Dist. 12, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 12
Quaestio III. Utrum sit verum, accidentia ibi esse sine subiecto.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit verum, accidentia ibi esse sine subiecto. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quia movere et operari debetur substantiae, quae est hoc aliquid3; sed accidentia illa habent movere et operari: ergo sunt in substantia.
2. Item, nullum accidens extenditur nisi in materia, quia omnis forma de se simplex est4; sed constat, quod accidentia illa habent extensionem et maiorem possunt habere: ergo sunt in materia.
3. Item, miraculum non aufert operationem; sed albedo est lux incorporata5: cessante ergo materia corporali, manet pura lux: ergo albedo per se deberet movere visum.
Contra: 1. Omne accidens, quod est in subiecto aliquo, denominat illud vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid6; sed hoc non faciunt illae species, quia nec denominant panem nec corpus Christi nec aerem: ergo etc.
2. Item, accidentia naturalia non consequuntur materiam secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum esse ut sub forma completiva, nec aliter materia est accidentium subiectum7; sed materia non est ibi sub forma panis — hoc constat — sed sub forma substantiali carnis; sed tales proprietates non sunt natae esse in carne Christi: ergo etc.
3. Item, quandocumque in aliqua mutatione salvatur accidens secundum esse, quod habet in subiecto, necesse est, quod sit commune ei quod mutatur, et in quod mutatur, ut si de aere fiat ignis, manet calidum8; sed panis convertitur in corpus
Christi, et color et sapor et odor non sunt communia utrisque: ergo vel non manent, vel non manent in subiecto; sed manent: ergo sunt sine subiecto.
Conclusio. In eucharistia accidentia sunt sine subiecto, non in aere circumfuso.
Respondeo: Aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod species illae erant in aere circumfuso. — Sed illud manifeste falsum est, tum propter hoc quod non denominant accidentia aerem circumiacentem; tum etiam, quia impossibile est, accidens transmutare subiectum1d; si ergo fuerunt in pane, non possunt esse in aere. Et iterum, aere mutato, transferuntur de uno loco ad alium. Item, locum replent et aerem expellunt; sed nullum locatum comparatur ad locum ut ad suum subiectum2d, et nullum accidens expellit subiectum proprium.
Propter haec et his similia communiter tenent magistri, quod accidentia sunt ibi sine subiecto.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de operationibus, dicendum, quod quaedam sunt ibi operationes naturales, quaedam supra naturam, quaedam partim sic, partim sic, et ideo ex operationibus nihil potest concludi; sed quae operationes sunt ibi naturales, infra3d patebit. Attamen sicut miraculum est, quod accidentia sunt sine subiecto; ita miraculum est, ut operentur per se.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de extensione, dicendum, quod quantitas, formaliter loquendo, habet extensionem de natura sui generis4d; unde cum salvatur quantitas, et extensio; sed tamen causaliter habet a substantia, et ideo, quia esse quantitatis et natura ortum habet a substantia. Sed divina virtus facit, quod sit quantitas vere et sine substantia; et hoc faciendo necesse est, extensionem salvari sine materia; et hoc miraculi est, non naturae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de albedine, quod est lux incorporata; potest responderi dupliciter: primo, quod non est in actu, sed in potentia; et ideo, adhuc cessante corpore, manet adhuc in potentia5d. — Secundo, quia non omnino cessat corpus, immo quamvis cesset substantia, manet dimensio, superficies et terminatio, et ideo albedo secundum illum actum solum, quem prius habebat6d.
Scholion in articulum unicum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.
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Question III. Whether it is true that the accidents are there without a subject.
Thirdly it is asked whether it is true that the accidents are there without a subject. And that they are not, seems to be the case:
1. Because to move and to operate belongs to a substance, which is a this-something3; but those accidents have to move and to operate: therefore they are in a substance.
2. Likewise, no accident is extended except in matter, because every form is of itself simple4; but it is evident that those accidents have extension and can have a greater one: therefore they are in matter.
3. Likewise, a miracle does not take away operation; but whiteness is incorporated light5: therefore, when the bodily matter ceases, pure light remains: therefore whiteness ought of itself to move sight.
On the contrary: 1. Every accident that is in some subject denominates it either simply or in a certain respect6; but those species do not do this, because they denominate neither the bread nor the body of Christ nor the air: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, natural accidents do not follow upon matter according to its essence, but only according to its being as under a completive form, nor is matter otherwise the subject of accidents7; but the matter is not there under the form of bread — this is evident — but under the substantial form of flesh; but such properties are not apt to be in the flesh of Christ: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, whenever in some change an accident is preserved according to the being which it has in the subject, it must needs be common to that which is changed and to that into which it is changed, as, if fire comes to be from air, the hot remains8; but the bread is converted into the body of
Christ, and color and savor and odor are not common to both: therefore either they do not remain, or they do not remain in a subject; but they remain: therefore they are without a subject.
Conclusion. In the Eucharist the accidents are without a subject, not in the surrounding air.
I respond: Some have wished to say that those species were in the surrounding air. — But that is manifestly false, both on account of this, that the accidents do not denominate the surrounding air; and also because it is impossible for an accident to pass over into [another] subject1d; if therefore they were in the bread, they cannot be in the air. And again, when the air is moved, they would be transferred from one place to another. Likewise, they fill a place and expel the air; but no thing-in-place is related to its place as to its subject2d, and no accident expels its own proper subject.
On account of these and similar considerations the masters commonly hold that the accidents are there without a subject.
1. To the objection from operations, it must be said that some operations there are natural, some above nature, some partly so, partly so, and therefore nothing can be concluded from the operations; but which operations there are natural will be made clear below3d. Yet, just as it is a miracle that the accidents are without a subject, so it is a miracle that they operate of themselves.
2. To the objection from extension, it must be said that quantity, speaking formally, has extension from the nature of its own genus4d; whence, when quantity is preserved, so also is extension; but nevertheless it has [extension] causally from substance, and therefore, because the being of quantity and its nature arise from substance. But the divine power brings it about that there be quantity truly and without substance; and in doing this it is necessary that extension be preserved without matter; and this belongs to miracle, not to nature.
3. To the objection from whiteness, that it is incorporated light, it can be answered in two ways: first, that it is not in act, but in potency; and therefore, even when the body has ceased, it remains still in potency5d. — Secondly, because the body does not altogether cease, but rather, although the substance ceases, the dimension, surface, and termination remain, and therefore whiteness [remains] according to that act alone which it had before6d.
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — Scholion in articulum unicum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.
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- 3Aristot., I. Elench. c. 6. (c. 7.), docet, quod « unum et substantiam maxime videtur sequi id quod est hoc aliquid [τόδε τι] et ens »; et in Lib. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, distinguens substantiam in primam (singularem) et secundam (genus et speciem) dicit: « In primis igitur substantiis indubitabile et verum est, quod hoc aliquid significant; individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis videtur quidem similiter... sed magis quale aliquid significant ». Cfr. tom. II. pag. 109, nota 7; pag. 197, nota 3. et pag. 375, nota 6. In II. de Anima, text. 2. (c. 1.) ait: « Dicimus itaque unum quoddam genus eorum quae sunt, substantiam. Huius autem aliud quidem sicut materiam, quod secundum se quidem non est hoc aliquid, aliud autem formam et speciem, secundum quam iam dicitur hoc aliquid, et tertium quod ex his ». Quae verba exponit S. Thom. (lect. I.) sic: « Materia quidem est, quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in potentia tantum, ut sit hoc aliquid. Forma autem est, secundum quam iam est hoc aliquid in actu. Substantia vero composita est quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse ».Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 6 (c. 7), teaches that "the one and substance most of all seem to follow that which is a this-something [τόδε τι] and a being"; and in the book Categories, c. On Substance, distinguishing substance into primary (the singular) and secondary (genus and species), he says: "In primary substances, then, it is indubitable and true that they signify a this-something; for what is signified is individual and one in number. But in secondary substances it seems indeed similar... yet they rather signify a what-sort-of-something." Cf. tom. II, p. 109, note 7; p. 197, note 3; and p. 375, note 6. In II On the Soul, text 2 (c. 1) he says: "We say, then, that one certain genus of the things that are is substance. Of this, one [aspect] is as matter, which of itself is not a this-something, another as form and species, according to which a thing is now called a this-something, and a third which is [composed] of these." S. Thomas (lect. I) expounds these words thus: "Matter is that which of itself is not a this-something, but only in potency to be a this-something. Form is that according to which a thing is now a this-something in act. But composite substance is that which is a this-something. For it is said to be a this-something, that is, something demonstrated which is complete in being."
- 4Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Principiis, c. 1: « Forma est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens ». Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto, recensens ea quae secundum accidens dicuntur quanta, ait: Album quantum quid sit assignans, superficie definiet; quanta enim fuerit superficies, tantum album esse dicit. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 18. (IV. c. 13.).Gilbert de la Porrée, On the Six Principles, c. 1: "A form is something accruing to a composite, consisting in a simple and invariable essence." Aristotle, Categories, c. On Quantity, in reviewing those things that are said to be quantified by accident, says: in assigning what the white is quantitatively, he will define it by surface; for as great as the surface is, so great does he say the white to be. Cf. V Metaphysics, text 18 (IV, c. 13).
- 5Cfr. II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.Cf. II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 2.
- 6Pro exemplo communiter illud adducitur, quod ponit Aristot. I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.), scil. Aethiops est albus secundum dentes (secundum quid).As an example, that is commonly adduced which Aristotle sets down in I Sophistical Refutations, c. 4 (c. 5), namely: the Ethiopian is white as to his teeth (in a certain respect).
- 7Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.): Dico autem materiam, quae per se ipsam [secundum essentiam] neque quid, neque quantum nec aliquid aliud quippiam dicitur, quibus ens determinatur. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Superius pro ut sub, quod habet cod. O, cod. A in, alii codd. ut, Vat. legit scilicet ut forma completur. In fine arg. post Christi cod. N addit quia albedo panis non est albedo carnis Christi.Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, text 8 (VI, c. 3): "I call matter that which of itself [according to its essence] is said to be neither a what, nor a how-much, nor anything else of those by which being is determined." Cf. II Sent., d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2. — Above, for ut sub, which codex O has, codex A [reads] in, other codices ut, the Vatican [edition] reads scilicet ut forma completur. At the end of the argument, after Christi, codex N adds because the whiteness of bread is not the whiteness of the flesh of Christ.
- 8Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 25. (c. 4.), ubi ostendit elementorum, quae cognationem habent ad invicem, velociorem esse transmutationem: « Ut ex igne quidem erit aer, altero transmutato; illud enim erat calidum et siccum, hoc autem calidum et humidum; quapropter, si vincatur siccum ab humido, aer erit ».Cf. Aristotle, II On Generation and Corruption, text 25 (c. 4), where he shows that the transmutation of elements which have a kinship to one another is swifter: "Thus from fire there will be air, with the one [quality] transmuted; for the former was hot and dry, the latter hot and moist; wherefore, if the dry is overcome by the moist, there will be air."
- 1dVel, ut Vat. exponit, transmigrare de subiecto in subiectum. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 462, nota 11. verba Boethii; cod. aa addit: quia secundum Boethium accidentia indignantis naturae sunt, perimi possunt, permutari autem nequaquam. Paulo inferius pro aere mutato eadem Vat. aere non mutato.Or, as the Vatican [edition] explains, to migrate from subject into subject. Cf. tom. I, p. 462, note 11, the words of Boethius; codex aa adds: because, according to Boethius, the accidents of an indignant nature can be destroyed, but in no way changed over. A little below, for with the air moved the same Vatican [edition reads] with the air not moved.
- 2dCfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 23-31. (c. 3.).Cf. Aristotle, IV Physics, text 23–31 (c. 3).
- 3dArt. seq. q. 3.The following article, q. 3.
- 4dScilicet extensionem partium extra partes in ordine ad situm. Cfr. supra d. 10. p. I. q. 4. ad 2.Namely, the extension of parts outside of parts in relation to position. Cf. above, d. 10, p. I, q. 4, ad 2.
- 5dSensus est: Sicut, existente substantia panis, color (lux incorporata) per se est tantum in potentia ad movendum visum, nisi lux exterior (non incorporata) accedat; ita et, cessante substantia panis, color erit tantum in potentia etc.The sense is: just as, with the substance of bread existing, color (incorporated light) is of itself only in potency to moving sight, unless an exterior (non-incorporated) light comes in; so too, with the substance of bread ceasing, color will be only in potency, etc.
- 6dSupple: manet, scil. ut apta movere visum. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 10. m. 7. a. 1. § 2, ubi eandem obiectionem solvens, ait: « quod lux, prout est de esse albedinis, non est in actu suo... est enim albedo naturaliter ex incorporatione lucis cum subiecto albedinis, subiecto, dico, substantia, non quantitate sola. Sed virtute mirabili est incorporatio lucis, quae est de esse albedinis, in specie panis in subiecto, scilicet in quantitate, et ex illa incorporatione est consimili modo potentia, quae ante fuit ex incorporatione in subiecto substantia etc. — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem.Supply: it remains, namely as apt to move sight. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV, q. 10, m. 7, a. 1, § 2, where, in solving the same objection, he says: "that light, insofar as it pertains to the being of whiteness, is not in its act... for whiteness comes naturally from the incorporation of light with the subject of whiteness — the subject, I say, being substance, not quantity alone. But by a wondrous power the incorporation of light, which pertains to the being of whiteness, is in the species of bread in a subject, namely in quantity, and from that incorporation there is in a similar way a potency, which before came from the incorporation in the subject which is substance," etc. — See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---