum nullam Trinitatis esse partem dicebat; sicut pars istius personae non est Deus. Quod si de persona intelligitur, manifestum est, quia persona non est pars personae. — Posita est diligenter sententia secunda et eius explanatio, cui in nullo vel in modico obviant auctoritates in tertia sententia inductae, quae nunc consideranda est.
(Secundum 3. opinionem.) In hac igitur sententia sic dicitur: Deus factus homo, quia hominem accepit, et11b sic dicitur esse homo, quia homo habet; vel quia est habens hominem; et homo factus est Deus, quia assumtus est a Deo; et homo esse Deus, quia habens hominem est Deus. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, vel habitus praedicatur, vel persona, sed humanata. Et quod persona humanata praedicetur, Cassiodorus12b ostendere videtur, dicens: «Factus est, ut ita dixerim, humanatus Deus, qui etiam in assumtione carnis Deus esse non destitit». Quod tamen varie accipi potest, ut dicatur: Deus factus humanatus, vel Christus factus Deus humanatus; utrumque enim sane dici potest. Cum ergo
dicitur: factus est Deus homo, multiplex secundum istos fit intelligentia, ut naturam humanam accepisse, vel humanatum Verbum esse incepisse intelligatur. Nec tamen, si incepit esse humanatum Verbum, ideo sequitur, quod inceperit esse Verbum; nec si Deus factus est humanatum Verbum, sequitur, quod factus sit Verbum; sicut de aliquo dicitur: hodie iste coepit esse bonus homo, vel factus est bonus homo; nec tamen hodie coepit esse homo, vel factus est homo.
(Quoad esse praedestinatum.) Secundum istos dicitur Christus, secundum quod homo, praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, quia est praedestinatum a Deo ab aeterno, et in tempore collatum est ei per gratiam, ut ipse ens homo sit Filius Dei. Hoc enim non semper habuit, sed in tempore per gratiam accepit. Quod videtur Augustinus notasse in libro (Augustinus.) ad Prosperum et Hilarium1c dicens: «Praedestinatus est Iesus, ut, qui futurus erat secundum carnem filius David, esset in virtute Filius Dei». Hi etiam, cum dicitur: Christus minor Patre, secundum quod homo, secundum habitum hoc intelligunt dictum, id est, in quantum habet hominem sibi unitum. Unde Augustinus in libro primo de Trinitate2c: «Deus Filius Deo Patri natura est aequalis, habitu minor. In forma enim servi minor est Patre, in forma Dei aequalis est Patri». Et quia secundum habitum accipienda est incarnationis ratio, ideo Deum humanatum, non hominem deificatum (Dubium 2.) dici tradunt. Unde Ioannes Damascenus3c: «Non hominem deificatum dicimus, sed Deum hominem factum».
Cap. III. Quod non debet dici homo dominicus.
Et licet dicatur homo Deus, non tamen congrue (Dubium 3.) dicitur homo dominicus. Unde Augustinus in libro Retractationum4c: «Non video, utrum recte dicatur homo dominicus qui est mediator Dei et hominum, Christus Iesus, cum sit utique Dominus; et hoc quidem ut dicerem, apud quosdam legi tractatores catholicos. Sed ubicumque hoc dixi, dixisse me nollem. Postea quippe vidi, non esse dicendum, quamvis nonnulla possit ratione defendi». — Secundum istos etiam dicitur persona Filii in duabus et ex duabus existere naturis, secundum adhaerentiam et inhaerentiam. Altera enim adhaeret ei, altera inest.
(Magister suspendit iudicium.) Satis diligenter iuxta diversorum sententias supra positas5c absque assertione et praeiudicio tractavi quaestionem. Verumtamen nolo, in tanta re tamque ad dignoscendum difficili putare lectorem, istam sibi nostram debere sufficere disputationem; sed legat et alia forte melius considerata atque tractata, et ea quae hic movere possunt, vigilantiore atque intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat, hoc firmiter tenens, quod «Deus hominem assumsit, homo in Deum transivit, non naturae versibilitate, sed Dei dignatione; ut nec Deus mutaretur in humanam substantiam assumendo hominem, nec homo in divinam, glorificatus in Deum; quia mutatio vel versibilitas naturae diminutionem et abolitionem substantiae facit6c».
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DISTINCTION VII.
Chap. I. Then he sets down the things which seem to be opposed to each of the opinions.
(The ambiguous locutions according to the first opinion.) According to the first, then, it is said: God was made man, and man was made God, because God began to be a certain rational substance which had not been before; and that substance began to be God, and this it had by grace, not by nature or by merits. Hence Christ is rightly said, (An objection is raised.) insofar as he is man, to be predestined to be the Son of God1. — But against this opinion it is objected: if that substance began to be God, and God [began to be] it; then a certain substance is God which was not always God; and a certain substance is God which is not the divine substance; (It is conceded.) and God is something which was not always. — Which they too concede, relying on the testimony of Origen2, who says: «He was made, without doubt, that which he was not before; but he added: according to the flesh; according to God, however, he was before, and there was not [a time] when he was not». — In several other ways too this opinion can be opposed; but we forbear these, leaving the zeal of the exercise to the reader and hastening on to other matters.
(According to the second opinion.) In the second opinion, however, the account of this statement3 seems to be such, that, when it is said: God was made man, it is understood that he began to be a subsistent [being] out of two natures, or three substances; and conversely, man was made God, because a subsistent [being] in two natures began to be God; or rather man was made God, and the converse is said, because God assumed a man, and the man was assumed by God. Hence Augustine says in the book On the Trinity4: «Such was that assumption, which made the man God, and God man». But the understanding varies when it is said: God is man, and man is God. For God is said to be the person subsisting in two and out of two natures, and the person subsisting in two and out of two natures is said to be God, that is, the Word, or the divine nature. For a simple person, or5 a nature, can be predicated of a composite person. But it is not, (Damascene.) as John Damascene6 says, the same to say nature or person. The authorities also which belong to the first (The authorities of the first opinion are determined.) opinion and seem to contradict this one determine [the matter]: so that, when one reads7 that the man was assumed by the Word in the singularity of the person, or made one person with the Word, it should be understood of the human nature, which is united to the Word in the singularity of the person, that is, in such a way that the same person, which was before and was simple, remained without increase of number8 and unchanged, although composite. But the account of this composition is said to be none other than the account by which there is [composition] in other men, because in his case the composition is out of three, in theirs out of two substances. They also deny that the human nature is a person, or the Son of God; and just as they say that one and the same is man and God, and the son of man and the Son of God, so [they say he is] one and the same, not one thing and another, as neither one and another.
(The opposed authorities of Augustine.) But to these seem opposed the things contained in the chapters subjoined. For Augustine says on John9: «The Word is one thing, the man another; but the Word was made flesh, that is, man; therefore the person of the Word is not one and the person of the man another, since each is Christ and one person». The same, to Felician10: «The Son of God is one thing, the son of man another; but [he is] not another [one]». Likewise: «The Son of God [is] one thing from the Father, another from the Mother». The same, in the first book On the Trinity11: «Since the Son is both God and man, the substance God is one, man another». (They are explained.) But these they determine in this manner: that, when it is said, the Word of God is one thing, the man another, or the substance God one thing, the man another; Christ is signified to be of one nature insofar as he is man, and of another,
(Damascene.) insofar as he is God; and one thing is the nature by which he is man, another the nature by which he is God. For as John Damascene1b says: «Unconvertibly and unalterably are the natures united to one another, neither the divine standing apart from its proper simplicity, nor the human either converted into the nature of deity, or converted2b into non-existence, nor made out of two one composite nature. For a composite nature cannot be consubstantial — that is, homoousion — with either of the natures out of which it is composed, perfecting the one out of the others, just as a body composed out of the four elements is called neither fire nor air nor earth nor water, nor is said to be homoousion with any of these. If therefore, according to the heretics, Christ existed after the union as of one composite nature, he was converted from a simple nature into a composite one, and is consubstantial neither with the Father, who exists of simple nature, nor with the Mother; and he will be called neither God nor man3b, but Christ alone; and this name, namely Christ, will not be the name of his person, but of one composite nature according to them. But we do not dogmatize that Christ is of one composite nature, and we say that this name, namely Christ, [is] of the person4b, not monotropos, that is, said in one way, but signifying two natures, namely of deity and of humanity. And we confess that out of deity and humanity one and the same is and is called perfect God and perfect man, out of two and in two natures». — So therefore the Son of God is said to be one thing, the son of man another, because he is of another substance or nature insofar as he is the Son of God, and of another insofar as he is the son of man, not that the Son of God and of man is those two diverse things, that is, two diverse natures.
(Hilary.) For Hilary plainly says, in the ninth book On the Trinity5b: «Since the son of man is not one thing, nor the Son of God another — for the Word was made flesh — and since he who is the Son of God is himself also the son of man; I ask, who has been glorified in this son of man». — He plainly says that the Son of God is not one thing and the son of man another. Whereby the foregoing determination is strengthened and approved.
(Augustine is again brought as an objection.) That too which was said — each is Christ and one person — can move the reader; as also that which Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity6b: «Because the form of God took the form of a servant, each [is] God, each [is] man. But each [is] God on account of the God who takes, and each [is] man on account of the man taken». And that which the same says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance7b: «He who is faithful believes that the true human nature, the God-Word assuming it, was so exalted that he who assumed and that which was assumed were one person in the Trinity, that assumption ineffably making the truth of the one [person] in God and man». But if he who assumed and that which was assumed are one person: therefore the human nature is one person with the Word. — But all these they hand down to have been said in such a sense (They answer.) that each is said to be Christ and one person, because in each one Christ and one person subsists. So too the thing assumed with the one assuming is said to be one person, because the thing assumed is associated to the one assuming in the unity of the person, that is, in such a way that the unity of the person remained, not in such a way that the flesh and soul are God, because, as Jerome8b says, (Jerome and Ambrose.) «The Word is God, and not the assumed flesh». And Ambrose, in the third book On the Holy Spirit9b, says: «One thing is that which assumed, and another that which was assumed».
(Another saying is adduced.) But there is also another thing which seems very much to stand in the way of this opinion. For Augustine says in the book (Augustine is brought as an objection.) against Maximinus10b: «Christ is one person of a twofold substance, because he is both God and man. Yet neither God nor man can be called a part of this person; otherwise the Son of God, [who is] God, before he took the form of a servant, was not whole and grew, when the man acceded to his divinity». — Behold, he says that God is not a part of that person. Whence it seems that that person does not consist of God and man. — To which these too answer that that (They answer.) person does not so consist of God and man as a whole out of parts. For the parts of any whole come together in such a way that out of them what was not is constituted. But the human and divine nature are not united in Christ in this way. (Doubt 1.) For the account of this union, which is not [a union] of parts, is inexplicable. — Some, however, think that by the name God the person is there signified, because he was treating of three persons, of whom he said none was a part of the Trinity; just as a part of this person is not God. But if it is understood of the person, it is manifest that a person is not a part of a person. — The second opinion and its explanation have been carefully set down, against which the authorities adduced in the third opinion stand in nothing or in little, which [third opinion] must now be considered.
(According to the third opinion.) In this opinion, then, it is said thus: God was made man, because he took a man, and11b thus he is said to be man, because he has a man; or because he is one having a man; and man was made God, because he was assumed by God; and man to be God, because the one having a man is God. When therefore it is said: God is man, either a habit is predicated, or a person, but a humanated one. And that a humanated person is predicated, Cassiodorus12b seems to show, saying: «He was made, so to say, a humanated God, who even in the assumption of the flesh did not cease to be God». Which nevertheless can be taken in various ways, so that it is said: God was made humanated, or Christ was made a humanated God; for each can soundly be said. When therefore
it is said: God was made man, the understanding becomes manifold according to them, so that it is understood [either] that he took a human nature, or that he began to be a humanated Word. Yet if he began to be a humanated Word, it does not on that account follow that he began to be the Word; nor if God was made a humanated Word does it follow that he was made the Word; just as it is said of someone: today this man began to be a good man, or was made a good man; yet he did not today begin to be a man, or was made a man.
(As to being predestined.) According to them Christ, insofar as he is man, is said to be predestined to be the Son of God, because it was predestined by God from eternity, and in time conferred on him by grace, that he, being man, should be the Son of God. For this he did not always have, but in time received by grace. Which Augustine seems to have noted in the book (Augustine.) to Prosper and Hilary1c, saying: «Jesus was predestined, that he who was to be according to the flesh the son of David, should be in power the Son of God». These too, when it is said: Christ is less than the Father, insofar as he is man, understand this said according to habit, that is, insofar as he has a man united to himself. Hence Augustine, in the first book On the Trinity2c: «God the Son is by nature equal to God the Father, by habit less. For in the form of a servant he is less than the Father, in the form of God he is equal to the Father». And because the account of the incarnation is to be taken according to habit, therefore they hand down that he is to be called a humanated God, not a deified man. (Doubt 2.) Hence John Damascene3c: «We do not say a deified man, but God made man».
Chap. III. That he ought not to be called a Lordly man.
And although man God is said, it is nevertheless not fittingly (Doubt 3.) said a Lordly man. Hence Augustine in the book of Retractations4c: «I do not see whether he who is the mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, is rightly called a Lordly man, since he is assuredly Lord; and this indeed, that I should say it, I read among certain catholic writers. But wherever I said this, I would I had not said it. For afterward I saw that it ought not to be said, although it can be defended with some reason». — According to them too the person of the Son is said to exist in two and out of two natures, according to adherence and inherence. For the one adheres to him, the other is in him.
(The Master suspends judgment.) Diligently enough, in accordance with the opinions of diverse [writers] set down above5c, I have treated the question without assertion and without prejudgment. Yet I would not have the reader, in so great a matter and one so difficult to discern, think that this our disputation ought to suffice him; but let him read also other things perhaps better considered and treated, and let him examine, with a more vigilant and more understanding mind, if he can, the things which here can move [him], holding this firmly, that «God assumed a man, the man passed over into God, not by a mutability of nature, but by the condescension of God; so that neither was God changed into a human substance by assuming a man, nor the man into a divine [substance], being glorified into God; because a change or mutability of nature works the diminution and abolition of the substance6c».
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- In Epist. ad Rom. 1, 3. n. 5. (Patrolog. Graec. t. 14. col. 848.).On the Epistle to the Romans 1:3, n. 5 (Patrologia Graeca, vol. 14, col. 848).
- Ita codd., ed. 2 traditionis, aliae edd. distinctionis.Thus the codices; edition 2 reads traditionis, other editions distinctionis.
- Libr. I. c. 13. n. 28.Book I, c. 13, n. 28.
- Edd. 1, 5, 8 ut.Editions 1, 5, 8 read ut.
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 3. circa medium.Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3, near the middle.
- Vat. aliaeque edd., exceptis 1, 5, 8, et codd. AD omittunt esse, scilicet personam illam, quae verba a codd. BCE transponuntur post Christum.The Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1, 5, 8, and codices AD omit esse, namely personam illam, which words are transposed by codices BCE after Christum.
- Dist. VI. c. 5.Distinction VI, c. 5.
- Vat. cum ceteris edd., exceptis 1, 8, addit personarum et ponit etiam pro et, refragantibus codd.The Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, 8, adds personarum and puts etiam for et, the codices contradicting.
- Tract. 69. n. 3. — In quo textu codd. et plurimae edd. ante Christus omittunt est; Vat. cum originali omittit et ante una persona.Tractate 69, n. 3. — In which text the codices and most editions omit est before Christus; the Vatican edition, with the original, omits et before una persona.
- Potius contra Felicianum, Arianum, de Unit. Trinit. c. 11. 12; seq. locus ibid. et cfr. supra pag. 148, nota 3.Rather, against Felician the Arian, On the Unity of the Trinity, c. 11–12; the following passage [is] in the same place, and cf. above, p. 148, note 3.
- Cap. 10. n. 20.Chapter 10, n. 20.
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 3. in initio. Prima pars huius textus habetur etiam in Glossa Lyrani, Rom. 1, 3.Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3, at the beginning. The first part of this text is found also in the Gloss of Lyranus, Rom. 1:3.
- Ita ed. 8 iuxta textum Graecum (συμφυρεῖσα); Vat. mutata, in ceteris edd. et codd. divisa. Infra post perficiens cod. E, Vat. et ed. 4 alteram pro alterum (ἕτερον).Thus edition 8, according to the Greek text (sumphyreisa); the Vatican edition altered, in the other editions and codices divisa. Below, after perficiens, codex E, the Vatican edition and edition 4 read alteram for alterum (heteron).
- Codd. A B C et edd. 2, 6 denominalur.Codices A B C and editions 2, 6 read denominalur.
- Edd. 1, 5, 8 praefigunt nomen.Editions 1, 5, 8 prefix nomen.
- Num. 40.Number 40.
- Cap. 7. n. 14. in fine.Chapter 7, n. 14, at the end.
- Sive Dono persev. c. 24. n. 67.Or On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 24, n. 67.
- Serm. (non genuinus) de Assumtione ad Paulam et Eustoch. c. 13. — Paulo superius ante Deus edd., exceptis 1, 8, addunt unus.Sermon (not genuine) On the Assumption, to Paula and Eustochium, c. 13. — A little above, before Deus, the editions, except 1, 8, add unus.
- Ita codd. et edd., excepta 8, quae recte substituit de Incarnationis dominicae sacramento (c. 6. n. 61.).Thus the codices and editions, except 8, which rightly substitutes On the sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation (c. 6, n. 61).
- Libr. II. c. 10. n. 2.Book II, c. 10, n. 2.
- In codd. et edd., exceptis 1, 8, omittitur et.In the codices and editions, except 1, 8, et is omitted.
- Cfr. Glossa Lyrani ad Rom. 1, 3. (sub nomine Origenis). — Paulo inferius post Christus factus edd. 1, 8 et cod. E addunt est.Cf. the Gloss of Lyranus on Rom. 1:3 (under the name of Origen). — A little below, after Christus factus, editions 1, 8 and codex E add est.
- Id est de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 15. n. 31.That is, On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 15, n. 31.
- Cap. 7. n. 14.Chapter 7, n. 14.
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 2.Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 2.
- Libr. I. c. 19. n. 8. — Pro possit codd. ABD et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 posset, et pro adhaeret omnes codd. et edd. eaedem inhaeret.Book I, c. 19, n. 8. — For possit codices ABD and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 read posset, and for adhaeret all the same codices and editions read inhaeret.
- Ita codd. BCE; Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 sententiam supra positam, edd. 1, 8 et codd. AD sententias supra positam (scil. quaestionem); deinde cum codd. ADE et edd. 1, 5, 8 posuimus tractavi pro tractavimus; denique pro tamque ad dignoscendum pleraeque edd. cum Vat. tanquam ad cognoscendum.Thus codices BCE; the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 read sententiam supra positam, editions 1, 8 and codices AD sententias supra positam (namely, the question); then with codices ADE and editions 1, 5, 8 we have put tractavi for tractavimus; finally, for tamque ad dignoscendum most editions with the Vatican read tanquam ad cognoscendum.
- Gennad., de Ecclesiast. Dogm. c. 2.Gennadius, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 2. ---