Dist. 12, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 12
Tractatio Quaestionum.
Ad intelligentiam huius partis tria principaliter quaeruntur.
Primo de existentia specierum sive accidentium sine subiecto.
Secundo de actione ipsorum, sive transmutatione.
Tertio de fractione.
Articulus I. De existentia accidentium sine subiecto.
Quaestio I. Utrum accidentia possint esse sine subiecto.
Circa primum proceditur sic et ostenditur, quod accidentia sit possibile esse sine subiecto.
1. Basilius in Hexaëmeron1: «Cum enim Deus possit plus facere, quam intellectus intelligere»; et intellectus intelligat accidens praeter subiectum: ergo Deus potest hoc facere, quod accidens sit sine subiecto.
Contra: 1. Per miraculum non potest separari definitum a definitione, vel a partibus definitionis, unde non potest fieri, quod aliquid sit homo et non sit animal rationale et mortale; sed accidens habet definiri per subiectum2: ergo non potest per miraculum esse sine subiecto.
2. Item, accidens habet definiri per comparationem ad subiectum et in comparatione ad suam operationem3 — et constat, quod prior est comparatio accidentis ad subiectum quam ad operationem, quia ab illo recipit esse — sed non potest aliquod accidens separari a definitione in comparatione ad actum per miraculum; unde non potest fieri, quod sit albedo et quod non sit color disgregativus visus: ergo nec a definitione per subiectum potest separari per miraculum.
3. Item, sicut se habet esse ad ens, ita inesse ad inhaerens, quia accidentis esse est inesse4; sed esse non potest separari ab ente, ut sit ens et non sit: ergo nec inesse ab inhaerente: ergo cum accidens sit inhaerens, impossibile est, quod sit et non insit.
4. Item, facere, quod aliquid non participans rationem alicuius fiat participans, est hoc transmutare in illud; sed ratio substantiae est ens per se5: si ergo accidentia per miraculum fiant entia per se, hoc est facere, quod sint substantiae: ergo species illae fiunt substantiae: cum ergo sint accidentia — illud constat — simul ergo sunt substantiae et accidentia, quod nequaquam potest capere intellectus.
5. Item, eadem est oppositio distantium specierum, quae est differentiarum6, sicut patet: quia quae est oppositio hominis ad asinum, eadem est rationalis ad irrationale; rursus, sicut opponitur asinus homini, sic opponitur rationali; unde sicut non potest fieri, quod idem sit homo et asinus, ita nec, quod sit asinus et sit rationalis: ergo a simili, immo multo fortius, non potest fieri, quod idem sit accidens et ens per se, sicut nec, quod idem sit substantia et accidens.
Conclusio. Per miraculum fieri potest, quod accidentia sint sine subiecto.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per miraculum potest fieri, quod accidentia sint sine subiecto sive substantia. Cum enim differant per essentiam7, potest Deus sine omni inconvenientia per virtutem suam illa separare.
Ad rationes ad oppositum respondent quidam, quod esse per se et esse in alio dicunt rationem substantiae et accidentis quoad modos consequentes qui sunt inseparabiles secundum potentiam naturalem — ideo per huiusmodi habent notificari, possunt1b tamen per potentiam supra naturam auferri. Et sic respondent ad obiecta, quia oppositiones currunt quoad rationes dicentes essentiam. Similiter de oppositione quoad differentias essentiales.
Potest tamen dici aliter, quod accidens et est accidens, et iterum est accidens secundum species sive differentias speciales. Nam in quantum comparatur ad subiectum, habet dici accidens2b; in quantum ad operationem, habet dici hoc. — Notandum igitur, quod sicut comparatio accidentis ad operationem est dupliciter, scilicet secundum actum et secundum aptitudinem; ita etiam ad subiectum. Comparatio vero accidentis ad propriam operationem secundum aptitudinem est essentialis et inseparabilis; unde non potest esse, quod sit albedo et non sit disgregativa3b. Comparatio secundum actum consequitur essentiam; unde posset accidens separari ab actuali operatione, unde albedo non semper disgregat. — Sic dicendum, quod comparatio accidentis ad subiectum secundum aptitudinem est essentialis; et haec nunquam privatur ab accidente nec ab illis speciebus; verum est enim dicere, quod sunt natae esse in subiecto. Comparatio vero actualis, quamvis semper insit actu secundum naturam, tamen sequitur essentiam, et ideo ab isto4b potest separari sine aliquo inconvenienti potentia supra naturam. His visis, patet responsio ad obiecta.
1. 2. Quod enim obiicit, quod definitum non potest separari a definitione; dicendum, quod nomina in definitione posita, similiter et verba dicunt5b aptitudinem, non semper actum; et ideo dico, quod accidens, quamvis non sit in subiecto, non tamen separatur a sua definitione, immo ei convenit, quia aptum est esse in subiecto. — Patet etiam responsio ad sequens de operatione, quia illa definitio, si intelligatur secundum actum, est separabilis; si secundum aptitudinem, neutra est separabilis.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de esse, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia esse dicit actum entis absolute, sed inesse actum accidentis in comparatione ad rem alterius generis6b; et quia res alterius generis diversa est, potest circumscribi intellectus eius a re illa sive separari; non sic esse ab ente.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de substantia, dicendum, quod accidentia illa nunquam participant rationem substantiae; nam substantia dicitur res per se existens, ita quod nata est per se existere et nullo modo in alio; hoc autem nullo modo convenit illis accidentibus, immo nata sunt esse in alio.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de oppositione, dicendum, quod differentiae debent dicere aptitudinem, sicut et definitiones. Si igitur accipiantur secundum aptitudinem naturalem ens per se, id est, quod natum est esse per se, similiter ens in alio, id est, quod natum est esse in alio; sicut accidens nunquam participat nomen substantiae, ita nec differentiam dicto modo. Dicitur autem accidens ens per se quantum ad actum7b; et sic non dicit differentiam essentialem, sed modum consequentem essentiam; et in talibus differentiis non tenet obiectio.
I. Quoad quaestiones huius articuli notanda est propositio (2.) Ioannis Wikleff, a Concilio Constant. damnata: «Accidentia panis non manent sine subiecto in eodem Sacramento» (cfr. alia Ecclesiae decreta superius pluries citata, praecipue Sess. 13. Concilii Trident.). Nihilominus prodierunt ex schola Cartesii plures, qui, cum negarent, accidentia physica realiter a substantia esse distincta, posuerunt, species huius Sacramenti, de quibus loquitur Concil. Trident., non esse nisi intentionales sive quasdam similitudines et apparitiones accidentium; quae opinio recte a catholicis theologis iudicatur esse falsa in philosophia et prorsus reiicienda in theologia.
II. Communiter Scholastici distinguunt duplex specierum subiectum, scilicet alterum substantiale et remotum, quod est substantia, alterum accidentale et proximum, quod est quantitas, quae ipsa immediate inhaeret substantiae simulque proximum subiectum est aliorum accidentium. Hinc iidem docent, omnia accidentia in Sacramento esse sine subiecto substantiali, sed plura accidentia, ut qualitates, cum alias naturaliter insint substantiae mediante quantitate (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 3. in corp. et fundam. 5; Thom., S. III. q. 77. a. 2.), etiam in Sacramento de facto non esse sine subiecto suo proximo (quantitate), sicut ante consecrationem. Hoc tamen negant Nominales dicentes, quantitatem non distingui realiter a re quanta. — Sed si quaeratur de possibili, sunt multi, qui cum Richardo, Aegidio et Durando dicunt, non omnia accidentia posse esse sine subiecto, praesertim relativa, de quo diffuse agit Scot., hic q. 2. et q. 1. n. 8. seqq. — Controvertitur etiam inter scholam Scoti et S. Thomae, utrum accidentibus remanentibus divinitus detur modus quidam positivus et permanens, quo sint per se, ut videtur docere S. Thom. (S. III. q. 77. a. 1. ad 4, a. 2. ad 1. et hic q. 1. a. 2.), an, ut sint, tantum habeant dependentiam continuam a virtute Dei per modum efficientis et conservantis: quod fuse docet Scot. (hic q. 1.), cui favere videtur modus loquendi a S. Bonaventura passim usurpatus.
III. In 1. quaestione agitur de possibilitate conclusionis, in 2. q. de congruentia, in 3. q. de facto, quam distinctionem quaestionum, duce Alexandro Hal., etiam S. Thom. in Comment. adhibet. Alii vero una, vel duabus quaestionibus totam hanc rem absolvunt. Hinc locos auctorum, qui de tribus huius articuli quaestionibus agunt, hic simul referimus, scilicet: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 10. m. 7. a. I. § 1. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. I. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I. quaestiunc. I. 2. 3; S. III. q. 77. a. I.; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 63. — B. Albert., hic a. 16. — Petr. Tar., hic q. 1. a. I. 2. — Richard. a Med. hic a. I. q. I. 2. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth. hic q. I.
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Treatment of the Questions.
For the understanding of this part, three things are principally asked.
First, concerning the existence of the species or accidents without a subject.
Second, concerning their action, or transmutation.
Third, concerning [their] breaking.
Article I. On the existence of the accidents without a subject.
Question I. Whether the accidents can exist without a subject.
Concerning the first [point], one proceeds thus, and it is shown that it is possible for the accidents to be without a subject.
1. Basil in the Hexaëmeron1: «For since God can do more than the intellect can understand»; and [since] the intellect understands an accident apart from a subject: therefore God can bring it about that an accident be without a subject.
On the contrary: 1. By a miracle the defined cannot be separated from its definition, or from the parts of the definition, whence it cannot come about that something be a man and not be a rational and mortal animal; but an accident is defined by a subject2: therefore it cannot by a miracle be without a subject.
2. Likewise, an accident is defined by relation to a subject and in relation to its operation3 — and it is established that the relation of the accident to the subject is prior to [its relation] to operation, since it receives [its] being from the former — but no accident can be separated from [its] definition in relation to its act by a miracle; whence it cannot come about that there be whiteness and that it not be a color dispersive of sight: therefore neither can it be separated from [its] definition by [removal of the] subject through a miracle.
3. Likewise, as to-be stands to a being, so to-be-in stands to that which inheres, because the being of an accident is to-be-in4; but to-be cannot be separated from a being, so that it be a being and not be: therefore neither [can] to-be-in [be separated] from that which inheres: therefore, since an accident is something inhering, it is impossible that it be and not be-in.
4. Likewise, to bring it about that something not participating in the account of a thing should become participating [in it], is to transmute it into that [thing]; but the account of substance is being-through-itself5: if therefore the accidents by a miracle become beings-through-themselves, this is to bring it about that they be substances: therefore those species become substances: since therefore they are accidents — that is established — therefore they are at the same time substances and accidents, which the intellect can in no way grasp.
5. Likewise, the opposition of species distant [from one another] is the same as that of differences6, as is clear: because the opposition which is of man to ass is the same as [that] of the rational to the irrational; again, just as the ass is opposed to man, so is it opposed to the rational; whence, just as it cannot come about that the same thing be a man and an ass, so neither that it be an ass and be rational: therefore by a similar [reasoning], nay much more strongly, it cannot come about that the same thing be an accident and a being-through-itself, just as neither that the same thing be a substance and an accident.
Conclusion. It can come about by a miracle that the accidents be without a subject.
I respond: It must be said that by a miracle it can come about that the accidents be without a subject or substance. For since they differ by essence7, God can without any incongruity by his power separate them.
To the arguments to the contrary certain men respond that being-through-itself and being-in-another express the account of substance and of accident with respect to consequent modes which are inseparable according to natural power — therefore they are made known by such [modes], yet they can1b be taken away by a power above nature. And so they respond to the objections, because the oppositions run with respect to the accounts expressing essence. Likewise concerning the opposition with respect to essential differences.
It can however be said otherwise, that the accident both is an accident, and again is an accident according to its species or specific differences. For insofar as it is related to the subject, it has to be called accident2b; insofar as [it is related] to operation, it has to be called this. — It must be noted, therefore, that just as the relation of the accident to operation is twofold, namely according to act and according to aptitude; so also [is its relation] to the subject. But the relation of the accident to its proper operation according to aptitude is essential and inseparable; whence it cannot be that there be whiteness and that it not be dispersive3b. The relation according to act follows the essence; whence the accident could be separated from actual operation, whence whiteness does not always disperse. — Thus it must be said that the relation of the accident to the subject according to aptitude is essential; and this is never taken away from the accident nor from those species; for it is true to say that they are apt to be in a subject. But the actual relation, although it always inheres in act according to nature, nevertheless follows the essence, and therefore from this4b it can be separated without any incongruity by a power above nature. These things seen, the response to the objections is clear.
1. 2. To that which objects that the defined cannot be separated from the definition; it must be said that the nouns placed in the definition, and likewise the verbs, express5b aptitude, not always act; and therefore I say that the accident, although it is not in a subject, is nevertheless not separated from its definition, nay it belongs to it, because it is apt to be in a subject. — The response is also clear to the following [objection] concerning operation, because that definition, if it is understood according to act, is separable; if according to aptitude, neither is separable.
3. To that which is objected concerning to-be, it must be said that it is not similar: because to-be expresses the act of a being absolutely, but to-be-in [expresses] the act of an accident in relation to a thing of another genus6b; and because a thing of another genus is diverse, its understanding can be circumscribed from that thing, or separated; not so [can] to-be [be separated] from a being.
4. To that which is objected concerning substance, it must be said that those accidents never participate in the account of substance; for substance is called a thing existing through itself, in such a way that it is apt to exist through itself and in no way in another; but this in no way belongs to those accidents, nay they are apt to be in another.
5. To that which is objected concerning opposition, it must be said that the differences must express aptitude, as do the definitions. If therefore being-through-itself be taken according to natural aptitude — that is, that which is apt to be through itself — and likewise being-in-another — that is, that which is apt to be in another; just as the accident never participates in the name of substance, so neither [does it participate] in the difference in the said manner. But the accident is called being-through-itself with respect to act7b; and so it does not express an essential difference, but a mode following the essence; and in such differences the objection does not hold.
I. With respect to the questions of this article, there is to be noted the proposition (2.) of John Wycliffe, condemned by the Council of Constance: «The accidents of the bread do not remain without a subject in the same Sacrament» (cf. the other decrees of the Church cited several times above, especially Session 13 of the Council of Trent). Nevertheless there came forth from the school of Descartes many who, since they denied that physical accidents are really distinct from substance, held that the species of this Sacrament, of which the Council of Trent speaks, are nothing but intentional [species] or certain likenesses and appearances of accidents; which opinion is rightly judged by Catholic theologians to be false in philosophy and altogether to be rejected in theology.
II. Commonly the Scholastics distinguish a twofold subject of the species, namely the one substantial and remote, which is substance, the other accidental and proximate, which is quantity, which itself immediately inheres in substance and is at the same time the proximate subject of the other accidents. Hence the same [authors] teach that all the accidents in the Sacrament are without a substantial subject, but that several accidents, such as qualities — since they otherwise naturally inhere in substance by the mediation of quantity (cf. below a. 2, q. 3, in the body and fundamentum 5; Thomas, S. III, q. 77, a. 2) — are also in the Sacrament in fact not without their proximate subject (quantity), just as before the consecration. This however the Nominalists deny, saying that quantity is not really distinct from the quantified thing. — But if the question be raised concerning what is possible, there are many who, with Richard, Giles, and Durandus, say that not all accidents can be without a subject, especially the relative ones, of which Scotus treats at length, here q. 2 and q. 1, n. 8 ff. — It is also controverted between the school of Scotus and [that] of St. Thomas whether, the accidents remaining, there is divinely given a certain positive and permanent mode by which they are through themselves, as St. Thomas seems to teach (S. III, q. 77, a. 1, ad 4; a. 2, ad 1; and here q. 1, a. 2), or whether, in order to be, they have only a continual dependence on the power of God by way of efficient and conserving [cause]: which Scotus teaches at length (here q. 1), to favor whom the manner of speaking employed throughout by St. Bonaventure seems [to incline].
III. In the 1st question there is treated the possibility of the conclusion, in the 2nd q. the congruity, in the 3rd q. the fact, which distinction of the questions, following Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas too employs in his Commentary. But others settle the whole matter in one or two questions. Hence the passages of the authors who treat of the three questions of this article we here refer to together, namely: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 10, m. 7, a. I, § 1, 2, 3. — Scotus, here q. I. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. I, little-questions I, 2, 3; S. III, q. 77, a. I; S. c. Gent. IV, c. 63. — Bl. Albert, here a. 16. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. I, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. I, 2. — Durandus, here q. I. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. I.
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- 1De hac sententia vide tom. I. pag. 750, nota 7. — Inferius post subiectum cod. Z addit secundum essentiam scilicet.On this opinion see tom. I, p. 750, note 7. — Below, after subject, codex Z adds according to essence, namely.
- 2Ut docet Aristot. VII. Metaph. tex. 12. et 19. (VI. c. 4.). Ad hunc locum revocat etiam cod. M, qui, praemissis ex Porphyrio (de Praedicab. c. de Accidente) et Augustino (V. de Trin. c. 4. n. 5.) definitionibus accidentis, subiungit et VII. Metaphysicae dicit Aristoteles, quod subiectum ingreditur definitionem accidentis. — Pro aliquid cod. F aliquis.As Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics VII, text 12 and 19 (VI, c. 4). To this passage codex M too recalls [it], which, having premised the definitions of accident from Porphyry (On the Predicables, c. On the Accident) and Augustine (On the Trinity V, c. 4, n. 5), subjoins and in Metaphysics VII Aristotle says that the subject enters into the definition of the accident. — For something codex F [reads] someone.
- 3Cfr. supra pag. 78, nota 5. — De albedine, in quantum est color disgregativus visus, vide tom. II. pag. 643, nota 9. — In fine arg. pro per subiectum cod. M (1 a secunda manu) per comparationem ad subiectum, cod. U in comparatione ad subiectum.Cf. above p. 78, note 5. — On whiteness, insofar as it is a color dispersive of sight, see tom. II, p. 643, note 9. — At the end of the argument, for by [the] subject codex M (1 by a second hand) [reads] by relation to the subject, codex U in relation to the subject.
- 4Vide supra pag. 20, nota 9. — Inferius post et non sit Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. addit ens.See above p. 20, note 9. — Below, after and not be the Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, adds a being.
- 5Cfr. tom. I. pag. 407, nota 1.Cf. tom. I, p. 407, note 1.
- 6Cod. G diversarum differentiarum.Codex G [reads] of diverse differences.
- 7Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 17. (II. c. 5.), et VII. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.).Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 17 (II, c. 5), and VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3).
- 1bFide codd. D E F G H (1 a secunda manu) L P Q aa, et contextu exigente, supplevimus verba possunt tamen usque ad et sic respondent ad obiecta.On the trust of codices D E F G H (1 by a second hand) L P Q aa, and as the context required, we have supplied the words they can however down to and so they respond to the objections.
- 2bSimplicius (Comment. operum Aristot. saeculo 6. post Christum), l. de Anima, text. 5: Accidens quasi cum alio cadens appellatur. Cfr. Isidor., II. Etymolog. c. 26. n. 12. — Superius pro et iterum est accidens cod. F et est hoc accidens.Simplicius (Commentator on the works of Aristotle in the 6th century after Christ), bk. On the Soul, text 5: The accident is so called as it were [from] falling together with another (cum alio cadens). Cf. Isidore, Etymologies II, c. 26, n. 12. — Above, for and again is an accident codex F [reads] and is this accident.
- 3bCod. Z addit habitu, edd. supplent visus.Codex Z adds in habit (habitu), the editions supply of sight.
- 4bScilicet accidente. — Pro ab isto, quod Vat. omittit, codd. B Y ab ista.Namely, [from] the accident. — For from this (ab isto), which the Vatican [edition] omits, codices B Y [read] from this (ab ista).
- 5bIn edd. additur interdum.In the editions there is added at times (interdum).
- 6bScilicet substantiae.Namely, of substance.
- 7bNempe quantum ad actum existendi, quem, si separatur a substantia, per potentiam Dei obtinet.Namely, with respect to the act of existing, which, if it is separated from substance, it obtains by the power of God. ---