Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 36
Articulus II. De impedimento ex defectu aetatis.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de impedimento, quod venit ex defectu aetatis. Et circa hoc tria quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum status aetatis impediat matrimonium.
Secundo, utrum defectus aetatis impediat contractionem sponsalium.
Tertio, utrum sponsalia contracta post septennium possint dissolvi per mutuum consensum.
Quaestio I. Utrum status aetatis impediat matrimonium.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod status aetatis impediat matrimonium:
1. Quia statum aetatis sequitur impotentia coeundi; sed impotentia coeundi impedit matrimonium: ergo et status aetatis.
2. Item, statum aetatis consequitur indiscretio5; sed discretio requiritur ad consensum legitimum, et consensus ad matrimonium: ergo talis potest esse status aetatis, quod impedit matrimonium.
3. Item, iura canonica6 et civilia dicunt, quod impuberes non possunt contrahere matrimonium; sed impuberes iudicantur ratione aetatis, ut masculus ante decimum quartum annum et femina ante duodecimum: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Status pubertatis non impedit susceptionem alicuius alterius Sacramenti, quae etiam maioris sunt perfectionis: ergo nec matrimonium.
2. Item, quare non possunt contrahere ante tempus pubertatis? Aut propter impotentiam coeundi, aut propter defectum discretionis. Si propter impotentiam; sed multi infirmi sunt impotentes reddere debitum, et tamen possunt contrahere; prae-p. 796terea, multi senio confecti sunt impotentes, et tamen possunt contrahere; praeterea, multi etiam ante annum decimum quartum coeunt. Si propter defectum discretionis; contra hoc est, quod multi sunt discretiores in decennio, quam alii in vigesimo anno, qui possunt contrahere: ergo etc.
Item, quaeritur, quare tempus pubertatis citius completur in muliere quam in viro? Et videtur, quod non deberet, quia quantum ad sponsalia contrahenda ad par tempus et aequale masculus et femina iudicantur, ut puta ad septennium1: ergo pari ratione ad matrimonium contrahendum.
Conclusio. Ante tempus pubertatis de iure non potest contrahi matrimonium.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod matrimonium est in officium et in remedium et in Sacramentum vel signum: in officium, inquam, procreandi prolem, in remedium contra impulsum libidinis, et in Sacramentum insolubilis coniunctionis naturarum Christi2. Quoniam igitur ante tempus pubertatis non possunt masculus et femina generare, nec fervore libidinis excitantur tanquam impotentes ad eius actum; quia etiam ante tempus illud sunt variabiles, et matrimonium est immutabile: decreverunt iura, tales personas non esse legitimas, antequam ad tempus veniant pubertatis.
Ad obiecta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Sacramentis aliis, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia utilia et necessaria sunt ante tempus pubertatis.
2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid impediat; dicendum, quod defectus aetatis ratione instabilitatis puerilis et impotentia coeundi naturalis. — Quod obiicit de sene et infirmo non est simile, quia stabiles sunt in sensu et in affectu. — Sed quod dicit, quod ante possunt; dicendum, quod iura iudicant et instituunt non ea quae semper, sed ea quae fiunt frequenter3, et quia, licet ante tempus indictum aliqui possint coire propter accelerationem naturae, tamen ut frequenter ante illud tempus non possunt. Quia tamen iura viderunt, quod aliqui possent; ideo non tantum arctaverunt, quin etiam proximi pubertati circa medium annum possint contrahere4.
Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare citius completur tempus pubertatis in muliere? dicendum, quod tempus sponsalium determinatur quantum ad discretionem, sed tempus pubertatis quantum ad potentiam coeundi; et quia citius potest coire femina quam masculus: ideo etc. — Si tu quaeras: quare mulier citius potest quam masculus? responderi potest, quod hoc fit multis rationibus: primo, quia prius fit solutio viscositatis propter meatus largiores; secundo, quia difficilius est agere quam pati; tertio, quia natura imperfecta in muliere appetit virum, sicut materia formam5; unde propter maiorem appetitum naturae maior fit acceleratio.
I. De 1. quaestione sive de impedimento aetatis lex positiva omnia satis determinavit.
De eadem: Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 5; Suppl. q. 58. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1.
II. De sponsalibus in genere alii Lombardi commentatores plerumque agunt supra d. 27.
De hac 2. quaestione: S. Thom., d. 27. q. 2. a. 2; Suppl. q. 43. a. 2. — B. Albert., d. 27. a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., d. 27. q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., d. 27. a. 3. q. 1. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., d. 27. q. 3; Dionys. Carth., d. 27. q. 3.
III. De dissolutione sponsalium (q. 3.) notandum est, quod cum S. Alphonso Liguori (Theol. Moral. VI. c. 1. dub. 3. n. 855.) communiter docetur, sponsalia etiam iurata solvi per verum, mutuum consensum non tantum valide, sed etiam licite, dummodo adsit rationabilis causa; qua deficiente, solutionem esse saltem veniale peccatum. Etiam S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 89. a. 9. ad 2.) docet, promissionem iuratam, quando promittitur aliquid pertinens ad utilitatem alterius, posse solvi consensu utriusque. — Quoad quaest. 2. incidentem Richard. a Med. octo illis casibus addit alios duos: «Nonus, si probetur fama de impedimento inter eos, vel scandalum de eorum coniunctione, Extra, de Sponsalibus, Cum in tua. Decimus, ut aliqui dicunt, si sponsalibus superveniat simplex continentiae votum» etc.
De 3. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 3. — B. Albert., d. 27. a. 16. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 4.
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Article II. On the impediment arising from defect of age.
Next, concerning the second article, there is inquiry about the impediment that arises from defect of age. And concerning this three questions are asked.
First it is asked, whether the state of age impedes marriage.
Second, whether defect of age impedes the contracting of a betrothal.
Third, whether a betrothal contracted after the seventh year can be dissolved by mutual consent.
Question I. Whether the state of age impedes marriage.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the state of age impedes marriage:
1. Because impotence for intercourse follows upon the state of [immature] age; but impotence for intercourse impedes marriage: therefore so also does the state of age.
2. Likewise, indiscretion follows upon the state of age5; but discretion is required for legitimate consent, and consent is required for marriage: therefore the state of age can be such that it impedes marriage.
3. Likewise, the canon laws6 and the civil laws say that those below puberty cannot contract marriage; but they are judged to be below puberty by reason of age, as a male before his fourteenth year and a female before her twelfth: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. The state of puberty does not impede the reception of any other Sacrament, which are even of greater perfection: therefore neither [does it impede] marriage.
2. Likewise, why can they not contract before the time of puberty? Either on account of impotence for intercourse, or on account of a defect of discretion. If on account of impotence — but many sick men are impotent to render the debt, and yet they can contract; morep. 796over, many worn out with age are impotent, and yet they can contract; moreover, many even before the fourteenth year have intercourse. If on account of a defect of discretion — against this is the fact that many are more discreet in their tenth year than others in their twentieth year, who [nonetheless] can contract: therefore, etc.
Likewise, it is asked why the time of puberty is completed sooner in a woman than in a man. And it seems that it ought not to be so, because, as regards the contracting of a betrothal, a male and a female are judged [fit] at an equal and identical time, namely at the seventh year1: therefore, by parallel reasoning, [they should be judged equal] as regards the contracting of marriage.
Conclusion. Before the time of puberty, marriage cannot lawfully be contracted.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that marriage is [ordained] to a duty and to a remedy and to a Sacrament or sign: to a duty, I say, of procreating offspring; to a remedy against the impulse of lust; and to a Sacrament of the indissoluble joining of the natures in Christ2. Since, therefore, before the time of puberty a male and a female cannot generate, nor are they stirred by the ardor of lust, being as it were impotent for its act; and since also before that time they are changeable, whereas marriage is unchangeable: the laws decreed that such persons are not legitimate [to marry] until they come to the time of puberty.
To the objections:
1. To that which is objected concerning the other Sacraments, it must be said that it is not alike, because they are useful and necessary before the time of puberty.
2. To that which is asked, what impedes [marriage], it must be said that [it is] the defect of age, by reason of childish instability and of natural impotence for intercourse. — As for what is objected concerning the old man and the sick man, it is not alike, because they are stable in sense and in affection. — But as for what he says, that they can [have intercourse] beforehand, it must be said that the laws judge and establish things not according to what happens always, but according to what happens frequently3; and because, although before the appointed time some can have intercourse on account of a hastening of nature, nevertheless for the most part they cannot before that time. Yet because the laws saw that some could, they did not restrict it so far but that those close to puberty, around the middle of the [fourteenth] year, may also contract4.
To that which is asked — why the time of puberty is completed sooner in a woman — it must be said that the time of betrothal is determined with regard to discretion, but the time of puberty with regard to the power of intercourse; and because a woman can have intercourse sooner than a man: therefore, etc. — If you should ask: why can a woman [do so] sooner than a man? It can be answered that this happens for many reasons: first, because the dissolving of the [bodily] viscosity occurs earlier on account of wider passages; second, because it is more difficult to act than to be acted upon; third, because imperfect nature in the woman desires the man, as matter [desires] form5; whence, on account of the greater appetite of nature, a greater hastening takes place.
I. Concerning the first question, that is, concerning the impediment of age, positive law has determined everything sufficiently.
On the same: Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 5; Suppl. q. 58, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 6, q. 1.
II. Concerning betrothals in general, the other commentators on Lombard generally treat above at d. 27.
On this second question: St. Thomas, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2; Suppl. q. 43, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, d. 27, a. 14. — Peter of Tarentaise, d. 27, q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, d. 27, a. 3, q. 1. — On this and the following question: Durandus, d. 27, q. 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 27, q. 3.
III. Concerning the dissolution of betrothals (q. 3) it must be noted that, with St. Alphonsus Liguori (Moral Theology VI, c. 1, dub. 3, n. 855), it is commonly taught that even sworn betrothals may be dissolved by true, mutual consent not only validly, but even licitly, provided a reasonable cause is present; and, this being lacking, that the dissolution is at least a venial sin. St. Thomas also (Summa II-II, q. 89, a. 9, ad 2) teaches that a sworn promise, when something pertaining to the advantage of another is promised, can be dissolved by the consent of both parties. — As regards the second, incidental question, Richard of Middleton adds two others to those eight cases: «The ninth, if a report of an impediment between them, or a scandal concerning their union, be proved — Extra, On Betrothals, Cum in tua. The tenth, as some say, if a simple vow of continence supervene upon the betrothal» etc.
Concerning the third question: St. Thomas, at the places cited, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, d. 27, a. 16. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, at the place cited, q. 4.
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- 5Codd. et ed. 1 discretio. In multis codd. plura in toto hoc arg. non bene omittuntur; retinuimus lectionem Vaticanae.The codices and ed. 1 read discretio. In many codices several words in this whole argument are, not well, omitted; we have retained the reading of the Vatican [edition].
- 6Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4; C. Puberes (3.) et C. Attestationes (10.), X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.). De iure civili vide Iustinian., D. XXIII. de Rit. nuptiar. (tit. 2.); lex Minorem (4.). Cfr. etiam C. V. de Nuptiis (tit. 4.), lex Sancimus, si quis (24.) et ibid. Quando tutores etc. (tit. 60.), lex Indecoram (3.). Aristot., VII. Polit. c. 16. (c. 14.) annum 18. pro feminis et annum 37. pro viris ad matrimonium contrahendum aptum esse censet.Cf. here the Master's text, c. 4; the chapter Puberes (3) and the chapter Attestationes (10), X [Decretals], On the Betrothal of Those Below Puberty (bk. IV, tit. 2). On the civil law see Justinian, Digest XXIII, On the Rite of Marriages (tit. 2); the law Minorem (4). Cf. also Codex V, On Marriages (tit. 4), the law Sancimus, si quis (24) and, in the same place, Quando tutores etc. (tit. 60), the law Indecoram (3). Aristotle, Politics VII, c. 16 (c. 14), judges the age of 18 for women and the age of 37 for men to be fit for contracting marriage.
- 1Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et C. Litteras (4.), seq., X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).See here the Master's text, c. 4, and the chapter Litteras (4) and following, X [Decretals], On the Betrothal of Those Below Puberty (bk. IV, tit. 2).
- 2Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2. et 6. — Inferius pro ad eius edd. ad hunc.Cf. above the Master's text, d. 26, c. 2 and 6. — Below, for ad eius the editions read ad hunc.
- 3Vide infra dub. 5. — Edd. superius substituunt perperam quod non possunt pro quod ante [nonnulli codd. quandoque, codd. P Q quidem ante, cod. G quandoque ante] possunt [cod. O addit coire], et subinde post instituunt prosequuntur non secundum ea... sed secundum ea.See below, dubium 5. — Above, the editions wrongly substitute quod non possunt for quod ante [some codices quandoque, codices P Q quidem ante, codex G quandoque ante] possunt [codex O adds coire], and then, after instituunt, continue non secundum ea... sed secundum ea.
- 4Cfr. C. De illis (9.), X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).Cf. the chapter De illis (9), X [Decretals], On the Betrothal of Those Below Puberty (bk. IV, tit. 2).
- 5Secundum Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.). Cfr. IV. de [Generat. animal. c. 3.]According to Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 (c. 9). Cf. [On the Generation of Animals] IV, [c. 3]. [The note breaks off at "Cfr. IV. de" at the trimmed outer margin of p. 796 — the tail is absent from the scan at 600 dpi and from the IA OCR alike; the bracketed continuation is supplied from the parallel note on p. 795, fn. 3, "Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 3."] ---