Bonaventure

# DISTINCTIO XLIX.

## Pars I.

Cap. I. De differentia mansionum in caelo et in inferno.

« Post resurrectionem vero, facto universo impletoque iudicio, suos fines habebunt civitates duae: una Christi, alia diaboli, una bonorum, altera malorum, utraque tamen Angelorum et hominum. Istis voluntas, illis facultas non poterit esse peccandi, vel ulla conditio moriendi; istis in aeterna vita feliciter viventibus, illis infeliciter in aeterna morte sine moriendi potestate durantibus, quoniam utrique sine fine; sed in beatitudine isti, alius alio praestabilius; in miseria vero illi, alius alio tolerabilius permanebunt¹ ». — Ex his apparet, quod sicut boni differenter glorificabuntur, alii magis, alii minus; ita et mali differenter in inferno punientur. Sicut enim in domo Patris, id est in regno caelesti, mansiones multae sunt², id est praemiorum differentiae; ita et in gehenna diversae sunt mansiones, id est suppliciorum differentiae. Omnes tamen aeternam

poenam patientur, sicut omnes electi eundem habebunt denarium, quem Paterfamilias dedit omnibus qui operati sunt in vinea. Nomine denarii aliquid omnibus electis commune intelligitur, scilicet vita aeterna, Deus ipse, quo omnes fruentur, sed impariter. Nam sicut erit differens clarificatio corporum, ita differens gloria erit animarum. Stella enim a stella, id est electus ab electo, differt in claritate mentis et corporis. Alii enim aliis vicinius clariusque Dei speciem contemplabuntur, et ipsa contemplandi differentia diversitas mansionum vocatur. Domus ergo est una, id est, denarius est unus; sed diversitas est ibi mansionum, id est differentia claritatis, quia unum est et summum bonum beatitudo et vita omnium, scilicet Deus ipse. Hoc bono omnes electi perfruentur, sed alii aliis plenius. Perfruentur vero videndo per speciem, non per speculum in aenigmate¹. Habere ergo vitam est videre vitam, id est cognoscere Deum in specie. Unde Veritas ait in Evangelio: Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, et quem misisti Iesum Christum, esse unum et solum verum Deum; hoc est habere vitam cognoscere te; non est ipsa cognitio, quod tu es, sed per cognitionem habere bonum, quod tu es, id est vita.

Solet etiam quaeri de beatitudine, utrum omnes eam velint et sciant, quae sit vera beatitudo. De hoc Augustinus in libro decimo tertio de Trinitate² ita disserit: « Mirum est, cum capessendae retinendaeque beatitudinis voluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta exstat de ipsa beatitudine rursus diversitas voluntatum; non quod eam aliquis nolit, sed quod non omnes eam norint. Si enim eam omnes noscerent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in virtute animi, ab aliis in voluptate corporis, ab aliis atque aliis alibi atque alibi. Quomodo ergo omnes amant quod non omnes sciunt? Quis potest amare quod nescit, sicut supra disputavi? Cur ergo beatitudo amatur ab omnibus, nec tamen scitur ab omnibus? An forte sciunt omnes, quae ipsa sit, sed non omnes sciunt, ubi sit, et inde contentio est »? « An forte falsum est quod pro vero posuimus, beate vivere omnes homines velle? Si enim beate vivere est, verbi gratia, secundum animi virtutem vivere; quomodo beate vivere vult qui hoc non vult? Nonne verius dixerimus: homo iste non vult beate vivere, quia non vult secundum virtutem vivere, quod solum est beate vivere? Non igitur omnes beate vivere volunt, immo pauci hoc volunt, si non est beate vivere, nisi secundum virtutem animi vivere, quod multi nolunt. Itane falsum erit, unde nec ipse Cicero dubitavit? Ait³ enim: Beati certe omnes esse volumus. Absit, ut hoc falsum esse dicamus. Quid ergo? An dicendum est, etiam si nihil sit aliud beate vivere, quam secundum virtutem animi vivere; tamen et qui hoc non vult beate vivere vult? Nimis quidem hoc videtur absurdum. Tale enim est, ac si dicamus: qui non vult beate vivere beate vult vivere. Istam repugnantiam quis audiat? quis ferat? Et tamen ad hanc contrudit necessitas. Si et omnes beate vivere velle verum est, et non omnes volunt sic vivere, quomodo solum vivitur beate »? « An illud ab his angustiis nos poterit eruere, si dicamus, nihil esse beate vivere nisi vivere secundum delectationem suam; et ideo falsum non esse, quod omnes beate vivere velint, quia omnes ita volunt, ut quemque delectat? Sed id quidem falsum est. Velle enim quod non deceat est esse miserrimum. Nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle quod non oporteat. Quis ita caecus sit, ut dicat aliquem ideo beatum, quia vivit, ut vult, cum profecto, etsi miser esset, minus tamen esset, si nihil eorum, quae perperam voluisset, habere potuisset. Mala enim voluntate vel sola miser quisque efficitur, sed miserior, cum desiderium malae voluntatis impletur. Quapropter, quoniam verum est, quod omnes homines esse beati velint idque ardentissimo amore appetant, et propter hoc cetera, quaecumque appetant; nec quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid vel quale sit, nescit, nec potest nescire, quid sit quod se velle scit: sequitur, ut omnes beatam vitam sciant. Omnes autem beati habent quod volunt, quamvis non omnes qui habent quod volunt, continuo sint beati. Continuo autem miseri sunt qui vel non habent quod volunt, vel id habent quod non recte volunt. Beatus igitur non est, nisi qui et habet omnia quae vult, et nihil vult mali ». « Ille quippe beate vivit, qui vivit, ut vult, nec male aliquid vult ». « Cum igitur ex his duobus constet beata vita, licet in malis sit aliquis bonus, non tamen, nisi finitis omnibus malis, est beatus ». « Cum vero ex hac vita qui in his miseriis fidelis et bonus est, venerit ad beatam; tunc erit vere quod nunc nullo modo esse potest, ut sic homo vivat, quomodo vult. Non enim ibi volet male vivere, aut volet aliquid, quod deerit, aut deerit aliquid, quod voluerit. Quidquid amabitur aderit, nec desiderabitur quod non aderit. Omne quod ibi erit, bonum erit, et summus Deus summum bonum erit; et quod est omnino beatissimum, ita semper fore certum erit ». « Beatos autem esse se velle omnium hominum est. Beatos esse se velle omnes in corde suo vident, nec tamen omnium est fides, qua ad beatitudinem pervenitur ».

Cap. II. Si quid ibi cognoscitur ab aliquo, quod non intelligant omnes.

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum aliquid de Deo cognoscat aliquis magis meritus, ut Petrus, quod non cognoscat aliquis minus meritus, ut Linus. — Pluribus videtur, quod omnia de Deo ad beatitudinem spectantia omnes communiter electi cognoscant, sed differenter. Nihil enim in Deo noscibile maius digniusque videtur, quam eum intelligere trinum et unum; hoc autem omnes tunc per speciem cognoscent. Unde sequitur, ut non sit aliquid beatitudini pertinens incognitum alicui Beatorum. Omnes igitur cuncta illa videbunt, quorum cognitio beatitudini servit, sed in modo videndi different. Alius enim alio magis, alius alio minus fulgebit⁴.

Cap. III. De paritate gaudii.

Solet etiam quaeri, an in gaudio dispares sint, sicut in claritate cognitionis differunt. — De hoc Augustinus¹ ait: « Multae mansiones in una domo erunt, scilicet variae praemiorum dignitates; sed ubi Deus erit omnia in omnibus, erit etiam in dispari claritate par gaudium, ut quod habebunt singuli commune sit omnibus; quia etiam gloria capitis omnium erit per vinculum caritatis ». — Ex his datur intelligi, quod par gaudium omnes habebunt, etsi disparem cognitionis claritatem, quia per caritatem, quae in singulis erit perfecta, « tantum quisque gaudebit de bono alterius, quantum gaudebit si in se ipso haberet² ». Sed si par erit cunctorum gaudium, videtur, quod par sit omnium beatitudo; quod constat omnino non esse. — Ad quod dici potest, quod beatitudo par esset, si ita esset par gaudium, ut etiam par esset cognitio; sed quia hoc non erit, non faciet paritas gaudii paritatem beatitudinis. — Potest etiam sic accipi par gaudium, ut non referatur paritas ad intensionem affectionis gaudentium, sed ad universitatem rerum, de quibus gaudebitur; quia de omni re, unde gaudebit unus, gaudebunt omnes.

Nota de numeratione. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, and page 997 carries two separate registers. The apparatus below is therefore labelled by page: the two entries of page 997's second register, headed Notae ad libr. Sententiarum, carry an `n`; then notes 1–4 of page 998; then notes 1 and 2 of page 999. Note 3 of page 999 anchors in Lombard's Pars II and is rendered there, not here.

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# DISTINCTION XLIX.

## Part I.

Chap. I. On the difference of the mansions in heaven and in hell.

« But after the resurrection, when the universe has been completed and the judgment fulfilled, the two cities will have their own ends: one of Christ, the other of the devil; one of the good, the other of the wicked — yet each of them made up of Angels and of men. For the one there will be no will, for the other no capacity, of sinning, nor any condition of dying; the one living happily in eternal life, the other enduring unhappily in eternal death without the power of dying, since both are without end; but in beatitude these will abide, one more excellently than another; while in misery those will abide, one more tolerably than another¹ ». — From these things it appears that, just as the good will be glorified differently, some more, some less, so also the wicked will be punished differently in hell. For just as in the Father's house, that is, in the heavenly kingdom, there are many mansions², that is, differences of rewards, so also in Gehenna there are diverse mansions, that is, differences of punishments. Yet all will suffer an eternal

punishment, just as all the elect will have the same denarius, which the Householder gave to all who had laboured in the vineyard. By the name of the denarius is understood something common to all the elect, namely eternal life, God himself, whom all will enjoy, but unequally. For as there will be a differing glorification of bodies, so there will be a differing glory of souls. For star differs from star, that is, one elect from another, in the brightness of mind and of body. For some will contemplate the sight of God more closely and more clearly than others, and that very difference of contemplating is called the diversity of the mansions. The house therefore is one, that is, the denarius is one; but there is there a diversity of mansions, that is, a difference of brightness, because the beatitude and life of all is one and the highest good, namely God himself. All the elect will enjoy this good, but some more fully than others. And they will enjoy it by seeing through the species, not through a mirror in an enigma¹. To have life, therefore, is to see life, that is, to know God in his species. Whence Truth says in the Gospel: This is eternal life, that they may know thee, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent, to be the one and only true God; this is to have life, to know thee; the knowledge itself is not what thou art, but through knowledge to have the good which thou art, that is, life.

It is also wont to be asked concerning beatitude, whether all will it and know what true beatitude is. On this Augustine, in the thirteenth book On the Trinity², discourses thus: « It is a wonder that, since the will for laying hold of and retaining beatitude is one in all, there should arise again so great a diversity of wills concerning that very beatitude — not that anyone does not will it, but that not all know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to lie in the virtue of the mind, by others in the pleasure of the body, and by others and others elsewhere and elsewhere. How therefore do all love what not all know? Who can love what he does not know, as I disputed above? Why therefore is beatitude loved by all, and yet not known by all? Or do perhaps all know what it is, but not all know where it is, and thence is the contention »? « Or is perhaps that false which we laid down as true, that all men will to live happily? For if to live happily is, for example, to live according to the virtue of the mind, how does he will to live happily who does not will this? Shall we not say more truly: this man does not will to live happily, because he does not will to live according to virtue, which alone is to live happily? Not all, therefore, will to live happily; rather few will it, if to live happily is nothing but to live according to the virtue of the mind, which many do not will. Will it then be false, of which not even Cicero himself doubted? For he says³: We certainly all will to be happy. Far be it that we should say this is false. What then? Is it to be said that, even if to live happily is nothing else than to live according to the virtue of the mind, nevertheless he too who does not will this wills to live happily? This indeed seems too absurd. For it is as if we should say: he who does not will to live happily wills happily to live. Who could hear such a contradiction? who could bear it? And yet necessity thrusts us to this. If it is both true that all will to live happily, and that not all will so to live as alone one lives happily »? « Or will this be able to rescue us from these straits, if we say that to live happily is nothing but to live according to one's own delight; and that therefore it is not false that all will to live happily, since all so will as each is delighted? But this indeed is false. For to will what is not fitting is to be most wretched. Nor is it so wretched not to obtain what you will, as to will to obtain what is not proper. Who would be so blind as to say that anyone is happy for this reason, that he lives as he wills, when in fact, even if he were wretched, he would be less so if he had been able to have none of those things which he had wrongly willed. For by an evil will alone each one is made wretched, but more wretched when the desire of the evil will is fulfilled. Wherefore, since it is true that all men will to be happy and seek this with the most ardent love, and on account of this all other things, whatever they seek; and since no one can love what he wholly does not know what or of what sort it is, nor can he fail to know what that is which he knows himself to will: it follows that all know the happy life. But all the happy have what they will, although not all who have what they will are forthwith happy. But forthwith wretched are those who either do not have what they will, or have that which they do not rightly will. He therefore is not happy, save he who both has all that he wills and wills nothing evil ». « For he indeed lives happily who lives as he wills, and wills nothing evil ». « Since therefore the happy life consists of these two, though someone good may be among evils, yet he is not happy unless all evils are ended ». « But when he who in these miseries is faithful and good has come from this life to the happy one, then will truly be what now can in no way be, that a man should so live as he wills. For there he will not will to live evilly, nor will he will anything that will be lacking, nor will anything be lacking that he shall have willed. Whatever will be loved will be present, nor will that be desired which is not present. Everything that will be there will be good, and the highest God will be the highest good; and — what is altogether most blessed — it will be certain that it will ever be so ». « But to will themselves to be happy belongs to all men. All see in their heart that they will themselves to be happy, and yet not of all is the faith by which one comes to beatitude ».

Chap. II. Whether anything is there known by someone which not all understand.

It is also wont to be asked whether someone of greater merit, such as Peter, knows anything of God which someone of lesser merit, such as Linus, does not know. — To most it seems that all the elect know in common all the things pertaining to beatitude concerning God, but differently. For nothing knowable in God seems greater or more worthy than to understand him as three and one; and this all will then know through the species. Whence it follows that there is nothing pertaining to beatitude unknown to any of the Blessed. All therefore will see all those things whose knowledge serves beatitude, but they will differ in the mode of seeing. For one will shine more than another, and one less than another⁴.

Chap. III. On the parity of joy.

It is also wont to be asked whether they are unequal in joy, as they differ in the brightness of knowledge. — On this Augustine¹ says: « There will be many mansions in one house, namely various dignities of rewards; but where God will be all in all, there will be, even amid unequal brightness, an equal joy, so that what individuals will have may be common to all; because also the glory of the head will belong to all through the bond of charity ». — From these things it is given to understand that all will have an equal joy, even though an unequal brightness of knowledge, because through charity, which in each one will be perfect, « each will rejoice as much over the good of another as he would rejoice if he had it in himself² ». But if the joy of all will be equal, it seems that the beatitude of all is equal; which is plainly not at all the case. — To which it can be said that beatitude would be equal if joy were equal in such a way that knowledge also were equal; but since this will not be, the parity of joy will not make a parity of beatitude. — The equal joy can also be taken thus, that the parity be referred not to the intensity of the affection of those rejoicing, but to the universality of the things over which there will be rejoicing; because concerning every thing over which one will rejoice, all will rejoice.

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