Bonaventure

ARTICULUS III. De sensuum remuneratione.

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum, circa hoc quaeritur de sensuum remuneratione. Et supposito, quod erunt¹⁰ in patria — quia erit anima habens omnes suas potentias, cum nullam amittat, erit etiam corpus habens organa omnia — circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in patria omnes sensus habeant suos actus.

Secundo, utrum sensus illi, qui sunt in suo actu, cognoscant per receptionem speciei.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum in patria omnes sensus habeant suos actus.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: note 10 of page 1017, notes 1–12 of page 1018, and notes 1–7 of page 1019.

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod omnes sensus erunt in suo actu:

1. Quia nobilior est potentia coniuncta suo actui quam non coniuncta; sed omnes potentiae erunt ibi in statu nobilissimo: ergo omnes erunt coniunctae actui¹: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut anima appetit uniri corpori, ita sensus obiecto; sed ad hoc, quod anima perfecte glorificetur, necesse est uniri corpori, ut ille appetitus quietetur²: ergo similiter necesse est, sensum omnem uniri obiecto. Sed unio sensus ad obiectum est mediante actu: ergo etc.

3. Item, constat, quod corpus remuneratur, quia servit animae: ergo et sensus debet remunerari; sed omnis potentia nata delectari, si perfecte remuneratur, in perfecta delectatione constituitur; quiescit enim in illo, et haec quies est delectatio³. Et hoc potest probari per simile in damnatis, quia ibi erit continuus dolor in sensu: ergo in Beatis continua delectatio. Ex hoc arguo: nulla potentia delectatur, nisi in eo quod cognoscit; sed sensus non cognoscit se nec organum nec quod supra se est⁴: ergo cum solum obiectum cognoscat, delectatur in obiecto. Sed in illo non delectatur nisi in actu: ergo etc.

4. Item, summa delectatio potentiae est in suo actu: ergo si sensus ibi delectantur, in suis actibus ibi sunt⁵. Praeterea, si delectatur, sentit; sicut sequitur, si dolet, quod sentiat: ergo cum probatum sit⁶, delectationem esse in omnibus sensibus, oportet, quod omnes sentiant.

5. Item, visus est in suo actu, qui est spiritualissimus; unde Iob decimo nono⁷: In carne mea videbo Deum; et Apocalypsis primo: Videbit eum omnis oculus; et Augustinus dicit, quod « visus reficietur in contemplatione humanitatis », in libro de Spiritu et anima. — Est etiam ibi sensus tactus; quod patet, quia unum corpus glorificatum poterit aliud amplexari, et iste est maxime materialis⁸. Quare, cum sit ibi actus sensus spiritualis et materialis: ergo et omnium sensuum.

Contra: Quod nullus sensus sit ibi in actu, videtur:

1. Quia omnis virtus finita plus potest in unum, quam quando dispergitur ad multa⁹; sed anima habet virtutem finitam: ergo et intensius moveretur, si in solum Deum moveretur cognitione et delectatione: ergo cognitio et delectatio sensuum minuit motum in Deum, ergo et gloriam. Sed nihil debet ibi esse tale: ergo etc.

2. Item, si est sensus in actu, aut ille est cum delectatione, aut sine. Si non est cum delectatione, ergo non est in actu perfecto. Si vero est cum delectatione; sed quando aliquid delectatur in uno oppositorum, tristatur in reliquo; quando delectatur in medio, tristatur in extremis: ergo si delectatur in percipiendo, possibile est tristari¹⁰. — Si dicas, quod nihil sibi repugnat nec corrumpit propter incorruptibilitatem; saltem carentia rei inducit tristitiam, cuius praesentia afferebat delectationem: ergo etc.

3. Item, quidam sensus sunt propter indigentiam, ut patet de gustu, ad¹¹ restaurationem deperditi; sed tunc tolletur omnis indigentia: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Sensus visus et tactus et fortasse etiam auditus erunt in suis actibus, alii vero non.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod posse sentire est ex coniunctione potentiae cum organo bene disposito, sentire vero ex coniunctione ipsius cum obiecto¹². Quoniam igitur ibi erunt potentiae iunctae organis bene dispositis, ibi erunt omnes potentiae sentiendi. Quoniam vero obiecta omnium sensuum non erunt in gloria, sed quorundam; ideo quidam

erunt in actu suo, quidam vero non. — Obiecta enim quorundam sensuum sunt proprietates absolutae, quae reperiuntur in corpore glorificando¹, utpote color visus, et levitas ipsius tactus; et quia corpus gloriosum resurget cum luminositate et levitate, erunt ibi obiecta duorum sensuum; ideo isti sensus erunt in suis actibus. Obiecta vero aliorum sensuum non sunt proprietates corporis glorificandi nec proprietates absolutae, sed emanationes a corporibus, ut odor et sonus et sapor; et quia non erunt in patria, ideo etc.

Alia etiam ratio sumitur ex parte medii: quia medium in visu potest esse omne quod habet rationem pervii, medium in tactu est caro sibi coniuncta²; et ideo, quia ista duo media erunt in patria, et isti duo sensus in suis actibus erunt, alii vero minime, deficientibus sibi mediis, nisi forte quis instet in auditu, de quo relinquitur in dubio, sicut de laude vocali in patria, quam ibi ponere nec videtur necessarium nec aperte falsum; et ideo hic opinari est licitum³.

Ad argumenta pro 1. parte:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnes erunt in actibus propter nobilitatem potentiarum maiorem; dicendum, quod est actus perfectionis, et actus, qui habet imperfectionem coniunctam; et quoniam actus gustandi habet imperfectionem coniunctam ratione status, et similiter olfactus ratione obiecti, quod non glorificatur, et habet fieri per medium receptivum peregrinae impressionis⁴: ergo etc.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod appetit sensus uniri; dicendum, quod alius est modus appetendi⁵; ille enim animae appetitus est ratione perfectionis esse naturalis, sed iste solum est quantum ad bene esse; et ideo ille non potest terminari, nisi corpus uniatur; iste potest, si in tali statu ponatur, quod illo obiecto non egeat.

Ad 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de delectatione, dicendum, quod delectatio est in sensu dupliciter: una per redundantiam, alia per obiecti praesentiam. Per redundantiam, sicut quando anima est interius plena delectatione, ita inebriantur et potentiae sentiendi, quod nullo modo quaerunt nec egent exterius delectari; et haec delectatio erit praemium omnium sensuum et in omnibus⁶. Hanc autem delectationem non habent a se nec ab actu suo, sed ab actu animae; et ideo non oportet, quod propter istam sint sensus in suo actu. — Alia est delectatio per obiecti convenientis praesentiam; et quia solum duo sunt sensus, qui habent obiecta gloriosa, ideo solum in duobus est; et hoc non est praemium, nisi valde accidentale, quia non magis est gloriosus sensus in illius praesentia quam absentia. — Aliud patet.

Ad argumenta pro 2. parte:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod nullus sit sensus, quia unus actus impedit alium; dicendum, quod verum est, quando unus non ordinatur ad alium; non sic in proposito, sed actus rationis redundat in sensum, et actus sensus ordinatur et subservit actui rationis; et ideo unus vigoratur ex alio.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi delectatio, ibi tristitia; dicendum, quod quidam sensus delectatur in obiecto, quia est conveniens, perficiens et conservans, utpote est obiectum respectu sensus corporis; quidam, quia est conveniens et perficiens, ut intellectus in intelligibili veritate⁷; quidam, quia tantum est conveniens, ut sensus gloriosus, non perficiens, quia interius perficitur, non conservans, quia incorruptibilis est; et talis non tristatur in contrario, quia non laeditur, nec in absentia, quia non efficitur imperfectus. Quod primo modo delectatur tristatur dupliciter; quod secundo, uno modo.

Ad 3. Ultima ratio concedenda est, quod illi sensus, qui sunt per indigentiam, non manebunt in suis actibus. Et sic patet totum.

ARTICLE III. On the remuneration of the senses.

Next, as to the third article, inquiry is made concerning the remuneration of the senses. And it being supposed that they will be¹⁰ in the fatherland — since the soul will be one having all its powers, seeing that it loses none, and the body too will be one having all its organs — concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked, whether in the fatherland all the senses have their acts.

Second, whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species.

QUESTION I. Whether in the fatherland all the senses have their acts.

As to the first, then, it is shown that all the senses will be in their act:

1. Because a power joined to its act is nobler than one not joined; but all the powers will be there in the noblest state: therefore all will be joined to their act¹: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, as the soul desires to be united to the body, so does sense to its object; but for the soul to be perfectly glorified it is necessary that it be united to the body, so that that appetite may be quieted²: therefore in like manner it is necessary that every sense be united to its object. But the union of a sense with its object is by means of an act: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is agreed that the body is remunerated because it serves the soul: therefore sense too ought to be remunerated; but every power born to be delighted, if it is perfectly remunerated, is established in perfect delight; for it rests in it, and this rest is delight³. And this can be proved by a parallel in the damned, since there will be continuous pain in sense there: therefore in the Blessed continuous delight. From this I argue: no power is delighted except in that which it knows; but sense does not know itself, nor its organ, nor what is above itself⁴: therefore, since it knows only its object, it is delighted in its object. But it is not delighted in it except in act: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the highest delight of a power is in its act: therefore if the senses are delighted there, they are there in their acts⁵. Moreover, if it is delighted, it senses; just as it follows that if it grieves, it senses: therefore since it has been proved⁶ that delight is in all the senses, it must be that all of them sense.

5. Likewise, sight is in its act, which is the most spiritual; whence Job, chapter nineteen⁷: In my flesh I shall see God; and Apocalypse, chapter one: Every eye shall see him; and Augustine says that « sight will be refreshed in the contemplation of the humanity », in the book On the Spirit and the Soul. — There is also there the sense of touch; which is clear, because one glorified body will be able to embrace another, and this sense is the most material of all⁸. Wherefore, since there is there the act of a spiritual and of a material sense: therefore also of all the senses.

On the contrary: That no sense is there in act seems to follow:

1. Because every finite power can do more upon one thing than when it is dispersed among many⁹; but the soul has a finite power: therefore it would also be moved more intensely if it were moved toward God alone by knowledge and delight: therefore the knowledge and delight of the senses diminishes its motion toward God, and therefore also its glory. But nothing of that kind ought to be there: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if sense is in act, that act is either with delight or without. If it is not with delight, then it is not in a perfect act. If, however, it is with delight; but when something is delighted in one of two opposites, it is saddened in the other; when it is delighted in the mean, it is saddened in the extremes: therefore if it is delighted in perceiving, it is possible for it to be saddened¹⁰. — If you say that nothing is repugnant to it nor corrupts it, on account of its incorruptibility; at least the absence of a thing induces sadness whose presence brought delight: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, certain senses exist on account of need, as is clear of taste, for¹¹ the restoration of what has been lost; but then all need will be taken away: therefore etc.

Conclusion

The senses of sight and touch, and perhaps also hearing, will be in their acts; the others, however, will not.

I respond: It must be said that being able to sense comes from the joining of the power with a well-disposed organ, but to sense comes from the joining of that power with an object¹². Since, therefore, the powers will there be joined to well-disposed organs, all the powers of sensing will be there. But since the objects of all the senses will not be in glory, but only of certain ones, therefore certain senses

will be in their act, and certain ones not. — For the objects of certain senses are absolute properties, which are found in the body to be glorified¹, such as color for sight and lightness for touch itself; and since the glorious body will rise with luminosity and lightness, the objects of two senses will be there; therefore those senses will be in their acts. But the objects of the other senses are not properties of the body to be glorified nor absolute properties, but emanations from bodies, such as odor and sound and savor; and since these will not be in the fatherland, therefore etc.

Another reason as well is drawn from the side of the medium: because the medium in sight can be everything that has the character of the transparent, while the medium in touch is the flesh joined to it²; and therefore, since these two media will be in the fatherland, these two senses will also be in their acts, while the others will by no means be so, their media failing them — unless perhaps someone should press the case of hearing, about which the matter is left in doubt, as it is about vocal praise in the fatherland, which to posit there seems neither necessary nor openly false; and therefore here it is permissible to hold an opinion³.

To the arguments for the first side:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that all will be in their acts on account of the greater nobility of the powers; it must be said that there is an act of perfection, and an act which has imperfection joined to it; and since the act of tasting has imperfection joined to it by reason of the state, and likewise smell by reason of its object, which is not glorified and has to come about through a medium receptive of an alien impression⁴: therefore etc.

To 2. To that which is objected, that sense desires to be united; it must be said that the mode of desiring is different⁵; for that appetite of the soul is by reason of the perfection of natural being, but this one is only as regards well-being; and therefore the former cannot be terminated unless the body be united; the latter can be, if it be placed in such a state that it does not need that object.

To 3 and 4. To that which is objected concerning delight, it must be said that delight is in sense in two ways: one by redundance, the other by the presence of the object. By redundance, as when the soul is inwardly full of delight, the powers of sensing too are so inebriated that they in no way seek nor need to be delighted outwardly; and this delight will be the reward of all the senses and in all of them⁶. But this delight they do not have from themselves nor from their own act, but from the act of the soul; and therefore it is not necessary that on its account the senses be in their act. — The other delight is by the presence of a suitable object; and since there are only two senses which have glorious objects, therefore it is only in two; and this is not a reward, except a very accidental one, because a sense is not more glorious in that object's presence than in its absence. — The rest is clear.

To the arguments for the second side:

To 1. To that, however, which is objected, that there is no sense, because one act impedes another; it must be said that this is true when the one is not ordered to the other; but it is not so in the present case, for the act of reason redounds into sense, and the act of sense is ordered to and subserves the act of reason; and therefore the one is invigorated by the other.

To 2. To that which is objected, that where there is delight, there is sadness; it must be said that a certain sense is delighted in its object because it is suitable, perfecting and conserving, as the object is with respect to bodily sense; another, because it is suitable and perfecting, as the intellect in intelligible truth⁷; another, because it is only suitable, as the glorified sense — not perfecting, since it is perfected inwardly, not conserving, since it is incorruptible; and such a sense is not saddened by its contrary, since it is not harmed, nor in its absence, since it is not made imperfect. That which is delighted in the first way is saddened in two ways; that which is delighted in the second, in one way.

To 3. The last reason must be conceded, namely that those senses which exist by reason of need will not remain in their acts. And thus the whole is clear.