Pars 2, Cap. 7
Breviloquium · Pars II: De creatura mundi
Capitulum VII. De apostasia daemonum.
De apostasia daemonum hoc tenendum est, quod Deus Angelos omnes fecit bonos, medios tamen inter se, summum bonum, et commutabile bonum, quod est creatura; ita quod, si converterentur ad amandum quod est supra, ascenderent ad statum gratiae et gloriae; si vero ad bonum commutabile, quod est infra, hoc ipso ruerent in malum culpae et poenae; quia non est « dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae8 ». — Primus inter Angelos lucifer, praesumens de privato bono, privatam appetiit excellentiam, volens aliis superferri; et ideo cecidit cum ceteris consentientibus sibi. Cadens autem factus est impoenitens, obstinatus et obcaecatus et exclusus a Dei contemplatione et deordinatus in operatione, toto nitens conamine ad subvertendum hominem per tentationem multiplicem.
Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia, cum primum principium sit summe bo-
num, nihil facit, quod non sit bonum; quia a bono non procedit nisi bonum1; quod tamen fit ab ipso hoc ipso minus est eo, et ideo non potest esse summum bonum. Fuit igitur Angelus a Deo conditus bonus quidem, sed non summus, perficiendus tamen, si affectu tenderet in summum.
Et quoniam per liberum arbitrium voluntatis poterat tendere in bonum summum, vel converti ad bonum privatum; lucifer, suae pulcritudinis et altitudinis consideratione excitatus ad se diligendum et suum privatum bonum, praesumsit de altitudine habita et ambivit excellentiam propriam, non tamen obtentam; ac per hoc praesumendo constituit se sibi principium, in se ipso gloriando; et ambiendo constituit se sibi summum bonum, in se ipso quiescendo. Cum autem ipse nec summum esset principium nec summum bonum; necesse fuit, quod inordinato ascensu2 rueret; pari ratione et omnes in hoc consentientes. — Et quia « non est dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae »; ideo statim, cum cecidit in peccatum, cum ceteris adhaerentibus sibi perdidit locum summum, scilicet empyreum, descendens ad imum, scilicet caliginosum aërem, vel infernum, ita quod lapsus in culpam fuit per liberum arbitrium, lapsus vero in poenam per divinum iudicium. — Et quoniam immutabilitatem habebat post electionem, ideo statim obstinatus est in malo, et per hoc excaecatus a vero et deordinatus est in operatione et infirmatus in virtute: ideo voluntas eius impia et actio aversa a Deo conversa est ad hominis odium et invidiam; et perspicacitas rationis a vero lumine excaecata conversa est ad deceptiones per divinationes et cautelas3; et officiositas in ministrando a vero ministerio amota conversa est ad tentamenta; et virtuositas imminuta et coarctata, quantum permittitur, convertitur ad mirabilia facienda per transmutationes repentinas, quas facit circa corpoream creaturam. — Et quia haec omnia deordinata sunt per voluntatem depravatam per superbiam; ideo haec omnia convertit ad fomentum suae superbiae, quaerens ab hominibus coli et adorari ad modum Dei. Hinc est, quod « omnia male agit4 »; quod tamen iuste Deus modo permittit ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum, sicut apparebit per finale iudicium.
Chapter VII. On the apostasy of the demons.
Concerning the apostasy of the demons this is to be held: that God made all the Angels good, yet midway between the highest good and the changeable good, which is the creature; in such a way that, if they turned to loving what is above, they would ascend to the state of grace and glory; but if to the changeable good, which is below, by that very fact they would fall into the evil of guilt and of punishment — because there is no « disgrace of sin without the comeliness of justice8 ». — The first among the Angels, Lucifer, presuming upon a private good, sought a private excellence, willing to be borne above the others; and therefore he fell, with the rest who consented to him. And in falling he was made impenitent, obstinate and blinded, and shut out from the contemplation of God and disordered in operation, striving with his whole effort to overthrow man by manifold temptation.
Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: that since the first principle is supremely
good, it makes nothing that is not good; because from the good there proceeds nothing but good1; yet what is made by it is, by that very fact, less than it, and therefore cannot be the highest good. The Angel was therefore founded by God good indeed, but not highest — to be perfected, however, if by affection he should tend toward the highest.
And since through the free choice of the will he was able to tend toward the highest good, or to turn toward a private good, Lucifer — roused by the consideration of his own beauty and loftiness to the love of himself and of his own private good — presumed upon the loftiness he had, and coveted an excellence proper to himself, which nevertheless he did not obtain; and through this, by presuming, he constituted himself a principle to himself, glorying in himself; and by coveting, he constituted himself the highest good to himself, resting in himself. But since he was neither the highest principle nor the highest good, it was necessary that by a disordered ascent2 he should fall; and for the same reason all those consenting with him in this. — And because « there is no disgrace of sin without the comeliness of justice », therefore at once, when he fell into sin, he lost with the rest who clung to him the highest place, namely the empyrean, descending to the lowest, namely the murky air, or hell; so that the fall into guilt was through free choice, but the fall into punishment through the divine judgment. — And since he had immutability after election, therefore he was at once made obstinate in evil, and through this blinded from the true and disordered in operation and weakened in power: hence his will, being impious, and his action, being turned away from God, were turned to the hatred and envy of man; and the perspicacity of his reason, blinded from the true light, was turned to deceptions through divinations and wiles3; and his dutifulness in ministering, removed from true ministry, was turned to temptations; and his power, diminished and constrained, is turned — so far as is permitted — to the working of marvels through sudden transmutations, which he effects upon corporeal creation. — And because all these things are disordered through a will depraved by pride, therefore he turns them all to the fuelling of his own pride, seeking to be worshipped and adored by men after the manner of God. Hence it is that « he does all things ill4 »; which nevertheless God now justly permits, for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of the good, as will appear through the final judgment.
- 8August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 15. n. 44, docet, nullo temporis intervallo peccatum a poena esse divisum, « ne vel puncto temporis universalis pulcritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore vindictae ». Ibid. II. c. 19. n. 53. insinuatur definitio peccati: Aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona. — Quod Deus Angelos non creaverit malos, ostenditur II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. — De peccato luciferi et minorum angelorum vide ibid. d. 5. a. 1. et 2. — De loco, in quem ceciderint, cfr. ibid. d. 6. a. 2. — De potestate tentandi homines vide ibid. d. 8. p. II. per totam. — Superius post amandum A addit summum bonum, et O bonum incommutabile.Augustine, III On Free Choice c. 15, n. 44, teaches that sin is divided from punishment by no interval of time, « lest even for a point of time the beauty of the universe be disfigured, so that there be in it the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of retribution ». Ibid. II, c. 19, n. 53, the definition of sin is intimated: A turning away from the unchangeable good and a turning toward changeable goods. — That God did not create the Angels evil is shown in II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1. — On the sin of Lucifer and of the lesser angels see ibid. d. 5, a. 1 and 2. — On the place into which they fell, compare ibid. d. 6, a. 2. — On their power of tempting men see ibid. d. 8, p. II, throughout. — Above, after amandum, A adds summum bonum, and O bonum incommutabile.
- 1Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19: Neque enim ignis est infrigidare, neque boni non bona producere. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 113, nota 7. — Inferius pro voluntatis B I K M O Q V voluntas, et pro excitatus plures codd. et 2 excaecatus. Subinde post principium Vat. et 1, 3 cum uno alteroque cod. (M a secunda manu) addunt summum.Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 19: For it belongs neither to fire to make cold, nor to the good to produce things not good. Compare vol. II, p. 113, note 7. — Below, for voluntatis B I K M O Q V [read] voluntas, and for excitatus very many codices and edition 2 [read] excaecatus. Thereafter, after principium, the Vatican [edition] and editions 1 and 3, with one or another codex (M by a second hand), add summum.
- 2A D F L M O addunt descensu, F insuper substituit appetitu pro ascensu, Vat. et 1, 3 legunt: ut inordinato ascensu appetito, descensu rueret; alii codd. et 2 exhibent nostram lectionem.A D F L M O add descensu; F moreover substitutes appetitu for ascensu; the Vatican [edition] and editions 1 and 3 read ut inordinato ascensu appetito, descensu rueret; the other codices and edition 2 exhibit our reading.
- 3Du Cange, Glossarium etc.: Cautela, cautelia, cautella saepius in malam partem accipiuntur pro fraude, astutia, dolo. — H incantationes, T cantationes. Superius post et actio, quod C et 2 omittunt (B omittit tantum actio) A repetit eius. Inferius pro tentamenta A tentandum. Porro cum A B C K (M a secunda manu) substituimus imminuta pro immutata (D imminuta et immutata).Du Cange, Glossarium etc.: Cautela, cautelia, cautella are more often taken in a bad sense for fraud, cunning, guile. — H [reads] incantationes, T cantationes. Above, after et actio, which C and edition 2 omit (B omits only actio), A repeats eius. Below, for tentamenta A [reads] tentandum. Further, with A B C K (M by a second hand) we have substituted imminuta for immutata (D imminuta et immutata).
- 4Ut dicit Glossa apud Petr. Lombard. in II. Cor. 6, 15. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 493, nota 1. — Superius pro hominibus F M O P et 2 omnibus. Mox edd. cum pluribus codd. legunt: quod tamen iusto iudicio Deus [P addit modo] permittit. Nostra lectio est in S et confirmatur a B C D G K, qui eo differunt, quod modo (i. e. nunc) ponunt ante Deus et habent iusto.As the Gloss says in Peter Lombard on 2 Cor. 6:15. Compare vol. III, p. 493, note 1. — Above, for hominibus F M O P and edition 2 [read] omnibus. Just below, the editions with very many codices read quod tamen iusto iudicio Deus [P adds modo] permittit. Our reading is in S and is confirmed by B C D G K, which differ from it in that they place modo (i.e. nunc) before Deus and have iusto.