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Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
p. 851

Articulus Unicus. De cognatione carnali sive consanguinitate.

Quaestio III. Usque ad quem gradum se extendat impedimentum consanguinitatis.

Tertio quaeritur, usque ad quem gradum consanguinitas impediat matrimonium. Et quod usque ad septimum, videtur.

1. Gregorius dicit, et habetur in littera3: «Progeniem suam usque ad septimam generationem unumquemque observare, decrevimus». Si tu dicas, quod illud est retractatum in Concilio generali, Extra, de Consanguinitate4, Non debet etc.; ostenditur, quod illud non debet esse retractatum, quoniam aut hoc est bene statutum, aut non. Si non: ergo male statuit sanctus Gregorius et alii Sancti. Si sic; sed quod bene statutum est non indiget retractatione, sed observatione: ergo etc.

2. Item, secundum rectum ordinem non est retrocedendum, sed ultra progrediendum: ergo si sancti Patres consanguinitatem usque ad gradum septimum produxerunt, ergo qui reducit ipsam ad quartum retrocedit. Sed qui aspicit retro non est aptus regno Dei5: ergo male fecerunt qui retractaverunt.

3. Item, in proximis gradibus non permittitur contrahere propter dilatationem caritatis; sed quanto caritas est frigidior, tanto magis indiget dilatari: cum ergo in fine caritas refrigescat6, et hoc iam evenerit; videtur, quod nunc magis competat gradus consanguinitatis protendere quam restringere.

4. Item, quanto magis fideles sunt multiplicati, tanto magis habent copiam de his, cum quibus licite possunt contrahere: ergo maior opportunitas erat in praecedentibus temporibus7 cum propinquis quam nunc: si ergo illa opportunitas non excludebat constitutionem de septenario gradu consanguinitatis observando; ergo nec nunc.

Contra:

1. Quod non debeat impedire ultra secundum, videtur: quia in Lege non prohibetur nisi usque ad secundum gradum, sicut patet Levitici decimo octavo8: ergo si omnes possunt matrimonialiter per Deum coniungi, qui a Deo non prohibentur; ergo omnes, quotquot infra illum gradum coniunguntur, a Deo coniunguntur: ergo per hominem separari non possunt: ergo non potest matrimonium alicui prohiberi infra illum gradum.

2. Item, Ecclesia non potest facere, quod baptizatus careat baptismate, et quantumcumque statuat, si baptizatur quis, de facto baptizatus est: ergo quantumcumque prohibeat et statuat, ut aliqui invicem non contrahant, tamen, si de facto contrahant, contractum est: ergo videtur, quod gradus prohibiti ab Ecclesia matrimonium non impediant. Sed isti omnes sunt ultra secundum: ergo etc.

3. Item, matrimonium contractum contra Ecclesiae interdictum verum est matrimonium9: ergo cum gradus consanguinitatis non habeant virtutem impediendi nisi propter Ecclesiae statutum; videtur, quod secundum veritatem non impediunt.

4. Item, Hieronymus10 dicit, quod «nihil sibi credatur, nisi probet per vetus vel per novum testamentum»: ergo cum non possit probari per novum nec per vetus, quod non possit contrahi in gradibus ultra secundum; videtur, quod nulli credendum est, si dicat contrarium: ergo retinendum est, quod potest contrahi.

Conclusio. Consanguinitas secundum legem naturalem impedit in primo gradu, secundum legem veterem, usque ad secundum; secundum legem evangelicam, usque ad quartum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum tempora nostra matrimonium impeditur a gradibus consanguinitatis usque ad quartum inclusive, sicut patet Extra, de Consanguinitate, Non debet, in decretali edita in Concilio generali.

Si autem quaeritur ratio huius; dicendum, quod huius ratio est statutum Ecclesiae. Si quaeratur ultra, quare Ecclesia statuit; dicendum, quod quia

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potuit, et congruum fuit, et quia erat utile, et quia erat necesse. — Primum quidem potuit, et quod potuit, probatur per Scripturam: quia in principio in constitutione matrimonii in lege naturae duae excipiebantur personae, scilicet pater et mater, Genesis secundo1: Relinquet homo patrem et matrem etc.; post processu temporis in Lege fuerunt plures exceptae, sicut patet Levitici decimo octavo: si ergo lex evangelica abundare debet a Moysaica, ergo in lege evangelica plures debuerunt excipi. Sed Christus in propria persona non excepit: ergo si nihil diminutum debet esse in Ecclesia, ergo posse determinandi Ecclesiae reliquit, maxime Petro2 et eius successori. Quod attendentes, sancti Patres exceperunt multos gradus consanguinitatis; ex quo apparet, quod ipsi posse habuerunt.

Si autem tu quaeras a me: quare huiusmodi posse Ecclesiae dereliquit? dicendum, quod ratio huius est, quia illud Sacramentum in contractu consistit, qui est personae ad personam; et quoniam Dominus plenam iurisdictionem dedit Petro super spiritualia et ampliorem, quam reges terrae et imperator habeant super temporalia. Si ergo regis et principis potentia potest contractus limitare, ut malae fidei possessor iudicetur qui contra eorum interdicta mercatur3; quid mirum, si dedit Ecclesiae posse? Immo debuit dare, ut posset personarum legitimitatem et idoneitatem ad contrahendum determinare.

Si tu quaeras: quare ipse per se non determinavit? dici potest, quod secundum diversa tempora oportebat, diversas personas et diversos gradus excipi; quia ergo statuta divina non decet sic mutare, sicut humana4: hinc est, quod non ipse Christus debuit limitare, sed limitandos Petro et eius successoribus committere. Et sic patet, quod potuit.

Secundo vero congruum fuit, quod usque ad talem gradum consanguinitas protenderetur: quoniam consanguinitas ortum habet ex propagatione; propagatio autem est ex semine, semen autem in se habet naturam quatuor humorum et quatuor elementorum5: et hinc est, quod consanguinitas ultra quartam generationem non debuit determinari. Et iterum, infra illum gradum non debuit commisceri, nec matrimonium copulari, ubi potestas corporis datur alii. Sicut ergo corpus quatuor constat elementis, ita oportet quatuor gradibus distare, qui debent carnaliter commisceri. — Et iterum, lex nova super legem Moysaicam plus debet addere perfectionis, quam lex Moysaica super legem naturae. Si ergo lex Moysaica unum addidit gradum supra legem naturae; tunc ergo lex evangelica saltem duos debet addere, sicut iustitia Evangelii non tantum superat iustitiam Legis, sed etiam superabundat. Congruum ergo fuit et propter legem matrimonii et propter legem Evangelii, matrimonium a consanguinitatis quarto gradu impediri, nec ultra addi nec minui. Et sic patet, quomodo fuit congruum.

Fuit etiam utile, quia vinculum matrimonii ratione affinitatis, quae ibi contrahitur, fovet caritatem et foederat inimicos; et quoniam caritas nostris temporibus refriguit, ideo citius nunc rumpitur vinculum amoris quam in Ecclesia primitiva; et alligatus vinculo citius fugit, et qui fuerat proximus frequentissime fit inimicus. Ut ergo fugiens posset revocari; cum a quarto gradu et deinceps iam ab affectione amoris frigescant, utile fuit constituere, ut post quartum gradum posset fugiens revocari ad vinculum, posset etiam confoederari inimicus; propter quam utilitatem decebat, Pontificem Summum, manente priori prohibitione, dispensare; et cum ista utilitas sit frequentissima, utile fuit, ut fieret ius commune.

Quarto vero fuit necesse propter periculum: quoniam propter multitudinem consanguineorum et brevitatem dierum vix potest aliquis computare consanguineos usque ad septimum gradum; et ita erat ibi maximum periculum, quia6 frequentissime contingebat, homines iungi infra gradus prohibitos, immo vix poterat aliquis evadere: et ideo oportuit, prius statutum retractare. Tale periculum vel talis necessitas non fuit in tempore Ecclesiae primitivae, tum quia homines erant longioris vitae, tum quia minoris generationis; nunc autem decrevit in hominibus potentia virtutis nutritivae, et augmentata est potentia virtutis generativae propter fervorem libidinis, qui viget nunc in hominibus adeo, quod secundum communem cursum possent homines ita multiplicari, quod usque ad quartum gradum, nedum usque ad octavum7, vix inveniret aliquis, cum qua contraheret. — Et illud patet ad oculum: possibile enim est, quod aliquis generet viginti, et iterum, quod aliquis generet tres; nunc ponamus secundum communem cursum, quod generet decem, et illi decem alios decem; in secundo gradu erunt centum, in tertio mille, in quarto decem millia; et ita infra quatuor gradus haberet aliquis consanguineos in una linea undecim millia centum et undecim, totidem in linea ascen-

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dente, et totidem in transversali: ergo secundum naturam haberet triginta tria millia et trecentos triginta tres consanguineos. Et in una magna patria vix inveniret, cum qua contraheret usque ad quartum1 gradum, quanto magis usque ad septimum. Ideo propter periculum oportuit revocare illud statutum, et hoc scilicet usque ad quartum gradum statuere. — Et ista fuit potissima ratio, quare mutatum est, sicut expresse dicitur in decretali2 edita in Concilio generali, ubi dicitur: «Non debet reprehensibile iudicari, si secundum varietatem temporum statuta quoque varientur humana, praesertim cum urgens necessitas vel evidens utilitas hoc exposcit». — Hoc autem non solum necessitas exposcebat, sed etiam utilitas requirebat, et aderat congruitas et potestas; ideo recte usque ad quartum gradum impediri matrimonium, rectissime et irreprehensibiliter statuit et ordinavit Ecclesia.

Ad argumenta primae partis:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Gregorio, dicendum, quod rationabiliter illud statutum fuit tempore suo, et non minus rationabiliter revocatum tempore moderno; nec fuit revocatum, quia esset male statutum, sed quia quod congruebat tempore primitivo non congruebat statui nostro propter maiorem imperfectionem, quae est in nobis, et propter maiora pericula.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est retrocedendum; dicendum, quod verum est in his quae sunt perfectionis3, sed ea quae sunt rigoris temperari possunt et debent. — Vel dicendum et melius, quod condescendere oporteat infirmitati, et ubi non possumus nos erigere, necessario oportet nos humiliare et inclinare; et ideo propter imperfectionem hominum statutum illud oportuit temperare. Unde verum est, quod non est retrocedendum, sed tamen imperfectionem hominum tolerare est opportunum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilatatione caritatis, dicendum, quod illa ratio potius est ad oppositum quam ad propositum. Quia enim caritas minus se extendit, ideo citius oportet ei succurri et adiuvari; et proximus ab amore citius fugit, et ideo citius est revocandus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maiorem habent fideles copiam; dicendum, quod verum est, si multiplicarentur personae, ita quod non multiplicarentur consanguinei; hoc autem non est verum: et ideo, sicut crescit ex una parte aptitudo, ita ex alia crescit ineptitudo.

Ad argumenta pro secunda parte:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non prohibet ultra secundum; dicendum, quod verum est per se; tamen prohibet per Ecclesiam, quia Ecclesia prohibet auctoritate sibi divinitus data. Ratio autem, quare Deus dedit Ecclesiae auctoritatem super hoc, iam visa est.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest facere, quod careat baptismate; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia baptismi institutionem Deus per se ordinavit et confirmavit; sed personarum legitimitatem commisit Ecclesiae, quia matrimonium contrahitur inter virum et mulierem, et Ecclesia habet plenitudinem iurisdictionis super utrumque.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ecclesiae interdicto, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia illud interdictum est ad tempus, non simpliciter, nec facit personas illegitimas simpliciter, sed ligat, ut sine peccato non possint, et ideo poena talibus debet imponi.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod secus est in dictis Ecclesiae et Hieronymi: quia Hieronymus non poterat probare per Scripturam, se esse testem veritatis; ideo ad hoc, quod crederetur sibi, oportebat, quod per Scripturam probaret, esse verum quod testificabatur et dicebat. Sed Ecclesia per Scripturam suam potuit probare auctoritatem4; qua probata, oportet obedire, non aliud testimonium quaerere. Et sic totum patet5.

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English Translation
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Article Unique. On carnal kinship, or consanguinity.

Question III. To what degree the impediment of consanguinity extends.

Thirdly it is asked, up to what degree consanguinity impedes marriage. And it seems that it does so up to the seventh.

1. Gregory says, and it is had in the text3: «We have decreed that each one is to observe his own progeny up to the seventh generation». If you should say that this was retracted in the general Council, Extra, On Consanguinity4, Non debet etc.; it is shown that it ought not to have been retracted, since either this was well established, or not. If not: then Saint Gregory and the other Saints legislated badly. If so — but what has been well established does not need retraction but observance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, according to right order one ought not to go backward but to advance further: therefore, if the holy Fathers extended consanguinity up to the seventh degree, then he who reduces it to the fourth goes backward. But he who looks back is not fit for the kingdom of God5: therefore those who retracted it did badly.

3. Likewise, in the nearest degrees contracting is not permitted, on account of the widening of charity; but the colder charity is, the more it needs to be widened: since therefore at the end charity grows cold6, and this has already come to pass; it seems that now it is more fitting to extend the degrees of consanguinity than to restrict them.

4. Likewise, the more the faithful are multiplied, the more they have an abundance of those with whom they can lawfully contract: therefore there was a greater opportunity in preceding times7 with kinsfolk than now: if therefore that opportunity did not exclude the constitution about observing the seventh degree of consanguinity, then neither does it now.

On the contrary:

1. That it ought not to impede beyond the second [degree] seems [true]: because in the Law nothing is prohibited except up to the second degree, as is plain from Leviticus, chapter eighteen8: therefore, if all can be joined matrimonially by God who are not prohibited by God; then all, as many as are joined within that degree, are joined by God: therefore they cannot be separated by man: therefore marriage cannot be prohibited to anyone within that degree.

2. Likewise, the Church cannot bring it about that one baptized should lack baptism, and however much she may legislate, if someone is baptized, he is in fact baptized: therefore, however much she may prohibit and legislate that certain persons not contract with one another, nevertheless, if they do in fact contract, the contract holds: therefore it seems that the degrees prohibited by the Church do not impede marriage. But all these [degrees] are beyond the second: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a marriage contracted against the Church's interdict is a true marriage9: therefore, since the degrees of consanguinity have no power of impeding except on account of the Church's statute; it seems that in truth they do not impede.

4. Likewise, Jerome10 says that «nothing is to be believed on a man's word unless he proves it by the Old or by the New Testament»: therefore, since it cannot be proved by the New nor by the Old that one cannot contract in degrees beyond the second; it seems that no one is to be believed if he says the contrary: therefore it is to be held that one can contract.

Conclusion. Consanguinity, according to the natural law, impedes in the first degree; according to the old law, up to the second; according to the evangelical law, up to the fourth.

I respond: It must be said that, according to our times, marriage is impeded by the degrees of consanguinity up to the fourth inclusive, as is plain from Extra, On Consanguinity, Non debet, in the decretal published in the general Council.

But if the reason for this be asked; it must be said that the reason for this is the statute of the Church. If it be asked further, why the Church legislated thus; it must be said that it is because she

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could, and because it was fitting, and because it was useful, and because it was necessary. — First indeed she could, and that she could is proved through Scripture: because in the beginning, in the constitution of marriage under the law of nature, two persons were excepted, namely father and mother, Genesis, chapter two1: A man shall leave father and mother etc.; afterward, in the course of time, under the Law more were excepted, as is plain from Leviticus, chapter eighteen: if therefore the evangelical law ought to abound beyond the Mosaic, then under the evangelical law more ought to have been excepted. But Christ in his own person did not except any: therefore, if nothing ought to be diminished in the Church, then he left the power of determining to the Church, especially to Peter2 and his successor. Attending to this, the holy Fathers excepted many degrees of consanguinity; from which it appears that they had the power.

But if you should ask me: why did he leave a power of this kind to the Church? it must be said that the reason for this is that that Sacrament consists in a contract, which is of person to person; and because the Lord gave to Peter full jurisdiction over spiritual things, and a fuller one than kings of the earth and the emperor have over temporal things. If therefore the power of a king and a prince can limit contracts, so that he is judged a possessor in bad faith who trades against their interdicts3; what wonder if he gave the power to the Church? Indeed he had to give it, so that she might be able to determine the legitimacy and fitness of persons for contracting.

If you should ask: why did he not determine it himself, of himself? it can be said that, according to diverse times, diverse persons and diverse degrees had to be excepted; since therefore it is not becoming that divine statutes be changed as human ones are4: hence it is that Christ himself did not have to set the limits, but to commit the setting of limits to Peter and his successors. And thus it is plain that she could.

Secondly, it was fitting that consanguinity be extended up to such a degree: since consanguinity has its origin from propagation; and propagation is from the seed, and the seed has in itself the nature of the four humors and of the four elements5: and hence it is that consanguinity ought not to have been determined beyond the fourth generation. And again, within that degree there ought to be no carnal mingling, nor marriage joined, where the power of the body is given to another. As therefore the body is composed of four elements, so those who are to be carnally mingled must be four degrees apart. — And again, the new law ought to add more of perfection over the Mosaic law than the Mosaic law over the law of nature. If therefore the Mosaic law added one degree above the law of nature; then the evangelical law ought to add at least two, just as the justice of the Gospel not only surpasses the justice of the Law, but even superabounds. It was therefore fitting, both on account of the law of marriage and on account of the law of the Gospel, that marriage be impeded by the fourth degree of consanguinity, and that nothing be added beyond it nor taken from it. And thus it is plain how it was fitting.

It was also useful, because the bond of marriage, by reason of the affinity which is contracted there, fosters charity and makes allies of enemies; and because charity in our times has grown cold, therefore the bond of love is now more quickly broken than in the primitive Church; and one bound by the bond more quickly flees, and he who had been a neighbor very often becomes an enemy. Therefore, that the one fleeing might be called back — since from the fourth degree and onward they already grow cold in the affection of love — it was useful to establish that after the fourth degree the one fleeing might be called back to the bond, and the enemy might also be made an ally; on account of which usefulness it was becoming that the Supreme Pontiff should dispense, the prior prohibition remaining; and since this usefulness is very frequent, it was useful that it should become common law.

Fourthly, it was necessary on account of danger: since, on account of the multitude of blood-relations and the shortness of days, scarcely can anyone reckon his blood-relations up to the seventh degree; and so there was the greatest danger there, because6 it very frequently happened that men were joined within the prohibited degrees — indeed, scarcely could anyone escape it: and therefore it was necessary to retract the earlier statute. Such danger or such necessity did not exist in the time of the primitive Church, both because men were of longer life, and because they were of smaller generation; but now the power of the nutritive faculty has decreased in men, and the power of the generative faculty has been increased on account of the ardor of lust, which now so flourishes in men that, according to the common course, men could so multiply that scarcely would anyone find a woman with whom he might contract even up to the fourth degree, not to say up to the eighth7. — And this is plain to the eye: for it is possible that someone beget twenty, and again, that someone beget three; now let us suppose, according to the common course, that he beget ten, and those ten another ten each; in the second degree there will be a hundred, in the third a thousand, in the fourth ten thousand; and thus within four degrees a man would have, in one line, eleven thousand one hundred and eleven blood-relations, as many in the ascending line,

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and as many in the collateral line: therefore according to nature he would have thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-three blood-relations. And in one great country he would scarcely find a woman with whom he might contract up to the fourth1 degree — how much less up to the seventh. Therefore on account of the danger it was necessary to revoke that statute, and namely to establish [it] up to the fourth degree. — And this was the strongest reason why it was changed, as is expressly said in the decretal2 published in the general Council, where it is said: «It ought not to be judged reprehensible if, according to the variety of the times, human statutes too are varied, especially when urgent necessity or evident usefulness demands it». — Now not only did necessity demand this, but usefulness also required it, and there was present both fittingness and power; therefore rightly, most rightly and irreprehensibly, has the Church established and ordained that marriage be impeded up to the fourth degree.

To the arguments of the first part:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that that statute was reasonable in his own time, and no less reasonably was it revoked in the modern time; nor was it revoked because it had been badly established, but because what was fitting in the primitive time was not fitting for our condition, on account of the greater imperfection which is in us, and on account of the greater dangers.

To 2. To that which is objected, that one ought not to go backward; it must be said that this is true in those things which belong to perfection3, but those things which belong to rigor can and ought to be tempered. — Or it must be said, and better, that one ought to condescend to weakness, and where we cannot raise ourselves up, we must of necessity humble ourselves and bow down; and therefore, on account of the imperfection of men, that statute had to be tempered. Hence it is true that one ought not to go backward, but nevertheless it is opportune to bear with the imperfection of men.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning the widening of charity, it must be said that that argument is rather for the opposite than for the proposition. For because charity extends itself less, therefore it must the more quickly be succored and assisted; and one's neighbor flees the more quickly from love, and therefore he is the more quickly to be called back.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the faithful have a greater abundance; it must be said that this would be true if persons were multiplied in such a way that blood-relations were not multiplied; but this is not true: and therefore, just as on the one side aptitude grows, so on the other side ineptitude grows.

To the arguments for the second part:

To 1. To that which is objected, that God does not prohibit beyond the second [degree]; it must be said that this is true of himself; nevertheless he prohibits through the Church, because the Church prohibits by the authority divinely given to her. And the reason why God gave the Church authority over this has already been seen.

To 2. To that which is objected, that she cannot bring it about that one lack baptism; it must be said that the case is not the same: because God of himself ordained and confirmed the institution of baptism; but the legitimacy of persons he committed to the Church, since marriage is contracted between a man and a woman, and the Church has fullness of jurisdiction over both.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning the Church's interdict, it must be said that the case is not the same: because that interdict is for a time, not absolutely, nor does it make persons illegitimate absolutely, but it binds them, so that they cannot [do it] without sin, and therefore a penalty ought to be imposed on such persons.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning Jerome, it must be said that it is otherwise in the sayings of the Church and in those of Jerome: because Jerome could not prove by Scripture that he was a witness of the truth; therefore, in order that he be believed, it was necessary that he prove by Scripture that what he testified and said was true. But the Church was able to prove her authority by her own Scripture4; and this being proved, one must obey, and not seek another testimony. And thus the whole is plain5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 3
    Hic c. 1.
    Here, c. 1.
  2. 4
    Libr. IV. tit. 14. c. 8, estque Innocent. III. in Concilio generali Lateran. — In fine arg. respicitur regula canonis supra d. 35. q. 5. arg. 1. ad oppos. allegata.
    Book IV, tit. 14, c. 8; and it is Innocent III's, in the general Lateran Council. — At the end of the argument, reference is made to the rule of the canon cited above at d. 35, q. 5, arg. 1, on the opposite side.
  3. 5
    Luc. 9, 62: Nemo... respiciens retro aptus est etc.
    Luke 9, 62: No man... looking back is fit etc.
  4. 6
    Matth. 24, 12: Refrigescet caritas multorum.
    Matt. 24, 12: The charity of many shall grow cold.
  5. 7
    Codd. L Y (E a secunda manu) supplent contrahere.
    Codd. L Y (E by a second hand) supply contrahere.
  6. 8
    Vers. 6. seqq. — Inferius respicitur Matth. 19, 6: Quod ergo Deus coniunxit homo non separet.
    Verse 6 ff. — Below, reference is made to Matt. 19, 6: What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.
  7. 9
    Cfr. supra d. 32. a. 4. q. 2.
    Cf. above, d. 32, a. 4, q. 2.
  8. 10
    Vide quae diximus tom. I. pag. 210, nota 10.
    See what we said in vol. I, p. 210, note 10.
  9. 1
    Vers. 24, ubi Vulgata post patrem addit suum (cfr. supra pag. 664, nota 3.). — Seq. locus est Lev. 18, 8. seqq.
    Verse 24, where the Vulgate after patrem adds suum (cf. above, p. 664, note 3). — The following passage is Lev. 18, 8 ff.
  10. 2
    Pro Petro multi codd. Ecclesiae principi. Aliquanto inferius post huiusmodi communior lectio codd. addit vel Sacramenta, vel Sacramenti (codd. T U X omittunt posse); cod. O legit: quare super huiusmodi Sacramenta posse.
    In place of Petro many codd. read Ecclesiae principi. Somewhat below, after huiusmodi, the more common reading of the codd. adds either Sacramenta or Sacramenti (codd. T U X omit posse); cod. O reads: quare super huiusmodi Sacramenta posse.
  11. 3
    Iustinian., C. XI. de Agricolis et censitis (tit. 47.), lex Quemadmodum originarios (7.): Malae fidei namque possessorem esse nullus ambigit, qui aliquid contra legum interdicta mercatur. Cfr. supra pag. 371, nota 2.
    Justinian, Codex XI, On Farmers and Registered Tenants (tit. 47), law Quemadmodum originarios (7): «For no one doubts that he is a possessor in bad faith who trades in anything against the interdicts of the laws». Cf. above, p. 371, note 2.
  12. 4
    Cfr. verba C. Non debet in fine corp. allegata.
    Cf. the words of the canon Non debet, cited at the end of the body [of the article].
  13. 5
    In praeallegato C. Non debet dicitur: Quaternarius vero numerus bene congruit prohibitioni coniugii corporalis... quia quatuor sunt humores [sanguis, cholera, phlegma, melancholia] in corpore, qui constant ex quatuor elementis. Cfr. C. In quadam nostra (8.), X. de Celebrat. Missarum (lib. III. tit. 41.). — Inferius pro ubi... datur edd. nec... dari.
    In the aforecited canon Non debet it is said: «The quaternary number indeed accords well with the prohibition of bodily marriage... because there are four humors [blood, choler, phlegm, melancholy] in the body, which are composed of four elements». Cf. the canon In quadam nostra (8), X, On the Celebration of Masses (lib. III, tit. 41). — Below, in place of ubi... datur, the editions have nec... dari.
  14. 6
    Cod. L (bb a secunda manu) et quia, edd. et, quae etiam aliquanto inferius pro decrevit perperam crevit.
    Cod. L (bb by a second hand) reads et quia, the editions et, which also, somewhat below, wrongly read crevit for decrevit.
  15. 7
    Plures codd. septimum.
    Several codd. read septimum.
  16. 1
    Non pauci codd. quintum, et post pauca edd. octavum pro septimum.
    Not a few codd. read quintum, and a little after, the editions read octavum for septimum.
  17. 2
    Scilicet Non debet, ubi textus originalis quandoque pro quoque. — Inferius pro recte Vat. iuste.
    Namely Non debet, where the original text has quandoque for quoque. — Below, in place of recte, the Vatican edition has iuste.
  18. 3
    Cfr. supra pag. 292, nota 11. et pag. 816, nota 7. — De seq. ratione cfr. 1. Cor. 3, 1. seqq.
    Cf. above, p. 292, note 11, and p. 816, note 7. — On the following argument cf. 1 Cor. 3, 1 ff.
  19. 4
    Vide Matth. 16, 18. seq.
    See Matt. 16, 18 f.
  20. 5
    Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
    See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---
Cited by

2 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

2 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 40, Dubia