Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 40
Articulus Unicus. De impedimento consanguinitatis.
Quaestio I. Utrum consanguinitas sit aliquod vinculum.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod consanguinitas non sit aliquod vinculum:
1. Quoniam, si consanguinitas est vinculum, hoc non est ob aliud nisi propter propagationem multorum ab uno; sed sicut multi homines ab uno homine, ita multa animalia bruta propagantur ex uno: si ergo ubi talis causa, et talis effectus1; si consanguinitas propter propagationem ex uno ponitur in hominibus, eadem ratione in brutis animalibus. Sed non ponitur in animalibus brutis: ergo etc.
2. Item, consanguinitas est vinculum ratione alicuius maioris convenientiae, aut ergo substantialis, aut accidentalis. Si substantialis; aut secundum formam specificam, aut numeralem2. Si secundum formam specificam; tunc ergo omnes homines sunt consanguinei. Si secundum formam numeralem; tunc nullus est consanguineus alterius, cum distinguantur secundum numerum. Si vero dicit convenientiam in accidente; cum nati de diversis generibus ut plurimum plus conveniant, quam nati de eadem parentela, tunc magis erunt consanguinei.
3. Item, generatio est de superfluo nutrimenti3; sed superfluitas nullam colligantiam nec vinculum habet cum eo cuius est superfluitas: ergo nec generatus de illa superfluitate aliquod vinculum habet cum eo, a quo generatur: ergo si ille est fons totius vinculi consanguinitatis, videtur, quod illud vinculum nullum sit.
4. Item, si consanguinitas contrahitur propter carnis propagationem; quantum se extendit propagatio, et4 vinculum; sed propagatio se extendit usque ad infinitas generationes nec habet terminum per naturam: ergo nec vinculum consanguinitatis.
Contra:
1. Ostenditur per iura nova et antiqua, quae consanguinitatem assignant et gradus distinguunt, sicut patet Extra, de Consanguinitate5 et Causa trigesima quinta, quaestione quinta, Series consanguinitatis.
2. Item, hoc probatur per rationem: confessio naturae mendax esse non potest; sed per naturam homines magis alligantur propinquis quam extraneis; quod patet, quia magis diligunt eos, et hoc commune est apud omnes6: ergo aliquod vinculum est inter ipsos, quod non est inter alios.
3. Item, «generatio est de substantia generantis» ut vult Damascenus7: ergo cum productio humani generis sit per generationem, videtur, quod filii sint de substantia et de sanguine patris et matris. Sed omnes qui sunt de eodem sanguine, sunt consanguinei: ergo etc.
4. Item, Deus vindicat peccata patrum in filios usque in tertiam et quartam generationem, sicut frequenter dicitur in Lege, et habetur Exodi vigesimo8: Ego sum Deus zelotes etc.: ergo si non vindicat in alios, sed in istos, aliquo vinculo iunguntur isti ad invicem, quo non iunguntur alii; hoc autem consanguinitatem appellamus: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Consanguinitas est aliquod vinculum, fundatum in relatione ad eandem originem et in naturali affectione.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod vinculum consanguinitatis est, quia hoc ipsa natura testatur, et de hoc nemo dubitat, nisi qui caret sensu1. Sed unde veniat, istud dubitationem et controversiam etiam habet.
Aliqui enim dixerunt, vinculum consanguinitatis specialiter esse in genere hominis, non in genere bestiarum, propter veritatem humanae naturae, quae tota fuit in uno, propter quam et originale peccatum in omnes processit uno peccato2; propter hoc etiam, quia substantiam totam trahit filius a patre et a matre. Hinc est, quod quodam speciali vinculo vinciuntur.
Sed si ita esset, quod tota substantia mea et tua in eodem homine secundum veritatem fuisset; quare ego et alius, qui non convenimus nisi in Adam, non essemus fratres propinqui et in primo gradu? Et iterum, quia fundamentum istius positionis non est stabile, sicut alibi3 melius patet; hinc est, quod alium modum dicendi oportet invenire: quod consanguinitas est ex propagatione carnali proveniens in hominibus; et hoc vinculum duo faciunt, scilicet relatio ad eandem originem, et naturalis affectio. Relatio ad eandem originem, tum sicut ad principium materiale, quia de sanguine eiusdem hominis generantur; tum sicut ad principium effectivum, quia cum illo semine deciduntur spiritus4, et etiam virtus, quae format et assimilat materiam; unde ut plurimum filii assimilantur parentibus, secundum quod illa virtus delata potentior est in operando. — Et quia natura in hominibus potens est cognoscere suam originem et originem alterius, et ulterius perspicax est, ut non solum assimilationem in forma corporea, sed etiam aliam cognoscat; cum affectio naturalis nata sit adhaerere tali, hinc est, quod est ibi vinculum consanguinitatis.
Et quoniam virtus assimilativa deficit per successionem, et cognitio etiam propinquitatis deficit, et affectio naturalis deficit; hinc est, quod vinculum consanguinitatis non tantum protenditur, quantum propagatio. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiectum ultimum.
Rursus, quia in brutis animalibus non est talis cognitio nec alligatio, nisi solum quantum ad matrem et fetum sive prolem5; hinc est, quod non est in eis tale vinculum. — Et sic patet primo obiectum, quia non est similis causa, ideo nec similis effectus. — Nec loquimur hic de affectione secundum actum, sed secundum naturale inclinativum, quae6 naturaliter inest, etsi non exeat in actum. Et hoc patet, quia aliquis credens, fratrem suum esse extraneum, non magis afficitur quam circa alium; sed statim, comperto quod sit frater, afficitur et affectione trahitur et eidem quodam speciali vinculo alligatur, cum tamen prius esset alligatus.
2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non est vinculum propter convenientiam in substantia nec propter convenientiam in accidente; dicendum, quod consanguinitas non dicit vinculum secundum proprietatem absolutam, sed secundum proprietatem relatam, utpote secundum processum ab eadem radice et origine, ut patet de duobus fratribus. Unde sicut rami ab eadem radice procedentes faciunt unam arborem, non solum propter assimilationem, sed7 propter comparationem ad idem principium; sic intelligendum, quod plures personae ab eodem descendentes faciunt unam lineam consanguinitatis, quae est se habens ad modum arboris.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de superfluo, dicendum, quod duplex est superfluitas: quaedam impuritatis, et haec potius habet repugnantiam quam colligantiam; quaedam residuitatis, et haec habet convenientiam nec est simpliciter superfluitas, quia, quamvis sit8 uni virtuti superflua, utpote nutritivae, tamen alii est necessaria, utpote generativae; et quamvis superfluat ad conservationem individui, est tamen necessaria ad conservationem speciei. Et praeterea, probabile est, quod cum ista humiditate nutrimentali aliquid fuit de humiditate radicali9 et spiritu, ratione cuius filius intimius attinet patri.
I. Quae in hac distinctione de impedimento consanguinitatis determinantur plerumque sumta sunt ex canonibus ecclesiasticis; tamen notandae sunt validae rationes, quibus auctor et S. Thom., inter se consentientes, defendunt leges Ecclesiae.
Circa praenotata cfr. hic S. Thom., q. unica a. 1. 2; Suppl. q. 54. a. 1. 2; B. Albert., a. 1-6; Petr. a Tar., a. 2; Richard. a Med., in praenotatis. Alii in mox citt. quaestionibus.
Quaestio 1. et 2. ab aliis una sola absolvitur. Quoad 2. quaestionem antiqui doctores cum Ss. Thoma et Bonav. communiter docent, consanguinitatem non tantum primi gradus lineae rectae, sed etiam 1. gradus lineae lateralis (scil. inter fratrem et sororem) esse iure naturali et divino impedimentum dirimens (cfr. supra d. 39. a. 2. q. 1.). Certum est, Ecclesiam separare matrimonia inter fratrem et sororem in infidelitate contracta, si ambo ad fidem convertuntur. Non pauci tamen doctores dubitant, utrum ista matrimonia iure naturali et divino fuerint per se invalida.
De 1. et 2. quaestione: Scot., hic q. unica (ubi etiam de q. 3.). — S. Thom., hic a. 3; Suppl. q. 54. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. 2. — Durand. et Dionys. Carth., de tota dist. hic q. unica.
II. De 3. quaestione est notandum, quod a Concilio Lateran. IV. sub Innocentio III. ob rationes graves, ab auctore nostro explicatas impedimentum consanguinitatis restrictum est ad quartum gradum.
De eadem quaestione praeter citatos: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3-6.
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Article, the Only One. On the impediment of consanguinity.
Question I. Whether consanguinity is some bond.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that consanguinity is not some bond:
1. Because, if consanguinity is a bond, this is for no other cause than on account of the propagation of many from one; but just as many men [come] from one man, so many brute animals are propagated from one: if therefore, where such a cause is, such an effect also is1; if consanguinity is posited in men on account of propagation from one, by the same account it is posited in brute animals. But it is not posited in brute animals: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, consanguinity is a bond by reason of some greater agreement, either therefore substantial or accidental. If substantial, then either according to specific form or according to numerical form2. If according to specific form, then all men are blood-relations. If according to numerical form, then no one is a blood-relation of another, since they are distinguished according to number. But if it names an agreement in an accident: since those born of diverse stocks for the most part agree more than those born of the same parentage, then the former will be more blood-related.
3. Likewise, generation is from the superfluity of nourishment3; but a superfluity has no linkage or bond with that whose superfluity it is: therefore neither does what is generated from that superfluity have any bond with him from whom it is generated: therefore, if he is the source of the whole bond of consanguinity, it seems that that bond is nothing at all.
4. Likewise, if consanguinity is contracted on account of the propagation of the flesh, then as far as propagation extends itself, so far does the bond4; but propagation extends itself even to infinite generations and has no terminus by nature: therefore neither does the bond of consanguinity.
On the contrary:
1. It is shown by the laws, new and ancient, which assign consanguinity and distinguish its degrees, as is plain in the Decretals, On Consanguinity5, and in Cause thirty-five, question five, "The Series of Consanguinity."
2. Likewise, this is proved by reason: the testimony of nature cannot be a lie; but by nature men are bound more to their near kin than to strangers; which is plain, because they love them more, and this is common among all6: therefore there is some bond among them which is not among others.
3. Likewise, "generation is from the substance of the one generating," as the Damascene holds7: therefore, since the production of the human race is by generation, it seems that sons are of the substance and of the blood of father and mother. But all who are of the same blood are blood-relations: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, God avenges the sins of the fathers upon the sons unto the third and fourth generation, as is frequently said in the Law, and is had in Exodus, chapter twenty8: I am a jealous God, etc.: therefore, if He does not avenge upon others but upon these, these are joined to one another by some bond by which others are not joined; and this we call consanguinity: therefore, etc.
Conclusion
Consanguinity is some bond, founded upon relation to the same origin and upon natural affection.
I respond: It must be said that there is a bond of consanguinity, because nature herself bears witness to this, and no one doubts it except one who lacks sense1. But whence it comes — that has doubt and controversy as well.
For some have said that the bond of consanguinity is specially in the genus of man and not in the genus of beasts, on account of the truth of human nature, which was wholly in one man, on account of which also original sin passed into all by one sin2; and on account of this too, because the son draws his whole substance from father and from mother. Hence it is that they are bound by a certain special bond.
But if it were so, that my whole substance and yours had in truth been in the same man, why then would I and another, who agree in nothing but Adam, not be near brothers and in the first degree? And again, because the foundation of this position is not stable, as is better shown elsewhere3; hence it is that another way of speaking must be found: namely, that consanguinity comes about in men from carnal propagation; and two things make this bond, namely relation to the same origin and natural affection. Relation to the same origin, both as to a material principle, because they are generated from the blood of the same man; and as to an effective principle, because together with that seed there are shed spirits4, and also a power which forms and assimilates the matter; whence for the most part sons are made like their parents, according as that transmitted power is more potent in operating. — And because nature in men is able to know its own origin and the origin of another, and is further perspicacious, so that it may know not only likeness in bodily form but also another [kind of likeness]; since natural affection is born to cleave to such a one, hence it is that there is there the bond of consanguinity.
And since the assimilative power fails through succession, and the knowledge also of nearness fails, and natural affection fails; hence it is that the bond of consanguinity is not extended as far as propagation is. — And by this the answer to the last objection is plain.
Again, because in brute animals there is no such knowledge or binding, except only as regards the mother and the fetus or offspring5; hence it is that there is no such bond in them. — And thus the first objection is plain, because the cause is not alike, and therefore neither is the effect alike. — Nor do we speak here of affection according to act, but according to the natural inclination, which6 is naturally present even if it does not go forth into act. And this is plain, because someone believing his brother to be a stranger is not more affected [toward him] than toward another; but at once, when it has been discovered that he is his brother, he is affected and is drawn by affection and is bound to him by a certain special bond, although he was bound before.
2. To that, then, which is objected — that there is no bond on account of agreement in substance nor on account of agreement in accident — it must be said that consanguinity does not name a bond according to an absolute property, but according to a relative property, namely according to procession from the same root and origin, as is plain in the case of two brothers. Hence, just as branches proceeding from the same root make one tree, not only on account of their likeness but7 on account of their relation to the same principle, so it must be understood that several persons descending from the same [stock] make one line of consanguinity, which stands after the manner of a tree.
3. To that which is objected concerning superfluity, it must be said that superfluity is twofold: one of impurity, and this has repugnance rather than linkage; another of residue, and this has agreement and is not superfluity simply, because, although it be8 superfluous to one power, namely the nutritive, yet it is necessary to another, namely the generative; and although it be superfluous for the conservation of the individual, it is nevertheless necessary for the conservation of the species. And moreover, it is probable that together with that nutrimental moisture there was something of the radical moisture9 and of spirit, by reason of which the son more intimately pertains to the father.
I. The matters determined in this distinction concerning the impediment of consanguinity are for the most part taken from the ecclesiastical canons; nevertheless the strong reasons are to be noted by which our author and St. Thomas, in agreement with one another, defend the laws of the Church.
Concerning the praenotata [prefatory notes], cf. here St. Thomas, q. unica a. 1, 2; Supplement q. 54, a. 1, 2; Blessed Albert, a. 1–6; Peter of Tarantaise, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, in the praenotata. Others in the questions cited just below.
Question 1 and question 2 are handled by others in a single question. As regards the second question, the ancient doctors, together with Saints Thomas and Bonaventure, commonly teach that consanguinity — not only of the first degree of the direct line, but also of the first degree of the collateral line (that is, between brother and sister) — is a diriment impediment by natural and divine law (cf. above, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1). It is certain that the Church separates marriages contracted between brother and sister in unbelief, if both are converted to the faith. Not a few doctors, however, doubt whether such marriages were of themselves invalid by natural and divine law.
On the first and second questions: Scotus, here q. unica (where also on q. 3). — St. Thomas, here a. 3; Supplement q. 54, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, 2. — Durandus and Dionysius the Carthusian, on the whole distinction, here q. unica.
II. On the third question it is to be noted that by the Fourth Lateran Council, under Innocent III, for grave reasons — expounded by our author — the impediment of consanguinity was restricted to the fourth degree.
On the same question, besides those already cited: St. Thomas, in the places cited, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3–6.
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- 1Vide supra pag. 78, nota 8. — Haec quaestio respicit definitionem consanguinitatis superius datam: Consanguinitas est vinculum personarum etc.See above, p. 78, note 8. — This question looks back to the definition of consanguinity given above: Consanguinity is a bond of persons, etc.
- 2Cfr. supra pag. 132, nota 9.Cf. above, p. 132, note 9.
- 3Secundum Aristot., I. de Generat. animal. c. 18. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 479, nota 5.According to Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals I, c. 18. Cf. vol. II, p. 479, note 5.
- 4Edd. tantum se extendit et.The editions read only se extendit et.
- 5Libr. IV. tit. 14. — Seq. habetur loc. cit. c. 1.Book IV, tit. 14. — What follows is found in the place cited, c. 1.
- 6Ideoque naturale; cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 5. et pag. 436, nota 2. — Maiorem insinuat Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2; minorem ibid. VIII. c. 12.And therefore natural; cf. above, p. 14, note 5, and p. 436, note 2. — Aristotle suggests the major premise in Ethics I, c. 2; the minor in the same work, VIII, c. 12.
- 7Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8.On the Orthodox Faith, Book I, c. 8.
- 8Vers. 5: Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus, fortis, zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam etc. Cfr. Num. 14, 18.Verse 5: I am the Lord thy God, mighty, jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third etc. Cf. Num. 14:18.
- 1Respicitur Aristot., I. Topic. c. 9: Non oportet autem omne problema nec non omnem positionem considerare, sed quam dubitabit aliquis eorum qui ratione egent et non poena vel sensu; nam qui dubitant, utrum oporteat deos honorare et parentes diligere, an non, poena indigent; qui vero, utrum nix alba, an non, sensu.Reference is made to Aristotle, Topics I, c. 9: "One ought not to examine every problem, nor indeed every position, but only such a one as would be doubted by someone of those who need argument and not punishment or sense-perception; for those who doubt whether the gods are to be honored and parents to be loved, or not, need punishment; but those who doubt whether snow is white, or not, need sense-perception."
- 2Cfr. Rom. 5, 12. — Cod. G bene uno peccante. Superius pro in uno cod. bb in una persona.Cf. Rom. 5:12. — Codex G rightly reads uno peccante. Above, for in uno, codex bb reads in una persona.
- 3Libr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. q. 1. — Inferius post consanguinitas est in cod. E secunda manus supplevit vinculum.Sentences, Book II, d. 30, a. 3, q. 1. — Below, after consanguinitas est, a second hand in codex E supplied vinculum.
- 4Nempe vitalis et spiritualis; cfr. Alfredi Anglici lib. de Motu cordis, et Costa-Ben-Lucae lib. de Differentia animae et spiritus (ed. Innsbruck 1878.). — Mox pro materiam cod. F (bb a secunda manu) membrum, codd. N aa fetum. Subinde pro et originem Vat. in forma, et pro corporea, sed etiam aliam ipsa substituit propria, sed etiam in alia (cod. V sed per aliam).Namely the vital and the spiritual [spirits]; cf. Alfred the Englishman's book On the Motion of the Heart, and Costa-ben-Luca's book On the Difference between Soul and Spirit (Innsbruck ed., 1878). — Shortly after, for materiam, codex F (bb by a second hand) reads membrum, codices N aa fetum. Then, for et originem, the Vatican edition reads in forma, and for corporea, sed etiam aliam it substitutes propria, sed etiam in alia (codex V: sed per aliam).
- 5Cod. bb addit et hoc ad tempus, non diu.Codex bb adds et hoc ad tempus, non diu ("and this for a time, not for long").
- 6Ita codd. A F G H I K, cod. E quod; edd. quia. Pro exeat in actum plures codd. esset in actu, Vat. insit in actu, vel non exeat in actum. Subinde post non magis afficitur codd. F G supplent circa ipsum, Vat. circa illum et pro affectione trahitur communis codd. lectio habet affectio trahitur, cui cod. K (I a secunda manu) addit in actum.So codices A F G H I K; codex E reads quod; the editions quia. For exeat in actum several codices read esset in actu, the Vatican edition insit in actu, vel non exeat in actum. Then, after non magis afficitur, codices F G supply circa ipsum, the Vatican edition circa illum; and for affectione trahitur the common reading of the codices has affectio trahitur, to which codex K (I by a second hand) adds in actum.
- 7Cod. aa sed etiam.Codex aa reads sed etiam.
- 8Vat. quamvis non sit.The Vatican edition reads quamvis non sit.
- 9Vide tom. I. pag. 316, nota 12. — Pro fuit codd. A E a secunda manu fluit.See vol. I, p. 316, note 12. — For fuit, codices A E, by a second hand, read fluit. ---