Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk carries two per-page series (p.585 notes 6–10, p.586 notes 1–3), renumbered consecutively 1–8 for this file. On p.585 notes 1–5 belong to the preceding chunk (a3-q2), which shares the page.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod originalia reputabuntur ei ad poenam. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia originale est a naturali origine¹; sed aliquis non bis potest nasci carnaliter: ergo non potest originale iterari. — Item, originale non est in uno nisi unum: ergo male dicit, quod redeunt originalia pluraliter. — Item quaeritur, utrum similiter possit dici, quod redeunt venialia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in originali duo sunt, scilicet carentia debitae iustitiae et ulterius pronitas; non fiat vis, utrum ista duo differant secundum rem². Ratione primi privat a visione Dei, sed ratione secundi frequenter in malum trahit; ratione utriusque dicitur quodam modo redire, quia pronitates intenduntur, et homo indignus visione Dei efficitur, et ita quodam modo redit in consimili reatu³.

Quod ergo dicitur, quod non potest iterari; verum est in se. — Quod obiicitur, quod dicitur pluraliter; dicendum, quod hoc est ratione plurium pronitatum. — Quod quaeritur de veniali, dicendum, quod potest aliquo modo dici, sed adhuc magis improprie quam peccata alia. Est tamen ibi quodam modo ingratitudo⁴.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Tot debuit cogitare dona Dei etc. Ex hoc enim videtur, quod ad tot gratiarum actiones teneatur quis, quot percepit beneficia; sed quilibet nostrum recipit quotidie innumerabilia beneficia: ergo ad innumerabiles tenemur gratiarum actiones. — Item, si ad tot tenemur gratiarum actiones, quot peccata sunt dimissa: ergo videtur similiter, quod si aliquis dedit alicui centum denarios, tenetur similiter centies gratias agere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut de peccatis sufficit conteri in communi, ita quod omnia detestetur, ita tamen quod nullum placeat⁵; sic de omnibus sufficit gratias agere in communi, ita tamen, quod de nullo in speciali ingratus existat; et secundum quod plura sunt beneficia, maiores debet gratias agere; et per oppositum, si non agit, magis ingratus iudicatur esse. Et pro tanto dicitur, quod debet pro omnibus gratias agere, non ita, quod pro quolibet divisim suam oportet gratiarum actionem p. 586 exhibere, sed quanto plura fuerint, magis accusant ingratum de ingratitudine et faciunt dignum increpatione⁶.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod propter ingratitudinem ita reus et peccator constituitur, ut ante fuerat; utrum scilicet ista ingratitudo dicatur genus peccati, vel circumstantia. Si genus; videtur tunc, quod necessario quilibet peccet duplici genere peccati in quolibet peccato, quia quilibet immemor est beneficii accepti, cum Deum offendit. Si circumstantia solum: non videtur ita aggravare peccatum. — Item quod non tantum sit circumstantia, videtur, quia gratiarum actio est actus virtutis, quae est gratitudo⁷: ergo ingratitudo est speciale vitium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod aliquis sit vere gratus, duo requiruntur, scilicet quod pro loco et tempore sit memor beneficiorum ad gratias agendum, et quod sit promptus ad obsequendum et ad reddendum bonum pro bono. — Similiter ingratitudo dupliciter dicitur: uno modo oblivio beneficii cum contemptu, ut puta, quando est locus et tempus agendi gratias et recognoscendi; et sic est peccatum speciale contentum sub omissione. Alio modo dicitur ingratus qui recipit bonum et reddit malum, et haec est circumstantia peccati; et sic est in omni peccato, et tanto magis aggravans, quanto homo plura bona percepit⁸.

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Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first about what he says, namely that original [sins] shall be reckoned to him for punishment. For it seems to say something false, since the original [sin] is from natural origin¹; but no one can be born carnally twice: therefore the original [sin] cannot be repeated. — Likewise, the original [sin] is not more than one in any one person: therefore he speaks badly when he says that original [sins] return in the plural. — Likewise it is asked whether it can similarly be said that venial [sins] return.

I respond: It must be said that in the original [sin] there are two things, namely the lack of the owed justice and, further, the proneness [to evil]; let no force be made of whether these two differ in reality². By reason of the first it deprives of the vision of God, but by reason of the second it frequently draws toward evil; by reason of both it is said in a certain way to return, because the pronenesses are intensified, and the man is made unworthy of the vision of God, and thus in a certain way he returns into a like guilt³.

What is said, therefore, that it cannot be repeated, is true in itself. — As to what is objected, that it is said in the plural, it must be said that this is by reason of the many pronenesses. — As to what is asked about the venial [sin], it must be said that it can in some way be said [to return], but still more improperly than the other sins. Yet there is there, in a certain way, ingratitude⁴.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: He ought to have considered so many gifts of God, etc. For from this it seems that one is bound to as many thanksgivings as the benefits he has received; but each of us daily receives innumerable benefits: therefore we are bound to innumerable thanksgivings. — Likewise, if we are bound to as many thanksgivings as the sins that have been remitted: then it seems similarly that, if someone has given another a hundred denarii, he is likewise bound to give thanks a hundred times.

I respond: It must be said that, just as regarding sins it suffices to be contrite in general, so that one detests them all, yet in such a way that none is pleasing⁵; so regarding all [benefits] it suffices to give thanks in general, yet in such a way that one be not ungrateful for any in particular; and according as the benefits are more, the greater thanks he ought to give; and, on the contrary, if he does not give [them], he is judged the more ungrateful. And to this extent it is said that he ought to give thanks for all, not in such a way that for each one separately he must render his thanksgiving p. 586 [distinctly], but the more they have been, the more they accuse the ungrateful man of ingratitude and make him worthy of rebuke⁶.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, namely that on account of ingratitude one is made guilty and a sinner just as he had been before; that is, whether this ingratitude be called a genus of sin, or a circumstance. If a genus: it seems then that necessarily everyone sins with a twofold genus of sin in every sin, since everyone is forgetful of the benefit received when he offends God. If a circumstance only: it does not seem so to aggravate the sin. — Likewise, that it is not merely a circumstance seems [to follow] because thanksgiving is an act of virtue, which is gratitude⁷: therefore ingratitude is a special vice.

I respond: It must be said that, for anyone to be truly grateful, two things are required, namely that in due place and time he be mindful of benefits so as to give thanks, and that he be prompt to serve and to render good for good. — Similarly ingratitude is spoken of in two ways: in one way [as] the forgetting of a benefit with contempt, as for instance when there is a place and time for giving thanks and acknowledging [them]; and thus it is a special sin contained under omission. In another way he is called ungrateful who receives good and renders evil, and this is a circumstance of sin; and thus it is in every sin, and aggravating the more, the more goods a man has received⁸.

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