Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 30
Articulus Unicus.
Quaestio III. Utrum consensus libidinosus sit causa matrimonii.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum consensus libidinosus sit causa matrimonii, ut puta cum aliquis consentit in aliquam propter divitias, vel propter pulcritudinem. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quia coniunctio matrimonialis est a Deo, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Matthaei decimo nono1: Quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet; sed coniunctio libidinis non est a Deo, haec autem coniunctio, vel consensus venit ex libidine, quia ex inordinato amore: ergo etc.
2. Item, cuius causa mala, ipsum quoque malum2, unde si radix mala, et ramus operis malus; sed consensus iste est malus: ergo non efficit matrimonium nisi malum. Sed matrimonium non est malum, cum sit Sacramentum: ergo etc.
3. Item, matrimonium spirituale, contractum interveniente avaritia et pecuniae pactione, omnino rumpitur et non debet stare, sicut patet in episcopo simoniaco: ergo pari ratione matrimonium carnale, quod est signum illius.
4. Item, matrimonium est signum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae3; sed Ecclesia non coniungitur Christo, nec Christus Ecclesiae, nisi amore casto: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Hoc videtur sacra Scriptura, quia dicitur expresse Genesis vigesimo nono4, quod Iacob propter pulcritudinem consensit in Rachelem; similiter Deuteronomii vigesimo primo5: Si videris mulierem pulcram etc.
2. Item, hoc ostenditur duplici simili: quia qui baptizat alium intentione lucrandi vere baptizat; et intentio est necessaria ad baptismum6, sicut consensus ad matrimonium. Item, mercenarius, qui praedicat amore pecuniae, praedicat et profert Evangelium verum, et credendum est ei: ergo si amor libidinosus non depravat Evangelium in praedicante, nec matrimonium in consentiente.
4. Item, si requiritur consensus castus ad matrimonium, pari ratione et caritas: ergo non poterit hoc Sacramentum perfici nisi ab habentibus caritatem7, quod non est in aliquo Sacramento.
Conclusio. Consensus libidinosus, qui caret intentione contrahendi, est contra Sacramenti huius veritatem, sed qui intendit contrahere intentione libidinis est tantum contra eiusdem utilitatem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod consensus libidinosus dicitur dupliciter: aut quia intendit libidinem per modum finis et obiecti, videlicet quia talis consensus nihil quaerit nisi corporalem copulam extorquere8, non uxorem ducere; et illud privat intentionem contrahendi. Alio modo dicitur libidinosus, quia, etsi consentiat in aliquam, ut ducat in uxorem, tamen hoc non facit propter servandam castitatem, sed propter explendam cupiditatem sive voluptatem. Primus consensus est contra Sacramenti veritatem, secundus est contra utilitatem, non contra veritatem; de consensu autem illo est hic sermo, non qui caret intentione contrahendi, sed qui intendit contrahere intentione libidinis; iste autem non aufert, quin sit matrimonium. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc probantes.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1, 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod matrimonium est a Deo, et hoc a libidine; dicendum, quod in consensu duo sunt, scilicet substantia consensus et circumstantia mala, quia propter pecuniam, vel luxuriam. Substantia actionis est bona9 et est a Deo; et haec est causa consensus; circumstantia vero nihil facit ad hoc, unde nec iuvat nec est causa nec concausa. — Unde ex hoc patet sequens, quia consensus non est causa matrimonii secundum id quod habet malitiae, sed secundum id quod habet bonitatis. — Quod vero dicitur, quod opera exteriora recipiunt qualitatem ab interiori10, verum est, secundum quod sunt opera rationis quae ordinantur in finem et procedunt ab ipsa voluntate, in quantum bona per ordinationem in bonum finem, vel in quantum mala.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de matrimonio spirituali; dicendum, quod non est simile: primum, quia ibi requiritur dignitas personae et honestas, quae debite tractare debeat Sacramenta; secundo vero quia illud Sacramentum est spirituale, et officium, ad quod eligitur, est spirituale, et sponsa spiritualis: et ideo, quando introducitur per pecuniam, omnino repellitur. Non sic in matrimonio carnali, ad quod nec personae dignitas nec officium spirituale est; et iterum, non datur gratia per eum modum per quem in aliis Sacramentis, sed solum auxilium gratiae, sicut supra in principio11 visum est, nisi forte ratione benedictionis adiunctae, quae vendentem faceret simoniacum.
Ad 4. Ad ultimum respondendum, quod non est signum ratione omnium conditionum, sed ratione divisibilitatis; ideo non oportet, quod ex castitate, vel ex caritate conveniant12.
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Article Unique.
Question III. Whether a lustful consent is the cause of matrimony.
Thirdly it is asked whether a lustful consent is the cause of matrimony, as for instance when someone consents to a woman on account of riches, or on account of beauty. And that it is not, is shown:
1. Because the matrimonial union is from God, as is clear from what is said in Matthew nineteen1: What God has joined, let not man separate; but the union of lust is not from God — and this union, or consent, comes from lust, since it arises from disordered love: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that whose cause is evil is itself also evil2; hence if the root is evil, the branch of the work is evil too; but this consent is evil: therefore it does not effect matrimony except an evil one. But matrimony is not evil, since it is a Sacrament: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, a spiritual marriage, contracted with avarice intervening and a pact concerning money, is altogether broken and ought not to stand, as is clear in the case of a simoniacal bishop: therefore by the same reasoning carnal matrimony, of which [spiritual matrimony] is a sign, [ought likewise not to stand].
4. Likewise, matrimony is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church3; but the Church is not united to Christ, nor Christ to the Church, except by a chaste love: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Sacred Scripture seems to show this, since it is said expressly in Genesis twenty-nine4, that Jacob consented to Rachel on account of her beauty; likewise in Deuteronomy twenty-one5: If you see a beautiful woman, etc.
2. Likewise, this is shown by a double similitude: because he who baptizes another with the intention of gain truly baptizes; and intention is necessary for baptism6, just as consent is for matrimony. Likewise, a hireling who preaches out of love of money nevertheless preaches and proclaims the true Gospel, and it must be believed on his account: therefore if lustful love does not corrupt the Gospel in the one preaching it, neither does it corrupt matrimony in the one consenting.
4. Likewise, if a chaste consent is required for matrimony, by the same reasoning charity would be required as well: therefore this Sacrament could not be perfected except by those having charity7, which is not [required] in any [other] Sacrament.
Conclusion. A lustful consent which lacks the intention of contracting is against the truth of this Sacrament, but one who intends to contract with the intention of lust is only against its usefulness.
I respond: It must be said that a lustful consent is spoken of in two ways: either because it intends lust after the manner of an end and an object, namely because such a consent seeks nothing but to extort bodily coupling8, not to take a wife; and this deprives it of the intention of contracting. In another way one is called lustful because, although he consents to some woman so as to take her as a wife, nevertheless he does this not for the sake of preserving chastity, but for the sake of satisfying cupidity or lust. The first consent is against the truth of the Sacrament, the second is against its usefulness, not against its truth; and it is of that latter consent that we speak here — not the one that lacks the intention of contracting, but the one that intends to contract with the intention of lust; and this does not take away that it is matrimony. — Hence the arguments proving this are to be granted.
To the arguments for the affirmative side:
To 1, 2. To what is objected, that matrimony is from God, and this [consent, is] from lust; it must be said that in consent there are two things, namely the substance of the consent and the evil circumstance, since [it is done] on account of money, or lust. The substance of the act is good9 and is from God; and this is the cause of the consent; the circumstance, however, contributes nothing to this, whence it neither helps, nor is it a cause or a co-cause. — Hence from this the following point is clear, that consent is not the cause of matrimony according to what it has of malice, but according to what it has of goodness. — As for what is said, that exterior works receive their quality from the interior [act]10, this is true insofar as they are works of reason, which are ordered to an end and proceed from the will itself, in that they are good through their ordination to a good end, or evil [through ordination to an evil end].
To 3. To what is objected concerning spiritual matrimony: it must be said that it is not alike, first, because there dignity of person and honesty are required, since one must treat the Sacraments with due propriety; second, because that Sacrament is spiritual, and the office to which one is chosen is spiritual, and the spouse is spiritual: and therefore, when it is brought about through money, it is altogether rejected. Not so in carnal matrimony, for which neither dignity of person nor a spiritual office is required; and again, grace is not given through it in the manner it is given through other Sacraments, but only the help of grace, as was seen above at the beginning [of this treatise]11, unless perhaps by reason of an attached blessing, which would make the seller simoniacal.
To 4. To the last it must be answered that it is a sign not by reason of all [the] conditions [of the thing signified], but by reason of indivisibility; hence it is not necessary that they come together out of chastity, or out of charity12.
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- 1Vers. 6. Non pauci codd. et ed. Quos Deus etc.Verse 6. Not a few codices and editions [read] Whom God etc.
- 2Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis argg., agens de causa efficiente ait: Cuius causa efficiens non est bona, ipsum quod fit, non est bonum. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 9.): Quorum generationes... malae, et ipsa mala. Cfr. Boeth., II. de Differentiis topic., qui praeter praedicta etiam hoc dicit: Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est.Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract on the Loci of arguments, treating of the efficient cause, says: That whose efficient cause is not good, the thing which comes to be is not good. Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 9): Things whose generations... are evil, are themselves also evil. Cf. Boethius, On Topical Differences II, who besides the aforesaid also says this: That whose end is good, is itself also good.
- 3Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 2, et Comment. a. 1. q. 4.Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. 25, c. 2, and the Commentary, a. 1, q. 4.
- 4Ut ostensum est supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1.As was shown above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1.
- 5Vers. 17. seqq. — Seq. locus est Deut. 21, 11: Et videris... mulierem etc. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.Verse 17 and following. — The following passage is Deut. 21:11: And you see... a woman, etc. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
- 6Vide supra d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — Mox post matrimonium cod. Iv addit: ergo qui consentit in aliquam ratione pulcritudinis vere matrimonium contrahit, edd. ergo etc.See above, d. 6, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 and following. — Shortly after matrimonium, codex Iv adds: therefore whoever consents to a woman by reason of beauty truly contracts matrimony; the editions [read simply] therefore etc.
- 7Vat. aliquo alio.The Vatican [manuscript reads] some other [i.e., a variant reading for this clause].
- 8Cod. L addit ex femina, Vat. et feminam.Codex L adds from a woman; the Vatican [manuscript reads] and a woman.
- 9Vide II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.See II Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 1.
- 10Cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. — Superius pro opera rationis codd. L P V (E a secunda manu) opera moris. Pro vel in quantum mala codd. non in quantum mala.Cf. II Sent., d. 38, a. 1, q. 1. — Above, for works of reason, codices L, P, V (E by a second hand) [read] works of custom. For or insofar as evil, the codices [read] not insofar as evil.
- 11Scil. tractatus de matrimonio, d. 26. a. 2. q. 2.Namely, the treatise on matrimony, d. 26, a. 2, q. 2.
- 12Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion to q. 1 of this article.