Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XLVI.

The numbered notes below are Quaracchi's page footers. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, and on page 953 it prints two distinct sequences — the notes to Bonaventure's dubia (notes 1 through 10, which belong to the preceding chunk) and then a separate sequence headed Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum, whose note 1 is the first note of this chunk. The labels used here are therefore page-qualified: note 1 of the Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum of page 953, notes 1 through 5 of page 954, and notes 1 through 3 of page 955.

Cap. I.

Si valde malis praestetur mitigatio poenae.

Sed quaeritur hic de valde malis, utrum et ipsi in aliqua poenarum mitigatione Dei misericordiam sentiant, ut minus, quam meruerint, puniantur. — Quidam autumant, eos nullam relevationem poenae habituros; quod confirmant Iacobi^lit1 auctoritate dicentis: Iudicium sine misericordia illi qui non fecit misericordiam. Augustinus etiam ait: « Misericordia hic, iudicium in futuro ».

Idem distinguens, quomodo omnes viae Domini sint misericordia et veritas, ait: « Erga Sanctos omnes viae Dei misericordia, erga iniquos omnes veritas; quia et in iudicando subvenit, et ita non deest misericordia, et in miserando id exhibet, quod promisit, ne desit veritas. Erga omnes autem, quos liberat et damnat, omnes viae sunt misericordia et veritas, quia, ubi non miseretur, vindictae veritas datur ». Dicens: ubi non miseretur, dat intelligi, aliquid a Deo fieri, ubi ipse non miseretur. — Sed his occurrit quod ait Cassiodorus super Psalmum quinquagesimum¹, loquens de misericordia et pietate Dei, « Hae duae, inquit, res iudicio Dei semper adiunctae sunt ». Ergo et in punitione malorum non est iustitia sine misericordia. Idem de misericordia et iudicio ait: « Haec duo mutua societate sibi iunguntur ». In his breviter omnia opera Dei includit. Augustinus² quoque, respondens illis qui reproborum supplicia finem habitura contendunt, ita illorum repellit opinionem, asserens reprobos perpetuo puniendos, ut eorum supplicia aliquatenus mitigari non neget. « Frustra, inquit, nonnulli aeternam damnandorum poenam et cruciatus sine intermissione perpetuos humano miserantur affectu, atque ita futurum esse non credunt, non quidem Scripturis adversando divinis, sed pro suo motu dura quaeque molliendo et in leniorem flectendo sententiam, quae putant in eis terribilius esse dicta quam verius. Non enim, inquiunt, obliviscetur misereri Deus, aut continebit in ira sua misericordias suas. Hoc quidem in Psalmo legitur, sed de his intelligitur, qui sunt vasa misericordiae, quia et ipsi non pro meritis suis, sed Deo miserante, de miseria liberantur. Aut si hoc ad omnes existimant pertinere, non ideo necesse est, ut damnationem opinentur finiri posse eorum, de quibus dictum est: Ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum; ne hoc modo putetur habitura finem felicitas eorum, de quibus e contrario dictum est: Iusti autem in vitam aeternam. Sed poenas damnatorum certis temporibus existiment, si hoc eis placet, aliquatenus mitigari. Et sic quippe intelligi potest manere ira Dei in illis, id est ipsa damnatio. Haec enim vocatur ira Dei, non divini animi perturbatio, ut in ira sua, id est manente ira sua, non contineat miserationes suas, non aeterno supplicio finem dando, sed levamen adhibendo vel interponendo cruciatibus; quia nec Psalmus ait ad finiendam iram suam, vel post iram suam, sed in ira sua. Quae si sola esset alienari a regno Dei, carere magna multitudine dulcedinis Dei; tam grandis tamen est poena, ut ei possint nulla tormenta, quae novimus, comparari, si illa sit aeterna, ista autem sit quamlibet multis saeculis longa ». « Manebit ergo sine fine mors perpetua damnatorum, et omnibus erit ipsa communis, sicut manebit communiter omnium vita aeterna Sanctorum ». — Ecce, ita asserit hic, poenas reproborum non esse finiendas, quod non improbat, si dicatur, eorum supplicio aliquod levamen adhiberi. Unde non incongrue dici potest, Deum, etsi iuste id possit, non omnino tantum punire malos in futuro, quantum meruerunt, sed aliquid eis, quantumcumque mali sint, de poena relaxare.

Quod ergo dictum est: iudicium sine misericordia fieri illi qui non fecit misericordiam; ita intelligi potest, quod iudicium damnationis fiet illi qui non fecit misericordiam, pro eo quod fuit sine misericordia; vel fiet iudicium ei sine misericordia liberante et salvante, qui tamen in aliqua poenae alleviatione misericordiam Dei sentiet. Ita cum dicitur: misericordia hic, iudicium in futuro; non negatur, quin in futuro sit misericordiae effectus et in electis, qui per misericordiam ab omni miseria liberabuntur, et in reprobis, qui minus, quam meruerint, cruciabuntur. Sed hic non sine causa dicitur fieri Dei misericordia, et iudicium in futuro; quia et hic multis modis miseretur Deus, quibus non miserebitur tunc; vocat enim nunc peccatores et iustificat, quod tunc non faciet; et tunc, reddens singulis secundum merita, manifeste iudicabit qui nunc occulte iudicat.

Cap. II.

De occulto Dei iudicio.

Cuius « occultum iudicium, ut ait Augustinus³, intelligitur poena, qua quisque vel exercetur ad purgationem, vel movetur ad conversionem, vel, si contemnit, excaecatur ad damnationem ». Occultum igitur iudicium Dei poena dicitur, quia iudicat purgando, convertendo, excaecando. Iudicia quoque Dei interdum appellantur dispositiones⁴ eius de omnibus rebus; unde: Quam incomprensibilia sunt iudicia eius! et, iudicia eius abyssus multa. Iudicium autem, quo in futuro iudicabit, intelligitur sententia, quia ventilabitur area, id est, dividentur localiter boni a malis ministerio Angelorum; et isti in vitam ducentur, illi in supplicium mittentur, qui nunc simul mixti sunt.

Cap. III.

De iustitia et misericordia Dei.

Sed quomodo iustitiam Dei et pietatem, id est misericordiam, supra Cassiodorus duas res dixit, quae semper adiunctae sunt Dei iudicio? Iustitia enim Dei et misericordia non duae res, sed una res, id est divina essentia, est, sicut supra⁵ pluribus auctoritatibus ostensum est: quia non est Deo aliud esse misericordem quam misericordiam, nec iustum quam iustitiam, sed idem prorsus. Nec aliud est esse misericordem quam iustum, vel misericordiam quam iustitiam, sed omnino idem; quia non denominative, sed essentialiter haec de Deo dicuntur. Cur igitur dicit Scriptura de operibus Dei, quaedam esse misericordiae, quaedam iustitiae? Si enim iustitia Dei misericordia est; quaecumque sunt opera misericordiae, esse videntur iustitiae, et e converso. — His responderi potest sic: illis locutionibus, quibus huiusmodi operum fiunt distinctiones, ut alia misericordiae, alia iustitiae, alia bonitati attribuantur; non diversitas subiacentis, id est rei his vocabulis significatae, exprimitur, sed varietas sensuum et effectuum in creaturis monstratur. Cum enim dicitur Deus iustus vel iustitia, essentia divina praedicatur; et etiam, quod ipse sit distributor et iudex meritorum, intelligi datur. Ita et, cum dicitur misericors, essentia divina praedicatur, et insuper, quod ipse sit miserorum liberator intelligi datur. Similiter, cum dicitur bonus, essentia divina praedicatur, ut cum dicitur Deus, et insuper auctor omnium bonorum ostenditur. Ita et, cum dicitur Deus, essentia divina praedicatur, et ipse timendus ostenditur. Inde ergo quaedam opera misericordiae, quaedam iustitiae dicuntur, non quin essentia divina haec et illa operetur, et quin haec et illa sint opera divinae essentiae, quae dicitur misericordia et iustitia; sed quia quaedam sunt, quibus ostenditur iudex et aequus distributor, quaedam, quibus ostenditur miserator — misericors enim dicitur in natura, miserator in exhibitione — et in quibusdam operibus dicitur effectus misericordiae esse, in quibusdam effectus iustitiae, non quod aliud efficiat iustitia, aliud misericordia Dei, si ad essentiam referas, sed quia ex quibusdam effectibus intelligitur iudex, ex quibusdam miserator, vel ut quibusdam placet, iustus et misericors.

Sed secundum hoc occurrit quaestio, quomodo ex aliis ostendatur iustus et ex aliis misericors, cum sit ei idem esse iustum et esse misericordem. Si enim secundum eandem rationem dicitur iustus et misericors, ex eo opere, quo intelligitur iustus, intelligitur misericors, et e converso. — Sed dixi supra, quia, cum dicitur Deus iustus et misericors, ita eadem divina essentia significatur, et secundum eam idem praedicatur, ut etiam quaedam diversa intelligantur. Intelligimus enim per hoc eum miseratorem et iustum iudicem. Quod evidenter Origenes¹ ostendit dicens: « Omnia quae Dei sunt, Christus est: ipse sapientia eius, ipse fortitudo, iustitia, sanctitas, ipse prudentia. Sed cum unum sit in subiacente, pro varietate sensuum diversis nuncupatur vocabulis. Aliud enim significat sapientia, aliud iustitia. Quando enim sapientia dicitur, disciplinis te divinarum humanarumque rerum instruere intelligitur; quando iustitia, distributor et iudex meritorum insinuatur. Ita et prudentia cum dicitur, doctor et demonstrator bonarum et malarum rerum vel neutrarum intelligitur ».

Cap. IV.

Quare quaedam opera dicuntur iustitiae, quaedam misericordiae vel bonitatis Dei.

Quod autem quaedam opera misericordiae, quaedam iustitiae, quaedam bonitati attribuantur, in Scripturis facile est reperire. Et de misericordia quidem et iustitia manifestum est, de bonitate vero et misericordia amplius latet. Sed Augustinus² docet, illa opera proprie ad misericordiam pertinere, quibus aliqui a miseria liberantur; ad bonitatem vero non solum illa, sed facturam et gubernationem naturalium, ita dicens: « Ad misericordiam pertinet, quod a peccatis mundat et de miseria liberat; ad bonitatem vero, quod caelum et terram et omnia valde bona creavit, ut essent ». Idem: « Caeli non indigent misericordia, ubi nulla est miseria; in terra hominis abundat miseria, et superabundat Domini misericordia. Miseria igitur hominis et misericordia Domini plena est terra, non caeli, qui non indigent misericordia, indigent tamen regente Domino. Omnia enim indigent Domino, et misera et felicia, quia sine illo miser non sublevatur, felix non regitur ». Item alibi: « Misericordia est erga miseros, bonitas erga quoslibet ». — Interdum tamen misericordia large accipitur ut bonitas.

Cap. V.

Quomodo universae viae Domini dicuntur misericordia et veritas.

Post haec considerari oportet, ex quo sensu universae viae Domini dicantur misericordia et veritas³. — Hoc multiplicem recipit expositionem. Universae enim viae Domini misericordia et veritas, quibus ad nos venit, ut ait Augustinus super Psalmum, intelliguntur duo adventus: primus, in quo manifestam et multiplicem misericordiam nobis exhibuit; et secundus, in quo requirendo merita iustitiam exhibebit. Universae etiam viae Domini, id est, quibus ad Dominum ascendimus, sunt iustitia, qua a malo declinamus, et misericordia, qua bonum facimus. In his enim duobus omne bonum meritum includitur. — Sed cum superius Cassiodorus dixerit, in his duobus omnia opera Dei includi; merito quaeri potest, an in omni opere Domini haec duo mutuo sibi iungantur. — Quibusdam placuit, non in omni opere Domini haec duo concurrere, secundum effectum dico; nam secundum essentiam non dividitur misericordia a iustitia, sed unum est; verum secundum effectum non in omni opere dicunt esse misericordiam et iustitiam, sed in quibusdam tantum misericordiam, in aliis iustitiam, atque in aliis misericordiam et iustitiam. Fatentur tamen, Deum omnia quae facit, misericorditer agere et iuste, referentes rationem dicti ad Dei voluntatem, quae iustitia est et misericordia, non ad effectus misericordiae et iustitiae, qui sunt in rebus. — Aliis autem videtur, quod sicut dicitur Deus omnia opera sua facere iuste et misericorditer; ita concedendum sit, in omni opere Dei iustitiam esse et misericordiam, id est clementiam, secundum effectum vel signum, quia nullum opus Dei est, in quo non sit effectus vel signum aequitatis vel clementiae, sive occulte, sive aperte. Aliquando enim manifesta est clementia sive benignitas, et occulta aequitas, aliquando e converso.

---

DISTINCTION XLVI.

Chapter I.

Whether a mitigation of punishment is granted to the utterly wicked.

But it is asked here concerning the utterly wicked, whether they too experience God's mercy in some mitigation of their punishments, so as to be punished less than they have deserved. — Some suppose that they will have no relief of punishment; and they confirm this by the authority of James^lit1, who says: Judgment without mercy to him who has not done mercy. Augustine also says: « Mercy here, judgment in the future ».

Likewise, distinguishing how all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, he says: « Toward the Saints all the ways of God are mercy, toward the wicked all are truth; because both in judging He comes to aid, and thus mercy is not lacking, and in showing mercy He exhibits what He promised, lest truth be lacking. But toward all whom He frees and whom He damns, all the ways are mercy and truth, because, where He does not show mercy, the truth of vengeance is given ». By saying: where He does not show mercy, he gives it to be understood that something is done by God where He Himself does not show mercy. — But against these there stands what Cassiodorus says on the fiftieth Psalm¹, speaking of the mercy and the loving-kindness of God: « These two, he says, are always joined to the judgment of God ». Therefore even in the punishment of the wicked there is no justice without mercy. The same author says of mercy and judgment: « These two are joined to one another in mutual fellowship ». In these he briefly includes all the works of God. Augustine² too, answering those who contend that the torments of the reprobate will have an end, so rejects their opinion, asserting that the reprobate are to be punished perpetually, that he does not deny that their torments are to some extent mitigated. « In vain, he says, do some, out of human feeling, pity the eternal punishment of the damned and their unceasing perpetual torments, and thus do not believe that it will be so — not indeed by opposing the divine Scriptures, but by softening, according to their own impulse, whatever is harsh and bending it into a milder judgment, since they think that in those Scriptures such things are said more terribly than truly. For God will not, they say, forget to show mercy, nor will He withhold His mercies in His anger. This indeed is read in the Psalm, but it is understood of those who are vessels of mercy, because they too are freed from misery not according to their own merits but by God's showing mercy. Or if they think that this pertains to all, it is not on that account necessary that they should suppose that the damnation can be ended of those of whom it is said: These shall go into everlasting punishment; lest in this way the happiness of those be thought to have an end, of whom on the contrary it is said: But the just into life everlasting. But let them suppose, if it pleases them, that the punishments of the damned are at certain times to some extent mitigated. And thus indeed it can be understood that the anger of God remains upon them, that is, the damnation itself. For this is called the anger of God, not a disturbance of the divine mind; so that in His anger, that is, while His anger remains, He does not withhold His compassions — not by giving an end to the eternal torment, but by applying or interposing a relief to the torments; because the Psalm does not say to end His anger, or after His anger, but in His anger. And if this alone were to be estranged from the kingdom of God, to lack the great multitude of the sweetness of God; yet so great is the punishment that no torments which we know can be compared to it, if that one be eternal, while this one be long for however many ages ». « There will therefore remain without end the perpetual death of the damned, and it will be common to them all, just as there will remain in common for all the eternal life of the Saints ». — Behold, thus he asserts here that the punishments of the reprobate are not to be ended, which he does not disapprove, if it be said that some relief is applied to their torment. Whence it can not incongruously be said that God, even though He could justly do so, does not punish the wicked in the future altogether as much as they have deserved, but relaxes something of the punishment for them, however wicked they may be.

What therefore has been said — that judgment without mercy is done to him who has not done mercy — can be understood thus: that the judgment of damnation will be done to him who has not done mercy, for this reason, that he was without mercy; or judgment will be done to him without a mercy that frees and saves, who nevertheless will experience God's mercy in some alleviation of his punishment. So too, when it is said: mercy here, judgment in the future; it is not denied that in the future there is an effect of mercy both in the elect, who through mercy will be freed from all misery, and in the reprobate, who will be tormented less than they have deserved. But not without cause is it said that God's mercy is done here, and judgment in the future; because here too God shows mercy in many ways in which He will not show mercy then; for now He calls sinners and justifies them, which then He will not do; and then, rendering to each according to his merits, He will judge manifestly, who now judges secretly.

Chapter II.

On the hidden judgment of God.

Of which « the hidden judgment, as Augustine says³, is understood to be the punishment by which each one is either exercised unto purgation, or moved unto conversion, or, if he despises it, blinded unto damnation ». God's hidden judgment is therefore called a punishment, because He judges by purging, by converting, by blinding. God's judgments are also sometimes called His dispositions⁴ concerning all things; whence: How incomprehensible are His judgments! and, His judgments are a great deep. But the judgment by which He will judge in the future is understood as the sentence, because the threshing-floor will be winnowed, that is, the good will be divided from the wicked locally by the ministry of the Angels; and these will be led into life, those sent into punishment, who now are mingled together.

Chapter III.

On the justice and mercy of God.

But how did Cassiodorus above call God's justice and loving-kindness, that is His mercy, two things, which are always joined to God's judgment? For God's justice and mercy are not two things, but one thing, that is the divine essence, as has been shown above⁵ by many authorities: because for God to be merciful is not other than mercy, nor to be just other than justice, but altogether the same. Nor is it other to be merciful than to be just, or mercy than justice, but wholly the same; because these things are said of God not denominatively, but essentially. Why then does Scripture say of the works of God that some are of mercy, some of justice? For if God's justice is mercy, then whatever are works of mercy seem to be works of justice, and conversely. — To these it can be answered thus: by those manners of speaking in which distinctions of works of this sort are made, so that some are attributed to mercy, some to justice, some to goodness, no diversity of the underlying subject, that is, of the thing signified by these words, is expressed, but a variety of senses and of effects in creatures is shown. For when God is called just or justice, the divine essence is predicated; and also it is given to be understood that He is the distributor and judge of merits. So too, when He is called merciful, the divine essence is predicated, and moreover it is given to be understood that He is the liberator of the wretched. Likewise, when He is called good, the divine essence is predicated, as when He is called God, and moreover He is shown to be the author of all good things. So too, when He is called God, the divine essence is predicated, and He is shown to be one to be feared. Hence therefore some are called works of mercy, some of justice, not as though the divine essence did not work both these and those, and as though both these and those were not works of the divine essence, which is called mercy and justice; but because there are some by which He is shown to be judge and equitable distributor, and some by which He is shown to be one who takes pity — for He is called merciful in nature, one who takes pity in the showing of it — and in some works the effect is said to be of mercy, in some the effect of justice, not that God's justice effects one thing and His mercy another, if you refer them to the essence, but because from certain effects He is understood as judge, from certain others as one who takes pity, or, as it pleases some, just and merciful.

But according to this a question arises: how is He shown just from some works and merciful from others, since for Him to be just and to be merciful is the same? For if He is called just and merciful according to the same account, then from that work by which He is understood just, He is understood merciful, and conversely. — But I said above that, when God is called just and merciful, the same divine essence is thus signified, and according to it the same thing is predicated, yet in such a way that certain diverse things are also understood. For by this we understand Him as one who takes pity and as a just judge. This Origen¹ evidently shows, saying: « All the things that are God's, Christ is: He is His wisdom, He His strength, justice, holiness, He prudence. But since it is one in the underlying subject, it is named by diverse words according to the variety of senses. For wisdom signifies one thing, justice another. For when wisdom is spoken of, He is understood to instruct you in the disciplines of things divine and human; when justice, the distributor and judge of merits is intimated. So too when prudence is spoken of, He is understood as the teacher and demonstrator of things good and evil and indifferent ».

Chapter IV.

Why certain works are called works of justice, and certain works of the mercy or goodness of God.

That certain works are attributed to mercy, certain to justice, certain to goodness, is easy to find in the Scriptures. And concerning mercy indeed and justice it is manifest, but concerning goodness and mercy it lies more hidden. But Augustine² teaches that those works properly pertain to mercy by which some are freed from misery; but to goodness not only those, but also the making and the governance of natural things, saying thus: « To mercy it pertains that He cleanses from sins and frees from misery; but to goodness, that He created heaven and earth and all things very good, that they might be ». The same: « The heavens do not need mercy, where there is no misery; on earth man's misery abounds, and the Lord's mercy superabounds. Therefore with man's misery and the Lord's mercy the earth is full, not the heavens, which do not need mercy, though they do need the Lord to rule them. For all things need the Lord, both the wretched and the happy, because without Him the wretched is not raised up, and the happy is not governed ». Likewise elsewhere: « Mercy is toward the wretched, goodness toward any whatsoever ». — Sometimes, however, mercy is taken broadly, as goodness.

Chapter V.

How all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth.

After these things it must be considered in what sense all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth³. — This admits of a manifold exposition. For all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, by which He comes to us, as Augustine says on the Psalm; and by them are understood two advents: the first, in which He showed us a manifest and manifold mercy; and the second, in which, requiring merits, He will show justice. Also all the ways of the Lord, that is, those by which we ascend to the Lord, are justice, by which we turn away from evil, and mercy, by which we do good. For in these two every good merit is included. — But since Cassiodorus said above that in these two all the works of God are included, it can rightly be asked whether in every work of the Lord these two are joined to one another. — It has pleased some that these two do not concur in every work of the Lord — I mean according to effect; for according to essence mercy is not divided from justice, but is one; yet according to effect they say that mercy and justice are not in every work, but in some only mercy, in others justice, and in others mercy and justice. They confess nevertheless that God does all that He does mercifully and justly, referring the ground of this saying to God's will, which is justice and mercy, not to the effects of mercy and justice, which are in things. — To others, however, it seems that, just as God is said to do all His works justly and mercifully, so it must be conceded that in every work of God there is justice and mercy, that is clemency, according to effect or sign, because there is no work of God in which there is not the effect or sign of equity or of clemency, whether secretly or openly. For sometimes clemency or kindness is manifest, and equity hidden; sometimes conversely.

---