Dist. 44, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 44
ARTICULUS II. Quid in quo resurgat.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur secundo, quid in quo resurgat. Et de hoc duo quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, quid in quo resurgat quantum ad totum corpus.
Secundo, quid in quo quantum ad quodlibet membrum.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum caro, quae est in duobus hominibus caro, resurgat caro in primo, vel in secundo.
Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, cum caro est in duobus hominibus caro, utrum resurgat caro in primo, vel in secundo. Et quod in primo, videtur.
1. Augustinus, de Civitate Dei, et habetur in littera6: « Illi animae in puncto temporis redditur, quae eam primitus, ut ex ea homo fieret, viveret, cresceret, animavit ».
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia « propria forma in propria materia nata est fieri7 »: ergo si haec caro est propria materia huius animae, cui primo est unita; ergo semper anima appetit ei uniri: ergo si non potest, frustratur eius appetitus. Hoc autem est inconveniens: ergo etc.
3. Item, caro ex unione cum anima dispositionem contrahit sive ordinationem ad immortalitatem: ergo si haec caro unita est cum hac anima, necessitatem habet iterum ad unionem cum ipsa; et si hoc; cum haec necessitas non patiatur, ut haec caro ordinetur ad animam aliam: patet8 etc.
4. Item, si non est necesse resurgere cum prima: ergo si tota caro hominis manducetur, privabitur omnino anima suo corpore, et ita dabitur ei aliud corpus: non ergo erit ei resurrectio, quia resurrectio est eiusdem numero9.
Sed contra: 1. Costa fuit in Adam et in Eva10; quaero igitur: in quo resurget? Si in Adam: ergo cum tota Eva sit inde facta, nihil resurget in Eva. Si non in Adam; sed in Adam primo fuit costa: non ergo resurget, in quo primo fuit.
2. Item, homo est de semine patris, et Christus « ex purissimis sanguinibus Virginis11 »: ergo si semen debet resurgere in patre, et sanguis in Vir- p. 911 gine; tunc nullus homo generatus resurgeret, nec etiam Christus. Quodsi hoc non est verum: ergo caro resurget in eo, in quo secundo est caro.
3. Item, esto quod aliquis nutriatur ex carne humana, dicit Augustinus1, quod redit ad primum; esto quod de illa generet, constat, quod si tunc redit ad primum, nihil remanebit generato; et hoc est inconveniens. Quodsi non redit: ergo non est necesse, quod resurgat in primo, sed in secundo potest.
4. Item, quod debeat resurgere in secundo, videtur: quia ab ultimo res denominatur et a fine2 — unde statur in ultimo testamento, quod est in morte testatoris — ergo si caro ista fuit istius hominis finaliter et posterius: ergo ad ipsum magis spectat: ergo ad secundum et postremum debet redire, non ad primum.
CONCLUSIO.
Caro, quae est in duobus, in uno sicut in principio, in alio sicut in individuo et toto suo, resurget in secundo; si est in ambobus secundum materiam, resurget in primo; si vero in hoc secundum materiam, in alio secundum speciem, resurget in secundo; impossibile est autem, quod in pluribus sit secundum speciem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod caro, quae est in duobus, potest esse dupliciter: aut ita quod sit in uno sicut in principio, in altero sicut in individuo et toto suo; aut in utroque sicut in individuo. Si sit in uno sicut in principio, in alio sicut in individuo et toto, resurget in secundo, quia non erat in primo ad ipsum3, sed ad alterum ordinata, sicut fuit costa in Adam, quia ordinata ad propagationem Evae; sic semen in patre, quia ordinatum ad propagationem filii; sic illi sanguines in Virgine beata, quia ordinati erant ad conceptionem Christi. — Si autem in utroque sit sicut in toto absoluto, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod sit in utroque caro secundum speciem; aut in utroque secundum materiam; aut in uno secundum speciem, in altero secundum materiam4. — De primo est controversia. Nam aliqui dicunt, quod caro unius secundum speciem potest fieri caro alterius secundum speciem, utpote si homo de illa nutriatur et generet; et hoc dicunt, quia omnino est transmutabilis caro5, ut alia, sicut experimento patet. — Et si quaeras: in quo resurget? dicunt, quod in illo, in quo maiorem et essentialem habet ordinationem, et Deus supplet alteri illud, ut verbi gratia, si de modica parte corporis unius quantum ad carnem secundum speciem sit aliquis generatus, ista resurget in generato, et Deus post supplebit in alio quod amissum est, sicut in Adam replevit carnem pro costa6.
Alia positio est, quod de carne secundum speciem alius homo nec potest nutriri nec generari, sed solum de carne secundum materiam; et rationem huius reddunt ex parte actualitatis ipsius, quia transsubstantiatio haec conversio est, et conversio et transmutatio sive transsubstantiatio est ex ente in potentia; et quia est caro secundum speciem, ideo non est possibilis converti in carnem secundum speciem. — Sed quoniam hoc non habet stabile fundamentum, quia lupus nutritur de carnibus lupi7, et in aliis animalibus eiusdem speciei hoc videmus; et iterum, caro secundum speciem potest fieri non-caro, et tunc erit in potentia: ideo rationem fundant super pulverum appetitum, qui plantatus est ad illam formam determinate et sempiternaliter, qui non patitur, ipsam carnem vivificari ab alia anima immortali. Et ideo respondent, quod istud est impossibile, quod in primo sit caro secundum speciem unius et postmodum fiat alterius.
Sed prima positio repugnare videtur resurrectioni eiusdem corporis: quia, si de una parte carnis meae secundum speciem posset fieri caro alterius secundum speciem, pari ratione et de alia, et sic de qualibet; et sic anima perderet suam carnem totam: quomodo ergo verum est quod dicit Iob8: In carne mea videbo Deum, Salvatorem meum? — Secunda positio non habet multum robur, tum quia videtur inconveniens dicere, quod homo non possit nutriri de carne secundum speciem, cum sint aptae ad nutriendum, et bestiae possint inde nutriri. — Amplius, nec istud est multum stabile, quod in corpore humano sit aliquid actu incorruptibile, et cum sit resolubile usque ad elementa, quod9 ibi sit appetitus impediens transmutationem.
Unde sanius dici potest, quod sicut resurrectio fit per divinam virtutem; sic ordinatio carnis ad suam animam est secundum divinum decretum et dispositionem, quae, quoniam est inviolabilis10, facit, p. 912 quod caro secundum speciem unius ad carnem secundum speciem alterius hominis sit impossibilis. Dicamus ergo, quod in utroque secundum speciem esse omnino est impossibile, quia tunc esset de necessaria constitutione utriusque et necessario resurgeret in utroque; et hoc est impossibile — istam impossibilitatem non dico1 venire de virtute carnis secundum speciem ipsius hominis, quia sic necessario est ordinata ad incorruptionem propter appetitum ad animam primam — et ideo non potest esse corporis alterius animae principalis materia, quia, sive sit ibi iste appetitus, sive non, sine calumnia potest dici, quod hoc venit ex ordinatione divina, quae carnem hominis sicut non dimittit perire, sic nec eius substantiam confundi nec permisceri. Unde sicut divina providentia faciebat Adam ab exteriori impassibilem2; sic etiam facit carnem secundum speciem unius in carnem secundum speciem alterius inconvertibilem.
Si autem caro sit in utroque secundum materiam, ut quando homo nutritur de carne alterius secundum materiam; dico, quod redit ad primum, quia ad utrumque ordinata est de congruo; et sequens ordinatio, cum non sit fortior, non solvit praecedentem. — Si autem in uno sit secundum speciem, in altero secundum materiam; resurgit in eo, in quo fuit secundum speciem, quia ad illum essentialiorem ordinationem habet, sive sit primus, sive secundus. Unde si aliquis nutritur de carnibus alterius secundum speciem, talis caro redit ad primum. Si autem generatur de carnibus secundum materiam, quia de his quae secundum speciem, non potest generari; dico, quod caro stat in secundo, et Deus recompensat primo. Et ratio huius est, quia3 essentialiorem habet ordinationem ad animam in secundo.
Ex his patent obiecta: quia Augustinus loquitur in duobus casibus, scilicet quando in primo fuit caro secundum speciem; et hoc patet ex verbo suo: « Ut ex ea homo fieret » etc., vel etiam, quando in duobus est secundum materiam.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod debet denominari ab ultimo; dicendum, quod sequens ordinatio non solvit priorem, nisi sit fortior; et quia non est fortior, prior manet; maxime quando in primo fuit caro secundum speciem, habuit essentialem4 ordinationem ad animam, quia caro secundum speciem, vivificata ab hac anima, habuit necessariam et indissolubilem ordinationem ad illam animam; et ideo, sicut matrimonium legitime contractum cum aliqua non potest solvi, si illa contrahit de facto cum aliquo; sic nec caro ordinationem ad primam carnem perdere. Quid autem sit caro secundum speciem, hoc habet locum in libro secundo, ubi agitur, utrum aliquid transeat in veritatem humanae naturae, et quaeratur distinctio trigesima5.
I. Posito hoc principio, quod totum resurgat, quod pertinet ad veritatem naturae, exsurgit difficultas, quomodo hoc fieri possit, quando (v. g. in anthropophagis) eadem caro pertineat ad plures homines. Solutio eruitur ex duplici distinctione, quarum primam S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. IV. c. 81. ad 5.) eodem sensu ac S. Bonav., sed aliis verbis, sic explicat, scilicet ut aliud sit, quod pertinet ad perfectionem individui, aliud, quod est deputatum ad perfectionem speciei. De secundo idem docet, quod « resurget in eo, ad quem pertinebat secundum perfectionem individui, unde semen resurget in genito et non in generante, et costa Adam resurget in Eva, non in Adam, in quo fuit sicut in naturae principio. Si autem secundum eundem perfectionis modum fuit in utroque, resurget in eo, in quo primitus fuit ». — Altera distinctio est inter partes formales et materiales corporis, sive ut antiqui secundum Aristotelem loquebantur, inter carnem secundum speciem et carnem secundum materiam; quae distinctio a Scholasticis non eodem modo accuratius explicatur et applicatur; de quo vide II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. scholion n. 11.
S. Thom. (locis infra citt.) secundum tres opiniones circa id quod est de veritate naturae, ponit tres solutiones tanquam probabiles. — Durand. (hic q. 1.) alia via incedit et supponit, quod « materia de se nullam habeat identitatem vel diversitatem, nisi quam habet a forma; et sic, manente eadem forma, est eadem materia, undecumque veniat, et per consequens est idem compositum » (ibid. n. 7.). « Et secundum istam viam evaduntur multae difficultates, quae tanguntur secundum materiam resurrectionis, sicut est illa de costa Adae... et illa qua quaeritur, si aliquis homo nutriatur ex carnibus alterius » etc. (ibid. n. 10.). Sed cfr. infra dub. 4; de resurgendo eodem sexu dub. 2.
In hoc tamen omnes conveniunt, non resurrectura omnia quae in corpore fuerint materialiter, quia partes secundum materiam in hac vita fluunt et refluunt, quin propter hoc corpus desinat esse idem (cfr. infra dub. 3, et Scot., hic q. 1. n. 9. seqq.).
De eadem 1. quaestione: Scot., loc. cit. n. 15. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 4. 5; Suppl. q. 80. a. 4. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.
II. Quaestio 2. a S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 79. a. 3.) et etiam ab aliis sic ponitur: « utrum oporteat, pulveres humani corporis ad eandem partem corporis, quae in eis resoluta est, per resurrectionem redire »; quod cum S. Bonaventura (hic et infra dub. 4.) etiam S. Thom. quoad factum affirmat tanquam « magis probabile ». Sed quoad id quod « fieri possit » sine identitatis praeiudicio, distinguit « diversas partes homogenei », sicut diversae partes carnis, et « diversas partes diversarum specierum totius heterogenei »; p. 913 porro docet, mutationem situs quoad secundas mutare identitatem et partium, et etiam totius, « si loquimur de partibus essentialibus, non autem, si loquimur de partibus accidentalibus, sicut sunt capilli et ungues ». Tamen quoad partes homogenei mutatio situs, ut idem dicit, nullum generaret praeiudicium identitati. — Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 19.) putat, non ita constare, materiam singularum partium ad easdem redituram esse.
De eadem 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 1.
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ARTICLE II. What rises again in what.
Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked, secondly, what rises again in what. And concerning this two things are asked.
First it is asked, what rises again in what with respect to the whole body.
Secondly, what [rises] in what with respect to each member.
QUESTION I. Whether flesh which is flesh in two men rises again as flesh in the first, or in the second.
As to the first, then, it is asked—since flesh is flesh in two men—whether it rises again as flesh in the first, or in the second. And that [it rises] in the first, seems [to be the case].
1. Augustine, On the City of God, and it is had in the [Master's] text6: « To that soul is restored, in a point of time, [the flesh] which it first animated, that from it a man might be made, might live, and might grow ».
2. Likewise, by reason it seems: for « a proper form is born to come to be in its proper matter7 »: therefore if this flesh is the proper matter of this soul, to which it was first united; therefore the soul always desires to be united to it: therefore if it cannot [be], its desire is frustrated. But this is unfitting: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, flesh from its union with the soul contracts a disposition or ordering to immortality: therefore if this flesh is united with this soul, it has again a necessity for union with it; and if this—since this necessity does not allow that this flesh be ordered to another soul: it is clear8 etc.
4. Likewise, if it is not necessary to rise again with the first: therefore if the whole flesh of a man is eaten, the soul will be deprived entirely of its body, and thus another body will be given to it: therefore there will be no resurrection for it, because resurrection is of the same [body] in number9.
On the contrary: 1. The rib was in Adam and in Eve10; I ask therefore: in which will it rise again? If in Adam: then, since the whole of Eve was made from it, nothing will rise again in Eve. If not in Adam; but the rib was first in Adam: therefore it will not rise again in that in which it first was.
2. Likewise, man is from the seed of the father, and Christ « from the most pure blood of the Virgin11 »: therefore if the seed ought to rise again in the father, and the blood in the Vir- p. 911 gin; then no begotten man would rise again, nor even Christ. But if this is not true: therefore flesh will rise again in that in which it is flesh secondly.
3. Likewise, suppose someone is nourished from human flesh, Augustine1 says that it returns to the first; suppose that he begets from it, it is agreed that if it then returns to the first, nothing will remain to the begotten; and this is unfitting. But if it does not return: therefore it is not necessary that it rise again in the first, but it can [rise] in the second.
4. Likewise, that it ought to rise again in the second, seems [true]: because a thing is denominated from the last and from its end2 — whence one stands by the last testament, which is at the death of the testator — therefore if this flesh was of this man finally and later: therefore it pertains more to him: therefore it ought to return to the second and last, not to the first.
CONCLUSION.
The flesh which is in two—in one as in a beginning, in the other as in an individual and its whole—will rise again in the second; if it is in both according to matter, it will rise again in the first; but if in this one according to matter, in the other according to species, it will rise again in the second; but it is impossible that it be in several according to species.
I respond: It must be said that flesh which is in two can be so in two ways: either so that it is in one as in a beginning, in the other as in an individual and its whole; or in both as in an individual. If it is in one as in a beginning, in the other as in an individual and whole, it will rise again in the second, because it was not, in the first, ordered to itself3, but to the other, as the rib was in Adam, because ordered to the propagation of Eve; so the seed in the father, because ordered to the propagation of the son; so those bloods in the blessed Virgin, because they were ordered to the conception of Christ. — But if it is in both as in an absolute whole, this can be understood in three ways: either so that it is in both flesh according to species; or in both according to matter; or in one according to species, in the other according to matter4. — Concerning the first there is controversy. For some say that the flesh of one according to species can become the flesh of another according to species, as for instance if a man is nourished from it and begets; and they say this because flesh is entirely changeable5, like anything else, as is clear by experience. — And if you ask: in which will it rise again? they say, in that in which it has the greater and essential ordering, and God supplies the other with that [which is lacking], as for example, if from a small part of one body, as to flesh according to species, someone is begotten, this [flesh] will rise again in the begotten, and God will afterward supply in the other what is lost, just as in Adam He filled up the flesh in place of the rib6.
Another position is that from flesh according to species another man can neither be nourished nor begotten, but only from flesh according to matter; and they give the reason for this from the side of its actuality, because this transubstantiation is a conversion, and conversion and change or transubstantiation is from a being [in act] into [a being] in potency; and because it is flesh according to species, therefore it is not possible for it to be converted into flesh according to species. — But since this has no stable foundation, because a wolf is nourished from the flesh of a wolf7, and we see this in other animals of the same species; and again, flesh according to species can become non-flesh, and then it will be in potency: therefore they base their reasoning upon the appetite of the dust, which is implanted toward that form determinately and everlastingly, [an appetite] which does not allow that same flesh to be vivified by another immortal soul. And therefore they respond that this is impossible, that in the first there be flesh according to species of one and afterward become another's.
But the first position seems to be repugnant to the resurrection of the same body: because, if from one part of my flesh according to species there could come to be flesh of another according to species, by parity of reasoning also from another, and so from any [part]; and thus the soul would lose its whole flesh: how then is it true what Job says8: In my flesh I shall see God, my Savior? — The second position does not have much strength, both because it seems unfitting to say that a man cannot be nourished from flesh according to species, since they are apt for nourishing, and beasts can be nourished from them. — Further, neither is this very stable, that in the human body there be something actually incorruptible, and, since it is dissoluble down to the elements, that9 there be in it an appetite impeding change.
Whence it can more soundly be said that, just as the resurrection comes about by divine power; so the ordering of the flesh to its soul is according to the divine decree and disposition, which, since it is inviolable10, brings it about, p. 912 that [the conversion] of flesh according to species of one into flesh according to species of another man be impossible. Let us say therefore that for [flesh] to be in both according to species is altogether impossible, because then it would belong to the necessary constitution of both and would necessarily rise again in both; and this is impossible — this impossibility I do not say1 comes from the power of the flesh according to species of the man himself, because it is thus necessarily ordered to incorruption on account of the appetite toward the first soul — and therefore it cannot be the principal matter of the body of another soul, because, whether that appetite be there or not, it can be said without cavil that this comes from the divine ordination, which, just as it does not let the flesh of a man perish, so [does not let] its substance be confounded nor commingled. Whence just as divine providence was making Adam impassible from the exterior2; so also it makes the flesh according to species of one inconvertible into the flesh according to species of another.
But if the flesh is in both according to matter, as when a man is nourished from the flesh of another according to matter; I say that it returns to the first, because it was ordered to both fittingly; and the subsequent ordering, since it is not stronger, does not dissolve the preceding one. — But if it is in one according to species, in the other according to matter; it rises again in that in which it was according to species, because it has toward that a more essential ordering, whether he be the first or the second. Whence if someone is nourished from the flesh of another according to species, such flesh returns to the first. But if he is begotten from flesh according to matter, since from those things which are according to species one cannot be begotten; I say that the flesh stands in the second, and God recompenses the first. And the reason for this is that3 it has a more essential ordering to the soul in the second.
From these things the objections are clear: because Augustine speaks in two cases, namely when in the first there was flesh according to species; and this is clear from his own word: « That from it a man might be made » etc., or also, when in two [men] it is according to matter.
To that, then, which is objected, that it ought to be denominated from the last; it must be said that a subsequent ordering does not dissolve a prior one, unless it be stronger; and because it is not stronger, the prior remains; especially when in the first there was flesh according to species, [which] had an essential4 ordering to the soul, because flesh according to species, vivified by this soul, had a necessary and indissoluble ordering to that soul; and therefore, just as a matrimony legitimately contracted with someone cannot be dissolved, if she contracts in fact with another; so neither [can] the flesh lose its ordering to the first flesh. But what flesh according to species is, this has its place in the second book, where it is treated whether anything passes over into the truth of human nature, and let distinction thirty be consulted5.
I. This principle being posited, that the whole rises again which pertains to the truth of nature, a difficulty arises: how this can come about, when (e.g., in cannibals) the same flesh pertains to several men. The solution is drawn from a twofold distinction, the first of which St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 81, ad 5) explains in the same sense as St. Bonaventure, but in other words, thus, namely, that one thing is what pertains to the perfection of the individual, another what is assigned to the perfection of the species. Concerning the second he teaches the same, that « it will rise again in that to which it belonged according to the perfection of the individual, whence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter, and the rib of Adam will rise again in Eve, not in Adam, in whom it was as in a principle of nature. But if according to the same mode of perfection it was in both, it will rise again in that in which it first was ». — The other distinction is between the formal and material parts of the body, or, as the ancients following Aristotle spoke, between flesh according to species and flesh according to matter; which distinction is not explained and applied by the Scholastics in the same more accurate way; concerning which see II Sent., d. 30, a. 3, scholion, n. 11.
St. Thomas (in the places cited below), according to three opinions concerning that which is of the truth of nature, sets down three solutions as probable. — Durandus (here, q. 1) proceeds by another way and supposes that « matter of itself has no identity or diversity, except what it has from form; and thus, the same form remaining, it is the same matter, from wherever it comes, and consequently it is the same composite » (ibid. n. 7). « And by this way many difficulties are evaded which are touched on according to the matter of the resurrection, as is that concerning the rib of Adam... and that in which it is asked, whether some man is nourished from the flesh of another » etc. (ibid. n. 10). But cf. below, dub. 4; concerning rising again in the same sex, dub. 2.
In this, however, all agree: that not all things which were in the body materially will rise again, because the parts according to matter in this life flow and flow back, without the body ceasing on this account to be the same (cf. below, dub. 3, and Scotus, here q. 1, n. 9 seqq.).
Concerning the same first question: Scotus, loc. cit. n. 15 seqq. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 4, 5; Suppl. q. 80, a. 4, 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7, 8. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 4. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. unica.
II. Question 2 is put by St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 79, a. 3) and also by others thus: « whether it is necessary that the dusts of the human body return through the resurrection to the same part of the body from which they were dissolved in them »; which, together with St. Bonaventure (here and below, dub. 4), St. Thomas also, as to the fact, affirms as « more probable ». But as to that which « can come about » without prejudice to identity, he distinguishes « the diverse parts of the homogeneous », as the diverse parts of flesh, and « the diverse parts of diverse species of the whole heterogeneous »; p. 913 furthermore he teaches that change of place, as to the secondary [ones], changes the identity both of the parts and also of the whole, « if we speak of the essential parts, but not, if we speak of the accidental parts, such as are the hairs and nails ». Yet as to the homogeneous parts, change of place, as he himself says, would generate no prejudice to identity. — Scotus (here q. 1, n. 19) thinks that it is not so certain that the matter of the individual parts will return to those same [parts].
Concerning the same second question, besides those praised: Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarantaise, loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 1.
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- 6Hic c. 2. Sententialiter habetur XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 20. n. 2. (vide infra pag. 911, nota 1.); verbotenus in Enchirid. Cfr. supra pag. 894, nota 3.Here, c. 2. It is had in substance in [Book] XXII On the City of God, c. 20, n. 2 (see below, p. 911, note 1); word for word in the Enchiridion. Cf. above, p. 894, note 3.
- 7Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 888, nota 1.According to Aristotle; see above, p. 888, note 1.
- 8Explicatio huius arg. habetur supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 5. ad 6.The explanation of this argument is had above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 5, ad 6.
- 9Ut ostensum est supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 4.As was shown above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4.
- 10Gen. 2, 21. seq. — Inferius pro nihil resurget non pauci codd. nihil resurgeret.Genesis 2:21 f. — Below, for nihil resurget not a few codices [read] nihil resurgeret.
- 11Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 2. et IV. c. 14. Cfr. III. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1.Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 2, and IV, c. 14. Cf. III Sent., text of the Master, d. III, c. 1.
- 1Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 20. n. 2: Reddetur ergo caro illa homini, in quo esse caro humana primitus coepit; ab illo quippe altero tanquam mutuo sumta deputanda est, quae sicut aes alienum ei redhibenda est etc.Book XXII On the City of God, c. 20, n. 2: « That flesh, then, will be restored to the man in whom human flesh first began to be; for by the other it must be reckoned as taken on loan, as it were, and, like a borrowed debt, must be repaid to him » etc.
- 2Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 247, nota 8. et pag. 470, nota 7. allegatum.According to Aristotle, cited above, p. 247, note 8, and p. 470, note 7.
- 3Codd. G aa (F a secunda manu) in primo ut ad ipsum. Post pauca pro sic semen codd. G H V Z sicut semen.Codices G aa (F by a second hand) [read] in primo ut ad ipsum. A little after, for sic semen codices G H V Z [read] sicut semen.
- 4Vide supra pag. 908, nota 7.See above, p. 908, note 7.
- 5Cod. P caro illa. Inferius pro maiorem et essentialem, edd. maiorem et essentialiorem.Codex P [reads] caro illa. Below, for maiorem et essentialem, the editions [read] maiorem et essentialiorem.
- 6Gen. 2, 21. — Pro in alio, quod exhibet cod. M, cod. U in altero, alii codd. et edd. in me (cod. E a secunda manu in primo). Inferius plures codd., omisso et conversio, pro sive transsubstantiatio substituunt sive transversio.Genesis 2:21. — For in alio, which codex M exhibits, codex U [reads] in altero, other codices and editions in me (codex E, by a second hand, in primo). Below, several codices, omitting et conversio, substitute sive transversio for sive transsubstantiatio.
- 7Plures codd. perperam hominis.Several codices wrongly [read] hominis.
- 8Cap. 19, 26. Vulgata omittit Salvatorem.Ch. 19:26. The Vulgate omits Salvatorem.
- 9Edd. legunt: actu corruptibile et tamen sit... elementa, et quod. Eaedem edd. superius pro sint aptae substituunt sit apta, et pro bestiae, quod praebent codd. L Y bb (E a secunda manu), cum aliis codd. bene.The editions read: actu corruptibile et tamen sit... elementa, et quod. The same editions, above, substitute sit apta for sint aptae, and for bestiae—which codices L Y bb (E by a second hand) offer, with the other codices, rightly.
- 10Ita codd. I K bb, codd. A F G H aa immobilis, codd. R S immutabilis, alii codd. et edd. immortalis. Cfr. supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6.Thus codices I K bb; codices A F G H aa [read] immobilis; codices R S immutabilis; other codices and editions immortalis. Cf. above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6.
- 1Cod. G dubito. Aliquanto inferius pro dimittit cod. L permittit.Codex G [reads] dubito. Somewhat below, for dimittit codex L [reads] permittit.
- 2Vide II. Sent. d. 19. a. 2. et 3.See II Sent., d. 19, a. 2 and 3.
- 3Edd. addunt caro maiorem et.The editions add caro maiorem et.
- 4Edd. cum nonnullis codd. essentialiorem (verbo habuit codd. F aa praemittunt et).The editions, with some codices, [read] essentialiorem (before the word habuit codices F aa prefix et).
- 5Art. 3. q. 1. seq. — Superius post sic nec caro edd. supplent potest.Art. 3, q. 1 f. — Above, after sic nec caro the editions supply potest.