Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 4
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15
Quaestio IV. Utrum restitutio sit pars satisfactionis.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum restitutio sit pars satisfactionis. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia aliquo peccato peccamus in Deum tantum, aliquo in Deum et proximum, ut rapina; sed constat, quod satisfactio respondet iniuriae: ergo satisfieri debet in hoc Deo et proximo. Sed satisfit proximo per restitutionem: ergo etc.
2. Item, qui peccat per gulositatem nullo modo melius satisfacit quam per ieiunii sobrietatem: ergo qui peccat rem alienam auferendo non melius satisfacit quam restituendo: ergo etc.
3. Item, per signum ostenditur: quia, si duo sunt raptores, quorum alter est1 in restituendo, alter non, minorem poenitentiam imponit sacerdos ei qui potest restituere, maiorem ei qui non: ergo restitutio facit ad satisfactionem.
4. Item, « satisfacere est causas peccatorum excidere »2; sed causa, quare raptor in peccato est, est, quia rem alienam abstulit et detinet: ergo satisfactio est per rei retentae redditionem, quia hic peccati causa exciditur.
Contra: 1. Peccatum eo ipso est peccatum, quia in Deum est, et quia Dei deformatur imago, non quia in alium similem — quia tunc leo peccaret, cum aliud animal comederet — unde et in Psalmo3: Tibi soli peccavi: ergo satisfactio est facienda soli Deo; sed haec non est per restitutionem, quia restitutio respicit proximum directe: ergo etc.
2. Item, satisfactio est per poenam, ad quam homo non tenetur alias nisi per culpam et secundum iudicium sacerdotis; sed ad restitutionem rei alienae tenetur, eo ipso quod aliena, et iudicio4 Dei sine sacerdote: ergo etc.
3. Item, si est pars satisfactionis, cum satisfactio nulla sit sine caritate5, nec restitutio est sine caritate; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.
4. Item, cum sint tres partes satisfactionis, scilicet ieiunium, oratio et eleemosyna6; quaeritur: sub qua illarum continetur? et cum sub nulla, patet etc.
CONCLUSIO.
Restitutio dici potest pars satisfactionis communiter, non vero proprie sumtae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex est opinio.
Quidam dicunt, quod restitutio non est pars satisfactionis, sed fundamentum. Quaedam enim requiruntur ad poenitentiam sive satisfactionem ut fundamenta, et talia sunt peccati dimissio et alienae rei restitutio; quaedam ut expedientia, ut vitare pravam societatem; quaedam ut satisfactoria, ut ieiunium, oratio et eleemosyna; quaedam ut perficientia, ut sunt opera supererogationis, Lucae decimo7: Quodcumque supererogaveris reddam tibi. — Et ratio eorum est, quia culpa proprie est in Deum, et quia satisfactio est per poenam arbitrariam arbitrio sacerdotis.
Sed alia opinio est, quod restitutio est opus satisfactorium, si fiat in caritate; alioquin non, sicut8 nec alia opera.
Posset tamen dici, quod satisfactio dicitur communiter et proprie: communiter, omne opus poenale voluntarie assumtum, sive ad quod tenetur iudicio Dei, sive iudicio sacerdotis; et sic restitutio est opus satisfactorium et eius pars. Si autem dicatur satisfactio proprie per poenam voluntarie assumtam, ad quam non tenebatur nisi ex culpa et iudicio sacerdotis; sic non est pars, quia restituere tenetur qui habet rem alienam secundum omne ius, etiam si sacerdos nunquam imponat. — Rationes igitur ad primam partem procedunt de satisfactione dicta communiter, aliter procedunt omnes ex insufficienti.
Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod peccatur in solum Deum etc.; dicendum, quod verum est per se; sed tamen, quia homo est imago Dei, et « honor et dehonoratio imaginis ad prototypum refertur »; ideo, sicut ex caritate diligi debet homo in quantum imago, sic etiam et in ipsum peccari potest. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod aut intelligitur de eo qui non habet superiorem ad puniendum; aut intelligitur primo et principaliter; aut de peccato, quod non est in proximum extra, sed per superbiam intra.
Ad 2. Ad aliud patet responsio, quia obiicit de satisfactione proprie dicta.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sine caritate; dicendum, quod satisfactio, quia Deo9, non potest esse nisi in caritate; restitutio, quia proximo, extra fieri potest; sed ad hoc, quod placeat Deo, oportet esse in caritate.
Ad 4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod ad nullam illarum partium reducitur, quia sunt satisfactionis proprie dictae.
Ad illud autem quod obiicitur ad contrarium, quod peccatur in proximum; dicendum, quod non peccatur in proximum nisi per accidens, scilicet quia offenditur Deus in proximo; et ideo soli Deo satisfaciendum est. Nec illi qui dicunt, restitutionem esse satisfactoriam; ideo dicunt, quia per ipsam homo satisfaciat proximo, sed quia aliquo modo, dum reddit rem, quam diligit et posset de facto tenere, amore Dei et mandato sacerdotis restituit. Verumtamen non est restitutio proprie satisfactio, sed inchoatio. Sed cum de proprio aliquid dat, tunc recte dat honorem Deo et superaddit; ideo satisfacit10.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod maior poenitentia imponitur, dici potest, quod hoc est, quia rem proximi dissipavit.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest melius curari; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo melius curatur quis, si dat de proprio11.
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Question IV. Whether restitution is a part of satisfaction.
Fourthly it is asked, whether restitution is a part of satisfaction. And that it is, it seems:
1. Because by some sin we sin against God alone, by another against God and neighbor, as in robbery; but it is established that satisfaction answers to the injury: therefore satisfaction must be made in this case to God and to the neighbor. But satisfaction is made to the neighbor through restitution: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, he who sins through gluttony in no way makes better satisfaction than through the sobriety of fasting: therefore he who sins by carrying off another's property makes no better satisfaction than by restoring it: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it is shown by a sign: because, if there are two robbers, one of whom is engaged1 in restoring and the other not, the priest imposes a lesser penance on him who is able to restore, a greater on him who is not: therefore restitution contributes to satisfaction.
4. Likewise, « to satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins »2; but the cause why the robber is in sin is that he has carried off and retains another's property: therefore satisfaction is through the restoration of the retained thing, because here the cause of the sin is cut away.
On the contrary: 1. Sin is sin by the very fact that it is against God, and because the image of God is deformed, not because it is against another like himself — for then a lion would sin when it ate another animal — whence also in the Psalm3: Against thee only have I sinned: therefore satisfaction is to be made to God alone; but this is not through restitution, because restitution regards the neighbor directly: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, satisfaction is through a penalty, to which a man is not otherwise bound except through fault and according to the judgment of the priest; but to the restitution of another's property he is bound, by the very fact that it is another's, and by the judgment4 of God without a priest: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if it is a part of satisfaction, since no satisfaction is without charity5, neither is restitution without charity; but this is false: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, since there are three parts of satisfaction, namely fasting, prayer, and almsgiving6; it is asked: under which of them is it contained? and since it is under none, the point is plain, etc.
CONCLUSION.
Restitution can be called a part of satisfaction taken broadly, but not properly.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion.
Some say that restitution is not a part of satisfaction, but a foundation. For certain things are required for penance or satisfaction as foundations, and such are the dismissal of sin and the restitution of another's property; certain things as expedient, such as avoiding evil company; certain things as satisfactory, such as fasting, prayer, and almsgiving; certain things as perfecting, such as the works of supererogation, in Luke ten7: Whatsoever thou shalt spend over and above, I will repay thee. — And their reason is that fault is properly against God, and that satisfaction is through a penalty arbitrarily set at the priest's discretion.
But there is another opinion, that restitution is a satisfactory work, if it is done in charity; otherwise not, just as8 neither are the other works.
It could nevertheless be said that satisfaction is spoken of both broadly and properly: broadly, every penal work voluntarily undertaken, whether one to which a man is bound by the judgment of God or by the judgment of the priest; and thus restitution is a satisfactory work and a part of it. But if satisfaction be taken properly, as a penalty voluntarily undertaken, to which one was not bound except from fault and the judgment of the priest; thus it is not a part, because he who has another's property is bound to restore it by every right, even if the priest never imposes it. — The reasons, therefore, for the first part proceed concerning satisfaction taken broadly; otherwise they all proceed from an insufficient ground.
To the arguments for the negative part:
To 1. To that which is objected on the opposite side, that sin is against God alone etc.; it must be said that this is true in itself; but nevertheless, because man is the image of God, and « the honor and dishonor of an image is referred to its prototype »; therefore, just as out of charity man is to be loved insofar as he is an image, so also one can sin against him. — Or it must be said otherwise, that either it is understood of him who has no superior to punish; or it is understood first and principally; or of the sin which is not against the neighbor outwardly, but through pride inwardly.
To 2. To the other the response is plain, because it objects concerning satisfaction taken properly.
To 3. To that which is objected, that it is not without charity; it must be said that satisfaction, because it is to God9, cannot be except in charity; restitution, because it is to the neighbor, can be done outwardly; but for it to please God, it must be in charity.
To 4. To the last it must be said that it is reduced to none of those parts, because they are of satisfaction properly so called.
To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, that one sins against the neighbor; it must be said that one does not sin against the neighbor except by accident, namely because God is offended in the neighbor; and therefore satisfaction is to be made to God alone. Nor do those who say that restitution is satisfactory; they say so not because through it a man satisfies the neighbor, but because in some way, while he restores the thing which he loves and could in fact retain, out of love of God and at the command of the priest he restores it. Nevertheless restitution is not properly satisfaction, but a beginning of it. But when he gives something of his own, then he rightly gives honor to God and adds something further; therefore he satisfies10.
To 3. To that which says that a greater penance is imposed, it can be said that this is because he has squandered the neighbor's property.
To 4. To that which is objected, that he cannot be better cured; it must be said that this is false; rather, one is better cured if he gives of his own11.
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- 1Codd. BHQ adiiciunt potens, Vat. omittit in, pro quo ed. I de. Inferius post qui non cod. F supplet potest.Codices BHQ add potens (able), the Vatican edition omits in, in place of which edition I has de. Further on, after qui non (who is not), codex F supplies potest (is able).
- 2Secundum Augustinum; cfr. supra a. I. q. 1, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. et 7. in fine. — Plurimi codd. et ed. I verbo satisfacere praemittunt si. In fine arg. pro quia hic cod. N quia hoc (ablativus).According to Augustine; cf. above, art. I, q. 1, and here the text of the Master, ch. 5 and 7 at the end. — Very many codices and edition I prefix si to the word satisfacere. At the end of the argument, in place of quia this codex N has quia hoc (ablative).
- 3Psalm. 50, 6. — Mox non pauci codd. omittunt facienda.Psalm 50:6. — Presently not a few codices omit facienda (is to be made).
- 4Edd. ex iudicio, cod. aa ergo et iudicio, cod. G iudicio Dei, ergo sine. Superius post Item non pauci codd. addunt si.The editions read ex iudicio (from the judgment), codex aa ergo et iudicio (therefore and by the judgment), codex G iudicio Dei, ergo sine (by the judgment of God, therefore without). Above, after Item, not a few codices add si.
- 5Ut ostensum est supra p. I. q. 3.As was shown above, part I, q. 3.
- 6Vide supra a. I. q. 1.See above, art. I, q. 1.
- 7Vers. 35, ubi Vulgata post supererogaveris habet ego cum rediero.Verse 35, where the Vulgate after supererogaveris (thou shalt spend over and above) has ego cum rediero (when I return).
- 8Vat. sed sic.The Vatican edition reads sed sic (but thus).
- 9Edd. supplent eius. Mox pro qui plures codd. quia; bene caritatem. Subinde ex codd. E L X adiunximus fieri, pro quo alii codd. et edd. esse.The editions supply eius (its). Presently, in place of qui, several codices read quia; correctly caritatem. Then, from codices E L X, we have added fieri (to be done), in place of which other codices and editions have esse (to be).
- 10Cfr. supra q. I. — Cod. G ut Deo satisfaciat.Cf. above, q. I. — Codex G reads ut Deo satisfaciat (that he may satisfy God).
- 11Vide August., Epist. 153. (alias 54.) c. 6. n. 20. seqq. — Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.See Augustine, Letter 153 (formerly 54), ch. 6, n. 20 ff. — See the scholion to question I of this article. ---