Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 41, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus

p. 863

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod Ecclesia infra praedictos gradus separat. Ponatur, quod Ecclesia decepta aliquos separet, et postmodum manifestetur deceptio; quaeritur, utrum tales sint reiungendi. Et quod sic, videtur: quia separatio per iniustitiam¹ facta est: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo possit stare, cum manifestatur, praecedens iudicium fuisse iniustum. — Contra hoc est, quia possibile est, quod aliquis post separationem in facie Ecclesiae fiat sacerdos, vel religiosus; sed talis non potest habere usum matrimonii: ergo non debet ei restitui.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quando et qualiter sit restitutio viri facienda uxori, vel e converso.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in tali casu facienda est restitutio: quoniam Ecclesia decepta fuit, et altera personarum iniuste exspoliata; et quoniam Ecclesia potest et debet errorem corrigere et non debet aliquam personam iure suo privare²: ideo, deceptione cognita, si alter, qui iniuste exspoliatus est, petat, debet restituere; et si intravit religionem et votum emisit, potest debitum reddere, sed non debet nec potest exigere, quoniam obligavit se ad continentiam, quantum est in se³.

Quod quaeritur, quando et quomodo debeat uxor restitui viro, aut e converso; dicendum, quod uxor aut agit iure petitorio, aut possessorio⁴. Tunc agit petitorio, quando dicit, aliquem sibi adiudicari in maritum, quoniam cum ea contraxit. Tunc agit possessorio iudicio, quando petit, aliquem sibi restitui, pro eo quod vir eius fuit et cum ea cohabitavit. — Si agit petitorio, et vir excipiat; primo tractabitur exceptio mariti, antequam fiat restitutio sive quam satisfiat petitioni, pro eo quod probata exceptione mariti, si recta est, principalis quaestio perimitur. Si vero agit possessorio, restituendus est mulieri, etiam antequam probetur exceptio, Extra, de Restitutione spoliatorum⁵, Litteras, et Extra, de Divortiis, Porro; exceptis quinque casibus. — Primus est, si obiiciatur mulieri publica fornicatio, et haec fuerit probata, nisi ipsa excipiat in contrarium contra virum de fornicatione, Extra, de Divortiis⁶, Significasti. — Secundus casus est, si obiiciatur consanguinitas divina lege prohibita, in continenti probanda; differenda est restitutio, nec debet compelli per sententiam, ne forte superinducatur perplexitas. Si vero differatur, oportet fieri restitutionem per sententiam, sed tamen non oportet debitum reddere, si habet de consanguinitate conscientiam, Extra, de Restitutione spoliatorum⁷, Litteras. — Tertius casus est, si obiiciatur exceptio rei iudicatae, a qua non est appellatum; argumentum de Officio delegati⁸, Causam matrimonii. — Quartus casus est, quando tanta est saevitia viri, quod non potest sufficiens cautio adhiberi, utpote quia persequitur uxorem odio capitali, Extra, de Restitutione spoliatorum, Litteras in fine. — Quintus casus est, quando ille qui agit, alterum spoliavit sine causa; dicitur, quod non debet restitui, Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione prima, De Benedicto⁹; attamen illud non est usquequaque verum, quia tunc, quando vult redire, et alter non vult, si non habet quod obiiciat manifeste, ex tunc incipit spoliare.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si duo vel tres consanguinitatem etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia personae propinquae sunt suspectae: ergo non debent recipi ad testificandum. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur: qui possunt matrimonium accusare?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accusatio, propter quam debeat fieri divortium, aut est de peccato, aut de consanguinitatis vinculo. Si est de peccato fornicationis, tunc soli coniuges possunt se mutuo accusare¹⁰ — alii vero non admittuntur, quia tunc fit iniuria viro — et possunt simul stare sine peccato. — Si autem fit accusatio de consanguinitatis vinculo, tunc primo admitti debent consanguinei, si sunt superstites, maxime cum est accusatio de matrimonio dissolvendo, quia non praesumitur, quod ipsi velint; et praeterea, melius sciunt genealogiam quam alii; et ideo specialiter in hac causa admittuntur consanguinei¹¹. Tamen si sit quaestio de matrimonio con-p. 864trahendo sive contracto, ut suspecti repellendi sunt, ubi ille cuius filius vel filia coniuncta dicitur, superior est divitiis, potentia et honore. Quodsi consanguinei non adsint, qui testificentur; tunc possunt admitti extranei antiqui et maturi. Quodsi nec hi velint testificari, tunc omnes extranei possunt accusare, nisi aliud obsistat, ut puta si facta fuit denuntiatio, quod matrimonium accuset qui novit; si ille praesens aderat et tacet, ex tunc accusare non potest. Si vero fuit absens, vel postmodum didicit matrimonii impedimentum; si hoc iureiurando firmaverit, est admittendus, Extra, de His qui matrimonium accusare possunt¹², Cum in tua, et infra. Alicubi tamen sine differentia omnis qui vult accusare, admittitur, quia hoc honestatis est, scilicet servare ordinem prius dictum.

Dub. III.

Item de hoc quod dicit, quod aliud est fornicatio, aliud stuprum etc.; quaeritur, utrum ista sint diversa peccata secundum speciem et quantum ad genus peccati. Et quod non, videtur: quia sunt contra idem praeceptum, scilicet non moechaberis¹³, et circa actum unius virtutis, sola circumstantia differente, in qua non est nisi accidentalis differentia. In oppositum est: primum peccatum habet rationem suam a defectu circumstantiae; sed adulterium dicitur, quia aliquis cognoscit coniugatam, sed fornicatio quia solutam: ergo sunt diversa peccatorum genera.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista non tantum differunt accidente, immo sunt diversa genera peccatorum; et talia oportet confiteri, quoniam, etsi videantur solum differre circumstantia, quae iudicatur esse accidentalis proprietas; tamen ipsa circumstantia comparata ad peccatum est essentialis, quamvis comparata ad actum sit accidentalis: et ideo non variat genus actus, sed peccatum. Quod ergo obiicit, quod est¹⁴ contra idem praeceptum et circa eundem actum; dicendum est, quod hoc non impedit, quin possint esse diversa peccata, pro eo quod circa eundem actum et contra idem bonum contingit multipliciter obliquari¹⁵.

Dub. IV.

Item super hoc quod dicit, quod stuprum est virginum illicita defloratio; quaeritur, quod sit maius peccatum, utrum stuprum, an adulterium. Et quod maius sit adulterium, patet ex ordine Magistri, quia praemittit minora, et gradatim ascendit¹⁶. — Amplius, per adulterium iniuriatur quis viro, per stuprum non. Unde virgo, quae non est alteri alligata, non peccat nisi in Deum; sed adultera in Deum et in proximum: ergo etc. — Contra: Nobilior est castitas virginalis quam coniugalis¹⁷: ergo gravius est peccatum, quod est contra virginalem quam contra coniugalem; sed stuprum est contra virginalem: ergo etc. — Item, qui corrumpit virginem aliquam aufert ei bonum irrecuperabile¹⁸; sed non qui adulterat: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod pro maiori parte peccata ad invicem comparata se habent sicut excedentia et excessa. Unde si comparemus coitum cum coniugata ad coitum cum virgine soluta; deformius est virginem deflorare quam defloratam cognoscere; attamen gravius peccat qui adulteratur, quia magis laedit rempublicam et magis offendit virum et magis generat infamiam. — Obiecta autem procedunt per diversas vias.

English Translation

p. 863

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this which he says, that the Church separates [spouses] within the aforesaid degrees. Suppose that the Church, deceived, separates certain persons, and afterwards the deception is made manifest; it is asked whether such persons are to be rejoined. And that they are, it seems: because the separation was made through injustice¹: therefore it seems that it can in no way stand, since it is made manifest that the preceding judgment was unjust. — On the contrary is this, that it is possible that someone, after the separation, becomes in the face of the Church a priest or a religious; but such a one cannot have the use of marriage: therefore it ought not to be restored to him.

Alongside this it is asked, when and in what manner restitution of the husband is to be made to the wife, or conversely.

I respond: It must be said that in such a case restitution is to be made: because the Church was deceived, and one of the persons unjustly despoiled; and because the Church can and ought to correct an error and ought not to deprive any person of his right²: therefore, once the deception is known, if the other, who was unjustly despoiled, seeks it, he ought to make restitution; and if he entered religion and made a vow, he can render the debt, but he neither ought nor is able to exact it, since he bound himself to continence, so far as in him lies³.

As to what is asked, when and how the wife ought to be restored to the husband, or conversely; it must be said that the wife acts either by the right of petition or of possession⁴. She acts by petition when she says that someone is to be adjudged to her as husband, since he contracted with her. She acts by possessory judgment when she asks that someone be restored to her, on the ground that he was her husband and cohabited with her. — If she acts by petition, and the husband raises an exception; the husband's exception will first be treated, before restitution is made or the petition satisfied, on the ground that, the husband's exception being proved, if it is sound, the principal question is quashed. If, however, she acts by possession, she is to be restored to the woman even before the exception is proved, X, "On the restitution of the despoiled"⁵, Litteras, and X, "On divorces," Porro; with five cases excepted. — The first is, if public fornication is charged against the woman, and this has been proved, unless she herself excepts to the contrary against the husband concerning fornication, X, "On divorces"⁶, Significasti. — The second case is, if consanguinity forbidden by divine law is charged, to be proved forthwith; restitution is to be deferred, nor ought [the party] to be compelled by sentence, lest perhaps perplexity be brought on. But if it is deferred, restitution must be made by sentence, yet the debt need not be rendered, if he has [a scruple of] conscience about the consanguinity, X, "On the restitution of the despoiled"⁷, Litteras. — The third case is, if the exception of a matter adjudged, from which there is no appeal, is charged; the argument from "On the office of the delegate"⁸, Causam matrimonii. — The fourth case is, when the savagery of the husband is so great that sufficient security cannot be furnished, inasmuch as he pursues his wife with mortal hatred, X, "On the restitution of the despoiled," Litteras, at the end. — The fifth case is, when he who brings the action has despoiled the other without cause; it is said that restitution ought not to be made, Cause the thirty-second, question the first, De Benedicto⁹; yet that is not everywhere true, because then, when he wishes to return, and the other does not wish, if he has nothing to charge openly, from then on he begins to despoil.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: If two or three [prove] consanguinity etc. For it seems ill said, because near persons are suspect: therefore they ought not to be admitted to testify. — Alongside this it is asked: who can accuse a marriage?

I respond: It must be said that the accusation on account of which a divorce ought to be made is either concerning sin or concerning the bond of consanguinity. If it is concerning the sin of fornication, then only the spouses can accuse each other¹⁰ — but others are not admitted, because then injury is done to the husband — and they can stand together without sin. — But if the accusation is made concerning the bond of consanguinity, then first the consanguinei ought to be admitted, if they are surviving, especially when the accusation is about dissolving the marriage, because it is not presumed that they would wish [it]; and besides, they know the genealogy better than others; and therefore in this cause especially the consanguinei are admitted¹¹. Yet if the question is about a marriage to be contracted p. 864or already contracted, so that they are to be rejected as suspect, where he whose son or daughter is said to be joined [in marriage] is superior in riches, power, and honor. But if consanguinei are not present to testify, then aged and mature strangers can be admitted. But if not even these are willing to testify, then all strangers can accuse, unless something else stands in the way, as for instance if a denunciation has been made that whoever knows should accuse the marriage; if he was present and is silent, from then on he cannot accuse. But if he was absent, or afterwards learned the impediment of the marriage; if he confirms this by oath, he is to be admitted, X, "On those who can accuse a marriage"¹², Cum in tua, and below. Somewhere, however, without distinction, everyone who wishes to accuse is admitted, because this pertains to fair dealing, namely to preserve the order previously stated.

Doubt III.

Likewise about this which he says, that fornication is one thing, defilement (stuprum) another etc.; it is asked whether these are diverse sins according to species and as to the genus of sin. And that they are not, it seems: because they are against the same precept, namely thou shalt not commit adultery¹³, and about the act of one virtue, only the circumstance differing, in which there is nothing but an accidental difference. In the opposite [sense] it stands: the first sin takes its account from a defect of circumstance; but it is called adultery because someone knows a married woman, but fornication because [he knows] an unmarried one: therefore they are diverse genera of sins.

I respond: It must be said that these do not merely differ by accident, but rather are diverse genera of sins; and such things must be confessed, since, even though they seem to differ only by a circumstance, which is judged to be an accidental property; nevertheless that very circumstance, compared to the sin, is essential, although compared to the act it is accidental: and therefore it does not vary the genus of the act, but the sin. As to what he objects, that it is¹⁴ against the same precept and about the same act; it must be said that this does not prevent them from being able to be diverse sins, on the ground that about the same act and against the same good it happens that one is deflected in manifold ways¹⁵.

Doubt IV.

Likewise upon this which he says, that stuprum is the illicit deflowering of virgins; it is asked which is the greater sin, whether stuprum or adultery. And that adultery is the greater is clear from the order of the Master, because he sets the lesser first and gradually ascends¹⁶. — Further, by adultery one does injury to a husband, by stuprum not. Hence a virgin, who is not bound to another, does not sin except against God; but an adulteress against God and against her neighbor: therefore etc. — On the contrary: virginal chastity is nobler than conjugal¹⁷: therefore the sin which is against the virginal is graver than that which is against the conjugal; but stuprum is against the virginal: therefore etc. — Likewise, he who corrupts a virgin takes from her an irrecoverable good¹⁸; but not he who commits adultery: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that for the most part sins compared to one another are related as exceeding and exceeded. Hence if we compare intercourse with a married woman to intercourse with an unmarried virgin; it is more unseemly to deflower a virgin than to know one [already] deflowered; yet he who commits adultery sins more gravely, because he more injures the commonwealth and more offends the husband and more begets infamy. — But the objections proceed by diverse ways.

Apparatus Criticus

1
Edd. iustitiam.
The editions read iustitiam ("justice") [for iniustitiam, "injustice"].
2
In C. Discretionem (6.) et C. Iordanae (11.), X. de Eo qui cognovit etc. (lib. IV. tit. 13.) nec non in C. Quanto te novimus (7.), X. de Divortiis (lib. IV. tit. 19.) dicitur, quod nemo suo iure debeat sine sua culpa privari.
In the chapter Discretionem (6) and the chapter Iordanae (11), X, "On him who knew" etc. (book IV, title 13), and also in the chapter Quanto te novimus (7), X, "On divorces" (book IV, title 19), it is said that no one ought to be deprived of his right without his own fault.
3
Cfr. supra d. 27. dub. 4.
Cf. above, d. 27, dub. 4.
4
Vide C. Ad ultimum (2.) seqq., X. de Causa possessionis etc. (lib. II. tit. 12.).
See the chapter Ad ultimum (2) and following, X, "On the matter of possession" etc. (book II, title 12).
5
Libr. II. tit. 13. c. 13. — Seq. locus est lib. IV. tit. 19. c. 3.
Book II, title 13, c. 13. — The following passage is book IV, title 19, c. 3.
6
Libr. IV. tit. 19. c. 4.
Book IV, title 19, c. 4.
7
Libr. II. tit. 13. c. 13.
Book II, title 13, c. 13.
8
Plenius de Officio et potestate iudicis delegati (lib. I. tit. 29.), c. 16. — De seq. loco cfr. nota praecedens.
More fully, "On the office and power of the delegated judge" (book I, title 29), c. 16. — On the following passage, cf. the preceding note.
9
Can. 5. — Inferius pro quia tunc edd. sed tunc. — Idem dub. solvitur a S. Thom., hic circa lit.
Canon 5. — Below, for quia tunc the editions read sed tunc. — The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, here in connection with the text.
10
Cfr. Glossa in verba Gratian. C. Apud misericordem (10.), C. 32. q. 1. § 1. et C. Maritis (4.), X. de Adulteriis et stupro (lib. V. tit. 16.). — Mox pro tunc [i. e. alias] fit codd. G R tunc fieret, et verbis et possunt cod. K (I a secunda manu) interserit non.
Cf. the Gloss on the words of Gratian, chapter Apud misericordem (10), C. 32, q. 1, § 1, and the chapter Maritis (4), X, "On adulteries and defilement" (book V, title 16). — Presently, for tunc [i.e. elsewhere] fit, codices G, R read tunc fieret, and into the words et possunt codex K (I, by a second hand) inserts non.
11
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et C. Videtur nobis (3.), X. Qui matrimonium accusare possunt etc. (lib. IV. tit. 18.), ubi etiam Glossa ad verba Antiqua consuetudine propositionem seq. (de repellendis) insinuat.
Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, and the chapter Videtur nobis (3), X, "Who can accuse a marriage" etc. (book IV, title 18), where the Gloss too, on the words Antiqua consuetudine, suggests the following proposition (concerning those to be rejected).
12
Libr. IV. tit. 18. c. 6. — Inferius pro differentia omnis qui ex codd. F G substituimus differentia, omnis qui, cod. A omittit omnis. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., IV. Sent. d. 31. a. 12; S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. et 3; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4.
Book IV, title 18, c. 6. — Below, for differentia omnis, which from codices F, G we have substituted as differentia, omnis qui, codex A omits omnis. — The same doubt is resolved by B. Albert, IV Sent., d. 31, a. 12; St. Thomas, here a. 3, subquestions 2 and 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here in connection with the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 4.
13
Exod. 20, 14; Deut. 5, 18. — Aliquanto inferius cod. aa bis quando pro quia.
Exodus 20:14; Deut. 5:18. — Somewhat below, codex aa twice reads quando for quia.
14
Edd. perperam non est. Superius pro essentialis codd. G aa substantialis.
The editions wrongly read non est. Above, for essentialis codices G, aa read substantialis.
15
Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 147-152; S. Thom., hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. In locis citt. agitur etiam de seq. dub.
Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part II, q. 147–152; St. Thomas, here a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here in connection with the text. In the passages cited the following doubt is also treated.
16
Edd. praemittit maiora et gradatim descendit, codd., servato contra contextum maiora, pro descendit substituunt ascendit.
The editions read praemittit maiora et gradatim descendit ("he sets the greater first and gradually descends"); the codices, keeping maiora against the context, substitute ascendit ("ascends") for descendit.
17
Cfr. supra pag. 754, nota 6. — Inferius post coniugalem edd. addunt decorem.
Cf. above, p. 754, note 6. — Below, after coniugalem the editions add decorem ("comeliness").
18
Vide supra pag. 338, nota 3. — Cod. II irreparabile. Mox edd. adulteratur.
See above, p. 338, note 3. — Codex II reads irreparabile. Presently the editions read adulteratur.