Bonaventure

Scholion in articulum primum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.

II. Item videtur, quod per quaecumque bona opera indifferenter contingit satisfacere, sicut patet in parabola vulnerati^1f [Luc. 10, 30.]: peccator non solum est spoliatus gratuitis, sed etiam vulneratus in naturalibus. Ex huiusmodi autem vulneratione redditur inhabilis ad bonum et pronus ad malum; sed licet per contritionem reddantur ei gratuita, nihilominus tamen oportet actu cooperari ad sanationem vulnerationis praedictae; hoc autem fit in satisfactione, quia per opera satisfactoria magis ac magis redditur homo habilis ad bonum et minus ac minus pronus ad malum. Cum ergo per quaecumque bona opera posset fieri huiusmodi sanatio, videtur, quod per quaecumque bona opera contingat satisfacere.

Contra: 1. Omnia bona, quaecumque sunt, a Deo sunt, mala vero a nobis; unde [I. Corinth. 4, 7.]: Quid habes quod non accepisti? ergo ex omni bono, quod habemus, sumus debitores Deo, ut ex hoc ei serviamus; sed constat, quod satisfactio plus dicit quam servire. Unde Anselmus [loc. cit.]: «Non sufficit solum reddere quod sublatum est, sed etiam pro contumelia illata plus oportet impendere»; et de hoc sunt plura exempla manifesta in Lege. Proprie ergo non fit satisfactio ex operibus bonis, secundum quod bona sunt, praecise loquendo, sed ulterius oportet in his aliquid intelligere, per quae [quod] fiant satisfactoria pro offensa; sed aliud quam poena non videtur, quod hoc posset intelligi in eis. Et hoc etiam maxime congruere videtur, quia, cum ad culpam essentialiter consequatur poena, manifestum est, quod peccator ex ratione culpae factus est debitor poenae. Ad hoc ergo, ut satisfaciat, exiguntur non solum bona opera, sed etiam poenalia bona, quia aliter non essent meritoria poenalia, quia aliter per haec non fieret satisfactio.

Resp.: Secundum hoc respondetur, quod proprie per sola bona opera poenalia est satisfacere, secundum quod opponebatur; nec sufficit, quod sint bona opera tantum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod licet per quaecumque bona opera magis ac magis possint habilitari naturalia, non tamen per omnia huiusmodi fit satisfactio, licet e contrario per omnia bona opera satisfactoria fiat maior ac maior habilitatio ad bonum, et minor pronitas ad malum. Unde in plus est habilitari naturalia quam satisfacere.

III. Si quaeritur: cum poena sit malum, et Deus non delectetur in hoc, sed solum in bono, cuius est in ipso exemplar; unde est hoc, quod ab hominibus exigit bonum opus poenale ex parte qua poenale? est dicendum, quod in illis, prout sunt poenalia simpliciter et absolute, non delectatur, sed quod hoc scilicet, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio, quod ordinatum est in poena quod inordinatum erat in culpa. Quia ergo huiusmodi ordinatio a sapientia Dei procedit, ideo, prout poena voluntarie suscepta sic poenitentem ordinat, dicitur Deo delectabile. Et dico voluntarie suscepta, quia per involuntarie susceptam non contingit satisfacere (sic enim contingeret poenam gehennae posse esse satisfactoriam); sed oportet, quod sit voluntaria rationi, etsi sit involuntaria carni et sensualitati. Et sic patet, quod non per quodcumque bonum opus contingit satisfacere, sed solum per poenale voluntarie secundum rationem susceptum, quod, quia poenitentem sic ordinat, est Deo delectabile.

Quod autem poena ordinet, patet etiam in poena gehennae. Secundum enim quod determinat alibi, [infra d. 45. a. 1. q. 1.] peccatori ratione peccati mortalis debetur locus infimus, et qui sit infra omnem creaturam; sed per poenam gehennae ordinatur in tali loco decedens in mortali. Similiter patet hoc in poena, qua affliguntur ipsi poenitentes.

Quia enim peccator se deordinavit in peccando, non subiiciendo voluntatem suam voluntati divinae nec eam sequendo, sed propriam; ideo ordinatur in poena quod prius inordinatum erat in culpa, quando in sustinendo voluntarie poenam ordinat se infra statum, quem habuit ad nunc. Et ex hoc patet quaestio: in hoc honoratur Deus, quia in hoc, quod isto in Deum deliquit, sic infra statum suum se humiliat.

III. Et ad maiorem evidentiam eorum quae dicta sunt, quaeritur, utrum de necessitate exigatur voluntas in qualibet actione, aut passione sive opere poenali ad hoc, quod sit meritoria sive satisfactoria, ut suppositum est. Et videtur, quod non:

1. Quia, ut dicatur, quod oportet, quod sit voluntaria, ad hoc quod sit meritoria; tunc multo dolore vel poena, secundum quod huiusmodi, contingeret non mereri nec satisfacere; quoniam, secundum Augustinum [Lib. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2.], «dolor est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt»: ergo dolor est involuntarius; sed omne quod est meritorium, est voluntarium, et similiter omne quod est satisfactorium: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio [Lib. III. c. 9. n. 26.] dicit, quod peccatum est affectio voluntaria, poena affectio involuntaria.

3. Item, Philosophus [II. Ethic. c. 5. et III. c. 1.], loquens de passionibus animae, dicit, eas esse involuntarias: ergo eis non contingit mereri nec satisfacere. Si propter hoc dicatur, quod dolore vel poena non contingit mereri, secundum quod huiusmodi, nisi sit voluntarius, et quod voluntas praeexigatur ad omne meritum; contra: Ioannis ultimo [v. 18.] dicitur Petro: Cum autem senueris, extendes manus tuas, et alius te cinget et ducet, quo tu non vis; sed constat, quod hoc fuit ei meritorium, et ita etc. — Ad hoc videtur solvi in quadam Glossa, in qua dicitur: «Nolens ductus est, sed volens vincit». Sed ex hoc apparet, quod fuit ibi noluntas et voluntas. Et quaeritur: quomodo hoc fuit? et quomodo fuit ibi differentia inter haec?

Si dicas, quod ibi fuit voluntas rationis, ut tactum est, et voluntas sensualitatis; contra: videtur, quodsi ponatur ibi voluntas ex parte sensualitatis, quod similiter ex parte rationis; quia quod apprehendit vis inferior, et superior. Si ergo apprehenditur aliquod terribile a sensualitate, eodem modo apprehendetur, secundum quod huiusmodi, a ratione; sed apprehensio terribilis inducit tristitiam: ergo ibi est tristitia sive dolor in sensualitate ex apprehensione terribilis: ergo et in ratione. Si ergo dolor non est nisi in his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt, videtur, quod sicut est voluntas in sensualitate, secundum quod movetur a terribili extra apprehenso, quod similiter et in ratione. Si ergo prima, sicut est sensualitas, unita naturaliter corpori, ita et ipsa ratio; unde etiam per mortem a corpore dividitur, sicut et sensualitas. Unde sicut in sensualitate est dolor, si apprehendit divisionem sui a corpore per mortem propinquam, et etiam in voluntate; sic et in ratione erit: ergo quod est involuntarium sensualitati vel carni est involuntarium rationi: ergo si non potest esse in aliquo voluntas rationis et voluntas sensualitatis, ergo in beato Petro non fuit voluntas ducendi ad martyrium; et tamen meruit: ergo videtur, quod non necessario exigatur voluntas ad hoc, quod poena sit meritoria vel satisfactoria.

Resp.: Ratio potest considerari dupliciter: vel ut est natura quaedam, vel ut est ratio, et est scilicet deliberativa. Primo modo verum est, quod sicut voluntas in sensualitate, sic in ratione. Unde sicut sensualitas non vult mortem nec poenam, sic nec ratio ut natura, secundum quod huiusmodi est et in hoc consistit. Sed ratio, ut est ratio, quae deliberat de fine et de praemio, bene vult mortem vel poenam sustinere ratione praemii et amore, et secundum hoc intelligitur illa Glossa, quod nolens ductus est, voluntate scilicet sensualitatis et rationis, ut est natura quaedam, sed volens vincit, voluntate scilicet rationis, ut est deliberativa. Et per hoc possunt alia solvi.

IV. Item videtur, quod omnis satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium, ut si quis peccavit peccato avaritiae, debet satisfacere per effusionem pecuniae; quia constat, quod medicina debet fieri per contrarium morbo, quia habet iuvari per huiusmodi respondens; videtur, quod satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium. Sed tunc quaeritur, qualiter ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio frequenter imponantur pro quolibet peccato, cum non habeant contrarietatem ad quodlibet peccatum.

Dicendum, quod sicut medicina corporalis non solum respicit morbum, sed etiam causam morbi et accidens eiusdem, quod a medicis dicitur symtoma; similiter medicina spiritualis non solum debet respicere morbum, scilicet ipsum peccatum, sed etiam occasiones eius et accidentia. Et sicut in medicina corporali quantum ad sanationem ipsius morbi debet dari medicina per contrarium, non tamen tantum quantum ad causam vel accidens morbi, sicut in medicina praeservativa, sed oportet, quod componantur ad invicem calida et frigida secundum debitam mensuram, ne omnino fiant intemperantia; similiter per congruentiam [?] satisfactio, et si debet fieri per contrarium peccato, nihilominus tamen occasiones eius oportet rescindere per alia, quae magis sunt ei contraria quam ipsi peccato. Unde Glossa: in quo peccavit peccato luxuriae, debet iniungi quoad satisfactionem huius peccati maceratio carnis. Et tamen divitiae dederunt ei occasionem peccandi vel luxuriandi, sicut patet de filio prodigo [Luc. 15, 12. 13.], tunc quoad hoc debet ei iniungi satisfactio contraria huic actioni; et similiter intelligendum est in aliis.

V. Item quaeritur, si uno et eodem opere contingat satisfacere et mereri. Videtur, quod non; quia qui debitum suo creditori cedit ex hoc non obligat eum sibi, sed solum se deobligat. Ex quo videtur, quod uno et eodem opere non potest aliquis se deobligare, et alterum sibi obligare; sed qui satisfacit se deobligat, qui meretur quasi Deum sibi obligat: ergo eodem opere non contingit satisfacere et mereri; et ita verum, quod [cod. cc] idem opus non potest esse satisfactorium et meritorium; quod suppositum est supra.

Contra: Ponatur, quod aliquis non faceret aliquod opus, nisi quod ei fuerit iniunctum pro satisfactione, et decedat; tunc si opere satisfactorio non contingeret mereri vitam aeternam, damnaretur; quod cum falsum sit, necesse est dicere, quod uno et eodem opere satisfecerit et vitam aeternam meruerit.

Resp.: In opere satisfactorio duo sunt, scilicet caritas informans voluntatem, et opus sic a voluntate informata procedens; videtur, quod satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium [?]: quantum ad secundum satisfactorium; et ita uno et eodem opere contingit sic mereri et satisfacere, tamen ratione diversorum. Nec est simile de redditione debiti homini et Deo. Deus enim non solum opus exterius attendit, sed etiam animum pensat; homo vero tantum opus exterius attendit. Non intelligas tamen, quod voluimus dicere, quod homo aliquo opere obliget sibi Deum, sicut homo hominem; sed si obligat, est quoad hoc, quod quantum est de exigentia meritorum, congruit, quod Deus det ei vitam aeternam.

VI. Quaeri potest, quot sint in genere opera, per quae contingit satisfacere, sive quot sint partes satisfactionis. Et videtur, quod non solum debeant assignari istae tres, quae sunt ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio: quia pro peccato mortali respondet poena involuntaria in futuro, scilicet carentia visionis Dei, vermis conscientiae et gehenna: ergo similiter poenitenti super mortali et pro eo volenti satisfacere debet iniungi triplex poena, respondens illi triplici; aut aliter non videtur, quod ei debent dimitti illa triplex poena.

Resp.: Verum est, quod triplex illa poena debetur in futuro pro peccato mortali, et hoc ratione trium, quae in peccato attenduntur, scilicet aversio a bono incommutabili, et huic respondet carentia visionis Dei; conversio ad bonum commutabile, et huic respondet poena gehennae et deformitas imaginis, cui respondet vermis conscientiae. Non tamen secundum hoc debet esse poena satisfactoria, et hoc, quia in contritione per gratiam reformatur imago, et fit tranquillitas in ipsa conscientia, cui tranquillitati opponebatur vermis conscientiae; et ideo huic poenae non respondet aliqua poena satisfactoria. Similiter est de carentia visionis Dei; aversus enim a bono incommutabili, quae fuerat per peccatum facta, removetur per visionem [unionem?], quae est in fide formata, cui aversioni respondebat pro poena illa carentia. Patet ergo, quod in poenitente removentur haec duo per actum gratiae et fidei formatae, et non per actus hominis; et quia satisfactio est actus hominis, ideo istis duobus non respondet aliqua poena satisfactoria. Sed licet similiter poena gehennae, prout est huiusmodi, dimittatur in contritione; tamen, ut dictum est, adhuc requiritur, ut ille qui voluntarie Deum offendit in culpa, voluntarie se puniat poena satisfactoria. Et sic punitur secundum tres praedictas partes satisfactionis, quae sunt ieiunium etc., ut dictum est.

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The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — Scholion in articulum primum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.

II. Likewise it seems that by any good works indifferently it is possible to satisfy, as appears in the parable of the wounded man^1f [Luke 10, 30]: the sinner is not only despoiled of the gratuitous [gifts], but also wounded in the natural [endowments]. By such a wounding, however, he is rendered unfit for good and prone to evil; but although through contrition the gratuitous [gifts] are restored to him, nevertheless it is still necessary actually to cooperate toward the healing of the aforesaid wounding; but this is done in satisfaction, because through satisfactory works a man is rendered more and more fit for good and less and less prone to evil. Since, therefore, by any good works such a healing could be effected, it seems that by any good works it is possible to satisfy.

On the contrary: 1. All goods, whatever they are, are from God, but evils from ourselves; whence [1 Corinthians 4, 7]: What do you have that you have not received? therefore from every good that we have we are debtors to God, that from it we should serve Him; but it is evident that satisfaction says more than to serve. Whence Anselm [in the place cited]: "It does not suffice only to render what was taken away, but for the affront inflicted one must expend more besides"; and of this there are many manifest examples in the Law. Properly, therefore, satisfaction is not made from good works according as they are good, speaking precisely, but one must further understand something in them by which [they] become satisfactory for the offense; but nothing other than punishment seems [to be that] which could be understood in them. And this also seems most fitting, because, since punishment essentially follows upon fault, it is manifest that the sinner, by reason of his fault, has been made a debtor of punishment. To this end, therefore, that he may satisfy, there are required not only good works, but also penal good [works], because otherwise penal [works] would not be meritorious, because otherwise satisfaction would not be made through these.

Response: According to this it is answered that properly it is to satisfy by penal good works alone, as was objected; nor does it suffice that they be good works only.

To the objection [made] to the contrary, it must be said that, although through any good works the natural [endowments] can be made more and more fit, nevertheless satisfaction is not made through all such [works], although on the contrary through all satisfactory good works a greater and greater fitness for good is made, and a lesser proneness to evil. Whence to be made fit in the natural [endowments] extends further than to satisfy.

III. If it is asked: since punishment is an evil, and God does not take delight in this, but only in good, of which there is the exemplar in Him; whence is it that He exacts from men a penal good work as to the respect in which it is penal? it must be said that in them, insofar as they are penal simply and absolutely, He does not take delight, but that [He takes delight] in this, namely, according as Augustine says in the book On Free Choice, that what was disordered in fault is ordered in punishment. Since, therefore, such an ordering proceeds from the wisdom of God, therefore, insofar as punishment voluntarily assumed thus orders the penitent, it is called delightful to God. And I say voluntarily assumed, because by [punishment] involuntarily assumed it is not possible to satisfy (for thus it would happen that the punishment of hell could be satisfactory); but it must be that it be voluntary to reason, even though it be involuntary to flesh and sensuality. And thus it is plain that it is not by any good work whatever that one satisfies, but only by a penal [work] voluntarily assumed according to reason, which, because it thus orders the penitent, is delightful to God.

That punishment orders, however, is plain also in the punishment of hell. For according to what he determines elsewhere, [below, d. 45, a. 1, q. 1] to a sinner, by reason of mortal sin, the lowest place is owed, and one that is below every creature; but through the punishment of hell one departing in mortal [sin] is ordered in such a place. Likewise this is plain in the punishment by which the penitents themselves are afflicted.

For since the sinner disordered himself in sinning, by not subjecting his will to the divine will nor following it, but his own; therefore there is ordered in punishment what was previously disordered in fault, when, in voluntarily enduring punishment, he orders himself below the state which he had hitherto. And from this the question is made clear: in this God is honored, because in this — that he so transgressed against God — he humbles himself below his own state.

III. And for the greater evidence of the things that have been said, it is asked whether the will is required of necessity in any action, or passion, or penal work, that it be meritorious or satisfactory, as has been supposed. And it seems that [it is] not:

1. Because, granted it be said that it must be that [the work] be voluntary, that it be meritorious; then by great grief or punishment, according as such, it would happen [that one] does not merit nor satisfy; since, according to Augustine [Bk. XIV On the City of God, c. 15, n. 2], "grief is a dissent from those things which befall us unwilling": therefore grief is involuntary; but everything that is meritorious is voluntary, and likewise everything that is satisfactory: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine On Free Choice [Bk. III, c. 9, n. 26] says that sin is a voluntary affection, punishment an involuntary affection.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher [II Ethics c. 5 and III c. 1], speaking of the passions of the soul, says that they are involuntary: therefore by them it is not possible to merit nor to satisfy. If on this account it be said that by grief or punishment it is not possible to merit, according as such, unless it be voluntary, and that the will is prerequired for all merit; on the contrary: in the last [chapter] of John [v. 18] it is said to Peter: When you have grown old, you will stretch out your hands, and another will gird you and lead you where you do not will; but it is evident that this was meritorious for him, and so etc. — To this it seems to be resolved in a certain Gloss, in which it is said: "Unwilling he was led, but willing he conquers." But from this it appears that there was there both unwillingness and willingness. And it is asked: how was this? and how was there a difference between these?

If you say that there was there a will of reason, as was touched on, and a will of sensuality; on the contrary: it seems that if a will be posited there on the part of sensuality, that likewise [there would be one] on the part of reason; because what the lower power apprehends, the higher also [apprehends]. If therefore something terrible is apprehended by sensuality, in the same way it will be apprehended, according as such, by reason; but the apprehension of something terrible induces sadness: therefore there is there sadness or grief in sensuality from the apprehension of the terrible: therefore also in reason. If therefore grief is only in those things which befall us unwilling, it seems that, just as there is a will in sensuality, according as it is moved by the terrible apprehended from without, so likewise also in reason. If therefore the former, just as sensuality is naturally united to the body, so also is reason itself; whence also through death it is divided from the body, just as sensuality also [is]. Whence just as in sensuality there is grief, if it apprehends its own division from the body through impending death, and also in the will; so also it will be in reason: therefore what is involuntary to sensuality or flesh is involuntary to reason: therefore if there cannot be in some [subject] a will of reason and a will of sensuality, then in blessed Peter there was no will of being led to martyrdom; and yet he merited: therefore it seems that the will is not necessarily required to this end, that punishment be meritorious or satisfactory.

Response: Reason can be considered in two ways: either as it is a certain nature, or as it is reason, and is namely deliberative. In the first way it is true that, as the will in sensuality, so in reason. Whence just as sensuality does not will death nor punishment, so neither does reason as nature, according as such it is and consists in this. But reason, as it is reason, which deliberates about the end and about the reward, well wills to endure death or punishment by reason of the reward and out of love, and according to this is understood that Gloss, that unwilling he was led, namely by the will of sensuality and of reason as it is a certain nature, but willing he conquers, namely by the will of reason as it is deliberative. And by this the others can be resolved.

IV. Likewise it seems that all satisfaction ought to be made by the contrary, as, if someone has sinned by the sin of avarice, he ought to satisfy by the pouring out of money; because it is evident that medicine ought to be made by the contrary to the disease, because [the disease] is to be helped by such a corresponding [remedy]; it seems that satisfaction ought to be made by the contrary. But then it is asked how fasting, almsgiving, and prayer are frequently imposed for every sin, since they do not have contrariety to every sin.

It must be said that, just as bodily medicine regards not only the disease, but also the cause of the disease and its accident, which by physicians is called a symptom; so likewise spiritual medicine ought to regard not only the disease, namely sin itself, but also its occasions and accidents. And just as in bodily medicine, as to the healing of the disease itself, medicine ought to be given by the contrary, yet not so much as to the cause or accident of the disease, as in preventive medicine, but it must be that hot and cold things be composed with one another according to due measure, lest they become altogether intemperate; so likewise by congruence [?] satisfaction, even if it ought to be made by the contrary to the sin, nevertheless its occasions must be cut off by other [means], which are more contrary to it than to the sin itself. Whence the Gloss: in whatever [sin] one has sinned by the sin of luxury, there ought to be enjoined, as to the satisfaction of this sin, a maceration of the flesh. And yet riches gave him the occasion of sinning or of being lustful, as is plain in the case of the prodigal son [Luke 15, 12. 13], then as to this there ought to be enjoined for him a satisfaction contrary to this action; and likewise it is to be understood in other [cases].

V. Likewise it is asked whether by one and the same work it is possible to satisfy and to merit. It seems that [it is] not; because he who remits a debt to his creditor does not by this oblige him to himself, but only frees himself. From which it seems that by one and the same work someone cannot free himself and oblige another to himself; but he who satisfies frees himself, [whereas] he who merits, as it were, obliges God to himself: therefore by the same work it is not possible to satisfy and to merit; and so [it is] true that [cod. cc] the same work cannot be satisfactory and meritorious; which was supposed above.

On the contrary: Suppose that someone would not do any work, except what was enjoined upon him for satisfaction, and dies; then if by a satisfactory work it would not be possible to merit eternal life, he would be damned; which, since it is false, it is necessary to say that by one and the same work he has satisfied and merited eternal life.

Response: In a satisfactory work there are two [things], namely the charity informing the will, and the work thus proceeding from the will [so] informed; it seems that satisfaction ought to be made by the contrary [?]: as to the second it is satisfactory; and thus by one and the same work it is possible thus to merit and to satisfy, yet by reason of different [things]. Nor is it similar with respect to the rendering of a debt to a man and to God. For God attends not only to the exterior work, but also weighs the mind; man, however, attends only to the exterior work. Do not, however, understand that we wished to say that a man by some work obliges God to himself, as a man [obliges] a man; but if he obliges, it is as to this, that, so far as concerns the exigency of merits, it is congruous that God give him eternal life.

VI. It can be asked how many kinds of works there are, by which it is possible to satisfy, or how many are the parts of satisfaction. And it seems that not only these three ought to be assigned, which are fasting, almsgiving, and prayer: because for a mortal sin there corresponds an involuntary punishment in the future, namely the lack of the vision of God, the worm of conscience, and hell: therefore likewise upon a penitent for a mortal [sin] and willing to satisfy for it there ought to be enjoined a threefold punishment, corresponding to that threefold [punishment]; or otherwise it does not seem that that threefold punishment ought to be remitted to him.

Response: It is true that that threefold punishment is owed in the future for mortal sin, and this by reason of the three [things] which are regarded in sin, namely the turning-away from the unchangeable good, and to this corresponds the lack of the vision of God; the turning-toward the changeable good, and to this corresponds the punishment of hell; and the deformity of the image, to which corresponds the worm of conscience. Yet not according to this ought the satisfactory punishment to be, and this because in contrition the image is reformed through grace, and there comes to be a tranquillity in the conscience itself, to which tranquillity the worm of conscience was opposed; and therefore to this punishment no satisfactory punishment corresponds. Likewise it is with the lack of the vision of God; for the turning-away from the unchangeable good, which had been made by sin, is removed by the vision [union?], which is in formed faith, to which turning-away the lack corresponded as punishment. It is plain, therefore, that in the penitent these two are removed through the act of grace and of formed faith, and not through the acts of man; and because satisfaction is an act of man, therefore to these two no satisfactory punishment corresponds. But although likewise the punishment of hell, insofar as it is such, is remitted in contrition; nevertheless, as has been said, it is still required that he who voluntarily offended God in fault should voluntarily punish himself with a satisfactory punishment. And thus he is punished according to the three aforesaid parts of satisfaction, which are fasting, etc., as has been said.

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