Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum sensus illi, qui sunt in suo actu, cognoscant per receptionem speciei.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so the labels are page-qualified: notes 1–10 of page 1020 and notes 1–3 of page 1021 (page 1021's notes 4–7 belong to the following chunk).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum illi sensus, qui sunt in suo actu, cognoscant per receptionem speciei. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia omnis cognitio est motus ad animam¹; sed omnis motus ad animam est in aliquid recipiendo: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis cognitio est per unionem cognoscibilis cum cognoscente²; sed sensus gloriosus aliquid cognoscit, cui non unitur secundum veritatem, et cuius non habet per naturam speciem: ergo habet uniri mediante specie recepta.

3. Item, quanto speculum est clarius et purius, tanto est ad recipiendum magis idoneum; sed sensuum gloriosorum organa sunt purissima et denudata a formis obiectorum³: ergo etc.

4. Item, ordo naturalis est, ut obiectum influat in organum⁴; sed natura non tolletur per gloriam: ergo organum recipiet.

Contra: 1. Augustinus in sexto Musicae⁵, et est propositio per se vera: « Minus nobile non agit in magis nobile »; sed quod recipit ab alio patitur ab illo: ergo visus non poterit recipere a corporibus inferioribus, cum organum eius sit nobilissimum.

2. Item, orbis primus non recipit peregrinam impressionem propter sui nobilitatem et incorruptionem⁶: ergo si oculus est nobilior, patet etc.

3. Item, si est ibi receptio de novo; cum non sit receptio faciens esse sensum in actu, nisi adsit iudicium: ergo est ibi iudicium, ergo cogitatio animae, ergo nova cogitatio, et ita volubiles cogitationes; quod est contra Augustinum⁷.

4. Item, immutationem et receptionem animalem antecedit immutatio naturalis⁸; sed corpus glorificatum et eius organum, cum sit incorruptibile, non recipiet naturalem immutationem: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Sensus glorificati cognoscunt recipiendo speciem a sensibili.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod non est receptio ab extrinseco; sed anima omnium quae vult videre species facit in oculo, et videt, quia tunc ordo erit commutatus, quia non erit receptio veniens ab inferiori, sed a superiori. — Sed haec solutio non potest stare; primum quidem, quia perverteretur ordo, cum species spiritualis fieret corporalis, perfectum fieret imperfectum; secundo, quia ita videret absentia, ut praesentia, ita oculis clausis, sicut apertis.

Secunda positio est, quod est sensus, sed non est intus suscipiendo, sed extra mittendo virtutem, quia non recipiet, sed influet. — Sed ista adhuc non potest stare, cum cognitio sit in unione, et⁹ organa sint maxime habilia ad recipiendum.

Tertia positio est, quod sensus glorificati cognoscunt recipiendo speciem ab ipso sensibili. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minus nobile etc.; dici potest, quod non oportet, quod obiectum sit nobilius organo, in quod agit, simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in hoc scilicet, quod habet speciem, et illud est denudatum¹⁰; et hoc sufficit ad agendum. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod minus nobile non agit virtute propria, sed aliena; et in sensu glorificato est natura duplex in oculo, perspicui et luminis; quando igitur videt corpus se luminosius, illud corpus sua virtute facit speciem in oculo; quando vero minus luminosum, tunc virtute propria in se facit. Et sic patet illud.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliena impressione, quod non est in orbe; dicendum, quod ibi notatur¹ aliena impressio, quae est via ad corruptionem; sed de hac non intelligitur hic.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cogitationes volvuntur; dicendum, quod cogitationes volvi est dupliciter: uno modo, quia intellectus non habet defixum aspectum in uno, et hoc modo est in via et non erit in patria; alio modo est, quod principaliter et continue videt unum et alia multa propter illud, et inter illa multa modo unum, modo aliud; et hoc bene erit in patria²; talis est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immutatio naturalis praecedit; dicendum, quod immutatio naturalis est duplex: quaedam est per receptionem et abiectionem, ut calidi a frigido, et haec non erit; quaedam per receptionem tantum, ut perspicui a luminoso³, et haec erit.

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Question II. Whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species.

Secondly it is asked whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species. And that they do, seems to follow:

1. Because all cognition is a motion toward the soul¹; but every motion toward the soul consists in receiving something: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, all cognition is through the union of the knowable with the knower²; but the glorified sense knows something to which it is not united according to truth, and of which it does not have the species by nature: therefore it has to be united by means of a received species.

3. Likewise, the clearer and purer a mirror is, the more apt it is for receiving; but the organs of the glorified senses are most pure and stripped bare of the forms of objects³: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is the natural order that the object should flow into the organ⁴; but nature will not be taken away through glory: therefore the organ will receive.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the sixth book of the Music⁵, and it is a proposition true of itself: « The less noble does not act upon the more noble »; but what receives from another is acted upon by it: therefore sight will not be able to receive from lower bodies, since its organ is most noble.

2. Likewise, the first sphere does not receive a foreign impression on account of its nobility and incorruptibility⁶: therefore if the eye is more noble, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, if there is there a reception anew; since there is no reception making the sense to be in act unless judgment be present: therefore there is judgment there, therefore a thought of the soul, therefore a new thought, and thus rolling thoughts; which is against Augustine⁷.

4. Likewise, an animal alteration and reception is preceded by a natural alteration⁸; but the glorified body and its organ, since it is incorruptible, will not receive a natural alteration: therefore etc.

Conclusion

The glorified senses know by receiving a species from the sensible thing.

I respond: To this some have said that there is no reception from without; but the soul makes in the eye the species of all the things it wishes to see, and sees, because then the order would be reversed, since the reception would not come from what is lower, but from what is higher. — But this solution cannot stand; first indeed, because the order would be perverted, since a spiritual species would become corporeal, and the perfect would become imperfect; secondly, because it would see absent things just as present ones, and with the eyes closed just as with them open.

The second position is that there is sense, but not by taking in from within, rather by sending a power outward, because it will not receive but will flow in. — But this too cannot stand, since cognition consists in union, and⁹ the organs are most fit for receiving.

The third position is that the glorified senses know by receiving a species from the sensible thing itself. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that the less noble etc.; it can be said that it is not necessary that the object be more noble than the organ upon which it acts simply, but in a certain respect, namely in this, that it has the species, and that is stripped bare¹⁰; and this suffices for acting. — Or it must be said otherwise, that the less noble does not act by its own power, but by another's; and in the glorified sense there is a twofold nature in the eye, that of the transparent and that of light; when therefore it sees a body more luminous than itself, that body by its own power makes the species in the eye; but when it sees a less luminous one, then it makes it in itself by its own power. And thus that is evident.

2. To that which is objected concerning the foreign impression, that it is not in the sphere; it must be said that what is there noted¹ is a foreign impression which is a way toward corruption; but of this there is no question here.

3. To that which is objected, that thoughts are rolled about; it must be said that thoughts being rolled about happens in two ways: in one way, because the intellect does not have a fixed gaze upon one thing, and in this way it is in the wayfaring state and will not be in the fatherland; in another way it happens that one principally and continuously sees one thing, and many others on account of it, and among those many now one, now another; and this indeed will be in the fatherland²; such is the case in the matter proposed.

4. To that which is objected, that a natural alteration precedes; it must be said that natural alteration is twofold: one is through reception and expulsion, as of the hot by the cold, and this will not be; another through reception only, as of the transparent by the luminous³, and this will be.

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