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Pars 1, Cap. 4

Breviloquium · Pars I: De Trinitate Dei

Textus Latinus
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Capitulum IV. De istius fidei expressione catholica.

Ad istius etiam fidei expressionem catholicam tenendum est secundum sanctorum Doctorum documenta, quod in divinis sunt duo modi praedicandi, scilicet per modum substantiae et relationis; tres modi supponendi, scilicet essentiae, personae et notionis; quatuor modi significandi substantiam, scilicet nomine essentiae, substantiae, personae et hypostasis; quinque modi dicendi, scilicet quis, qui, quae, quod et quid; et tres modi differendi, scilicet secundum differentem modum existendi, secundum differentem modum se habendi et secundum differentem modum intelligendi5.

Ratio praedictorum haec est: quia, cum primum principium sit perfectissimum simul et simplicissimum, omnia, quae perfectionis sunt, de ipso dicuntur proprie et vere; quae autem imperfectionis sunt aut non dicuntur, aut si dicuntur, secundum assumtionem humanae naturae dicuntur, vel translative. Cum igitur decem sint praedicamenta, scilicet substantia, quantitas, relatio, qualitas, actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs et habere6; quinque ultima proprie spectant ad corporalia seu mutabilia; ideo non attribuuntur Deo nisi transsumtivo modo et figurativo. Alia vero quinque praecedentia Deo attribuuntur, secundum id quod completionem dicunt, ita tamen, quod divinam simplicitatem non impediunt. Omnia ergo haec praedicamenta sunt id ipsum, quod est illud, de quo praedicantur; et ita per comparationem ad subiectum, in quo sunt, omnia dicuntur transire in substantiam, relatione tamen excepta; quae, cum duplicem habeat comparationem, scilicet ut ad subiectum in quo, et ut ad terminum ad quem, primo modo transit, ne faciat compositionem, secundo modo manet, ut faciat distinctionem. Et hinc est, quod « substantia continet unitatem, et relatio multiplicat trinitatem7 »; et ideo manent ibi hi tantum duo modi praedicandi differentes. — De quibus talis datur regula, quod quae dicuntur secundum substantiam de omnibus dicuntur et singillatim et simul et singulariter; quae vero secundum

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relationem aut non de omnibus dicuntur, aut si de pluribus, pluraliter, ut relati, distincti, similes, aequales, propter relationem intrinsecam. Nomen autem trinitatis comprehendit utrumque.

Et quoniam plures possunt esse relationes in una persona1, sicut sunt plures personae in una natura; ideo distinctio in notione non infert diversificationem personae, nec distinctio personae plurificationem naturae. Et propterea non quidquid convenit essentiae convenit notioni, vel personae, nec e converso. Et hinc est, quod sunt ibi tres modi supponendi; de quibus talis consuevit dari regula: supposita essentia, non supponitur notio nec persona; et supposita notione, non supponitur essentia nec persona; et supposita persona, non supponitur essentia nec notio, sicut patet per exempla2.

Et quoniam vera distinctio est in suppositis substantiae, manente essentia una; ideo necesse est, ibi multipliciter significari substantiam, scilicet ut communicabilem et incommunicabilem. Ut communicabilem, per modum abstractionis per nomen essentiae, et per modum concretionis per nomen substantiae; ut incommunicabilem vero, vel ut distinguibilem per nomen hypostasis, vel ut distinctam per nomen personae. — Vel aliter, scilicet ut distinctam qualitercumque, et sic hypostasis; vel notabiliter et perfecte, et sic persona3. — Exempla horum quatuor sunt in creatura: humanitas, homo, aliquis homo, Petrus; primum essentiam, secundum substantiam, tertium hypostasim, et quartum personam dicit.

Et quia in persona, quae distinguitur, non solum est considerare eum qui distinguitur, sed etiam illud quo distinguitur; et hoc est proprietas sive notio: ideo necesse est, quod in divinis sint quinque modi dicendi pariter et quaerendi, scilicet quis, ratione personae; qui, ratione hypostasis, quia dicit suppositum substantiae indistincte4; quae, ratione notionis; quod, ratione substantiae; quid sive quo, ratione essentiae.

Et quoniam omnes hi modi in unitate essentiae radicantur, quia quidquid est in Deo est ipse Deus unus et solus; ideo non ponunt ibi differentiam, nec secundum essentiam nec secundum esse. Et propterea sunt ibi tantum tres modi differendi, scilicet secundum modos essendi sive emanandi, sicut differt persona a persona; secundum modos se habendi, sicut differt persona et essentia — quia una persona ad alteram refertur, et ideo distinguitur5, essentia vero non refertur ad alteram, et ideo non distinguitur — secundum modos etiam intelligendi, sicut differt una proprietas substantialis ab altera, ut bonitas et sapientia. — Prima differentia est maior, quae possit reperiri in divinis; est enim in suppositis, ita quod unum non dicitur de altero. — Secunda differentia est minor, quia est in attributis; licet enim unum possit dici de alio, ut persona de essentia, aliquid tamen dicitur de uno, quod non de altero, ut: persona distinguitur et refertur, essentia vero non. — Tertia vero differentia est minima, quia est in connotatis. Licet enim unum de altero dicatur ad invicem, et idem possit dici de utrisque6; non tamen idem connotatur utrobique, nec per idem intelligi datur utrumque. — Ex primo modo differendi oritur pluralitas personarum; ex secundo modo pluralitas praedicationum substantialium et relativarum; ex tertio pluralitas proprietatum essentialium et notionum, sive ab aeterno, sive ex tempore; sive proprie, sive transsumtive; sive communiter, sive appropriate7. Dictorum exempla manifesta sunt. — His intellectis, satis claret, et quid sentiendum, et qualiter loquendum sit de summa trinitate divinarum personarum.

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English Translation

Chapter IV. On the catholic expression of this faith.

For the catholic expression of this faith also it must be held, according to the teachings of the holy Doctors, that in the divine there are two modes of predicating, namely by way of substance and of relation; three modes of suppositing, namely of essence, of person, and of notion; four modes of signifying substance, namely by the name of essence, of substance, of person, and of hypostasis; five modes of saying, namely who [quis], which [qui], what things [quae], that which [quod], and what [quid]; and three modes of differing, namely according to a different mode of existing, according to a different mode of being disposed, and according to a different mode of understanding5.

The reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle is at once most perfect and most simple, all things that belong to perfection are said of it properly and truly; but the things that belong to imperfection either are not said of it, or, if they are said, are said according to the assumption of human nature, or transferredly. Since, then, there are ten categories — namely substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, when, position, and having6 — the last five properly regard corporeal or mutable things; therefore they are not attributed to God except in a transsumptive and figurative mode. But the other five preceding are attributed to God according to that which they express of completion, yet in such a way that they do not impede the divine simplicity. All these categories, therefore, are that very thing which is that of which they are predicated; and thus, by comparison to the subject in which they are, all are said to pass over into substance — relation alone excepted; which, since it has a twofold comparison, namely as to the subject in which and as to the term toward which, in the first mode passes over, lest it produce composition, and in the second mode remains, that it may produce distinction. And hence it is that « substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity7 »; and therefore there remain in it only these two differing modes of predicating. — Concerning which this rule is given: that the things said according to substance are said of all and severally and together and singularly; but the things said according to relation either are not said of all, or, if of several, are said plurally — as related, distinct, alike, equal — on account of the intrinsic relation. But the name of trinity comprehends both.

And since there can be several relations in one person1, just as there are several persons in one nature; therefore distinction in notion does not entail a diversification of person, nor does distinction of person entail a plurification of nature. And for that reason not whatever belongs to the essence belongs to the notion or to the person, nor conversely. And hence it is that there are in it three modes of suppositing; concerning which this rule is customarily given: the essence being supposited, neither notion nor person is supposited; and the notion being supposited, neither essence nor person is supposited; and the person being supposited, neither essence nor notion is supposited, as is clear from examples2.

And since true distinction is in the supposits of substance, the essence remaining one; therefore it is necessary that substance be signified there in several ways, namely as communicable and incommunicable. As communicable, by way of abstraction through the name of essence, and by way of concretion through the name of substance; but as incommunicable, either as distinguishable through the name of hypostasis, or as distinct through the name of person. — Or otherwise, namely as distinct in whatever way, and thus hypostasis; or notably and perfectly, and thus person3. — Examples of these four are found in the creature: humanity, man, some man, Peter; the first says essence, the second substance, the third hypostasis, and the fourth person.

And because in the person which is distinguished there is to be considered not only him who is distinguished, but also that by which he is distinguished — and this is the property or notion — therefore it is necessary that in the divine there be five modes of saying and likewise of asking: namely who, by reason of person; which, by reason of hypostasis, because it says a supposit of substance indistinctly4; what things, by reason of notion; that which, by reason of substance; what or by what, by reason of essence.

And since all these modes are rooted in the unity of the essence, because whatever is in God is God himself, one and alone; therefore they do not posit a difference there, neither according to essence nor according to being. And for that reason there are in it only three modes of differing: namely according to modes of being or of emanating, as person differs from person; according to modes of being disposed, as person and essence differ — because one person is referred to another, and therefore is distinguished5, whereas the essence is not referred to another, and therefore is not distinguished — and according to modes also of understanding, as one substantial property differs from another, as goodness and wisdom. — The first difference is the greatest that can be found in the divine; for it is in the supposits, so that one is not said of the other. — The second difference is lesser, because it is in the attributes; for although one can be said of the other, as person of essence, yet something is said of the one which is not said of the other — as: the person is distinguished and referred, but the essence is not. — But the third difference is the least, because it is in the connoted. For although one may be said of the other reciprocally, and the same may be said of both6, yet the same is not connoted in both, nor is each given to be understood through the same. — From the first mode of differing arises the plurality of persons; from the second mode the plurality of substantial and relative predications; from the third the plurality of essential properties and of notions — whether from eternity or from time; whether properly or transsumptively; whether commonly or by appropriation7. The examples of what has been said are manifest. — These things being understood, it is sufficiently clear both what is to be thought and how one must speak concerning the supreme trinity of the divine persons.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 5
    De duobus modis praedicandi cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. q. 4; de modis supponendi vide I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1; d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 33. q. 2. ad 5; de modis significandi substantiam cfr. I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3, ubi etiam tanguntur modi dicendi, de quibus et de modis differendi vide etiam d. 26. q. 1. — Mox post Ratio edd. cum pluribus codd. addunt autem ad intelligentiam. Inferius edd., 2 excepta, vel transsumtive pro vel translative (cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. q. 3.).
    On the two modes of predicating, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 22, q. 4; on the modes of suppositing, see Book I of the Sentences, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3; and d. 33, q. 2, ad 5; on the modes of signifying substance, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, where the modes of saying are also touched on — concerning which, and concerning the modes of differing, see also d. 26, q. 1. — Shortly after, following Ratio, the editions together with several codices add autem ad intelligentiam. Further below the editions, 2 excepted, have vel transsumtive for vel translative (cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 22, q. 3).
  2. 6
    Ex Aristot., de Praedicam. (Edd., excepta 2, habitus; Aristot.: ἔχειν i. e. habere). Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 4. seqq., ubi ostendit, quaenam praedicamenta sint in Deo etc. — Inferius voci ideo B H K S praefigunt et, ac post nisi V addit tantum.
    From Aristotle, On the Categories (the editions, 2 excepted, have habitus; Aristotle: ἔχειν, i.e. habere). Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 4 ff., where he shows which categories are in God, etc. — Further below, before the word ideo B H K S prefix et, and after nisi V adds tantum.
  3. 7
    Boeth., de Trin. c. 6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 2; d. 27. p. I. q. 3. ad 1-3. et d. 33. q. 1. De seq. regula cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. dub. 2; d. 31. p. I. q. 2. (ubi de terminis relati, distincti, similes etc.) et d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. seq. (ubi de nomine trinitatis). Propositio: Nomen autem trinitatis comprehendit utrumque, in multis codd. omittitur.
    Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 6. Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 26, q. 2; d. 27, p. I, q. 3, ad 1–3; and d. 33, q. 1. On the following rule, cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 22, dub. 2; d. 31, p. I, q. 2 (where the terms relati, distincti, similes, etc. are treated); and d. 24, a. 3, q. 1 f. (where the name trinitatis is treated). The proposition Nomen autem trinitatis comprehendit utrumque is omitted in many codices.
  4. 1
    Ut paternitas et spiratio activa in Patre.
    As paternity and active spiration in the Father.
  5. 2
    Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 5. in corp. explicat sensum, quem hoc loco habet vocabulum supponendi: Illud dicitur supponi, altero supposito, quod est in intentione [conceptu] eius in rectitudine, ut, supposito homine, supponitur animal, et supposito Petro, supponitur homo; essentia autem in ratione personae non est secundum rectitudinem, sed oblique; similiter, supposita notione, non supponitur persona. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 576, nota 1.
    Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 56, m. 5, in the body, explains the sense which the word supponendi has in this place: That is said to be supposited, when something else has been supposited, which is in the intention [concept] of the latter in direct line — as, man being supposited, animal is supposited, and Peter being supposited, man is supposited; but the essence is not in the account of the person in direct line, but obliquely; likewise, the notion being supposited, the person is not supposited. Cf. tom. I, p. 576, note 1.
  6. 3
    Vide I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1-3. et d. 25. a. 1. et 2.
    See Book I of the Sentences, d. 23, a. 1, qq. 1–3, and d. 25, a. 1 and 2.
  7. 4
    I M bene indefinite. Edd. scribunt indistinctae, non falso (cfr. praecedentia); sed adverbium (indistincte dicit) clarius rem exprimit. Codd. nunquam habent diphtongum ae.
    I M rightly have indefinite. The editions write indistinctae, not falsely (cf. what precedes); but the adverb (indistincte dicit) expresses the matter more clearly. The codices never have the diphthong ae.
  8. 5
    B addit persona. Inferius post distinguitur A subiungit essentia. Pro secundum modos, quod ter hoc loco occurrit, T secundum differentem modum. Subinde pro maior, quod praebent S V, A E L O Q maior (H maior perfecta) et summa, alii codd. et 2 perfecta et summa, Vat., 1, 3 perfectissima et summa.
    B adds persona. Further below, after distinguitur A subjoins essentia. For secundum modos, which occurs three times in this place, T has secundum differentem modum. Thereupon, for maior, which S V offer, A E L O Q have maior (H maior perfecta) et summa; other codices and 2 have perfecta et summa; the Vatican edition, 1, 3 have perfectissima et summa.
  9. 6
    B utroque.
    B has utroque.
  10. 7
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq., ubi de proprietatibus ex respectu ad tempus; d. 22. q. 3, ubi de propriis et translativis; d. 34. q. 3, ubi de appropriatis, de quibus vide etiam infra c. 6. — Pro et notionum D et connotatarum (F G et connotatorum). Inferius pro sentiendum A B S sciendum, D F sentiendum vel sciendum.
    Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 30, q. 1 ff., where properties in respect to time are treated; d. 22, q. 3, where the proper and the transferred are treated; d. 34, q. 3, where appropriations are treated — on which see also below, c. 6. — For et notionum D has et connotatarum (F G et connotatorum). Further below, for sentiendum A B S have sciendum, D F sentiendum vel sciendum. ---
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