Dist. 21, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 21
Articulus I. De purgatione peccatorum venialium in hac vita.
Quaestio I. Utrum peccata venialia possint deleri sine gratia.
Et quod possint deleri sine gratia2 videtur:
1. Quia omnis culpa remissa est omnino, cum quantum ipsa exigit1 est punita; sed venialis culpa est digna sola poena temporali: ergo cum omne temporale finem habeat, possibile est, aliquem existentem extra gratiam sufficienter pro illa culpa puniri: ergo possibile est sine gratia remitti. Prima propositio manifesta est, quia nullus ita severus est in iustitia, quod puniat ultra quod meruit3 qui peccavit: ergo cum sufficienter punit Deus, amplius non punit; sed non potest esse culpa sine poena: ergo cessante poena, cessat culpa.
2. Item, venialis culpa non dicit deformitatem imaginis, sed solum pronitatem ad bonum commutabile4; sed pronitas potest sine gratia aboleri, quoniam qui est pronus ad avaritiam sine gratia potest fieri prodigus et pronus ad prodigalitatem: ergo etc.
3. Item, in morbis parvis natura non indiget medicina, sed solum quando morbus magnificatus est; sed venialia non prosternunt naturam, immo dimittunt eam in suo vigore: ergo praeter medicinam gratiae potest per naturam veniale curari.
4. Item, quanto morbi minorem habent connexionem et similitudinem, tanto specialius potest unus sine alio curari; sed veniale maiorem convenientiam habet cum aliquo veniali quam cum mortali1b; sed unum veniale potest deleri, alio remanente: ergo multo fortius potest deleri veniale, remanente mortali: ergo etc.
5. Item, si veniale non potest deleri sine gratia; esto quod aliquis in solo veniali moriatur, illud nunquam delebitur, sed quamdiu durabit, punietur: ergo aeternaliter ex se ipso punitur: ergo non differt a mortali.
Contra: 1. Augustinus, de Civitate Dei vigesimo primo2b: «Nec magna nec parva possunt nobis dimitti, nisi nos dimiserimus debitoribus nostris»; hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia, dum homo non dimittit, est semper in peccato: ergo nullum peccatum potest homini dimitti, quamdiu est in peccato mortali: ergo si sola gratia a peccato liberat, veniale non dimittitur sine gratia.
2. Item, si aliquid delet aliquid aliud, habet oppositionem ad illud aliquo modo; sed nec poena nec natura habet oppositionem ad culpam: ergo nec per poenam nec per3b naturam delentur venialia, nisi adsit gratia.
3. Item, omne peccatum nocet et adimit, sicut vult Augustinus in Enchiridio4b et multis locis: ergo veniale aliquid de bono spirituali et rectitudine adimit; sed solus Deus potest animae restituere bonum, sicut solus potuit eam creare, et hoc est per gratiam: ergo etc.
4. Item, Deus punit pro veniali, hoc constat: ergo aliquid invenit displicentiae in veniali; sed nihil omnino removet displicentiam Dei, nisi quod invenit placentiam et veniam; sed sola gratia gratum faciens est illa quae Deo placere facit5b: ergo etc.
5. Item, perfectius est carere veniali quam mortali: ergo aeque nobilis doni sive aeque perfecti, vel magis perfecti actus est delere veniale quam delere mortale; sed mortale deleri non potest nisi a dono gratiae gratum facientis6b: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Peccata venialia sine gratia gratum faciente non delentur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquorum positio fuit, quod venialia sine gratia gratum faciente deleri possunt per gratiam gratis datam. Et rationem huius ostendere voluerunt, pro eo videlicet, quod veniale peccatum non repugnat gratiae gratum facienti, sed gratis datae; nec offendit Maiestatem divinam, quia ibi non diligitur aliquid supra Deum, sed aliquantulum inordinate sub Deo. Et ideo, sicut mortale potest deleri per gratiam7b, quia ei repugnat, et quia gratia Deo offenso reconciliat, et quia Deum contemptum amare facit super omnia; sic veniale potest deleri per gratiam gratis datam, quae illam modicam inordinationem removet et illam occasionem minus amandi Deum ab ipsa anima tollit; nec oportet, ibi esse gratiam elevantem animam ad dilectionem Dei super omnia, quia per veniale nihil amatur supra Deum.
Sed haec positio, licet probabilis videatur, a veritate tamen deviat, si quis inspiciat. Omne enim peccatum, eo ipso quod peccatum est, aliquo modo animam foedat8b et aliquo modo ipsam deordinat, et necesse est ex hoc, quod aliquo modo Deo displiceat. Quoniam igitur nota displicentiae minima, quae esse possit, sine habitu, qui reducit ad complacentiam et ad amicitiam, auferri non potest; tenendum omnino de omni peccato generaliter, est quod nullum omnino potest deleri sine gratia gratum faciente. Sic enim decrevit nos sanare divina misericordia; et hoc dicunt Sancti, et sonat Scriptura9b, quae maxime ponit, gratiam esse necessariam ad delenda peccata.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sufficiens punitio absolvit a culpa; dicendum, quod si illud intelligatur in facie hominum, qui iudicant secundum exteriora10b, potest habere veritatem. Sed in facie Dei, qui considerat faciem animae internam et decorem imaginis suae, quantacumque sit poena, non potest omnino absolvere peccatorem, nisi removeatur interior deformitas; et ideo in foro Dei impossibile est peccatum sufficienter puniri quantum ad tempus, nisi deleatur per gratiam.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veniale dicit solam pronitatem; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo amplius dicit quandam notam displicentiae; et ita semper manet in anima, etiam si veniat pronitas ad oppositum, nisi interveniat caritas, quae operit multitudinem peccatorum11b.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in morbis parvis natura non indiget medicina; dicendum, quod verum est; et similiter in spiritualibus est, si recte fiat similitudinis translatio. Natura igitur habet in
se fundamentum sanitatis, scilicet virtutes naturales, regentes complexionem et expellentes nociva; regimen autem spiritualis sanitatis non est nisi gratia gratum faciens: et ideo, sicut corrupta vi naturali, non potest deleri morbus corporalis; sic nec, absente gratia, potest deleri, quantumlibet sit parvus, morbus spiritualis. Non ergo gratia sicut medicina, sed sicut regitiva virtus est; exterius autem Sacramentum est sicut medicina, quo non indiget gratia necessario, expedit sibi tamen ad curationem venialis, maxime cum illa aegritudo est consuetudinaria.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior connexio est venialis ad veniale; dicendum, quod veniale sine veniali potest deleri, quia neutrum fundamentum virtutis vivificantis et sanantis evertit, scilicet gratiam; sed mortale exstirpat gratiam; non enim simul stat cum vita. Et quoniam non potest deleri aliqua culpa sine gratia, ideo nullus morbus, etiam minimus, potest deleri, quin deleatur omnis mortalis culpa; non sic autem est in veniali, pro eo quod utrumque simul stat cum gratia.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui in solo veniali decedit; dicendum, quod positio est impossibilis; et ideo non est mirum, si accidat impossibile. Si tamen aliquis decedat cum originali et veniali, vel cum veniali et alio quocumque mortali; punietur pro veniali aliquanta poena intensive; sed ratione adiuncti poena illa erit aeterna, non ratione ipsius culpae venialis.
I. De purgatorio vide supra d. 20. p. I. per totam et hic dub. 1–3, ubi locus Apostoli (I. Cor. 3, 12.) exponitur (cfr. etiam infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. de remissione venialium per extremam unctionem). — Quaestio 1. intelligitur de habitu sive statu gratiae et influxu eius, ut est «regitiva virtus» (ad 3.), non de nova infusione gratiae habitualis, ut docet etiam S. Thom. locc. infra citt. — De I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 15. m. 3. a. 4. § 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 1. — S. Thom., supra d. 16. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 87. a. 2; de Malo q. 7. a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., supra d. 16. a. 7. quaestiunc. 1. 3. — Richard. a Med., supra d. 16. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. — Durand., supra d. 16. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de tota hac p. I. hic q. 1.
II. Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem Alex. Hal., (loc. cit. § 2.) resolvit: «Dico ergo sine praeiudicio, quod sine motu voluntatis actuali, vel habituali [i. e. virtuali] nolentis peccasse venialiter non deletur veniale». Hoc autem ita explicat, ut asserat: «Non video, quomodo liberum arbitrium possit consentire gratiae delenti peccatum, nisi dissentiat ipsi sive nolit fecisse, sive in particulari... sive in generali dissentiat, sive nolit actu vel habitu, dico». Ratione huius principii idem (loc. cit. in fine) etiam opinatus est, venialia fieri mortalia in casu, si quis moriens et sui compos non dissentiendo poenitentiam egerit de istis venialibus. — Communis quidem sententia ad veniam horum peccatorum impetrandam requiri et sufficere docet virtualem displicentiam; sed simul asserit, hanc importari etiam in actibus aliarum virtutum, non tantum poenitentiae sive contritionis (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 87. a. 2.). Simul communius docetur, etiam post mortem animas in gratia decedentes vi eiusdem et poenarum purgari posse a culpa venialium (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1.). — A doctrina valde communi, quod venialia peccata in damnatis habeant poenam aeternam per accidens (q. 1. ad 5. tacta), dissentit Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 8.) cum suis, Nominalibus nonnullisque aliis et docet, poenam aeternam venialibus deberi nec per se nec per accidens. De hac quaestione cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 8; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3; Durand., hic q. 2. — De 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: Scot., loc. cit. n. 8. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. 4. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 1.
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Article I. On the purgation of venial sins in this life.
Question I. Whether venial sins can be destroyed without grace.
And that they can be destroyed without grace2 is seen:
1. Because every fault [that is] remitted is wholly punished, in proportion to what it itself demands1; but a venial fault is worthy of temporal penalty alone: therefore, since everything temporal has an end, it is possible that someone existing outside grace be sufficiently punished for that fault: therefore it is possible that it be remitted without grace. The first proposition is manifest, because no one is so severe in justice that he should punish beyond what he who has sinned has deserved3: therefore when God punishes sufficiently, he punishes no further; but a fault cannot exist without a penalty: therefore, the penalty ceasing, the fault ceases.
2. Likewise, a venial fault does not denote a deformity of the image, but only a proneness toward a changeable good4; but a proneness can be abolished without grace, since one who is prone to avarice can without grace become prodigal and prone to prodigality: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, in small ailments nature does not need medicine, but only when the ailment has been magnified; but venial [sins] do not lay nature low, nay rather they leave it in its vigor: therefore, apart from the medicine of grace, a venial [sin] can be cured by nature.
4. Likewise, the less connection and likeness ailments have, the more specially can one be cured without the other; but a venial [sin] has greater agreement with another venial [sin] than with a mortal one1b; but one venial [sin] can be destroyed while another remains: therefore much more strongly can a venial [sin] be destroyed while a mortal one remains: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, if a venial [sin] cannot be destroyed without grace; suppose that someone die in a venial [sin] alone, that [sin] will never be destroyed, but as long as it endures, it will be punished: therefore he is punished eternally by his very self: therefore it does not differ from a mortal [sin].
On the contrary: 1. Augustine, On the City of God, [book] twenty-one2b: «Neither great nor small [sins] can be remitted to us, unless we ourselves remit [them] to our debtors»; this is for no other reason than that, while a man does not remit, he is always in sin: therefore no sin can be remitted to a man so long as he is in mortal sin: therefore if grace alone frees from sin, a venial [sin] is not remitted without grace.
2. Likewise, if something destroys something else, it has some opposition to it; but neither penalty nor nature has opposition to fault: therefore venial [sins] are destroyed neither by penalty nor by3b nature, unless grace be present.
3. Likewise, every sin harms and takes away, as Augustine holds in the Enchiridion4b and in many places: therefore a venial [sin] takes away something of spiritual good and of rectitude; but God alone can restore good to the soul, just as he alone could create it, and this is through grace: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, God punishes for a venial [sin], this is established: therefore he finds something of displeasure in a venial [sin]; but nothing whatever removes the displeasure of God, except that which finds favor and pardon; but grace making-pleasing alone is that which makes [one] pleasing to God5b: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, it is more perfect to be free of a venial [sin] than of a mortal one: therefore it is the act of an equally noble gift, or of an equally perfect, or more perfect, [act] to destroy a venial [sin] than to destroy a mortal one; but a mortal [sin] cannot be destroyed except by the gift of grace making-pleasing6b: therefore etc.
Conclusion. Venial sins are not destroyed without grace making-pleasing.
I respond: It must be said that the position of some was that venial [sins] can be destroyed without grace making-pleasing, through gratuitously-given grace [gratia gratis data]. And they wished to show the reason for this, namely for this, that a venial sin does not conflict with grace making-pleasing, but [only] with gratuitously-given [grace]; nor does it offend the divine Majesty, because there nothing is loved above God, but [something is loved] somewhat inordinately under God. And therefore, just as a mortal [sin] can be destroyed by grace7b, because it conflicts with it, and because grace reconciles [the man] to the offended God, and because it makes [the man] love the contemned God above all things; so a venial [sin] can be destroyed by gratuitously-given grace, which removes that slight inordinateness and takes away from the soul itself that occasion of loving God less; nor is it necessary that there be there a grace elevating the soul to the love of God above all things, because through a venial [sin] nothing is loved above God.
But this position, although it seems probable, nevertheless deviates from the truth, if one examines it. For every sin, by the very fact that it is a sin, in some way defiles the soul8b and in some way disorders it, and from this it is necessary that it in some way displease God. Since therefore the least mark of displeasure that can be cannot be taken away without a habit which leads back to complacency and to friendship; it is to be held altogether, concerning every sin generally, that nothing whatever can be destroyed without grace making-pleasing. For thus the divine mercy has decreed to heal us; and this the Saints say, and Scripture sounds forth9b, which especially posits that grace is necessary for the destroying of sins.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that sufficient punishment absolves from fault; it must be said that if that be understood in the face of men, who judge according to outward things10b, it can have truth. But in the face of God, who considers the inward face of the soul and the beauty of his own image, however great the penalty be, he cannot wholly absolve the sinner, unless the inner deformity be removed; and therefore in the court of God it is impossible for a sin to be sufficiently punished as to time, unless it be destroyed through grace.
2. To that which is objected, that a venial [sin] denotes only a proneness; it must be said that it is false, nay rather it denotes besides a certain mark of displeasure; and so it always remains in the soul, even if a proneness to the opposite should come, unless charity intervene, which covers a multitude of sins11b.
3. To that which is objected, that in small ailments nature does not need medicine; it must be said that it is true; and likewise it is so in spiritual things, if the transfer of the likeness be rightly made. Nature therefore has in
itself a foundation of health, namely the natural virtues, governing the complexion and expelling harmful things; but the governance of spiritual health is nothing but grace making-pleasing: and therefore, just as, the natural power being corrupted, a bodily ailment cannot be destroyed; so neither, grace being absent, can a spiritual ailment be destroyed, however small it be. Therefore grace [acts] not as medicine, but as a governing virtue; but outwardly the Sacrament is as medicine, of which grace does not necessarily have need, yet it is expedient for it for the curing of a venial [sin], especially when that sickness is habitual.
4. To that which is objected, that there is greater connection of a venial [sin] to a venial [sin]; it must be said that a venial [sin] can be destroyed without [another] venial [sin], because neither overturns the foundation of the life-giving and healing virtue, namely grace; but a mortal [sin] uproots grace; for it does not stand together with life. And since no fault can be destroyed without grace, therefore no ailment, even the smallest, can be destroyed without every mortal fault being destroyed; but it is not so in a venial [sin], for this [reason], that each stands together with grace.
5. To that which is objected concerning one who departs in a venial [sin] alone; it must be said that the position is impossible; and therefore it is no wonder if the impossible follows. If, however, someone should depart with an original and a venial [sin], or with a venial [sin] and any other mortal one; he will be punished for the venial [sin] with a certain penalty intensively; but by reason of the adjunct that penalty will be eternal, not by reason of the venial fault itself.
I. On purgatory see above d. 20. p. I. throughout, and here dub. 1–3, where the passage of the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) is expounded (cf. also below d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. on the remission of venial [sins] through extreme unction). — Question 1 is understood concerning the habit or state of grace and its influx, as it is a «governing virtue» (at [reply] 3.), not concerning a new infusion of habitual grace, as St. Thomas too teaches in the places cited below. — On Question I: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 15. m. 3. a. 4. § 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. n. 1. — St. Thomas, above d. 16. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1; S. III. q. 87. a. 2; de Malo q. 7. a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, above d. 16. a. 7. quaestiuncula 1. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, above d. 16. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. — Durandus, above d. 16. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this whole p. I., here q. 1.
II. As to the following (2nd) question, Alexander of Hales (in the place cited, § 2.) resolves: «I say therefore without prejudice, that without a movement of the will, actual or habitual [i.e. virtual], unwilling to have sinned venially, a venial [sin] is not destroyed». And this he explains thus, so as to assert: «I do not see how free choice can consent to grace destroying a sin, unless it dissent from it or be unwilling to have done it, whether in particular... whether it dissent in general, whether it be unwilling in act or in habit, I say». By reason of this principle the same [author] (in the place cited, at the end) also was of the opinion that venial [sins] become mortal in the case where someone dying and in possession of himself should, by not dissenting, do penance for those venial [sins]. — The common opinion indeed teaches that for obtaining the pardon of these sins a virtual displeasure is required and suffices; but it asserts at the same time that this is implied also in the acts of other virtues, not only of penance or contrition (cf. St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 87. a. 2.). At the same time it is more commonly taught that even after death souls departing in grace can, by the power of the same [grace] and of penalties, be purged from the fault of venial [sins] (cf. below a. 2. q. 1.). — From the very common doctrine that venial sins in the damned have an eternal penalty per accidens (touched on at q. 1. ad 5.), Scotus dissents (here q. 1. n. 8.) with his [followers], the Nominalists, and some others, and teaches that an eternal penalty is owed to venial [sins] neither per se nor per accidens. On this question cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 2. quaestiuncula 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 8; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. quaestiuncula 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3; Durandus, here q. 2. — On the 2nd question, besides those praised: Scotus, in the place cited, n. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, in the place cited, quaestiuncula 2. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, in the place cited, q. 1.
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- 1Dist. 17. p. I. per totam.Distinction 17, p. I, throughout.
- 2Aliis verbis sic poni potest quaestio: utrum in statu peccati mortalis dimittatur veniale.In other words the question can be put thus: whether in the state of mortal sin a venial [sin] is remitted.
- 3Vat. cum paucis codd. ultra quam meruit ille. Inferius post punit ex cod. U supplevimus Deus.The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] beyond what that one deserved. Below, after punishes, from codex U we have supplied God.
- 4Cfr. supra pag. 292, nota 9.Cf. above p. 292, note 9.
- 1bVide supra d. 16. p. II. a. 3. q. I.See above d. 16. p. II. a. 3. q. I.
- 2bCap. 27. n. 4. Respicitur Matth. 6, 12. — Circa finem arg. post a peccato in codd. bene O R S T additur mortali.Chapter 27, n. 4. Reference is made to Matthew 6:12. — Near the end of the argument, after from sin, in codices clearly O R S T is added mortal.
- 3bCum codd. I K L X bis substituimus per pro propter.With codices I K L X we have twice substituted per [by] for propter [on account of].
- 4bCap. 12. n. 4. et c. 17. n. 5. Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 13. n. 36. Vide etiam tom. II. pag. 822, nota 1, ubi alios locc. allegavimus. — Mox post et multis cod. U addit aliis.Chapter 12, n. 4, and c. 17, n. 5. Cf. III On Free Choice, c. 13, n. 36. See also tom. II, p. 822, note 1, where we have cited other passages. — Soon, after and many, codex U adds other.
- 5bUt ostensum est II. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.As was shown in II Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.
- 6bCfr. supra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. above d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
- 7bCodd. R S T bene supplent gratum facientem.Codices R S T clearly supply making-pleasing.
- 8bPlures codd. et edd. defoedat, cod. A deformat.Several codices and editions [read] defiles thoroughly, codex A deforms.
- 9bCfr. Rom. 3, 24. seqq.; 5, 15. seqq.; Eph. 2, 5. seqq.; Tit. 3, 7. Ambros., Epist. 26. n. 7, docet, gratiam abolere peccatum. August., de Spiritu et lit. c. 30. n. 52: Per gratiam sanatio animae a vitio peccati. Vide etiam II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. et d. 28. a. 1. q. I. — Pro sanare cod. H salvare.Cf. Rom. 3:24 ff.; 5:15 ff.; Eph. 2:5 ff.; Tit. 3:7. Ambrose, Letter 26, n. 7, teaches that grace abolishes sin. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 30, n. 52: Through grace [comes] the healing of the soul from the vice of sin. See also II Sent. d. 26. q. 2. and d. 28. a. 1. q. I. — For to heal codex H [reads] to save.
- 10bLibr. I. Reg. 16, 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor. — Mox post Sed cod. H addit si.1 Kings [1 Samuel] 16:7: For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart. — Soon, after But, codex H adds if.
- 11bEpist. I. Petr. 4, 8: Quia caritas operit etc. Cfr. Prov. 10, 12.1 Peter 4:8: Because charity covers etc. Cf. Prov. 10:12. ---