Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 13
Quaestio III. Utrum potestas consecrandi magis resideat circa sacerdotem, an circa verbum.
Tertio quaeritur, cum potestas sacerdotalis concurrat ad consecrandum et verbi virtus; quaeritur: circa quod magis residet potestas, an circa verbum, an circa sacerdotem? Et quod maior potestas circa ministrum, videtur:
1. Quia Deus communicat virtutem rebus secundum congruentiam ipsarum; sed anima ministri, cum sit spiritualis et Dei imago, maioris virtutis est capax quam verbum sensibile5: ergo penes ipsum magis residet virtus.
2. Item, sacerdos operatur per verbum sicut per instrumentum; sed nobilior est potentia agentis quam instrumenti, sive virtus operandi magis est penes agentem quam penes instrumentum6: ergo etc.
3. Item, verbum est effectus sacerdotis; sed effectus non est maioris virtutis quam causa, quia « causa prima plus influit quam secunda7 »: ergo sacerdos plus influit quam verbum, cum sit causa verbi.
Contra: 1. Sacerdos non potest nisi per virtutem verbi; sed « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis8 »: ergo etc.
2. Item, sacerdos non recitat illud verbum sicut suum, sed sicut Christi; sed verbum Christi plus potest9 quam minister Christi: ergo magis residet penes verbum.
3. Item, verbum est de Sacramento isto; sed ordo est aliud Sacramentum: ergo Sacramentum10 magis per accidens respicit consecrationem quam verbum; et si hoc, patet etc.
Conclusio. Secundum opinionem probabilem dici potest, unam esse potestatem conficiendi eucharistiam, consistentem in ministro et in verbo, ac potestatem sacerdotis quoad substratum esse nobiliorem.
Respondeo: Ad hanc quaestionem dupliciter respondetur secundum duplicem opinionem de virtute verbi11. —
Quidam enim dicunt, quod verbum habet virtutem quandam, quae est qualitas absoluta et est sicut causa efficiens consecrationis. Et hi ponunt, quod potestas conficiendi principaliter residet penes verbum, et verbum illam virtutem habet, quia est verbum Christi. Et est exemplum de praecone sive nuntio, qui compellit populum per edictum regis; potestas quidem compellendi consistit principaliter in edicto1d; et hanc habet, quia exit a rege. — Per hoc patent obiecta ad oppositum.
Alia positio est, quod virtus verbi non est aliqua qualitas absoluta, sed solum ordinatio ad talem effectum, ut ad eius prolationem fiat, non ad prolationem factam a quolibet, sed ab habente Christi signaculum. Et secundum hanc positionem dicendum, quod una est potestas conficiendi, consistens in ministro et in verbo, sicut in litteris papalibus. — Si quaeratur: ubi est maior vis, in verbo sive in scripto, an in sigillo? dicendum, quod una vis est in utroque, quia unum dat vim alii. Nam charta scripta sine sigillo non habet aliquam vim, similiter nec charta sigillata sine scripto. — Rationes autem ad utramque partem procedunt, ac si essent diversae potestates omnino.
Et si quaeras: quomodo est una potestas in duobus? dicendum, quod una ordinatio est et virtus, et potestas illa est per ordinationem ad hunc effectum; nihilominus tamen haec tria quasi una ordinatione concurrunt, scilicet ordo, verbum et elementum. Penes elementum est ordinatio per modum potentiae passivae; penes verbum ordinatio per modum potentiae activae; similiter penes sacerdotem, sed in sacerdote potestas est ad modum generalis et primae2d, in verbo per modum specialis et immediatae. Cum enim potestas sit in sacerdote ad conficiendum et absolvendum; verbo tamen cum intentione prolato arctatur ad hoc, ut conficiat. Potestas autem illa in sacerdote ponit characterem, qui est qualitas absoluta nobilitans animam sacerdotis; in verbo secundum hanc opinionem nihil ponit novum, quod sit aliquid absolutum, sed ad aliquid3d. Et ideo si quantum ad substratum loquamur, posset dici, quod nobilior est potestas sacerdotis, quantum ad id quod est in eo.
Et quod obiicit in contrarium, quod non potest nisi per virtutem verbi; dici potest, quod verbum prolatum et habet ordinationem et habet virtutem divinam assistentem. Ratione primi se habet ad sacerdotem sicut instrumentum: ratione vero virtutis assistentis sicut agens nobilius; et de illa virtute concedo, quod nobilior est. Sed tamen propter hoc non sequitur, quod verbum sit nobilius; bene tamen conceditur, quod immediatius.
Sic igitur duobus modis respondetur secundum duas opiniones. Quae autem harum opinionum verior sit, difficile est diiudicare, et difficilius videtur aliquam harum improbare. Nam prima, quae dicit, quod in verbo est virtus divinitus, dicit hoc esse supra naturam secundum immensitatem divinae potentiae; et quis potest negare, quin Deus possit hoc facere? Et si potest, quis neget, quod det Sacramentis, si placet? Et etiam multae auctoritates4d videntur hoc dicere. — Similiter quis audeat alteram improbare, quae dicit, quod in verbo est efficax ordinatio, et amplius ibi esse asserere non praesumit? Et hoc quidem verum est. Quis autem audeat arguere, si amplius non vult asserere, cum nec fides cogat, nec auctoritas compellat amplius dicere, maxime adhuc perspecta5d quae non possit satis exponi hoc modo sine sensus distorsione? Et ideo, quia magis est sobria et magis intellectui consona, potest cui placet huic positioni satis adhaerere secure6d.
Scholion in articulum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.
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Question III. Whether the power of consecrating resides more in the priest or in the word.
Thirdly it is asked — since both the priestly power and the power of the word concur in consecrating — it is asked: in which does the power reside more, in the word or in the priest? And that the greater power is in the minister, seems to be the case:
1. Because God communicates power to things according to their congruity; but the soul of the minister, since it is spiritual and the image of God, is capable of a greater power than a sensible word5: therefore power resides more in it.
2. Likewise, the priest operates through the word as through an instrument; but the potency of the agent is more noble than that of the instrument, or the power of operating is more in the agent than in the instrument6: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the word is the effect of the priest; but the effect is not of greater power than the cause, because "the first cause influences more than the second7": therefore the priest influences more than the word, since he is the cause of the word.
On the contrary: 1. The priest can do nothing except through the power of the word; but "that on account of which each thing is, is itself more so8": therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the priest does not recite that word as his own, but as Christ's; but the word of Christ can do more9 than the minister of Christ: therefore [the power] resides more in the word.
3. Likewise, the word belongs to this Sacrament; but order is another Sacrament: therefore the Sacrament10 regards consecration more by accident than does the word; and if this is so, the point is clear, etc.
Conclusion. According to a probable opinion it can be said that there is one power of confecting the Eucharist, consisting in the minister and in the word, and that the power of the priest, as to its substrate, is the more noble.
I respond: To this question there is a twofold reply, according to the twofold opinion concerning the power of the word11. —
For some say that the word has a certain power which is an absolute quality and is as the efficient cause of consecration. And these hold that the power of confecting resides principally in the word, and that the word has that power because it is the word of Christ. And there is the example of a herald or messenger who compels the people by the king's edict; the power of compelling consists principally in the edict1d; and it has this because it issues from the king. — By this the objections to the opposite are made clear.
There is another position, that the power of the word is not any absolute quality, but only an ordination to such an effect, that it come to be at its utterance — not at an utterance made by just anyone, but by one having the seal of Christ. And according to this position it must be said that there is one power of confecting, consisting in the minister and in the word, as in papal letters. — If it be asked: where is the greater force, in the word or in the writing, or in the seal? it must be said that there is one force in both, because the one gives force to the other. For a written charter without a seal has no force, and likewise a sealed charter without writing. — But the arguments for either side proceed as if there were altogether diverse powers.
And if you ask: how is there one power in two things? it must be said that there is one ordination and force, and that power is through the ordination to this effect; nevertheless these three concur as by one ordination, namely order, word, and element. In the element there is an ordination by way of passive potency; in the word an ordination by way of active potency; likewise in the priest, but in the priest the power is after the manner of a general and primary [potency]2d, in the word after the manner of a special and immediate one. For although the power is in the priest to confect and to absolve, yet by the word uttered with intention it is restricted to this, that he confect. But that power in the priest sets down a character, which is an absolute quality ennobling the soul of the priest; in the word, according to this opinion, it sets down nothing new that is something absolute, but [only] a relation to something3d. And therefore, if we speak as to the substrate, it could be said that the power of the priest is the more noble, as to that which is in it.
And as to what is objected to the contrary, that he can do nothing except through the power of the word; it can be said that the word, when uttered, both has an ordination and has a divine power assisting it. By reason of the first it is related to the priest as an instrument: but by reason of the assisting power as a more noble agent; and of that power I grant that it is the more noble. But nevertheless it does not follow from this that the word is more noble; yet it is rightly granted that it is more immediate.
Thus, then, the reply is given in two ways, according to the two opinions. But which of these opinions is the truer is difficult to judge, and it seems more difficult to disprove either of them. For the first, which says that in the word there is a power divinely [given], says that this is above nature according to the immensity of the divine power; and who can deny that God is able to do this? And if He can, who would deny that He gives it to the Sacraments, if it please Him? And many authorities4d also seem to say this. — Likewise, who would dare to disprove the other, which says that in the word there is an efficacious ordination, and does not presume to assert that there is anything more there? And this indeed is true. But who would dare to argue, if he is unwilling to assert anything more — since neither does faith compel, nor does authority constrain one to say more — especially since the matter has thus far been examined5d in such a way that it cannot be sufficiently explained on this view without distorting the sense? And therefore, because it is more sober and more consonant with the intellect, whoever pleases may safely adhere to this position6d.
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — Scholion in articulum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.
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- 5Cfr. tom. II. pag. 398, nota 11. — De maiori vide Matth. 25, 15.Cf. tom. II, p. 398, note 11. — On the greater [power], see Matthew 25:15.
- 6Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 29. (c. 3.); V. Metaph. text. 2. (IV. c. 2.); VIII. Ethic. c. 11, et I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.).See Aristotle, II Physics, text 29 (c. 3); V Metaphysics, text 2 (IV, c. 2); VIII Ethics, c. 11, and I Politics, c. 3 (c. 2).
- 7Secundum auctorem libri de Causis, propos. 1.According to the author of the book On Causes, proposition 1.
- 8Aristot. I. Poster. c. 2.Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 2.
- 9Codd. RST bb et ed. 1 habet, Vat. potest vel habet.Codices RST, bb, and edition 1 [read] habet ["it has"], the Vatican [edition] potest vel habet ["it can, or it has"].
- 10Cod. E bene supplet ordinis.Codex E rightly supplies ordinis ["of order"].
- 11Supra d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. relatam.[The opinion] reported above, d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3.
- 1dCod. aa addit non in praecone, et paulo superius regis subiungit ire alicubi.Codex aa adds non in praecone ["not in the herald"], and a little above, after regis ["the king's"], it appends ire alicubi ["to go somewhere"].
- 2dEdd. medio. — Superius pro generalis legendum forte generalioris.The editions [read] medio ["intermediate"]. — Above, for generalis one should perhaps read generalioris.
- 3dVide supra pag. 226, nota 1. — Superius post characterem cum codd. E aa substituimus qui pro quae. Cfr. supra d. 6. p. I. q. 1.See above, p. 226, note 1. — Above, after characterem, with codices E and aa we have substituted qui for quae. Cf. above, d. 6, p. I, q. 1.
- 4dSupra d. 1. p. I. q. 4. et d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. relatam. — Superius pro divinitus cod. O divinitus data, codd. divina, et pro Sacramentis Vat. sacerdotibus.[Reported] above, d. 1, p. I, q. 4, and d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3. — Above, for divinitus ["divinely"], codex O [reads] divinitus data ["divinely given"], [other] codices divina ["divine"], and for Sacramentis the Vatican [edition reads] sacerdotibus ["to the priests"].
- 5dId est, (ut videtur) etiam si quam maxime perspiciatur.That is, (as it seems) even if it be examined to the utmost.
- 6dVide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem.See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---