Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 33
Articulus I. De continentia coniugali in antiquis.
Quaestio I. Utrum contra legem naturae sit habere concubinam.
Quantum ad primum ostenditur, quod non sit contra legem naturae habere concubinam:
1. Quia non est contra legem naturae habere ancillam et servum; sed ancilla potest homo uti, ut libet: ergo non est contra legem naturae carnaliter eam cognoscere, et sic etc.
2. Item, mulier non coniugata et libera habet potestatem sui corporis; sed qui habet rem aliquam potest illam dare cui vult: ergo et ille qui acquirit licite, licite accipit, quia nulli facit iniuriam: ergo quando de voluntate mulieris procedit, ut cognoscat eam etiam sine pactione coniugali, cum non sit alterius, nec alicui fiat iniuria; videtur etc.
3. Item, Isidorus in quinto libro Etymologiarum1: «Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum»; sed habere concubinam non est contra hoc: ergo etc.
Item, quod possit de iure naturae habere eam cum uxore, videtur:
4. Quia vir non habet sui corporis potestatem, sed mulier2: ergo, uxore volente suscipere semen de ancilla sua, tenetur vir ancillam cognoscere.
5. Item, ad hoc ipsum facit exemplum de Abraham, qui ad petitionem Sarae cognovit Agar3; ubi etiam dicit Augustinus, quod hoc fecit Sara «eo iure, quo non habet vir sui corporis potestatem»; sed hoc est secundum ius naturae: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Secundum omnes leges4 filii, qui de concubinis sunt, vituperabiles sunt, et contumelia est eis sic nasci; sed non est vituperium, nisi praecedat inordinatio: ergo si secundum dictamen naturae est contumelia in filiis, qui sic nascuntur; videtur, quod in tali actu sit deordinatio, et sic etc.
2. Item, recta ratio dictat, quod filius debet succedere patri, ergo poena est filio, quando non habet hereditatem paternam; sed secundum omnium mores5 est, quod nati de concubinis non succedunt in hereditate paterna: ergo cum similiter recta ratio dictet, quod non est poena iusta nisi propter deordinationem culpae; cum non fuerit in eo culpa post generationem, fuit culpa in generando.
3. Item, recta ratio dictat, quod vir et mulier in actu illo uniuntur et fiunt una caro6, et quod actus ille est aequalitatis, quoniam similis in specie et natura; sed unio ad aequalitatem non est nisi uxoris et viri, aliter non sunt aequales: ergo recta ratio sive dictamen naturale refugit coitum cum concubina.
4. Item, recta ratio dictat, quod parentes ambo debent filium educare, et quod proles7 postmodum in senectute debet educare parentes, et aequaliter eos educare tenetur et semper: ergo cum iudicet, virum et mulierem debere coniungi propter prolis generationem, quia ad hoc data est vis generativa; iudicatur, eos ex hoc simul convenire ad prolis educationem, et rursus ad prolis recipiendum obsequium et honorem usque in finem: ergo iudicat, quod non recte conveniunt, nisi aequaliter et inseparabiliter conveniant in actu illo. Sed si sic; tunc vir et uxor solum debent convenire: ergo etc.
Item, quod non debeat habere concubinam cum uxore, videtur:
5. Quia uxor non potest convenire cum alio viro, quin committat adulterium, quod est contra ius naturale: ergo nec vir cum aliqua alia muliere quam cum uxore.
6. Item, ius naturale dictat, quod homo quod sibi vult fieri faciat alii, et non faciat alii quod sibi non vult fieri8; sed maritus secundum rectam rationem abominatur et odit, quod alius suam cognoscat uxorem: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Habere concubinam, licet non sit contra ius naturae propriissime sumtum, est tamen contra ius communiter et proprie sumtum; ideo non solum est malum, quia prohibitum, sed prohibitum, quia malum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ius naturale tripliciter dicitur, scilicet communiter, proprie et magis proprie; et secundum hoc tripliciter definitur ab Isidoro.
Uno modo sic: «Ius naturale est quod in Lege et Evangelio continetur»; sic definitur in principio Decreti1. Si sic accipiatur ius naturale; sic habere concubinam est contra ius naturale, quia est contra Legem et Evangelium; sed contra legem Moysi implicite: quia non praecipit expresse, fornicatorem interfici, nisi in casu, sicut patet Deuteronomii vigesimo secundo2; tamen implicite clauditur ibi: Non moechaberis, ubi prohibetur omnis coitus non matrimonialis. Contra legem evangelicam est expresse; nam dicit, fornicarios non habere partem in regno Dei, primae ad Corinthios sexto3, et in septimo dicit, quod habeat unusquisque suam propter fornicationem. — Ratio autem huius praeceptionis est Sacramentum matrimonii, quod est institutum a Deo in significationem et in curationem: in significationem ante lapsum, sed in curationem post lapsum. Quia enim corrupta est illa vis et deordinata, ut dictum est supra4, adeo quod non exit in actum, quin regnum animae pervertatur; non potest fieri post lapsum sine peccato, nisi excusetur per matrimonium; ideo taliter cognoscere concubinam est peccatum, quantum est de se, et contra Legem et Evangelium, et ita contra ius naturale communiter dictum.
Secundo modo dicitur proprie, et sic definitur in principio Decretorum5: «Ius naturale est quod est commune omnium nationum»; et hoc ius est, quod dictat ratio recta. Contra illud adhuc est cognoscere sive habere concubinam. — Et hoc patet: quia ius naturale dictat, quod conveniant vir et mulier in tali actu ad generationem prolis, quae utrique succedat, et cui communiter praesint, et illa utrique aequaliter subsit. Et quoniam actus ille est consimilis in specie et ad generandum consimilem in specie; dictat natura, ut conveniant in quadam aequalitate; sed hoc est, cum pater coniungitur illi, ut sit uxor et materfamilias. Et ideo recta ratio dictat, quod non conveniat ut concubinae; sed ista in multis est obfuscata per libidinem, sed tamen salva manet in his qui non depravant iudicium per mala opera6.
Tertio modo dicitur ius naturale propriissime, quod «natura docuit omnia animalia7»; et hoc modo non est contra naturam, nec tamen omnino secundum naturam, et hoc, quia quaedam animalia bruta sunt — licet non omnia — quae coniunguntur in individuam copulam, ut sunt turtures; et quoniam, sicut vult Philosophus8, omnes virtutes, quae sunt in animalibus dispersae, in homine colliguntur, sicut arma omnium animalium in manu hominis; quamvis non omnia alia animalia habeant instinctum, tamen natura hominis habet: unde ad hoc inclinatur recta natura hominis, ut, si adhaeret mulieri, sic adhaereat, ut pro ipsa patrem et matrem deserat9, et sic accipiat in copulam individuam.
Secundum haec igitur patet, quod fornicari vel habere concubinam non solum est malum, quia prohibitum, sed prohibitum, quia malum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potest uti re sua etc.; dicendum, quod quae ad talem usum accipitur, ad aequalitatem accipitur; et si ordinate accipitur, oportet, quod aequalis fiat. Et ideo nunquam recte utitur nec ancilla nec libera, nisi cum ea tanquam cum uxore contrahat.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulli facit iniuriam, quia illa se ei committit; dicendum, quod facit iniuriam Deo, contra cuius statutum facit; facit etiam iniuriam sibi, pro eo quod se deordinando in corpus suum peccat10; nam vir facit sibi iniuriam, quamvis ipsa velit, quia ut phrenetica vult malum suum. Si enim aliqua vellet, ut se occideret, vel abuteretur contra naturam, quis auderet dicere, hoc non esse malum?
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ius naturale est commune; dicendum, quod quoddam11 est apertum, quoddam magis occultum; et secundum quod plus apertum, est communius, secundum quod minus, est minus commune; et quoniam istud magis est occultum, ideo minus commune; tamen lex matrimonii apud omnes reperitur.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mulier habet potestatem corporis viri; dicendum, quod etsi cetera bona sint communia, hoc tamen bonum debet
esse privatum. Unde1 nulli alii potest uxorem suam communicare nec potestatem exigere in alio, sed solum in corpore suo; sic nec mulier de viro.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Sara, dicendum, quod Abraham nunquam obtemperasset nec obtemperare debuisset, nisi divina dispensatio intervenisset. Unde illud quod dicit Augustinus, non fuit tota causa excusans, sed signum fuit2.
I. Accedere ad mulierem non iunctam matrimonio ipso iure naturali graviter esse prohibitum, probatur et constanti doctorum catholicorum doctrina et reprobatione contrariae opinionis facta ab Innocentio XI. 2 Martii 1779 (prop. 48.); cfr. prop. 7. Clementis V. cum Concilio Viennensi contra errores Beguardorum. — Eadem triplex divisio legis naturae recepta est a S. Thom. (hic a. 1. ad 4; Suppl. q. 65. a. 1. ad 4.). — In reddenda ratione, quare hoc semper sit peccatum grave, Richard. a Med. non approbat eam quam ponit S. Thomas, atque aliam affert. De 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 35. m. 4, p. II. q. 147. m. 2. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 15. q. unica n. 18. — S. Thom., locis citt. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 122. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 1.
II. In modo loquendi de polygamia (q. 2.) est quaedam differentia inter doctores; quidam enim cum S. Bonav. dicunt, eam esse contra legem naturae, alii vero cum Scoto hoc negant, alii denique media via incedunt, docentes cum S. Thoma et etiam ad veram mentem S. Bonaventurae, ipsam quodam modo esse contra naturam, et quodam modo non. Sed attente consideratis eorundem principiis et explicationibus, re ipsa vix dissentiunt. Ipsum Conc. Trident. (Sess. XXIV. can. 2.) definivit: Christianis plures simul habere uxores, lege divina esse prohibitum. De 2. quaestione: Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., locis citt. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 124. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.
III. Quoad 3. quaestionem fuerunt qui dixerint, polygamiam etiam in veteri testamento nunquam fuisse licitam; sed communissime antiqui et recentes doctores catholici cum iure canonico (cfr. infra pag. 752, nota 7.) tenent, vi dispensationis divinae Patriarchas sine peccato usos esse polygamia. Notabilis est doctrina nostri auctoris, qua affert plures congruentiae rationes talis dispensationis. — Quod autem idem hic innuit et infra dub. 5. clare docet, Agar et ancillas Iacob non fuisse «secundum veritatem uxores, sed tantum concubinas», plerisque antiquis non probatur. Docent enim, easdem fuisse legitimas uxores quoad torum, sed non quoad dignitatem. Unde S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.) docet, ipsas habuisse aliquid de ratione uxoris, scilicet quatenus matrimonium refertur ad suum principalem finem, qui est bonum prolis; aliquid vero de ratione concubinae, scilicet quoad finem secundarium, qui est dispensatio familiae. Simul idem docet, contra primum finem non esse aliquam dispensationem. Etiam B. Albert. (hic 5.) dicit: «Nunquam licuit ancillam, vel alienam cognoscere, sed ancillam ductam in matrimonio ex instinctu Spiritus S.; et ita fecerunt Patriarchae». De 3. quaestione: Scot., hic q. 1. n. 4. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; Suppl. q. 65. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.
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Article I. On conjugal continence among the ancients.
Question I. Whether it is against the law of nature to have a concubine.
As to the first point it is shown that to have a concubine is not against the law of nature:
1. Because it is not against the law of nature to have a maidservant and a manservant; but a man may use a maidservant as he pleases: therefore it is not against the law of nature to know her carnally, and so on.
2. Likewise, a woman not married and free has power over her own body; but one who has some thing may give it to whom he wills: therefore he too who acquires it lawfully, lawfully receives it, since he does injury to no one: therefore when it proceeds from the woman's will that he should know her even without a conjugal compact, since she belongs to no other, nor is injury done to anyone; it seems [so], and so on.
3. Likewise, Isidore in the fifth book of the Etymologies1: «The natural law is common to all nations»; but to have a concubine is not against this: therefore, and so on.
Likewise, that one may by the law of nature have her together with a wife, it seems:
4. Because the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman does2: therefore, the wife being willing to receive seed from her maidservant, the man is bound to know the maidservant.
5. Likewise, to this very point the example of Abraham makes, who at Sarah's request knew Hagar3; where Augustine also says that Sarah did this «by that right, by which the man does not have power over his own body»; but this is according to the law of nature: therefore, and so on.
On the contrary: 1. According to all laws4 the sons who are of concubines are blameworthy, and it is a reproach to them to be born thus; but there is no reproach unless some disorder precede: therefore if, according to the dictate of nature, there is reproach in the sons who are born thus; it seems that in such an act there is disorder, and so on.
2. Likewise, right reason dictates that a son ought to succeed his father, therefore it is a penalty to a son when he does not have the paternal inheritance; but according to the customs of all5 it is the case that those born of concubines do not succeed to the paternal inheritance: therefore, since right reason likewise dictates that there is no just penalty except on account of the disorder of a fault; since there was no fault in him after generation, there was fault in the generating.
3. Likewise, right reason dictates that the man and the woman in that act are united and become one flesh6, and that that act is one of equality, since it is like in species and nature; but union unto equality belongs only to wife and husband, otherwise they are not equal: therefore right reason or the natural dictate shrinks from intercourse with a concubine.
4. Likewise, right reason dictates that both parents ought to raise the child, and that the offspring7 afterward in old age ought to raise the parents, and is bound to raise them equally and always: therefore since it judges that man and woman ought to be joined for the generation of offspring, because for this the generative power was given; it is judged that from this they come together for the raising of offspring, and again for receiving from the offspring service and honor unto the end: therefore it judges that they do not rightly come together unless they come together equally and inseparably in that act. But if so; then only the husband and wife ought to come together: therefore, and so on.
Likewise, that one ought not to have a concubine together with a wife, it seems:
5. Because a wife cannot come together with another man without committing adultery, which is against the natural law: therefore neither may the husband [come together] with any other woman than with his wife.
6. Likewise, the natural law dictates that a man should do to another what he wishes to be done to himself, and not do to another what he does not wish to be done to himself8; but a husband according to right reason abominates and hates that another should know his wife: therefore, and so on.
Conclusion.
To have a concubine, although it is not against the law of nature taken most properly, is nevertheless against the law taken commonly and properly; therefore it is not only evil because forbidden, but forbidden because evil.
I respond: It must be said that natural law is spoken of in three ways, namely commonly, properly, and more properly; and according to this it is defined in three ways by Isidore.
In one way thus: «The natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel»; so it is defined at the beginning of the Decretum1. If natural law be taken in this way; then to have a concubine is against natural law, because it is against the Law and the Gospel; but against the law of Moses implicitly: for it does not expressly command the fornicator to be slain, except in a [certain] case, as is clear from Deuteronomy the twenty-second2; yet it is implicitly enclosed there: Thou shalt not commit adultery, where every non-matrimonial intercourse is forbidden. Against the evangelical law it is [forbidden] expressly; for it says that fornicators do not have a part in the kingdom of God, in the first [Epistle] to the Corinthians, the sixth [chapter]3, and in the seventh it says that each one should have his own [wife] on account of fornication. — Now the reason of this precept is the Sacrament of matrimony, which was instituted by God for signification and for healing: for signification before the fall, but for healing after the fall. For since that power is corrupted and disordered, as was said above4, to such a degree that it does not go forth into act without the kingdom of the soul being overturned; it cannot come about after the fall without sin, unless it be excused through matrimony; therefore to know a concubine in such a way is a sin, as far as it is of itself, and against the Law and the Gospel, and so against natural law taken commonly.
In the second way it is called [natural law] properly, and so it is defined at the beginning of the Decretals5: «The natural law is that which is common to all nations»; and this is the law which right reason dictates. Against this too is it to know or to have a concubine. — And this is clear: because natural law dictates that man and woman should come together in such an act for the generation of offspring, which should succeed to both, and over which they should preside in common, and which should be subject to both equally. And since that act is alike in species and [is] for begetting one alike in species; nature dictates that they come together in a certain equality; but this is the case when the father is joined to her that she may be wife and mother of a family. And therefore right reason dictates that it is not fitting [that they come together] as with a concubine; but this [dictate] in many is obscured through lust, yet nevertheless it remains intact in those who do not deprave their judgment through evil works6.
In the third way natural law is called [it] most properly, [namely] that which «nature has taught all animals7»; and in this way it is not against nature, nor yet altogether according to nature, and this because certain animals are brute — though not all — which are joined in an undivided coupling, as are turtledoves; and since, as the Philosopher holds8, all the powers which are dispersed among the animals are gathered together in man, as the weapons of all animals are in the hand of man; although not all other animals have the instinct, yet the nature of man has it: hence to this the right nature of man is inclined, that, if he cleaves to a woman, he should so cleave that for her sake he leaves father and mother9, and so takes [her] into an undivided coupling.
According to these things, therefore, it is clear that to fornicate or to have a concubine is not only evil because forbidden, but forbidden because evil. — Hence the reasons [adduced] for this are to be conceded.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that one may use his own thing, etc.; it must be said that she who is taken for such a use is taken unto equality; and if she is taken in an ordered way, it is required that she become an equal. And therefore one never rightly uses either a maidservant or a free woman, unless he contract with her as with a wife.
2. To that which is objected, that he does injury to no one, since she commits herself to him; it must be said that he does injury to God, against whose statute he acts; he does injury also to himself, in that by disordering himself he sins against his own body10; for the man does injury to himself, although she is willing, because like one frenzied she wills her own evil. For if some woman should will that she be killed, or be abused against nature, who would dare to say that this is not evil?
3. To that which is objected, that natural law is common; it must be said that one [part]11 is open, another more hidden; and according as [it is] more open, it is more common, according as [it is] less [open], it is less common; and since this [precept] is more hidden, therefore [it is] less common; yet the law of matrimony is found among all.
4. To that which is objected, that the woman has power over the man's body; it must be said that although the other goods be common, this good nevertheless ought to be
private. Hence1 he can share his wife with no other nor exact the [conjugal] power over another, but only over his own body; so neither the woman over the man's.
5. To that which is objected concerning Sarah, it must be said that Abraham would never have complied, nor ought he to have complied, unless divine dispensation had intervened. Hence that which Augustine says was not the whole excusing cause, but was a sign2.
I. That to approach a woman not joined [to oneself] in matrimony by the very natural law is gravely forbidden, is proved also by the constant teaching of the catholic doctors and by the reprobation of the contrary opinion made by Innocent XI, 2 March 1779 (prop. 48.); cf. prop. 7 of Clement V with the Council of Vienne against the errors of the Beghards. — The same threefold division of the law of nature is received by St. Thomas (here a. 1. ad 4; Suppl. q. 65. a. 1. ad 4.). — In rendering the reason why this is always a grave sin, Richard of Middleton does not approve the one which St. Thomas sets down, and adduces another. On the 1st question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 35. m. 4, p. II. q. 147. m. 2. — Scotus, III. Sent. d. 15. q. unica n. 18. — St. Thomas, in the places cited a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 122. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Denys the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions here q. 1.
II. In the manner of speaking about polygamy (q. 2.) there is a certain difference among the doctors; for some with St. Bonaventure say that it is against the law of nature, others however with Scotus deny this, others finally proceed by a middle way, teaching with St. Thomas and also according to the true mind of St. Bonaventure that it is in a certain way against nature, and in a certain way not. But when their principles and explanations are attentively considered, in reality they scarcely disagree. The Council of Trent itself (Sess. XXIV. can. 2.) defined: that for Christians to have several wives at once is forbidden by divine law. On the 2nd question: Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, in the places cited a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 124. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question here q. 1.
III. As to the 3rd question, there have been those who said that polygamy even in the Old Testament was never lawful; but most commonly the ancient and recent catholic doctors, together with the canon law (cf. below p. 752, note 7.), hold that by divine dispensation the Patriarchs used polygamy without sin. Notable is the teaching of our author, who adduces several reasons of congruity for such a dispensation. — But that which he here intimates and below in dub. 5 clearly teaches — that Hagar and the handmaids of Jacob were not «according to truth wives, but only concubines» — is not accepted by very many of the ancients. For they teach that these same women were legitimate wives as to the bed, but not as to dignity. Hence St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiuncula 3.) teaches that they had something of the character of a wife, namely inasmuch as matrimony is referred to its principal end, which is the good of offspring; but something of the character of a concubine, namely as to the secondary end, which is the dispensation of the family. At the same time he teaches that against the first end there is no dispensation. Bl. Albert also (here 5.) says: «It was never lawful to know a maidservant, or another man's [woman], but a maidservant taken in matrimony by the instinct of the Holy Spirit; and thus did the Patriarchs act». On the 3rd question: Scotus, here q. 1. n. 4. seqq. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; Suppl. q. 65. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2.
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- 1Cap. 4. n. 1. — Mox pro hoc plurimi codd. et edd. huiusmodi.[Isidore, Etymologies bk. V,] c. 4, n. 1. — Presently, for hoc, very many codices and editions [read] huiusmodi ("of this kind").
- 2Epist. I. Cor. 7, 4.[Paul,] First Letter to the Corinthians 7:4.
- 3Gen. 16, 1. seqq. — Sententia August., in qua allegatur I. Cor. 7, 4, habetur XVI. de Civ. Dei, c. 25.Genesis 16:1 ff. — The opinion of Augustine, in which 1 Cor. 7:4 is cited, is found in [book] XVI of The City of God, c. 25.
- 4Cfr. C. Liberi dicti (15.), C. 32. q. 4.Cf. the canon Liberi dicti (15.), Causa 32, q. 4 [of Gratian's Decretum].
- 5Vide C. Dicat aliquis (9.), C. 32. q. 4, et Iustinian., C. V. de Naturalibus Liberis (tit. 27.), lex Humanitatis (8.) Authent. Licet patri.See the canon Dicat aliquis (9.), Causa 32, q. 4, and Justinian, Codex bk. V, On Natural Children (tit. 27.), the law Humanitatis (8.), Authentica Licet patri.
- 6Cfr. supra pag. 496, nota 6.Cf. above, p. 496, note 6.
- 7Edd. pro proles ponunt plus est et post senectute addunt filius.The editions, for proles, put plus est, and after senectute add filius.
- 8Cfr. Tob. 4, 16; Matth. 7, 12. et Luc. 6, 31.Cf. Tobit 4:16; Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31.
- 1Introduct. d. 1, ubi Gratian. sententiam Isidori, V. Etymolog. c. 2, his verbis complectitur.[Decretum,] Introduction, d. 1, where Gratian embraces Isidore's opinion (Etymologies bk. V, c. 2) in these words.
- 2Vers. 23. seqq. — Seq. locus est Exod. 20, 14. Cfr. Deut. 5, 18.[Deut. 22,] vv. 23 ff. — The following passage is Exodus 20:14. Cf. Deut. 5:18.
- 3Vers. 9. seq.: Neque fornicarii... regnum Dei possidebunt. — Seq. textus est ibid. 7, 2, ubi Vulgata post suam addit uxorem. — Post fornicationem in Vat. additur vitandam.[1 Cor. 6,] vv. 9 f.: Nor shall fornicators... possess the kingdom of God. — The following text is ibid. 7:2, where the Vulgate after suam adds uxorem. — After fornicationem the Vatican [edition] adds vitandam.
- 4Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 1.[Above,] Distinction 31, a. 2, q. 1.
- 5In C. Ius naturale (7.), d. 1, sumta ex Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 4. n. 1.In the canon Ius naturale (7.), d. 1, taken from Isidore, Etymologies bk. V, c. 4, n. 1.
- 6Cfr. supra pag. 496, nota 6.Cf. above, p. 496, note 6.
- 7Vide tom. II. pag. 901, nota 3, ubi diximus, hanc definitionem Isidoro attributam inveniri apud Iustinianum; cfr. D. 1. de Iustitia et iure lege Iuri (1.) (tit. 1.), § Huius.See vol. II, p. 901, note 3, where we said that this definition, attributed to Isidore, is found in Justinian; cf. Digest bk. 1, On Justice and Law, the law Iuri (1.) (tit. 1.), § Huius.
- 8Libr. IV. de Partib. animal. c. 10, ubi contra Anaxagoram ostendit, hominem non ideo prudentissimum animalium esse, quia unus omnium manus obtineat, sed e contrario, quoniam prudentissimus omnium sit, ideo manus recepisse; « qui enim prudentissimus est, recte plurimis uti instrumentis potest; manus autem esse videtur non unum instrumentum sed multa... Cetera enim animalia unum auxilium habent, idque nullo pacto possunt permutare... neque arma mutare, quae semel acceperint... at homini multa habere auxilia licet eaque subinde mutare, arma etiam, quae velit et ubi velit, capere potest; manus enim et unguis est et ungula et cornu et hasta et ensis et quodvis aliud genus armorum aut instrumentorum » etc.[Aristotle,] bk. IV On the Parts of Animals, c. 10, where against Anaxagoras he shows that man is not the most prudent of animals because he alone of all has hands, but on the contrary, because he is the most prudent of all, therefore he received hands; «for he who is most prudent can rightly use very many instruments; but the hand seems to be not one instrument but many... For the other animals have one aid, and can in no way exchange it... nor change the weapons which they once received... but to man it is granted to have many aids and to change them from time to time; he can also take up weapons which he wills and where he wills; for the hand is both nail and claw and horn and spear and sword and any other kind of weapon or instrument» etc.
- 9Respicitur Gen. 2, 24. et Matth. 19, 5. — Pro seq. propos. valent verba August., I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 6: Non sane ideo [adulterium] malum est, quia vetatur Lege, sed ideo vetatur Lege, quia malum est.Reference is to Genesis 2:24 and Matthew 19:5. — For the following proposition the words of Augustine avail, [book] I On Free Choice, c. 3, n. 6: Adultery is surely not evil because it is forbidden by the Law, but is forbidden by the Law because it is evil.
- 10Epist. I. Cor. 6, 18. — Superius pro se committit, quibus verbis ex codd. M O T U X interseruimus ei, edd. voluit, et quia contra ius pro contra cuius.First Letter to the Corinthians 6:18. — Above, for se committit — words into which, from codices M O T U X, we inserted ei — the editions [read] voluit, and quia contra ius for contra cuius.
- 11Edd. addunt magis.The editions add magis.
- 1Supple cum cod. bb vir. Infra pro de viro codd. R S T in viro.Supply, with codex bb, vir. Below, for de viro, codices R S T [read] in viro.
- 2Cfr. infra q. 3. et dub. 5.Cf. below, q. 3 and dub. 5. ---