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Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus
p. 141

Quaestio III. In quo sit character sicut in subiecto.

Tertio quaeritur, in quo sit character sicut in subiecto. Et quod in tota anima, videtur:

1. Quia character distinguit ovem Christi a non ove, et membrum Christi a non membro1; sed anima non dicitur ovis nec membrum secundum potentiam, sed secundum substantiam: ergo character secundum substantiam distinguit.

2. Item, cuius est dispositio, et habitus; sed character disponit ad gratiam et remissionem originalis, quod respicit totam animam2: ergo character est in animae substantia.

Sed quod sit tantum in potentia cognitiva, videtur:

3. Quia omne quod est in anima pertinens ad cognitionem, est in potentia cognitiva; sed character pertinet ad cognitionem, cum sit signum3: ergo etc.

4. Item, in una anima est unus character per unum Sacramentum; sed omnis habitus est in potentia ut in subiecto4: ergo cum accidens sit in uno subiecto, character est in una potentia. Sed potentia, quae maxime huic convenit, est cognitiva: ergo etc.

Sed quod sit in tota imagine, videtur:

1. Character est quaedam configuratio5; sed configurari dicitur anima Trinitati secundum tres potentias, non unam tantum: ergo etc.

2. Item, character disponit principaliter ad imaginis reformationem; sed reformatio imaginis attenditur quantum ad informationem ipsarum potentiarum, ut convertuntur ad Deum6: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Character est in anima secundum totam imaginem, appropriatur tamen potentiae cognitivae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex fuit opinio.

Quidam dixerunt, quod character est in tota anima propter rationes praedictas, quia distinguit ovem ab ove, vel ab ea quae non est ovis: et hoc respicit animae substantiam.

Quidam, quod in cognitiva propter rationem signandi, et quoniam signum, quod est ratio cognoscendi, respicit potentiam cognitivam.

Quidam, quod in tota imagine propter rationem configurandi. Et quia actus characteris, a quo nomen accepit, et principalis7 est configurare: ideo haec tertia melior est, quod sit in anima secundum imaginem secundum proprietatem et veritatem. Sed quia imago, etsi sit in tribus, tamen appropriatur cognitivae, secundum quod dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima8, quod « imago est in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo in potentia diligendi »: ideo per appropriationem est in potentia cognitiva.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod distinguit animam: ergo est in anima; verum est, sed non oportet, quod sit in tota anima, sicut color non tingit corpus, sed tamen primo modo est in superficie9.

p. 142

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur: cuius est dispositio, et habitus; dicendum, quod verum est de illa dispositione, quae fit habitus; sed de alia non sic, quia habitus unius potentiae disponit ad habitum alterius, ut habitus fidei ad habitum caritatis10.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spectat ad cognitionem; dicendum, quod verum est, si sit habitus cognoscendi. Et praeterea, non tantum11 ad cognitionem spectat, sed etiam ad gratiam reformantem totam imaginem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est unum in anima una; dici potest dupliciter: quod unum accidens est in pluribus, sicut una gratia in pluribus potentiis, et una sanitas in pluribus membris12, quando accidens non respicit determinate unam potentiam, sed eas secundum quod fundantur in uno. — Vel aliter: imago una est, et tamen in tribus potentiis, quia dicit relationem ad unum; similiter dici potest in charactere. Quia enim imago importat distinctionem, ideo comparatur ad plura sicut ad unum subiectum. Et exemplum est in numero: ternarius enim unus est in tribus hominibus, et unus est, quamvis illi sint plures in se, qui sunt unum subiectum ternarii, et nullus eorum per se tantum est subiectum. Ita et in charactere intelligendum est, quod dicit, sicut praetactum est13, quandam configurationem animae ad beatam Trinitatem, mediam inter configurationem animae quantum ad naturam, et configurationem eiusdem quantum ad gratiam gratum facientem14.

Scholion

III. Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem negari non potest, radicale subiectum characteris esse animam; sed quaestio remanet, quid sit immediatum et proximum eiusdem subiectum. Quod non ipsa essentia animae, sed eius potentiae, quatenus in eis est imago Dei, sint proximum characteris subiectum, antiqui Scholastici concorditer resolvunt. Iterum autem quaeritur, in qua principaliter sit potentia. S. Thom., cui favent B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et Richard., docet, eum esse in potentia cognitiva, « quia ex memoria et intelligentia oritur voluntas; unde tota imago est in intellectiva parte sicut in radice » (Comment. loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.); Scot. vero pro eo assignat voluntatem; S. Bonav. cum Alexandro vult, eum esse in tribus animae potentiis, quatenus sunt imago, et per appropriationem tantum specialiter tribui potentiae cognitivae. De hac 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 3. — Scot., hic q. 11; Report. hic q. 10. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

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English Translation

Question III. In what the character is as in a subject.

Thirdly it is asked, in what the character is as in a subject. And that it is in the whole soul, it seems:

1. Because the character distinguishes the sheep of Christ from the non-sheep, and the member of Christ from the non-member1; but the soul is not called a sheep nor a member with respect to a power, but with respect to substance: therefore the character distinguishes with respect to substance.

2. Likewise, that to which a disposition belongs, also a habit; but the character disposes to grace and to the remission of original [sin], which regards the whole soul2: therefore the character is in the substance of the soul.

But that it is only in the cognitive power, it seems:

3. Because everything in the soul pertaining to cognition is in the cognitive power; but the character pertains to cognition, since it is a sign3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in one soul there is one character through one Sacrament; but every habit is in a power as in a subject4: therefore, since an accident is in one subject, the character is in one power. But the power to which this most belongs is the cognitive: therefore etc.

But that it is in the whole image, it seems:

1. The character is a certain configuration5; but the soul is said to be configured to the Trinity according to the three powers, not one alone: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the character disposes principally to the reformation of the image; but the reformation of the image is observed with respect to the information of the powers themselves, as they are turned toward God6: therefore etc.

Conclusio

The character is in the soul according to the whole image, yet it is appropriated to the cognitive power.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there have been three opinions.

Some have said that the character is in the whole soul for the aforesaid reasons, because it distinguishes the sheep from the [other] sheep, or from that which is not a sheep: and this regards the substance of the soul.

Some [have said] that it is in the cognitive [power] by reason of signifying, and because a sign, which is a ground of knowing, regards the cognitive power.

Some [have said] that it is in the whole image by reason of configuring. And because the act of the character, from which it takes its name, and its principal [act]7, is to configure: therefore this third [opinion] is better, that it is in the soul according to the image, according to property and truth. But because the image, although it is in the three, nevertheless is appropriated to the cognitive [power], according to what is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul8, that « the image is in the power of knowing, the likeness in the power of loving »: therefore by appropriation it is in the cognitive power.

To the arguments:

1. To that therefore which is objected, that it distinguishes the soul: therefore it is in the soul; it is true, but it is not necessary that it be in the whole soul, just as color does not tinge the [whole] body, yet in the primary mode it is in the surface9.

2. To that which is objected: that to which a disposition belongs, also a habit; it must be said that this is true of that disposition which becomes a habit; but not so of another, because the habit of one power disposes to the habit of another, as the habit of faith [disposes] to the habit of charity10.

3. To that which is objected, that it regards cognition; it must be said that this is true, if it be a habit of knowing. And moreover, it regards not only11 cognition, but also grace reforming the whole image.

4. To that which is objected, that it is one thing in one soul; it can be said in two ways: that one accident is in many [things], as one grace [is] in many powers, and one health in many members12, when an accident does not regard determinately one power, but [regards] them according as they are founded in one. — Or otherwise: the image is one, and yet [is] in the three powers, because it bespeaks a relation to one; likewise it can be said of the character. For since the image implies distinction, therefore it is compared to many [things] as to one subject. And there is an example in number: for the number three is one in three men, and is one, although those [men] are several in themselves, who are the one subject of the three, and none of them by itself alone is the subject. So also in the character it must be understood that it bespeaks, as was touched on before13, a certain configuration of the soul to the blessed Trinity, intermediate between the configuration of the soul with respect to nature, and the configuration of the same with respect to grace making [one] pleasing14.

Scholion

III. As to the following (3rd) question, it cannot be denied that the radical subject of the character is the soul; but the question remains, what is its immediate and proximate subject. That not the essence itself of the soul, but its powers, insofar as the image of God is in them, are the proximate subject of the character, the ancient Scholastics resolve in concord. Again, however, it is asked, in which [power] it is principally. St. Thomas, whom Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard favor, teaches that it is in the cognitive power, « because from memory and understanding will arises; whence the whole image is in the intellective part as in a root » (Commentary, in the place cited, a. 3, quaestiuncula 3); but Scotus assigns the will for it; St. Bonaventure, with Alexander, holds that it is in the three powers of the soul, insofar as they are the image, and that by appropriation alone it is specially attributed to the cognitive power. On this 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, § 3. — Scotus, here, q. 11; Reportatio, here, q. 10. — St. Thomas, in the place cited, a. 3; St. [Bonaventure], in the place cited, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 4, quaestiuncula 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, in the place cited, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, in the place cited, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Cfr. supra pag. 139, nota 8.
    Cf. above, p. 139, note 8.
  2. 2
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. — Quod character disponit ad gratiam, probatum est duabus quaest. praeced. Cfr. etiam supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et d. 4. p. I. dub. 4. — Maior colligitur ex Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 2. — That the character disposes to grace was proved in the two preceding questions. Cf. also above, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and d. 4, p. I, dub. 4. — The major [premise] is gathered from Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Quality.
  3. 3
    Cfr. quaest. praeced.
    Cf. the preceding question.
  4. 4
    Vide Aristot., I. Ethic. c. ult.; II. c. 5. et VI. c. 1. seqq. — De eo, quod accidens sit in uno subiecto, cfr. tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8.
    See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, last chapter; II, c. 5, and VI, c. 1 sqq. — On the point that an accident is in one subject, cf. tom. II, p. 119, note 8.
  5. 5
    Cfr. supra q. 1. et 2.
    Cf. above, q. 1 and 2.
  6. 6
    Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et q. 2. — Pro informationem Vat. reformationem, et pro convertuntur cod. G convertantur.
    See I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and q. 2. — For informationem the Vatican edition [reads] reformationem, and for convertuntur codex G [reads] convertantur.
  7. 7
    Vat., omisso cum paucis codd. et, substituit principaliter. Superius ante quoniam codd. E F (a secunda manu) omittunt et.
    The Vatican edition, omitting et with a few codices, substitutes principaliter ("principally"). Above, before quoniam, codices E and F (by a second hand) omit et.
  8. 8
    Cap. 10. Cfr. ibid. c. 39. Vide II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.
    Chapter 10. Cf. there, c. 39. See II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
  9. 9
    Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 27. (c. 4.); V. Metaph. text. 23. (IV. c. 18.): Secundum quod multipliciter dicitur: uno modo, forma et substantia cuiuscunque rei; ... alio, in quo primo fieri aptum est, ut color in superficie. Cfr. ibid. VII. text. 11. (VII. c. 4.). — Edd. omittunt modo, et Vat. superius post quod sit addit primo.
    Aristotle, Physics VII, text 27 (c. 4); Metaphysics V, text 23 (IV, c. 18): In which is said in many ways: in one way, the form and substance of any thing; ... in another, that in which something is first apt to come to be, as color in a surface. Cf. there, Physics VII, text 11 (VII, c. 4). — The editions omit modo, and the Vatican edition above, after quod sit, adds primo.
  10. 10
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. seq., d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Pro quia cod. F quando.
    Cf. III Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 sq., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — For quia codex F [reads] quando.
  11. 11
    Edd. character non tantum.
    The editions [read] character non tantum ("the character not only").
  12. 12
    Secundum August., Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 4. n. 13. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 171, nota 10. De una gratia vide II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq., et III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 8. a. 1. § 3: Dicendum, quod nihil impedit, unum accidens esse in pluribus, quando illa radicantur sive fundantur in uno, sicut una gratia in pluribus potentiis, et una sanitas in pluribus membris. Potest ergo unum accidens esse in pluribus potentiis, quando illud accidens non respicit unam potentiam, sed eas, secundum quod fundantur sive uniuntur in uno. — Superius pro quod unum codd. F H aut unum, Vat. primo quod unum.
    According to Augustine, Letter 187 (alias 57), c. 4, n. 13. Cf. tom. I, p. 171, note 10. On one grace see II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1 sq., and III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 8, a. 1, § 3: It must be said that nothing prevents one accident from being in many [things], when they are rooted or founded in one, as one grace in many powers, and one health in many members. Therefore one accident can be in many powers, when that accident does not regard one power, but [regards] them, according as they are founded or united in one. — Above, for quod unum codices F H [read] aut unum, the Vatican edition primo quod unum.
  13. 13
    Quaest. 1. et 2.
    Questions 1 and 2.
  14. 14
    Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
    See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---
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