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Dist. 12, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 12

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum accidentia illa operationes habeant per naturam, an per miraculum.

Tertio quaeritur de operationibus, quas habent illa accidentia, utrum habeant per naturam an per miraculum. Et quaeritur primo de immutationis operatione, quae est illarum specierum, utrum sit naturalis, vel miraculosa. Et quod naturalis, videtur:

1. Quia quod per se inest alicui non solum inest illi coniuncto materiae, sed etiam abstracto et separato; sed movere sensus per se inest sensibilibus4: ergo per se inest illis a materia separatis; sed quae per se insunt naturaliter insunt: ergo etc.

2. Item, forma substantialis nunquam movet sensum separata a formis accidentalibus5: ergo forma substantialis nihil facit, nihil privat, quin accidentia moveant sensum, dummodo accidentia habeant esse: ergo per naturam movent.

3. Item, sensus est susceptivus specierum praeter materiam, tamen sub conditionibus materialibus hic et nunc6: si ergo est aliqua species sensibilis sine materia, habens tamen materiales conditiones, illa maxime habet movere sensum: ergo cum huiusmodi sint istae species, patet etc.

4. Item, hoc patet per simile: si idolum7 relinqueretur in speculo, abstracto corpore obiecto, moveret visum, et tamen idolum in speculo habet esse spirituale: ergo videtur, quod species illae, cum sint ibi relictae sine materia, quod habent naturaliter immutare.

5. Item, si navis per miraculum levaretur in aëra, licet existentia navis in aëre esset miraculosa, tamen existentia nautae in navi esset naturalis, et operationes consequentes illam existentiam essent naturales: cum igitur accidentia fundentur in quantitate, et quantitas in materia8; sublevatio quantitatis a materia est miraculosa; sed existentia aliorum accidentium est naturalis: ergo operatio in sensus consequens illam existentiam est naturalis.

Contra: 1. Philosophus in primo de Anima9: «Recto, in quantum rectum, contingit tangere aeneam sphaeram secundum punctum, tangit autem nunquam separatum», quia aenea sphaera non est nata tangi nisi a naturali: si ergo rectum separatum tangeret aeneam sphaeram, hoc esset supra naturam, vel contra. Cum igitur sensus particularis non sit natus immutari nisi a specie existente in materia; si immutetur a separata, immutatio ista non est naturalis.

2. Item, sicut se habet sensus interior ad speciem sine materia, sic exterior ad speciem in materia; et permutatim, sicut interior ad speciem in materia, sic exterior ad speciem sine materia; sed interior nunquam naturaliter apprehendit speciem in materia, sed abstractam1b: ergo nec exterior speciem separatam a materia.

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3. Item, formae convenit esse hic et nunc ratione materiae2b; sed per eam naturam, per quam est hic et nunc, habet movere sensum: ergo cum hoc sit a materia, naturaliter ergo habet movere: ergo si fiat separatio a materia, iam non movebit naturaliter.

4. Item, illa species motiva sensus habet triplicem comparationem, ad subiectum scilicet, ad medium et ad organum3b, et sunt istae comparationes ordinatae: ergo destructa prima, et destruuntur aliae consequenter: ergo si habeat species illa comparationes duas sequentes sine prima, non habet naturaliter, sed miraculose.

Secundo quaeritur de opere transmutationis et maxime de putrefactione, utrum scilicet sit naturalis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia quod convenit alicui naturaliter, salvata natura, adhuc illi convenit; sed speciebus illis naturaliter convenit corrumpi et deficere propter defectum virtutis naturalis, et quia causantur a contrariis qualitatibus4b; et constat, quod illae species salvantur in eadem natura: ergo etc.

2. Item, corruptio per contrarietatem est naturalis, hoc patet; sed species illae ibi existentes habent vere naturam contrarietatis: ergo sunt corruptibiles naturaliter. Minor patet sic: ubi contraria sunt secundum esse spirituale, simul possunt esse in eodem et secundum idem, ut in eodem medio, ut in sensu et intellectu contrarii colores5b: cum ergo hic non possint esse contrarii colores nec sapores simul, immo mutuo se expellunt: habent igitur naturam verae contrarietatis.

3. Item, ubi sunt species secundum spirituale esse, excellentia talis speciei non est corruptiva6b: si ergo in speciebus sacramentalibus excellentia sensibilium contristat sensum: ergo est ibi species habens naturam verae contrarietatis. Sed quod sic est corruptibile est naturaliter: ergo etc.

4. Item, Anselmus, de Conceptu virginali7b, distinguit triplicem cursum: naturalem, voluntarium et mirabilem, et dicit, quod mirabilis a Deo administratur immediate: cum igitur Deus nihil immediate corrumpat, illa corruptio sive putrefactio cum non sit a Deo immediate: ergo non est mirabilis, ergo est naturalis, vel voluntaria; sed non voluntaria: ergo naturalis.

Contra: 1. «Forma de sui natura est in simplici et invariabili essentia consistens8b»: si ergo accidat ei variatio, hoc est per materiam: ergo separata a materia est invariabilis per naturam. Si ergo varietur, hoc est supra naturam: ergo etc.

2. Item, ad transmutationem physicam concurrunt tria principia, scilicet subiectum et duo contraria9b: ergo ubi deficit materia, non est intelligi mutationem physicam; sed hoc est in huiusmodi speciebus: ergo putrefactio illa non est physica.

3. Item, «sicut a forma est agere, ita est a materia pati10b»; sed non contingit agere physice nisi per formam: ergo nec pati nisi per materiam: ergo ubi deficit materia, manifestum est, quod non est passio physica: ergo nec transmutatio.

4. Item, non est vere contrarietas sine subiecto; sed materia prima est subiectum omnis contrarietatis corporalis11b: ergo ubi deficit prima materia, non est vera contrarietas. Sed actio naturalis est per veram contrarietatem: ergo etc. Similiter posset argui de contactu, quod est formae in materia, et actio et passio per contactum.

Tertio quaeritur de opere nutritionis, utrum sit naturalis, vel supernaturalis12b.

Conclusio. Duplici via probatur, operationes immutationis, transmutationis et nutritionis partim esse naturales, partim miraculosas.

Respondeo: Dicendum ad intelligentiam praedictorum secundum unum modum dicendi satis probabilem13b ex comparatione virtutis ad operationes

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ex virtute egredientes. Operationes enim habent regulari secundum potentias et virtutes, a quibus egrediuntur.

Propter quod notandum, quod aliquando datur alicui potestas conformis suae naturae; et egressus ab illa potentia est naturalis, sicut cum caeco redditur potentia videndi. — Aliquando datur potestas alicui partim conformis naturae et partim supra naturam; et tunc actus egrediens quodam modo est naturalis, quodam modo supra naturam, sicut caeco videre de nocte. — Aliquando vero datur potestas omnino supra naturam; et tunc actus egrediens ab illa potentia est miraculosus simpliciter et supra naturam, sicut Virgini data est potestas pariendi1c.

Considerandum est igitur, quod in hoc Sacramento est haec omnia reperire. Nam primo quantitas naturaliter habet substare aliis accidentibus, et alia accidentia naturaliter sustentari2c ab illa. Si ergo detur quantitati potentia sustentandi alia accidentia, illorum existentia in quantitate est naturalis, et operatio consequens habet potentiam naturalem. Unde dico, quod operationes illarum specierum in sensus sunt naturales, quia in quantitate habent esse conveniens immutationi sensuum.

Omnes igitur rationes hoc ostendentes sunt concedendae.

Ad oppositiones manifesta est responsio: quia quantitas est ibi loco materiae, et per illam sunt hic et nunc et habent esse materiale et conveniens immutationi sensuum, et accidentia primo sunt in quantitate; et hoc potest satis videri per exemplum supra de navi positum. — Quod vero datur ulterius quantitati illi potentia sustinendi transmutationes illarum formarum3c; talis potentia partim est conformis naturae, partim supra naturam. Conformis est quantum ad subsistentiam contrarietatis, quia quantitati per se insunt contraria; sed supra quantum ad hoc, quod manet eadem secundum se, facta fractione: hoc enim est proprium solius substantiae4c, et ita supra naturam quantitatis.

Ad illud ergo quod quaeritur de transmutatione, utrum sit naturalis, vel miraculosa; dicendum, quod ratione naturarum illarum specierum, quae habent naturam contrarietatis, illa transmutatio est naturalis, sed ratione sustinentis5c secundum hoc est supra naturam; et ita partim naturalis, partim supra naturam.

Rationes igitur ad partem oppositam factae in secundo problemate currunt secundum has duas vias. Nam quae probant, quod sunt naturales, sumuntur a natura contrarietatis formarum illarum; quae vero probant quod sunt supra naturam, procedunt secundum viam sustinentis. — Et sic patet secundo quaesitum de transmutatione. Si vero datur illis accidentibus potentia convertendi in substantiam, cum desinunt esse, et cum corpus Christi ibi desinit esse; talis potentia omnino est supra naturam, et ideo talis actus omnino supra naturam est et miraculosus.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de nutritione, dicendum, quod ibi triplex est operatio6c. Prima est, quod species illae per actionem virtutis agentis transmutantur; et haec partim est naturalis, partim supra naturam. — Secunda est, quod in fine transmutationis cedunt in substantiam, ita quod in illam convertuntur, sicut converteretur substantia panis, si esset praesens; et haec est miraculosa7c. — Tertia est, quod substantia illa postea convertitur in carnem; et haec est simpliciter naturalis.

Sed quamvis iste modus dicendi probabiliter possit sustineri, aliter potest dici et securius et brevius, quod operationes accidentium sive virtus operans habet comparari et ad illud, a quo egreditur, et ad illud, in quod operatur. Si loquamur per comparationem ad illud a quo; sic dico, quod cum per naturam omnis virtus operans vel sit substantialis, vel saltem ab illa dependeat et reguletur; quod substantia circumscripta, si ulterius accidens operetur, ita miraculum est, quod operetur per se, sicut miraculum est, quod per se manet; et ita omnis operatio est miraculosa. — Si autem loquamur per comparationem ad obiectum, sive sit8c organum sensus, sive aliud quodcumque corpus, sic dico, quod accidentia multas habent ibi operationes naturales; unde quod albedo movet visum et sapor gustum, hoc non est supra naturam nec

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contra, sed secundum naturam. Quoniam ergo albedo non separatur ibi, ut habeat esse mathematicum, sed salvatur esse naturale et singulare1d; ideo illae operationes, quae inerant albedini et aliis accidentibus, adhuc naturaliter insunt.

Concedendum ergo, quod immutatio et transmutatio quodam modo naturalis est in relatione ad obiectum, quia salvatur ibi natura accidentium; quodam modo est supra naturam in comparatione ad subiectum, quia accidentia per se agunt. — Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad partes oppositas adductae2d.

Scholion

Scholion in articulum secundum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether those accidents have their operations by nature or by miracle.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the operations which those accidents have, whether they have them by nature or by miracle. And it is asked first about the operation of altering [the senses], which belongs to those species, whether it is natural or miraculous. And that it is natural, seems to be the case:

1. Because what belongs to something per se belongs to it not only when joined to matter, but also when abstracted and separated; but to move the senses belongs per se to sensible things4: therefore it belongs per se to those [species] separated from matter; but the things that belong per se belong naturally: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a substantial form never moves the sense when separated from accidental forms5: therefore the substantial form does nothing, deprives of nothing, but that the accidents should move the sense, provided the accidents have being: therefore they move by nature.

3. Likewise, the sense is receptive of species apart from matter, yet under material conditions, here and now6: if therefore there is some sensible species without matter, yet having material conditions, that one most of all is apt to move the sense: therefore since these species are of this kind, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, this is clear by a similar [case]: if an image7 were left in a mirror, the opposed body being removed, it would move the sight, and yet the image in the mirror has spiritual being: therefore it seems that those species, since they are left there without matter, that they alter [the sense] naturally.

5. Likewise, if a ship were raised into the air by a miracle, although the existence of the ship in the air would be miraculous, nevertheless the existence of the sailor in the ship would be natural, and the operations consequent upon that existence would be natural: since therefore the accidents are founded in quantity, and quantity in matter8; the raising of quantity from matter is miraculous; but the existence of the other accidents is natural: therefore the operation upon the senses consequent upon that existence is natural.

On the contrary: 1. The Philosopher in the first [book] On the Soul9: «A straight [line], insofar as it is straight, happens to touch a bronze sphere at a point, but it never touches a separated [thing]», because a bronze sphere is not apt to be touched except by a natural [thing]: if therefore a separated straight [line] touched a bronze sphere, this would be above nature, or against [it]. Since therefore the particular sense is not apt to be altered except by a species existing in matter; if it be altered by a separated [species], that alteration is not natural.

2. Likewise, as the interior sense is related to a species without matter, so the exterior to a species in matter; and conversely, as the interior to a species in matter, so the exterior to a species without matter; but the interior never naturally apprehends a species in matter, but [only] an abstracted one1b: therefore neither does the exterior [apprehend] a species separated from matter.

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3. Likewise, it belongs to a form to be here and now by reason of matter2b; but by that nature by which it is here and now, it is apt to move the sense: therefore since this is from matter, it therefore moves naturally: therefore if a separation from matter occurs, it will no longer move naturally.

4. Likewise, that species that moves the sense has a threefold relation, namely to the subject, to the medium, and to the organ3b, and these relations are ordered: therefore, the first being destroyed, the others are consequently destroyed: therefore if that species has the two following relations without the first, it does not [act] naturally, but miraculously.

Secondly it is asked concerning the work of transmutation and especially of putrefaction, namely whether it is natural. And that it is, seems to be the case:

1. Because what belongs to something naturally, the nature being preserved, still belongs to it; but to those species it belongs naturally to be corrupted and to fail because of the defect of natural power, and because they are caused by contrary qualities4b; and it is established that those species are preserved in the same nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, corruption through contrariety is natural — this is clear; but those species existing there have truly the nature of contrariety: therefore they are corruptible naturally. The minor is shown thus: where contraries exist according to spiritual being, they can be at once in the same [thing] and according to the same [respect], as in the same medium, as in the sense and in the intellect contrary colors [exist]5b: since therefore here contrary colors or savors cannot exist at once, but rather mutually expel each other: they therefore have the nature of true contrariety.

3. Likewise, where there are species according to spiritual being, the excellence of such a species is not corruptive6b: if therefore in the sacramental species the excellence of the sensibles distresses the sense: therefore there is there a species having the nature of true contrariety. But what is thus corruptible is so naturally: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Anselm, On the Virginal Conception7b, distinguishes a threefold course: the natural, the voluntary, and the miraculous, and says that the miraculous is administered immediately by God: since therefore God corrupts nothing immediately, that corruption or putrefaction, since it is not from God immediately: therefore it is not miraculous, therefore it is natural or voluntary; but it is not voluntary: therefore it is natural.

On the contrary: 1. «A form by its own nature consists in a simple and invariable essence8b»: if therefore variation should befall it, this is through matter: therefore separated from matter it is invariable by nature. If therefore it be varied, this is above nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, three principles concur in a physical transmutation, namely the subject and two contraries9b: therefore where matter is lacking, a physical change cannot be understood; but this is the case in species of this kind: therefore that putrefaction is not physical.

3. Likewise, «as acting is from form, so undergoing is from matter10b»; but it does not happen [for anything] to act physically except through form: therefore neither to undergo except through matter: therefore where matter is lacking, it is manifest that there is no physical undergoing: therefore neither transmutation.

4. Likewise, there is no true contrariety without a subject; but prime matter is the subject of all corporeal contrariety11b: therefore where prime matter is lacking, there is no true contrariety. But natural action is through true contrariety: therefore etc. Similarly it could be argued concerning contact, which is of form in matter, and action and passion [occur] through contact.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the work of nutrition, whether it is natural or supernatural12b.

Conclusion. By a twofold way it is proved that the operations of alteration, of transmutation, and of nutrition are partly natural, partly miraculous.

I respond: It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, according to one fairly probable manner of speaking13b, from the comparison of the power to the operations

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issuing from the power. For operations have to be regulated according to the potencies and powers from which they issue.

On account of which it must be noted that sometimes there is given to someone a power conformable to his nature; and the issuance from that potency is natural, as when the power of seeing is restored to a blind man. — Sometimes there is given to someone a power partly conformable to nature and partly above nature; and then the issuing act is in a certain way natural, in a certain way above nature, as for a blind man to see by night. — Sometimes, however, there is given a power wholly above nature; and then the act issuing from that potency is miraculous simply and above nature, as the power of giving birth was given to the Virgin1c.

It must be considered therefore that in this Sacrament all these are to be found. For first, quantity naturally has it to underlie the other accidents, and the other accidents naturally to be sustained2c by it. If therefore there is given to quantity the power of sustaining the other accidents, their existence in the quantity is natural, and the consequent operation has a natural potency. Hence I say that the operations of those species upon the senses are natural, because in the quantity they have a being suited to the alteration of the senses.

All the reasons therefore showing this are to be conceded.

To the opposing [arguments] the reply is manifest: because quantity is there in place of matter, and through it [the accidents] are here and now and have material being suited to the alteration of the senses, and the accidents are first in quantity; and this can be sufficiently seen by the example of the ship set forth above. — But as to what is further given to that quantity, namely the power of sustaining the transmutations of those forms3c; such a power is partly conformable to nature, partly above nature. It is conformable as regards the subsistence of contrariety, because contraries belong per se to quantity; but it is above [nature] as regards this, that it remains the same in itself when fracture has occurred: for this is proper to substance alone4c, and so above the nature of quantity.

To the question therefore which is asked concerning transmutation, whether it is natural or miraculous; it must be said that by reason of the natures of those species, which have the nature of contrariety, that transmutation is natural, but by reason of what sustains [them]5c it is on this account above nature; and so partly natural, partly above nature.

The reasons therefore made for the opposing part in the second problem run according to these two ways. For those which prove that they are natural are taken from the nature of the contrariety of those forms; but those which prove that they are above nature proceed according to the way of what sustains [them]. — And thus the second question concerning transmutation is clear. But if there is given to those accidents the power of being converted into the substance, when they cease to be, and when the body of Christ ceases to be there; such a power is wholly above nature, and therefore such an act is wholly above nature and miraculous.

To the question which is asked concerning nutrition, it must be said that there is a threefold operation there6c. The first is that those species are transmuted through the action of the acting power; and this is partly natural, partly above nature. — The second is that at the end of the transmutation they pass into the substance, so that they are converted into it, just as the substance of bread would be converted, if it were present; and this is miraculous7c. — The third is that that substance is afterward converted into flesh; and this is simply natural.

But although this manner of speaking can probably be maintained, it can be said otherwise, both more safely and more briefly, that the operations of the accidents, or the operating power, has to be compared both to that from which it issues and to that upon which it operates. If we speak by comparison to that from which [it issues]; thus I say that, since by nature every operating power is either substantial or at least depends upon and is regulated by it [substance]; [it follows] that a substance being removed, if an accident should further operate, it is as much a miracle that it operates per se as it is a miracle that it remains per se; and so every operation is miraculous. — But if we speak by comparison to the object, whether it be8c an organ of sense, or any other body, thus I say that the accidents have there many natural operations; hence that whiteness moves the sight and savor the taste, this is not above nature nor

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against [it], but according to nature. Since therefore whiteness is not there separated so as to have mathematical being, but its natural and singular being is preserved1d; therefore those operations which inhered in whiteness and the other accidents still inhere naturally.

It must be conceded therefore that alteration and transmutation are in a certain way natural in relation to the object, because the nature of the accidents is there preserved; in a certain way they are above nature in comparison to the subject, because the accidents act per se. — And according to this the reasons brought forward for the opposing parts run [their course]2d.

Scholion

The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — Scholion in articulum secundum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 4
    Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.). — De maiori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. — Cod. aa legit inest accidentibus: ergo movere sensus per se etc.
    See Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 63 ff. (c. 6). — On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 4. — Codex aa reads belongs to the accidents: therefore to move the senses per se etc.
  2. 5
    Substantia enim per se est obiectum intellectus (Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 9. seqq. et text. 38. seq.) et a sensu non percipitur nisi per accidens «ut si album sit Diaris filius; secundum accidens enim hoc sentit, quoniam accidit albo hoc quod sentit» (Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 65.).
    For substance is per se the object of the intellect (Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 9 ff. and text 38 ff.) and is not perceived by the sense except by accident, «as if the white thing should be the son of Diaris; for it senses this by accident, since it befalls the white thing, this which it senses» (Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 65).
  3. 6
    Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121. (c. 12.); I. Poster. c. 11. et 24. (c. 18. et 31.), de quo vide supra pag. 220, nota 9.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 121 (c. 12); Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 11 and 24 (c. 18 and 31), concerning which see above, p. 220, note 9.
  4. 7
    A voce graeca εἴδωλον i. e. imago, simulacrum, species.
    From the Greek word εἴδωλον, i.e. image, likeness, species.
  5. 8
    Cfr. supra pag. 276, nota 1. — Inferius ex cod. H substituimus in sensus, pro in sensibus.
    Cf. above, p. 276, note 1. — Below, from codex H we have substituted upon the senses for in the senses.
  6. 9
    Text. 13. (c. 1.): Recto, in quantum rectum, multa accidunt, ut tangere etc.
    Text 13 (c. 1): To the straight [line], insofar as it is straight, many things befall, such as to touch etc.
  7. 1b
    Vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2. seq.), ubi agit de interioribus sensibus, scil. sensu communi, imaginatione etc.
    See Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 136 ff. (III, c. 2 ff.), where he treats of the interior senses, namely the common sense, imagination, etc.
  8. 2b
    Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 92. (c. 9.); II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3. et a. 2. q. 3. — Infra post a materia (vel naturaliter) supple: a materia; quod in codd. et edd. excidisse videtur. In fine arg. Vat. movebitur pro movebit.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Heaven and the World I, text 92 (c. 9); II Sent. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3, and a. 2, q. 3. — Below, after from matter (or naturally) supply: from matter; which seems to have dropped out in the codices and editions. At the end of the argument the Vatican [edition reads] will be moved for will move.
  9. 3b
    De quo vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 73. seqq. (c. 7.).
    Concerning which see Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 73 ff. (c. 7).
  10. 4b
    Cfr. Aristot., I. de Longitud. et brevit. vitae, c. 2; de Iuvent. et senect. etc. c. 3. (c. 5.). Vide tom. II. pag. 192, nota 7. — Vat., voci propter praemisso vel et pro et quia substituto vel quia, hic addit et habent contraria.
    Cf. Aristotle, On Length and Shortness of Life I, c. 2; On Youth and Old Age etc. c. 3 (c. 5). See tom. II, p. 192, note 7. — The Vatican [edition], having prefixed or to the word because of and substituted or because for and because, here adds and they have contraries.
  11. 5b
    Vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. seq. (c. 8.).
    See Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 37 ff. (c. 8).
  12. 6b
    Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. et 143, nec non III. text. 7. (c. 2. et 4.), constituit differentiam sensus et intellectus in eo, quod sensus per excellens sive forte sensibile tristatur et laeditur, intellectus vero per excellens intelligibile fortificatur. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 38, nota 5. et pag. 39, nota 5.
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 123 and 143, as well as III, text 7 (c. 2 and 4), establishes the difference between sense and intellect in this, that the sense is saddened and harmed by an excelling or strong sensible, but the intellect is strengthened by an excelling intelligible. Cf. tom. I, p. 38, note 5, and p. 39, note 5.
  13. 7b
    Cap. 11. Vide tom. II. pag. 346, nota 1. — Quod Deus nihil immediate corrumpat, insinuat August. supra pag. 246, nota 3.
    Chapter 11. See tom. II, p. 346, note 1. — That God corrupts nothing immediately, Augustine intimates above, p. 246, note 3.
  14. 8b
    Ut dicit Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Principiis, c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 273, nota 4.
    As Gilbert of Poitiers says, On the Six Principles, c. 1. Cf. above, p. 273, note 4.
  15. 9b
    Vide Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 23. seqq. (c. 5.), et VIII. Metaph. text. 4. (VII. c. 1.), et XII. text. 6. seqq. (c. 4.); VIII. (XI. c. 2.). — Inferius pro intelligi cod. F intelligere, et pro hoc cod. A sed non.
    See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 23 ff. (c. 5), and Metaphysics VIII, text 4 (VII, c. 1), and XII, text 6 ff. (c. 4); VIII (XI, c. 2). — Below, for to be understood codex F [reads] to understand, and for this codex A but not.
  16. 10b
    Secundum Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 53. (c. 9.). Vide supra pag. 273, nota 3. — Inferius pro manifestum est, quod cod. B ibi, Vat. per consequens, ibi.
    According to Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 53 (c. 9). See above, p. 273, note 3. — Below, for it is manifest that codex B [reads] there, the Vatican [edition] consequently, there.
  17. 11b
    Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. 9.); I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 43. seqq. (c. 6.), ubi etiam agitur de contactu, actione et passione, quae mox nominantur.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 ff. (c. 9); On Generation and Corruption I, text 43 ff. (c. 6), where also there is treatment of contact, action, and passion, which are mentioned shortly.
  18. 12b
    Codd. et ed. 1. non bene omittunt totam hanc propositionem.
    The codices and the first edition not rightly omit this whole proposition.
  19. 13b
    Secunda manus in cod. P addidit qui sumitur. Edd. legunt: secundum unum modum dicendi est, quod ex satis probabili comparatione... egredientes operationes habent regulari etc. Aliquanto inferius pro et egressus eaedem edd. et actus egressus.
    A second hand in codex P added which is taken. The editions read: according to one manner of speaking it is, that from a fairly probable comparison... the issuing operations have to be regulated etc. Somewhat below, for and the issuance the same editions [read] and the act of issuance.
  20. 1c
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. q. 4.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 44, q. 4.
  21. 2c
    Codd. plerique substantificari, quod explicari posset, cum secundum Dionysium dicatur: Malum substantificatur in bono; (cfr. tom. II. pag. 812, nota 6.). Vide supra pag. 276, nota 1.
    Most codices [read] to be substantified, which could be explained, since according to Dionysius it is said: Evil is substantified in the good; (cf. tom. II, p. 812, note 6). See above, p. 276, note 1.
  22. 3c
    Codd. R S sustentandi transmutationes, edd. subsistendi transmutationibus.
    Codices R S [read] of sustaining the transmutations, the editions of subsisting in the transmutations.
  23. 4c
    Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: Maxime vero proprium substantiae esse videtur, cum unum et idem numero sit, contrariorum susceptivum esse; quare in aliis quidem non habet quisquam quod proferat tale, quaecumque non sunt substantiae, quod cum sit unum numero, susceptibile contrariorum sit, velut color, qui est unus et idem numero, non dicitur contra, sed secundum naturam. — Pro facta fractione (cfr. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2; Scot. hic q. 5.), cui codd. N aa subnectunt scilicet et sine subiecto, cod. O facta transsubstantiatione, edd. facta mutatione. Mox pro quantitatis edd. contrarietatis.
    Aristotle, Categories, c. on Substance: But it seems most of all proper to substance, while remaining numerically one and the same, to be receptive of contraries; wherefore among other things no one can bring forward any such thing, whatever things are not substances, which while being numerically one should be receptive of contraries, as a color, which is numerically one and the same, is not said [to be receptive] — [it is] not against, but according to nature. — For fracture having occurred (cf. a. 3, q. 2, ad 2; Scotus, here q. 5), to which codices N aa append namely also without a subject, codex O [reads] transubstantiation having occurred, the editions change having occurred. Shortly, for of quantity the editions [read] of contrariety.
  24. 5c
    Scilicet subiecti. — Codd. H aa subsistentis; ed. 1 subsistentialitatis, Vat. subsistentialitatis (idem recurrit aliquanto inferius). Immediate post ex cod. aa supplevimus secundum hoc, pro quo alii codd. vel hic, vel haec, vel hoc.
    Namely of the subject. — Codices H aa [read] of what subsists; the first edition of subsistentiality, the Vatican [edition] of subsistentiality (the same recurs somewhat below). Immediately after, from codex aa we have supplied according to this, for which other codices [read] either here, or these, or this.
  25. 6c
    Cfr. Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 31. seqq. (c. 5.), et II. de Anima, text. 42. seqq. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 31 ff. (c. 5), and On the Soul II, text 42 ff. (c. 4).
  26. 7c
    De quo vide supra q. 1.
    Concerning which see above, q. 1.
  27. 8c
    Cum codd. F G L bb omisimus ad, quod in aliis additur. Inferius pro movet cod. L immutet.
    With codices F G L bb we have omitted to, which is added in others. Below, for moves codex L [reads] should alter.
  28. 1d
    Cfr. supra q. 2. ad 3. — Pro mathematicum cod. ll metaphysicum.
    Cf. above, q. 2, ad 3. — For mathematical codex ll [reads] metaphysical.
  29. 2d
    Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
Cited by

1 place in the Opera Omnia citesthis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether the elements will be renewed
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 48
supra pag. 282, nota 4

1 further reference addresses the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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