Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; markers are labelled by printed page and page-note number. Footnotes 1–3 of p. 776 anchor in the preceding chunk (a3-q2) and are not repeated here.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Plene legitimae sunt, quibus non obviat votum etc. Videtur enim falsum dicere: quia legitimitas est habitus, illegitimitas est privatio; sed « per habitus cognoscuntur privationes, non per privationes habitus⁴ »: ergo male definitur legitimitas per privationem illegitimam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut solutio uno modo dicit habitum respectu ligationis, alio modo privationem; sic in proposito. Si enim comparentur solutum et ligatum respectu actus, quantum ad quem est expeditio, solutio dicit habitum; si vero comparentur respectu vinculi, solutio dicit privationem vinculi; et sic dupliciter potest definiri. Per hunc modum de legitimitate oportet intelligi⁵.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Volo esse mater et filios procreare etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia propter sterilitatem uxoris non potest vir allegare contra uxorem, quod velit esse pater: ergo nec propter frigiditatem viri mulier, quod velit esse mater. — Item, matrimonium stat sine bono prolis: ergo propter hoc, quod velit esse mater, non debet dividi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Sancti⁶ curialiter loquuntur, secundum quod ipsae mulieres sunt verecundae; mulier enim non potest separari a viro propter defectum potentiae generandi, sed potentiae coeundi; et in illa circumlocutione curialiter intelligitur, quod vult cognosci a viro. Et ita patet, quod non est simile de sterilitate, sed bene est simile de arctitudine. Si enim adeo arcta est, quod cognosci non potest; vir potest allegare et dicere, quod velit esse pater, id est, nolit continere, si potest⁷ coire. Et sic patet illud.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si retinaculum coniugale voluerint rescindere, maneant innupti utrique. Videtur enim utrumque esse falsum, primum scilicet de retinaculo coniugali; quia, si est ibi retinaculum, cum sit vinculum insolubile, solvi non potest⁸, si vero non, quomodo rescinditur? — Rursus, videtur falsum dicere et male praecipere, quia, cum alter eorum non habeat impedimentum aliquod, posset licite cum altero contrahere.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum, si ille qui est frigidus vere, divortium petat, utrum audiendus sit. Et quod non, videtur: quia fornicans non potest petere divortium, quia fit ob culpam suam: ergo nec talis frigidus, cum ipse sit in causa. — Sed contra hoc est, quia, cum non sit ibi matrimonium, videtur, quod neuter teneatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod divortium propter impotentiam coeundi aliquando fit propter hoc, quod impotentia est in altero; aliquando propter hoc, quod impotentia est in utroque. Si propter hoc, quod sit in utroque, uterque debet sine spe coniugii remanere. Si propter hoc, quod sit in altero, sive in viro p. 777 sive in muliere, post divortium ille, in quo est causa, debet remanere sine spe coniugii tanquam persona illegitima; quodsi contrahat et possit, tunc oportet redire ad priora vota.

Quod ergo dicit, quod maneant innupti, refertur ad eum, in quo reperitur causa illegitimitatis, sive in viro, sive in muliere.

Quod obiicitur de retinaculo, dicendum, quod etsi secundum veritatem non sit ibi retinaculum coniugale, tamen secundum apparentiam vel aestimationem ibi est; vel etiam quaedam sponsio et obligatio, quia affectu maritali invicem cohabitare possunt; unde valde laudandum¹ est eis, quod insimul permaneant, nisi velint transire ad arctiorem vitam.

Quod quaeritur, si, viro petente, debeat fieri; dicendum, quod sic, si probare possit; attamen, quia contra se et contra matrimonium vadit, suspicio mala de viro colligitur. Et ideo abundans probatio tali viro indicitur, maxime si mulier dicat, se cognitam esse ab ipso; quod si mulier confiteatur; aut oportet evidenter probare, aut debent ambo innupti remanere, vel etiam nunquam separari; pro quo Ecclesia debet diligentiam quam potest adhibere².

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Septima manu propinquorum, tactis sacrosanctis reliquiis, iurando dicat etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nullus debet iurare nisi de eo, de quo certus est; sed nullus propinquorum certus est, pro eo quod actus ille latebras requirit: ergo videtur, quod nullus possit iurare. — Item, esto quod nullus sit propinquus, vel pauci; nunquid poterunt separari? — Item, quare magis hoc debet fieri manu propinquorum quam aliorum?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis de actu illo vix aut nunquam habeatur certitudo per facti evidentiam; habetur tamen ut plurimum per signa probabilia et per coniecturas, quae, quamvis non sufficiant ad generandam scientiam, sufficiunt tamen ad generandam fidem sive credulitatem, quae aliquod robur praestat. Dico igitur, quod ad hoc, quod divortium fiat, uterque debet iurare, quod nunquam carnaliter convenerint nec convenire potuerint, et quod operam dederint, et unusquisque, quod per se non steterit; et propinqui debent iurare, quod ita credunt; et tunc, ex quo simul cohabitaverunt per tempus sufficiens, dividi possunt. Si autem alter eorum, utpote mulier, dicat, quod non sit cognita, et vir dicat, quod sic; standum est viro, quia vir est caput mulieris³, et quia etiam loquitur pro causa matrimoniali, quae est maxime favorabilis. Si autem mulier velit offerre et replicare, ipsum esse mentitum, per ostensionem claustrorum; standum est probationi mulieris. Si vero vir petat divisionem et dicat, se non cognovisse, et mulier dicat, se fuisse cognitam; quamvis vir sit caput mulieris, tamen non standum iuramento viri, pro eo quod ipse contra matrimonium agit, et multi relinquunt uxores suas. Unde si aliae probationes non sunt, non est standum pro eo, sed pro matrimonio.

Quod quaeritur, quare manu propinquorum; dicendum, quod hoc est ex duplici ratione: tum quia eis magis constat, tum etiam, quia probabile est, quod magis pro matrimonio stent⁴.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Tunc qui iuraverant periurii crimine rei teneantur. Videtur enim male dicere, quia iuraverunt, se ita credere; sed quamvis ita non sit, non propter hoc iuraverunt falsum nec contra mentem: ergo non sunt periuri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo. Non enim dicit, quod sint periuri, sed quod rei teneantur, quia ita retractanda est sententia divortii lata per illa iuramenta, sicut si lata esset per iuramenta falsa, pro eo quod facti evidentia ostendit, illa iuramenta fuisse nulla quantum ad illam sententiam fortificandam⁵, nec praebuerunt fortificationem, sed potius errandi occasionem.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod prioribus reconciliari nequibunt etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, si copulentur aliis et coeunt invicem, tunc apertum est, quod solutum est maleficium: ergo videtur, quod non fuerit perpetuum: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod non possunt reconciliari; hoc intelligitur, quando praesumitur, maleficium illud fuisse personale; et tunc valet uterque coniungi alii, quia non habet ille illegitimitatem nisi respectu huius; et ideo, cum alii coniungitur, vere coniungitur, et ideo non potest redire ad primam. Si autem maleficium illud fuisset universaliter, ut nullam posset cognoscere mulierem; tunc, si rediret potentia cognoscendi, et vellent redire; possent et deberent se invicem reconciliare. p. 778 Sed quis potest hoc experiri, vel dare licentiam probandi? Tamen haec et multo maiora quotidie eveniunt et contingunt¹.

Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Fabianus: Neque furiosus neque furiosa matrimonium contrahere possunt; sed si contractum fuerit, non separentur. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, si non separantur, contrahunt; et si contrahunt, possunt contrahere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod furiosus in actu non potest contrahere, nec de iure nec de facto. Furiosus vero in habitu non potest de iure contrahere, quia prolem nescit educare; sed tamen, si sit sanae mentis in actu, potest de facto contrahere; et si contrahat, contractum est. Unde negatio prima non privat potentiam simpliciter, sed solum de iure; vel si privat potentiam simpliciter, tunc intelligitur de furia in actu. Et sic intelligitur verbum Magistri, et verbum sequens² adversative intelligitur de furiosis in habitu, sanae mentis in actu, qui possunt contrahere saltem de facto.

Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nec propriae uxori sibi liceat debitum reddere etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia non potest eam iure suo privare.

Respondeo: Istud non tenetur nunc, sed debet intelligi illud: quia non licet ei petere nec reddere etiam, ut satisfaciat suae concupiscentiae; sed tamen tenetur debitum reddere uxori, ex quo peccatum supervenit post matrimonium legitime contractum. Unde quamvis matrimonium non claudicet quantum ad vinculum, tamen quantum ad debitum reddendum claudicare potest; sicut patet de eo qui intrat religionem sine licentia uxoris et emittit votum solemne³; sic in proposito intellige. Unde ista decreta, quae hic allegantur, abrogata sunt.

Dub. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod pro aliqua infirmitate corporali non licet viro uxorem dimittere. Videtur enim male dicere: quia magis potest sustineri ut plurimum fornicationis culpa, in qua potest esse usus coniugii, quam illa infirmitas, in qua non potest esse usus: ergo si propter fornicationem dimittitur⁴, videtur, quod et propter talem infirmitatem possit dimitti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non fit separatio post coniugii consummationem, nisi fiat in poenam alterius; et quoniam nemo punitur nisi pro culpa, et afflicto⁵ afflictio addenda non est; hinc est, quod pro qualicumque poena, vel infirmitate non est uxor reiicienda.

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Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: They are fully legitimate whom no vow bars etc. For it seems to be false to say [this]: because legitimacy is a habit, illegitimacy is a privation; but "privations are known through habits, not habits through privations⁴": therefore legitimacy is ill-defined through illegitimate privation.

I respond: It must be said that, just as loosing in one way names a habit with respect to binding, in another way a privation; so in the matter at hand. For if the loosed and the bound are compared with respect to the act, in regard to which there is a freeing, the loosing names a habit; but if they are compared with respect to the bond, the loosing names the privation of the bond; and thus it can be defined in two ways. In this manner must legitimacy be understood⁵.

Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: I wish to be a mother and to bear children etc. For it seems to be badly said, because on account of the sterility of the wife the husband cannot allege against the wife that he wishes to be a father: therefore neither, on account of the frigidity of the husband, [can] the wife [allege] that she wishes to be a mother. — Likewise, marriage stands without the good of offspring: therefore, on account of this, that she wishes to be a mother, it ought not to be dissolved.

I respond: It must be said that the Saints⁶ speak courteously, insofar as women themselves are modest; for a woman cannot be separated from her husband on account of a defect of the power of generating, but of the power of intercourse; and in that circumlocution it is courteously understood that she wishes to be known by a man. And so it is clear that it is not similar in the case of sterility, but it is indeed similar in the case of narrowness. For if she is so narrow that she cannot be known, the husband can allege and say that he wishes to be a father, that is, that he does not wish to be continent, if he can have intercourse⁷. And thus that is clear.

Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: If they should wish to sever the conjugal bond, let both remain unmarried. For it seems that each is false: first, namely, concerning the conjugal bond; because, if there is a bond there, since it is an insoluble bond, it cannot be loosed⁸; but if there is not, how is it severed? — Again, it seems false to say and ill to command, because, since one of them has no impediment whatever, he could licitly contract with another.

Alongside this it is asked whether, if he who is truly frigid seeks a divorce, he ought to be heard. And that he ought not, it seems: because a fornicator cannot seek a divorce, since it comes about through his own fault: therefore neither can such a frigid man, since he himself is the cause. — But against this is that, since there is no marriage there, it seems that neither is bound.

I respond: It must be said that divorce on account of impotence for intercourse sometimes comes about because the impotence is in one party; sometimes because the impotence is in both. If because it is in both, each ought to remain without hope of marriage. If because it is in one, whether in the husband p. 777 or in the wife, after the divorce that one, in whom the cause lies, ought to remain without hope of marriage as an illegitimate person; but if he should contract and be able, then he must return to his former vows.

That, then, which he says—that they should remain unmarried—refers to the one in whom the cause of illegitimacy is found, whether in the husband or in the wife.

As to what is objected concerning the bond, it must be said that although according to truth there is no conjugal bond there, nevertheless according to appearance or estimation it is there; or even a certain betrothal and obligation, since they can dwell together with marital affection; whence it is greatly to be praised¹ in them that they remain together, unless they wish to pass over to a stricter life.

As to what is asked—whether, at the husband's petition, it ought to be done—it must be said that yes, if he can prove it; nevertheless, because he goes against himself and against the marriage, an evil suspicion is gathered concerning the husband. And therefore abundant proof is enjoined on such a husband, especially if the wife says that she was known by him; but if the wife should confess [it]; either it is necessary to prove it evidently, or they must both remain unmarried, or even never be separated; for which the Church ought to apply what diligence it can².

Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: By the hand of seven kinsmen, the holy relics being touched, let him say on oath etc. For it seems to be badly said, because no one ought to swear except concerning that of which he is certain; but no one of the kinsmen is certain, because that act requires concealment: therefore it seems that no one can swear. — Likewise, suppose that there is no kinsman, or few; will they not be able to be separated? — Likewise, why ought this rather to be done by the hand of kinsmen than of others?

I respond: It must be said that although concerning that act certainty is scarcely ever had through the evidence of the fact, nevertheless it is had for the most part through probable signs and through conjectures, which, although they do not suffice to generate knowledge, nevertheless suffice to generate faith or belief, which affords some strength. I say therefore that, for this—that a divorce be granted—each ought to swear that they have never come together carnally nor have been able to come together, and that they have taken pains, and that each has not, by his own part, stood in the way; and the kinsmen ought to swear that they so believe; and then, since they have dwelt together for a sufficient time, they can be divided. But if one of them, namely the wife, says that she was not known, and the husband says that she was; one must stand by the husband, because the man is the head of the woman³, and because he also speaks for the matrimonial cause, which is most favorable. But if the wife wishes to offer and to reply that he has lied, by the showing of [her intact] enclosures; one must stand by the wife's proof. But if the husband seeks division and says that he did not know [her], and the wife says that she was known; although the man is the head of the woman, nevertheless one must not stand by the husband's oath, because he himself acts against the marriage, and many abandon their wives. Whence, if there are no other proofs, one must not stand by him, but by the marriage.

As to what is asked—why by the hand of kinsmen—it must be said that this is for a twofold reason: both because it is more evident to them, and also because it is probable that they stand rather for the marriage⁴.

Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Then let those who had sworn be held guilty of the crime of perjury. For it seems to be badly said, because they swore that they so believed; but although it is not so, they did not on that account swear falsely nor against their mind: therefore they are not perjurers.

I respond: It must be said that stress must be laid on the word. For he does not say that they are perjurers, but that they are held guilty, because the sentence of divorce passed through those oaths must be retracted just as if it had been passed through false oaths, because the evidence of the fact shows those oaths to have been null as regards the strengthening of that sentence⁵; nor did they furnish strengthening, but rather an occasion of erring.

Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that they will not be able to be reconciled to their former [spouses] etc. For it seems to be badly said, because, if they are joined to others and come together with one another, then it is clear that the bewitchment has been dissolved; therefore it seems that it was not perpetual: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that when it is said that they cannot be reconciled, this is understood when it is presumed that that bewitchment was personal; and then each is able to be joined to another, because that one does not have illegitimacy except with respect to this one; and therefore, when he is joined to another, he is truly joined, and therefore he cannot return to the first. But if that bewitchment had been universal, so that he could know no woman; then, if the power of knowing should return, and they should wish to return, they could and ought to be reconciled to one another. p. 778 But who can test this, or grant license for proving it? Nevertheless these things and much greater happen and occur daily¹.

Dub. VII.

Likewise it is asked about this which Fabianus says: Neither a madman nor a madwoman can contract marriage; but if it has been contracted, let them not be separated. For it seems to be badly said, because, if they are not separated, they contract; and if they contract, they can contract.

I respond: It must be said that a madman in act cannot contract, neither by right nor in fact. But a madman in habit cannot contract by right, because he does not know how to rear offspring; but nevertheless, if he is of sound mind in act, he can contract in fact; and if he contracts, it is contracted. Whence the first negation does not deprive [him] of the power absolutely, but only by right; or if it deprives [him] of the power absolutely, then it is understood of madness in act. And thus the word of the Master is understood, and the following word² is understood adversatively of the mad in habit, of sound mind in act, who can contract at least in fact.

Dub. VIII.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Nor let it be permitted to render the debt to his own wife etc. For it seems to be badly said, because he cannot deprive her of her own right.

I respond: This does not hold now, but that [saying] must be understood [thus]: that it is not permitted him to ask nor even to render [the debt], so as to satisfy his own concupiscence; but nevertheless he is bound to render the debt to his wife, since the sin supervened after the marriage was legitimately contracted. Whence, although the marriage does not limp as regards the bond, nevertheless as regards the rendering of the debt it can limp; just as is clear in the case of one who enters religion without his wife's license and makes solemn vow³; understand it so in the matter at hand. Whence those decrees which are here alleged have been abrogated.

Dub. IX.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that for some bodily infirmity it is not permitted a man to dismiss his wife. For it seems to be badly said: because for the most part the fault of fornication can rather be endured, in which there can be the use of marriage, than that infirmity, in which the use cannot exist: therefore if [a wife] is dismissed on account of fornication⁴, it seems that she may also be dismissed on account of such an infirmity.

I respond: It must be said that separation is not made after the consummation of the marriage, unless it be made as a penalty on the other party; and since no one is punished except for fault, and affliction is not to be added to one afflicted⁵, hence it is that for any penalty whatever, or for infirmity, the wife is not to be cast off.

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