Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 22
Quaestio II. Utrum peccata dimissa redeant quantum ad reatum poenae.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccata dimissa redeant quantum ad reatum. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per textum Matthaei decimo octavo1: Serve nequam, omne debitum dimisi tibi etc.; et post: Tradidit eum tortoribus, quousque redderet etc.; et post: Sic Pater vester etc.: ergo Dominus debitum, quod dimiserat, iterum exigit: ergo etc.
2. Item, ponatur, quod aliquis ante completam satisfactionem cadat in culpam; constat, quod satisfacere non potest extra gratiam2; ponatur ergo, quod decedat; iste reatum secum portat, qui non potest solvi per poenam satisfactoriam: ergo punitur poena aeterna.
3. Item, quot peccata sunt dimissa, tot tenetur gratias agere, tot etiam tenetur detestari continue peccata; sed cum peccat uno peccato, omittit gratias agere et peccata detestari: ergo tot poenarum reus erit, quot prius erat3.
4. Item, in legibus humanis servus manumissus redigitur in servitutem, quando dominum suum attrectat manu cruenta, vel pro alia enormi offensa4: ergo si leges istae a lege procedant aeterna,
videtur, quod Deus similiter faciat: ergo ita recidivantem assidue reputat obligatum ad poenam, sicut prius reputabat.
Contra: 1. Non iudicat Deus bis in idipsum, Nahum primo5, non ergo bis punit: si ergo aliquis pro peccato commisso poenituit et se punivit, videtur, quod amplius pro illo non puniatur, quantumcumque peccat alias: ergo etc.
2. Item, reatus poenae aeternae est inseparabiliter annexus culpae; sed culpa non potest redire6: ergo etc.
3. Item, si reatus peccatorum praecedentium redit, ergo nulla est in mundo utilitas, quod quis bene fecit et poenituit; sed hoc videtur impium dicere: ergo etc.
4. Item, dona Dei sunt sine poenitentia7: ergo si Deus aliquid condonat, non poenitet de condonatione: ergo non potest reatus redire, quem Deus dimisit vel a quo solvit.
Conclusio. Peccata omnino dimissa non redeunt per sequentem culpam nisi quoad poenam damni.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, peccata praecedentia redire quoad reatum, quia per culpam sequentem tot reatibus obligatur ad poenam, quot prius erat obligatus. Et ratio huius tangitur in littera8. Dicebant enim, quod quot peccata commiserat, tot vinculis obligabatur, cum veniebat ad poenitentiam, ut detestaretur praeterita mala; et ideo, cum peccat, omnia vincula rumpit: et ideo tot reatibus reus est, quot prius peccata commisit. — Sed illud nihil est: primum, quia sufficit una detestatione detestari cetera, nec tenetur simul et semel divisim detestari omnia9: ergo in uno non peccat nisi omissione unica.
Aliorum opinio fuit, quod peccata priora redeant per recidivum quantum ad aequivalentiam, pro eo quod ingratitudo, quae est conditio peccati, adeo aggravat peccatum, ut sit ita reus, sicut per omnia peccata praecedentia reus fuerat. — Sed illud adhuc non videtur10: primo, quia ingratitudo pensatur secundum quantitatem beneficii; sed maius beneficium praestat Deus conservando innocentiam quam revocando ad poenitentiam: ergo gravius peccavit, cum primo innocentiam perdidit, quam quando post recidivavit: ergo ingratitudo non facit, quod adeo sit peccatum grave, ut praecedentia. — Praeterea, ingratitudo ista est peccati circumstantia a parte peccantis; sed magis aggravat peccatum libido vel genus peccati, quam aggravat circumstantia: ergo nunquam propter ingratitudinem unum peccatum leve secundum genus aequipollebit peccatis praecedentibus gravibus et enormibus.
Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod reatus est obligatio ad poenam, poena autem peccati duplex est, scilicet poena damni et sensus. Possumus ergo loqui de reatu peccati dupliciter: aut quantum ad poenam damni, aut quantum ad poenam sensus. Si autem quantum ad poenam damni; sic, quia qui peccat in uno factus est omnium reus11, credendum est, quod peccata dimissa redeunt. Si autem loquamur quantum ad poenam sensus; sic distinguendum est: quia quaedam peccata sunt omnino dimissa quantum ad poenam et culpam, et talia nullo modo redeunt; quaedam autem dimissa sunt in parte, et de talibus fienda12 est satisfactio. Et quoniam culpa sequens tollit potentiam satisfaciendi, quamdiu manet; per hoc ipsum iste obligatur ad supplicium aeternum, non ratione sui principaliter, sed ratione annexi; et sic intelligendum est, peccata redire. — Verum est tamen, quod aliquo modo aggravat culpam sequentem praecedens remissio, quia est ibi contemptus praestiti beneficii, non tamen ita, quod faciat aequivalentiam.
Ad 1 et 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Matthaei, dicendum, quod altero horum modorum intelligendum est. Et similiter sequens obiectum patet, quia verum concludit.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tentionibus, iam responsum est per interemptionem13, quia non tot tentionibus tenetur, sed ea sola tentione, qua tenetur conteri.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de servo manumisso, dicendum, quod in legibus humanis illud fit ad cautelam et terrorem; et ideo non oportet sic in lege divina reperiri. — Rationes autem ad oppositum, quibus ostenditur, quod reatus non omnino redit, verum concludunt14.
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Question II. Whether forgiven sins return as to the debt of punishment.
Secondly it is asked whether forgiven sins return as to the debt [of punishment]. And that they do, it seems:
1. By the text of Matthew, chapter eighteen1: Wicked servant, I forgave you all that debt etc.; and afterward: He delivered him to the torturers, until he should repay etc.; and afterward: So also my Father etc.: therefore the Lord again exacts the debt which He had forgiven: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, suppose that someone, before completed satisfaction, falls into fault; it is agreed that one cannot make satisfaction outside grace2; suppose, then, that he dies: he carries the debt with him, and it cannot be discharged by a satisfactory punishment: therefore he is punished with eternal punishment.
3. Likewise, for as many sins as have been forgiven, for so many is he bound to give thanks, and for so many likewise is he bound continually to detest [his] sins; but when he sins by one sin, he omits to give thanks and to detest [his] sins: therefore he will be guilty of as many punishments as he was before3.
4. Likewise, in human laws a manumitted slave is reduced back to servitude when he lays hands on his master with a bloody hand, or for another enormous offense4: therefore, if those laws proceed from the eternal law,
it seems that God does likewise: therefore He continually reckons the one relapsing bound to punishment, just as He reckoned him before.
On the contrary: 1. God does not judge twice for the same thing, Nahum chapter one5; therefore He does not punish twice: if, then, someone has repented and punished himself for a committed sin, it seems that he is no longer punished for it, however much he sins otherwise: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the debt of eternal punishment is inseparably annexed to fault; but fault cannot return6: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if the debt of preceding sins returns, then there is no usefulness in the world in the fact that someone has done well and repented; but this seems impious to say: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the gifts of God are without repentance7: therefore if God pardons something, He does not repent of the pardon: therefore the debt which God has forgiven, or from which He has released, cannot return.
Conclusion. Sins wholly forgiven do not return through a subsequent fault, except as to the punishment of loss.
I respond: It must be said that some wished to say that preceding sins return as to the debt, because through the subsequent fault one is bound by as many debts to punishment as he was bound before. And the ground of this is touched upon in the [Master's] text8. For they said that by as many sins as he had committed, by so many bonds was he bound, when he came to penitence, so as to detest past evils; and therefore, when he sins, he breaks all the bonds: and therefore he is guilty of as many debts as he formerly committed sins. — But that is nothing: first, because a single detestation suffices to detest the rest, nor is he bound to detest all separately at one and the same time9: therefore in [the] one he does not sin except by a single omission.
The opinion of others was that prior sins return through relapse as to equivalence, for the reason that ingratitude, which is a condition of sin, so aggravates the sin that he is as guilty as he had been guilty through all the preceding sins. — But that still does not seem [right]10: first, because ingratitude is weighed according to the magnitude of the benefit; but God confers a greater benefit in preserving innocence than in calling back to penitence: therefore he sinned more gravely when he first lost innocence than when he afterward relapsed: therefore ingratitude does not bring it about that the sin is as grave as the preceding ones. — Moreover, that ingratitude is a circumstance of the sin on the part of the sinner; but lust or the kind of sin aggravates the sin more than a circumstance aggravates: therefore never on account of ingratitude will one sin, light according to its kind, be equivalent to preceding grave and enormous sins.
And therefore it must be said otherwise, that the debt is an obligation to punishment, and the punishment of sin is twofold, namely the punishment of loss and of sense. We can therefore speak of the debt of sin in two ways: either as to the punishment of loss, or as to the punishment of sense. If, however, as to the punishment of loss; thus, because he who sins in one is made guilty of all11, it is to be believed that forgiven sins return. But if we speak as to the punishment of sense; then it must be distinguished: because certain sins are wholly forgiven as to punishment and fault, and such in no way return; but certain [others] have been forgiven in part, and concerning such satisfaction is to be made12. And since the subsequent fault takes away the power of making satisfaction, so long as it remains, by this very fact that person is bound to eternal punishment, not by reason of itself principally, but by reason of the annexed [fault]; and thus it is to be understood that sins return. — Yet it is true that the preceding remission in some way aggravates the subsequent fault, because there is there a contempt of the benefit conferred, yet not so as to make equivalence.
To 1 and 2. To that which is objected from the authority of Matthew, it must be said that it is to be understood in one or the other of these ways. And likewise the following objection is clear, because it concludes truly.
To 3. To that which is objected concerning temptations, answer has already been given through interception13, because he is not bound by so many temptations, but by that sole temptation by which he is bound to be contrite.
To 4. To that which is objected concerning the manumitted slave, it must be said that in human laws this is done for caution and terror; and therefore it need not be found thus in the divine law. — But the reasons to the contrary, by which it is shown that the debt does not wholly return, conclude truly14.
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- 1Vers. 32. 34. et 35: Sic et Pater meus caelestis faciet vobis, si non remiseritis etc.[Matthew 18], verses 32, 34, and 35: So also my heavenly Father will do to you, if you do not forgive etc.
- 2Vide supra d. 15. p. 1. q. 3. — Inferius pro satisfactoriam cod. A temporalem.See above, d. 15, p. 1, q. 3. — Below, for satisfactoriam (satisfactory) codex A [reads] temporalem (temporal).
- 3Ut insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Pro poenarum cod. aa peccatorum.As is intimated here in the Master's text, c. 1. — For poenarum (of punishments) codex aa [reads] peccatorum (of sins).
- 4Vide Gratian. C. Episcopus, qui mancipium (38.), seqq. c. 12. q. 2, et Iustinian., Authent. Ut libert. de ceter. (collat. 6. tit. 6.) § Illud. Cfr. etiam C. VI. de Libertis et eor. lib. (tit. 7.) lex Si manumissus ingratus circa patronum suum exstiterit (2.); Idem Iustinian. in I. Institut. tit. 5. ait: Libertini sunt, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt; manumissio autem est de manu datio; nam quamdiu aliquis in servitute est, manui et potestati suppositus est, et manumissus liberatur potestate etc. — Leges humanas, dummodo iustae sint, fundari in lege aeterna, docet August., l. de Lib. Arb. c. 6. n. 15. (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 26. m. 7.). — Circa finem arg. multi codd. omittunt recidivantem, post assidue supplentes te, codd. F G L U autem omittunt assidue.See Gratian, C. Episcopus, qui mancipium (38.) and following, c. 12, q. 2, and Justinian, Authent. Ut libertorum de cetero (collation 6, tit. 6) § Illud. Cf. also C. VI, On Freedmen and their children (tit. 7), the law Si manumissus ingratus circa patronum suum exstiterit (2.); the same Justinian, in the first [book] of the Institutes, tit. 5, says: Freedmen are those who have been manumitted from a just servitude; and manumission is a giving from the hand; for as long as anyone is in servitude, he is subject to hand and power, and the manumitted man is freed from that power etc. — That human laws, provided they are just, are founded on the eternal law, Augustine teaches, book I On Free Choice, c. 6, n. 15 (cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 26, m. 7). — Near the end of the argument many codices omit recidivantem (the one relapsing), supplying after assidue the word te; but codices F G L U omit assidue.
- 5Vers. 9. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi etiam lectio Vulgatae habetur. — Inferius pro puniatur codd. et ed. 1 puniat, scil. Deus.[Nahum 1], verse 9. See here the Master's text, c. 1, where also the Vulgate reading is found. — Below, for puniatur (he be punished) the codices and edition 1 [read] puniat (he punish), namely God.
- 6Ut ostensum est quaest. praeced.As was shown in the preceding question.
- 7Rom. 11, 29: Sine poenitentia enim sunt dona et vocatio Dei.Romans 11:29: For the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.
- 8Hic c. 1. — Post poenitentiam cod. aa addit necesse erat.Here, c. 1. — After poenitentiam codex aa adds necesse erat (it was necessary).
- 9Cfr. supra d. 16. p. I. a. 4. q. 2. — Ex codd. G K substituimus omnia pro omnino.Cf. above, d. 16, p. I, a. 4, q. 2. — From codices G K we have substituted omnia (all) for omnino (wholly).
- 10Edd. illud non videtur verum.The editions [read] illud non videtur verum (that does not seem true).
- 11Iac. 2, 10: Quicumque... offendat autem in uno etc.James 2:10: Whoever... but offends in one etc.
- 12Cod. aa facienda. Aliquanto inferius pro est tamen edd. est etiam.Codex aa [reads] facienda (to be done). Somewhat below, for est tamen the editions [read] est etiam.
- 13Sive negationem; cfr. tom. 1. pag. 87, nota 4.Or negation; cf. tome 1, p. 87, note 4.
- 14Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.