Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 18
Quaestio III. A quo possit excommunicatio fieri.
Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit excommunicatio fieri. Et quod a solo habente clavem, ostenditur sic.
1. Solvere et ligare sunt actus clavium; sed «excommunicare est ligare», ut dicit Magister in littera1; sed «cuius est actus, eius est et potentia»: ergo etc.
2. Item, excommunicare est a communione Sacramentorum separare; sed eius est a communione sive a participatione separare, cuius est administrare; sed solus sacerdos, qui habet claves, potest Sacramentum corporis et sanguinis administrare2: ergo solus potest excommunicare.
3. Item, Petro data est potestas ligandi et solvendi in foro iudiciali et poenitentiali; quaero igitur, quando datae fuerunt ei claves3? Non nisi quando? ergo qui non habet claves non habet hanc potestatem.
4. Item, maioris virtutis est et potestatis ligare vinculo excommunicationis quam satisfactionis; sed solus sacerdos potest poenitentiam imponere et confessiones audire, qui habet claves: ergo solus talis potest excommunicare, quia qui non potest in minus non potest in maius4.
Contra: 1. Iudices delegati habent potentiam excommunicandi5; tamen multi eorum claves non habent, quia non sunt sacerdotes: ergo aliquis potest excommunicare, qui non habet claves. Si tu dicas, quod non sua auctoritate excommunicat; obiicitur tunc de archidiacono, qui ex suo officio causas audit et decidit: ergo excommunicare potest, et tamen, si non est sacerdos, non habet claves. Si tu dicas, quod similiter habet per demandationem vel consuetudinem; quare6 non similiter habet actum ligandi in foro poenitentiali per commissionem vel per consuetudinem? Non enim videtur maior ratio in uno quam in alio.
2. Item, electus canonice et approbatus certum est quod, antequam ordinetur in presbyterum, non habet claves, tamen potest causas audire et excommunicare propria auctoritate7: ergo videtur etc.
3. Item, sacerdos parochialis non habet secundum iura potestatem excommunicandi nisi pro furtis et rapinis et consimilibus8; et constat, quod ipse habet claves et usum clavium: ergo excommunicatio non est a potestate clavium.
4. Item, multitudo tota, ut capitulum, excommunicat, ita quod nullus9; sed multitudinem habere claves, ita quod nullus, est impossibile, cum dicat proprietatem absolutam: ergo actus excommunicandi non est a clave.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum multitudo non possit excommunicari, ita quod nullus10, quomodo possit excommunicare, ita quod nullus.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Potestas excommunicandi non sequitur praecise claves, sed est in omnibus qui habent iurisdictionem ordinariam in foro iudiciali.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod inter ipsos iuristas11 de hac quaestione est controversia. — Quidam enim dixerunt, quod potestas excommunicandi solum est in episcopis. Alii dixerunt, quod non solum est in episcopis, sed etiam in archipresbyteris, archidiaconis et abbatibus et aliis praelatis. Tertii dixerunt, quod hoc competit his et etiam sacerdotibus parochialibus.
Sed licet in hac quaestione canonum sit dicere quia, tamen theologiae est dicere propter quid12, tanquam scientiae superioris. Quod enim in Ecclesia aliquis habeat potestatem, hoc est ab ipso Christo, qui potestatem contulit Apostolis et praecipue ipsi Petro. Dominus autem ipsi Petro utramque contulit potestatem, et ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitenp. 489tiali, et ligandi et solvendi in foro iudiciali1. Prima potestas respicit ordinem, secunda praelationem.
Unde secundum primam par potest absolvere parem, secundum secundam non potest par ligare parem nec superiorem; et hoc est, quia illa est ordinis, haec autem praelationis, scilicet potestas excommunicandi.
Prima potestas ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitentiali aditum caeli aperit; et ideo recte dicitur clavis2. Secunda per censuram iudicii subditos coercet; et ideo dicitur gladius. — Prima potestas est potestas arbitrandi inter Deum et hominem, secunda vero inter hominem et hominem; et ideo prima respicit ordinem, secunda praelationem. — Prima potestas, quoniam collata est Petro ut sacerdoti, descendit in omnes sacerdotes, quamvis non omnes habeant exsecutionem3. Secunda, quia collata est Petro, ut praelatus est, descendit in omnes personas ecclesiasticas, quae habent praelationem vel iurisdictionem. Unde qui habent iurisdictionem ordinariam in iudicando aliquos habent potestatem coercendi eos per censuram ecclesiasticam, ut iudicium eorum inviolabiliter observetur. Et quoniam iurisdictionem habent non solum habentes claves, sed etiam non habentes; habent, inquam, vel ex iure, vel ex consuetudine, sicut archidiaconi et aliqua capitula; ideo possunt excommunicare. Rursus, quia aliqui habent claves, qui non habent iurisdictionem in foro iudiciali, ut simplices sacerdotes; ideo non possunt excommunicare nisi per commissionem, vel nisi in casibus determinatis, ut in furto et rapinis. — Concedo ergo rationes probantes, quod haec potestas non sequitur praecise potestatem clavium.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod solvere et ligare sunt actus clavium; dicendum, quod verum est in foro poenitentiali, sed in foro iudiciali non sunt clavium, nisi accipiatur potestas clavium secundum plenitudinem, secundum quem modum dicitur esse in episcopis, qui, quando promoventur a sacerdotio in episcopatum, non recipiunt novam clavem, sed clavis potestatis in eis ampliatur4.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eius est excommunicare, cuius est communicationem dare5; dicendum, quod non solum eius est, verum etiam eius qui praeest communitati, vel etiam administranti Sacramenta; et quoniam tales sunt qui habent iurisdictionem, quamvis non habeant claves; ideo etc.
3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: quando data est haec potestas Petro? dici potest, quod simul data est utraque, quia data est potestas clavis in sua plenitudine. — Vel potest dici, quod non simul, sed potestas clavium promissa fuit Matthaei decimo sexto6 et data Ioannis vigesimo: Accipite Spiritum sanctum etc.; potestas vero excommunicandi insinuatur fuisse data Matthaei decimo octavo, ubi, postquam dictum est: Si Ecclesiam non audierit etc., additum est: Amen dico vobis, quodcumque ligaveritis etc.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod hoc est maioris virtutis, scilicet excommunicare; dicendum, quod se habent sicut excedentia et excessa et sunt alterius et alterius ordinationis; et ideo non sequitur, quod qui habet unam potestatem habet aliam; utraque tamen concurrit ad potestatis plenitudinem, et una sine alia esse potest. Pluribus tamen conceditur clavis quam gladius, quia plures habent ordinem sacerdotalem quam praelationem et ecclesiasticam iurisdictionem.
Et si quaeratur ratio huius, duplex est. Una est diffusio boni, quia potestas clavium est ad reconciliandum, potestas gladii ad compellendum. — Alia ratio est vitatio periculi, quia pauci sunt, qui sciant hoc ense percutere; ideo propter periculum paucorum manibus tradi debuit. Ideo etiam solemnem excommunicationem7, quae fit cum candelis prius accensis et deinde exstinctis, et pulsatis campanis, oportet a solis episcopis fieri, licet aliae possint ab aliis fieri.
Ad illud quod quaeritur ultimo: quare congregatio sive multitudo potest excommunicare, ita quod nullus, et non excommunicari? dicendum, quod peccata multitudinis nulla sunt, sed iurisdictio multitudinis nonnulla est. Et si tu quaeras: unde hoc est? dicendum, quod multitudo bene facit ad augmentum potentiae in excellentia — unde multitudo potest trahere navem, ita quod nullus trahit navem per se — sed multitudo, in quantum huiusmodi, non facit defectum nec impotentiam virium8; unde multitudo non trahitur, quin quilibet de multitudine trahatur. Sic tota multitudo excommunicat, ita quod nullus; non sic excommunicatur, ad minus secundum nova iura9, ut iuristae dicunt.
[No scholion is rendered with this quaestio. The Articulus Unicus scholion (§§ I–VII), which covers q1–q6 together, is transcribed and translated with Quaestio I (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`); cf. p. 489 footer note 9 below: "Vide scholion ad 1. articuli quaest." / "See the scholion to question 1 of the article."]
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Question III. By whom excommunication can be done.
Thirdly it is asked, by whom excommunication can be done. And that it can be done only by one having a key is shown thus.
1. To loose and to bind are acts of the keys; but "to excommunicate is to bind," as the Master says in the text1; but "whose is the act, his too is the power": therefore etc.
2. Likewise, to excommunicate is to separate from the communion of the Sacraments; but it belongs to him to separate from communion or from participation whose it is to administer; but only the priest, who has the keys, can administer the Sacrament of the body and blood2: therefore only he can excommunicate.
3. Likewise, to Peter was given the power of binding and loosing in the judicial and the penitential forum; I ask, therefore, when were the keys given to him3? Only when? therefore he who does not have the keys does not have this power.
4. Likewise, it is of greater virtue and power to bind with the bond of excommunication than [with the bond] of satisfaction; but only the priest can impose penance and hear confessions, who has the keys: therefore only such a one can excommunicate, because he who cannot do the lesser cannot do the greater4.
On the contrary: 1. Delegated judges have the power of excommunicating5; yet many of them do not have the keys, because they are not priests: therefore someone can excommunicate who does not have the keys. If you say that he does not excommunicate by his own authority, then the objection is made about the archdeacon, who by his office hears and decides cases: therefore he can excommunicate, and yet, if he is not a priest, he does not have the keys. If you say that he likewise has [this] by delegation or by custom; why6 does he not likewise have the act of binding in the penitential forum by commission or by custom? For there does not seem to be a greater reason in the one than in the other.
2. Likewise, one canonically elected and approved is certainly such that, before he is ordained a priest, he does not have the keys, yet he can hear cases and excommunicate by his own authority7: therefore it seems etc.
3. Likewise, the parish priest does not according to the laws have the power of excommunicating except for thefts and robberies and the like8; and it is established that he has the keys and the use of the keys: therefore excommunication is not from the power of the keys.
4. Likewise, a whole multitude, as a chapter, excommunicates, so that no one [individually does]9; but that a multitude should have the keys, so that no one [individually does], is impossible, since it states an absolute property: therefore the act of excommunicating is not from a key.
Alongside this it is asked: since a multitude cannot be excommunicated, so that no one [individually is excommunicated]10, how can it excommunicate, so that no one [individually does]?
Conclusion
Conclusion. The power of excommunicating does not follow precisely upon the keys, but is in all who have ordinary jurisdiction in the judicial forum.
I respond: It must be said that among the jurists themselves11 there is a controversy about this question. — For some said that the power of excommunicating is only in bishops. Others said that it is not only in bishops, but also in archpriests, archdeacons and abbots and other prelates. A third group said that this belongs to these and also to parish priests.
But although in this question it belongs to the canons to say the "that," nevertheless it belongs to theology to say the "why"12, as to the higher science. For that anyone in the Church has power, this is from Christ himself, who conferred the power on the Apostles and especially on Peter himself. But the Lord conferred on Peter himself both powers, both of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, and of binding and loosing in the judicial forum1. The first power regards order, the second prelacy.
Hence according to the first an equal can absolve an equal, according to the second an equal cannot bind an equal nor a superior; and this is because the former belongs to order, the latter to prelacy, namely the power of excommunicating.
The first power, of binding and loosing in the penitential forum, opens the entrance of heaven; and therefore it is rightly called a key2. The second by the censure of judgment coerces subjects; and therefore it is called a sword. — The first power is the power of arbitrating between God and man, the second between man and man; and therefore the first regards order, the second prelacy. — The first power, since it was conferred on Peter as a priest, descends to all priests, although not all have its execution3. The second, because it was conferred on Peter as he is a prelate, descends to all ecclesiastical persons who have prelacy or jurisdiction. Hence those who have ordinary jurisdiction in judging some have the power of coercing them by ecclesiastical censure, so that their judgment may be inviolably observed. And since not only those having the keys have jurisdiction, but also those not having them — they have it, I say, either by law or by custom, as archdeacons and certain chapters; therefore they can excommunicate. Again, because some have the keys who do not have jurisdiction in the judicial forum, as simple priests; therefore they cannot excommunicate except by commission, or except in determined cases, as in theft and robberies. — I grant therefore the reasons proving that this power does not follow precisely upon the power of the keys.
To the arguments:
1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that to loose and to bind are acts of the keys; it must be said that this is true in the penitential forum, but in the judicial forum they are not [acts] of the keys, unless the power of the keys be taken according to its fullness, in which way it is said to be in bishops, who, when they are promoted from the priesthood to the episcopate, do not receive a new key, but the key of power is enlarged in them4.
2. To that which is objected, that it belongs to him to excommunicate whose it is to give communion5; it must be said that it belongs not only to him, but also to him who presides over the community, or also to him administering the Sacraments; and since such are those who have jurisdiction, although they do not have the keys; therefore etc.
3. To that which is asked: when was this power given to Peter? it can be said that both were given at once, because the power of the key was given in its fullness. — Or it can be said that not at once, but the power of the keys was promised in Matthew the sixteenth6 and given in John the twentieth: Receive the Holy Spirit etc.; but the power of excommunicating is intimated to have been given in Matthew the eighteenth, where, after it was said: If he will not hear the Church etc., it was added: Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind etc.
4. To that which is objected, that this is of greater virtue, namely to excommunicate; it must be said that they stand as exceeding and exceeded and are of one ordination and another; and therefore it does not follow that he who has the one power has the other; yet both concur toward the fullness of power, and one can exist without the other. Yet the key is granted to more than the sword, because more have the priestly order than [have] prelacy and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
And if the reason for this be asked, it is twofold. One is the diffusion of the good, because the power of the keys is for reconciling, the power of the sword for compelling. — The other reason is the avoidance of danger, because few are those who know how to strike with this sword; therefore on account of the danger it ought to be handed over to the hands of few. For this reason too the solemn excommunication7, which is done with candles first lit and then extinguished, and the bells rung, ought to be done only by bishops, although the others can be done by others.
To that which is asked lastly: why can a congregation or multitude excommunicate, so that no one [individually does], and not be excommunicated? it must be said that the sins of a multitude are nothing, but the jurisdiction of a multitude is something. And if you ask: whence is this? it must be said that a multitude does indeed contribute to the increase of power in excellence — whence a multitude can draw a ship, so that no one draws the ship by himself — but a multitude, as such, does not produce defect nor impotence of strength8; whence a multitude is not drawn, unless each one of the multitude is drawn. Thus the whole multitude excommunicates, so that no one [individually does]; it is not so excommunicated, at least according to the new laws9, as the jurists say.
[No scholion is rendered with this quaestio. The Articulus Unicus scholion (§§ I–VII), covering q1–q6 together, is transcribed and translated with Question I (`bon-sent-IV-d18-p2-a1-q1`); cf. p. 489 footer note 9: "See the scholion to question 1 of the article."]
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- 1Hic c. 6. circa finem. — Seq. axioma profert, terminis transpositis, Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 1: Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.Here ch. 6, near the end. — In what follows he adduces the axiom, with its terms transposed, from Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking, c. 1: "For whose is the power, his too is the act."
- 2Vide supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. et infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. seq.See above d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, and below d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 and following.
- 3Cfr. Matth. 16, 19. et Ioan. 20, 23.Cf. Matthew 16:19 and John 20:23.
- 4Vide supra pag. 142, nota 8.See above p. 142, note 8.
- 5Cfr. C. Quaerenti (26.), X. de Officio et potest. iud. deleg. (lib. I. tit. 29.). Ibid. tit. 23. agitur de Officio archidiaconi.Cf. the chapter Quaerenti (26), X, On the Office and Power of a Delegated Judge (bk. I, tit. 29). In the same place, tit. 23, the Office of the Archdeacon is treated.
- 6Edd. quaero: quare.The editions [read] quaero [for] quare ["I ask" for "why"].
- 7Ex C. Transmissam (15.), X. de Electione et electi potest. (lib. I. tit. 6.).From the chapter Transmissam (15), X, On Election and the Power of the Elect (bk. I, tit. 6).
- 8Ius loquitur non de his casibus, sed generaliter, ut C. Nemo episcopus, nemo presbyter excommunicet aliquem (11.), C. 2. q. 1, et C. Cum ab ecclesiarum praelatis (3.), X. de Officio iudicis ordinarii (lib. I. tit. 31.), in quo Alexander III. episcopo Florentino praescribit, sententiam interdicti vel excommunicationis a plebano S. Pancratii iuste latam esse observandam.The law speaks not of these cases, but generally, as the chapter Nemo episcopus, nemo presbyter excommunicet aliquem (11), C. 2, q. 1, and the chapter Cum ab ecclesiarum praelatis (3), X, On the Office of the Ordinary Judge (bk. I, tit. 31), in which Alexander III prescribes to the bishop of Florence that a sentence of interdict or excommunication justly pronounced by the parish priest of St. Pancras is to be observed.
- 9Cfr. C. Episcopali sede vacante (1.), de Maioritate et obedientia (lib. I. tit. 17.) in VI.Cf. the chapter Episcopali sede vacante (1), On Superiority and Obedience (bk. I, tit. 17), in the Sext.
- 10Constat ex C. Romana Ecclesia (5.), de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 11.) in VI, qui est Innocentii IV; C. Si habes (1.), C. 24. q. 3. Cfr. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum in Matth. 13, 29: Multitudo non est excommunicanda.It is established from the chapter Romana Ecclesia (5), On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 11), in the Sext, which is of Innocent IV; the chapter Si habes (1), C. 24, q. 3. Cf. the Glossa ordinaria in Strabus on Matthew 13:29: "A multitude is not to be excommunicated."
- 11Cod. 1 iurisperitos.Codex 1 [reads] iurisperitos ["legal experts"].
- 12De quia (si res est sive de facto) et propter quid cfr. Aristot., II. Poster. c. 1. seq. c. 9. (c. 8.) seq.On the "that" (whether the thing is, that is, the fact) and the "why" cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, c. 1 and following, c. 9 (c. 8) and following.
- 1Cfr. C. In novo testamento (2.), seqq. d. 21.Cf. the chapter In novo testamento (2), and following, dist. 21.
- 2Ut dictum est supra p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — De propos. seq. vide supra pag. 486, nota 5.As was said above, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and following. — On the proposition that follows, see above p. 486, note 5.
- 3Cfr. d. 19. a. 2. q. 2. — Mox pro ut praelatus est edd. ut praelato.Cf. d. 19, a. 2, q. 2. — Shortly, for ut praelatus est the editions [read] ut praelato.
- 4Vide infra d. 24. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. — Plures codd. clavis potestas; lectio non spernenda. Superius post non sunt cod. aa supplet actus.See below d. 24, p. II, a. 2, q. 3. — Several codices [read] clavis potestas; a reading not to be despised. Above, after non sunt, codex aa supplies actus.
- 5Codd. 1 K bene communionem.Codices 1 and K rightly [read] communionem ["communion"].
- 6Vers. 19. — Seq. locus est Ioan. 20, 22. seq., tertius Matth. 18, 17. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 484, nota 1. — In principio solut. pro quaeritur codd. obiicitur.Verse 19. — The following passage is John 20:22 and following, the third [is] Matthew 18:17 and following. Cf. above p. 484, note 1. — At the beginning of the solution, for quaeritur the codices [read] obiicitur.
- 7Cfr. C. Debent duodecim sacerdotes (106.), C. 11. q. 3. — Superius pro compellendum cod. U bene compescendum.Cf. the chapter Debent duodecim sacerdotes (106), C. 11, q. 3. — Above, for compellendum codex U rightly [reads] compescendum ["restraining"].
- 8Ex codd. R T X supplevimus virium. Subinde pro quin, quod praebent codd. F G M O (E a secunda manu), cod. U (I a secunda manu) ita quod, alii codd. vel quod vel cum Vat. nisi, ed. 1 etsi.From codices R, T, X we have supplied virium. Thereupon, for quin, which codices F, G, M, O provide (E by a second hand), codex U (I by a second hand) [reads] ita quod, other codices either quod or, with the Vatican edition, nisi, edition 1 etsi.
- 9Vide supra pag. 488, nota 10. — Vide scholion ad 1. articuli quaest.See above p. 488, note 10. — See the scholion to question 1 of the article.