Pars 3, Cap. 10
Breviloquium · Pars III: De corruptela peccati
Capitulum X. De origine et qualitate peccatorum poenalium.
De peccatis autem poenalibus hoc tenendum est, quod licet malum culpae et malum poenae sint diversae malorum differentiae; quaedam tamen sic sunt peccata, quod etiam sunt poena8 peccati. Speciali namque modo peccata et poenae peccati dicuntur illa quae habent adiunctum dolorem et moestitiam, sicut invidia, accidia et consimilia. — Minus specialiter dicuntur illa quae habent adiunctam vel meram depravationem naturae, vel ignominiam, sicut sunt illa, quantum ad quae dicitur peccator tradi in reprobum sensum1. — Generaliter autem peccata, quae « sunt inter primam apostasiam et ultimam poenam gehennae, et peccata dici possunt et poena peccati2 », iuxta quod dicit Gregorius, crimina criminibus vindicari. — Licet autem idem dicatur peccatum et poena peccati, tenendum tamen est, quod omnis poena in quantum poena iusta est et a Deo; nulla vero culpa iusta nec a Deo, sed tantum a libero voluntatis arbitrio. — Poena vero, quae mere poena est, a Deo est inflicta; quae vero est culpa, vel inclinans ad culpam est contracta, vel acta3.
Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia, cum malum dicat recessum a primo principio, per hoc quod nocet bono; non autem nocet bono nisi aliquid adimendo de bono; bonum autem consistit in modo, specie et ordine: nullum est malum, quod non sit corruptivum modi, speciei et ordinis4. Ordo autem duplex est, scilicet ordo naturae et ordo iustitiae. Ordo naturae est in bono naturali, ordo iustitiae in bono morali; et quia bonum naturale est in omni natura, bonum morale in voluntate habet consistere: ideo ordo naturae est in omni natura, ordo vero iustitiae in voluntate electiva consistit. Et quia voluntas « est instrumentum se ipsum movens5 », natura vero minime; hinc est, quod ordo iustitiae est ordo non tantum factus, sed etiam factivus; ordo vero naturae est ordo factus. Quoniam ergo malum privare potest ordinem iustitiae et ordinem naturae; hinc est, quod duplex est malum, scilicet culpae et poenae.
Rursus, quia ordo iustitiae est ordo voluntarius; hinc est, quod « malum culpae est affectio voluntaria, malum autem poenae est affectio involuntaria6 ».
Postremo, quia ordo iustitiae, qui est in voluntate, est ordo factivus; ideo « malum culpae, quod est eius privatio, est malum, quod facimus, et malum poenae est malum, quod patimur ». Et quia passio non est, nisi naturaliter praecedat actio; nec actio, ad quam non sequatur aliqua passio7: hinc est, quod nulla est poena sine praecedente merito culpae, nulla est etiam culpa, quin comitetur aliqua poena.
Et quoniam quod facimus a nobis est, quod patimur potest esse a nobis et ab aliis, utpote a causa superiori, vel inferiori: ideo, licet omnis culpa sit a nobis, non tamen omnis poena est a nobis, immo quaedam a nobis acta, quaedam inflicta, quaedam contracta.
Et quia cum qui facit quod non debet, iustum est pati quod debet; ideo omnis poena in quantum poena iusta est et a divina providentia, quia ordinata ad culpam et ipsius culpae ordinativa.
Quia vero passio illa potest esse per ademptionem boni naturalis, vel boni moralis cum naturali; hinc est, quod quaedam poena est mere poena, quaedam vero est poena et culpa; quia bonum morale, quod est iustitia, non adimitur nisi per iniustitiam, quae est culpa. — Prima igitur poena est a Deo et secundum quod poena, et secundum id quod est: a Deo, inquam, non instituente, sed vindicante. Secunda vero, cum sit culpa, secundum id quod est8, a Deo non est, sed solum quantum ad ordinem. Ipsa vero vel est acta, si sequatur ad actuale, vel est contracta, si sequatur ad originale.
Si ergo proprie accipiatur malum, secundum quod est privatio boni naturalis et affectio involuntaria et malum, quod patimur; sic non coincidit cum malo culpae in idem, licet sit annexum eidem. Si autem accipiatur large, ut dicatur malum, quod patimur sive a nobis, sive aliunde, sive in natura, sive in voluntate; sic coincidunt in idem, sed non ad idem, vel secundum idem: quia quod est culpa in se dicitur praecedentis9 poena; vel: culpa ratione actionis dicitur esse poena ratione passionis. — Et sic patet, quomodo, pro quanto et quare aliquid simul dicatur peccatum et poena peccati.
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Chapter X. On the origin and quality of the penal sins.
Concerning the penal sins this is to be held: that although the evil of fault and the evil of penalty are diverse differentiae of evils, some things are nevertheless sins in such a way that they are also the penalty8 of sin. For in a special way those things are called sins and penalties of sin which have sorrow and sadness joined to them, such as envy, sloth and the like. — Less specially are called those which have joined to them either the mere depravation of nature, or ignominy — such as those things in respect of which a sinner is said to be handed over to a reprobate sense1. — But generally are so called the sins which "are between the first apostasy and the last penalty of hell, and can be called both sins and the penalty of sin2," according to what Gregory says: that crimes are avenged by crimes. — But although sin and the penalty of sin are called the same, it must nevertheless be held that every penalty, inasmuch as it is a penalty, is just and from God; but no fault is just, nor from God, but only from the free choice of the will. — And a penalty which is merely a penalty is inflicted by God; but the one which is a fault, or which inclines to fault, is either contracted or enacted3.
Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since evil bespeaks a withdrawal from the first principle through this, that it harms a good; and it does not harm a good except by taking something away from the good; and a good consists in mode, species and order: there is no evil which is not destructive of mode, species and order4. But order is twofold, namely the order of nature and the order of justice. The order of nature is in the natural good, the order of justice in the moral good; and because the natural good is in every nature, while the moral good has to consist in the will: therefore the order of nature is in every nature, but the order of justice consists in the elective will. And because the will "is an instrument moving itself5," but nature is by no means such; hence it is that the order of justice is an order not only made but also making; whereas the order of nature is an order made. Since therefore evil can deprive of the order of justice and of the order of nature; hence it is that evil is twofold, namely of fault and of penalty.
Again, because the order of justice is a voluntary order; hence it is that "the evil of fault is a voluntary affection, but the evil of penalty is an involuntary affection6."
Lastly, because the order of justice, which is in the will, is a making order; therefore "the evil of fault, which is the privation of it, is the evil which we do, and the evil of penalty is the evil which we suffer." And because there is no passion unless naturally an action precede; nor is there an action upon which some passion does not follow7: hence it is that there is no penalty without a preceding merit of fault, and there is also no fault which some penalty does not accompany.
And since what we do is from ourselves, while what we suffer can be from ourselves and from others — as, for instance, from a higher or a lower cause: therefore, although every fault is from ourselves, not every penalty is from ourselves; rather, some is enacted by us, some inflicted, some contracted.
And because it is just that he who does what he ought not should suffer what he ought; therefore every penalty, inasmuch as it is a penalty, is just and from divine providence, because it is ordained to the fault and is ordinative of the fault itself.
But because that passion can be through the taking away of a natural good, or of a moral good together with the natural; hence it is that some penalty is merely a penalty, but some is penalty and fault; because the moral good, which is justice, is not taken away except through injustice, which is fault. — The first penalty, therefore, is from God both according as it is a penalty and according to that which it is: from God, I say, not as instituting but as avenging. But the second, since it is a fault, is not from God according to that which it is8, but only as regards its order. And it is either enacted, if it follow upon the actual, or contracted, if it follow upon the original.
If, therefore, evil be taken properly, according as it is the privation of a natural good and an involuntary affection and the evil which we suffer; then it does not coincide with the evil of fault in one and the same thing, although it is annexed to it. But if it be taken broadly, so that whatever we suffer be called evil — whether from ourselves or from elsewhere, whether in nature or in the will — then they coincide in the same thing, but not toward the same, nor according to the same: because what is fault in itself is called the penalty9 of a preceding one; or: fault by reason of action is said to be penalty by reason of passion. — And thus it is clear how, to what extent, and why one and the same thing may be called both sin and the penalty of sin.
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- 8Edd., excepta 2, cum paucis codd. poenae.The editions, except edition 2, together with a few codices, have poenae.
- 1Rom. 1, 28: Tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt. Cfr. ibid. v. 24. et 26, ubi dicitur, quod « tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis eorum, in immunditiam » et « in passiones ignominiae ». — Pro ignominiam I P et 2 ignorantiam, aliae edd. ignominiam vel ignorantiam.Rom. 1:28: God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Cf. ibid. vv. 24 and 26, where it is said that "God gave them up to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness" and "unto passions of ignominy." — For ignominiam, I P and edition 2 have ignorantiam; the other editions, ignominiam vel ignorantiam.
- 2His verbis complectitur Magister in II. Sent. d. XXXVI. c. 1. sententiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 57, 9. n. 18. Ibid. c. 1. et 3. habetur etiam sententia Gregorii, quae, si verba attenduntur, ab August., I. contra Adversarium Legis et Prophet. c. 24. n. 51, exhibetur in exponendo praenotatum verbum Apostoli (Rom. 1, 26: Tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae): « ut crimina criminibus vindicarentur ».In these words the Master, in II Sent., d. XXXVI, c. 1, embraces the opinion of Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms 57:9, n. 18. In the same place, cc. 1 and 3, there is also found the opinion of Gregory, which — if the wording is attended to — is presented by Augustine, Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets I, c. 24, n. 51, in expounding the aforenoted word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:26: God delivered them up to passions of ignominy): "that crimes might be avenged by crimes."
- 3Vide tom. II. pag. 826, nota 4. de hac poenae distinctione verba Praepositivi. — Materia huius cap. exponitur II. Sent. d. 36. per totam. — Superius fide S posuimus libero pro liberae.See tom. II, p. 826, note 4, for Praepositinus's words on this distinction of penalty. — The matter of this chapter is expounded in II Sent., d. 36, throughout. — Above, on the faith of S, we have put libero for liberae.
- 4Cfr. supra c. 1., et II. Sent. d. 35. per totam, ubi etiam (praecipue a. 2. q. 1.) quae sequuntur fusius declarantur. — Inferius non pauci codd. omittunt habet consistere, et pro consistit, quod praebent A S et 2, alii codd. et edd. ponunt habet consistere.Cf. above, c. 1, and II Sent., d. 35, throughout, where also (especially a. 2, q. 1) what follows is set out more fully. — Below, not a few codices omit habet consistere, and for consistit, which A S and edition 2 give, the other codices and the editions put habet consistere.
- 5Ut dicit Anselm., de Concord. grat. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11.As Anselm says, On the Concord of Grace and Free Choice, q. 3, c. 11.
- 6Secundum August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 825, nota 4. Ibid. nota 3. seq. ipsius sententia seq. ex I. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. habetur. — Mox voci factivus A praemittit activus sive.According to Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will III, c. 9, n. 26. Cf. tom. II, p. 825, note 4. In the same place, note 3, the following opinion of his is taken from On Free Choice of the Will I, c. 1, n. 1. — Shortly after, before the word factivus A places activus sive.
- 7Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Princip. c. de Actione: Omnis enim actio passionis est effectiva, et omne passionem inferens actio est. — Inferius pro quin A C E H quam non.Gilbert de la Porrée, On the Six Principles, the chapter On Action: "For every action is productive of passion, and everything inflicting passion is an action." — Below, for quin, A C E H have quam non.
- 8Edd., excepta 2, cum aliquot codd. quod culpa est. Pro vindicante H M O Q et 2 iudicante. Mox pro sed solum edd. cum uno alteroque cod. nisi solum.The editions, except edition 2, together with some codices, have quod culpa est. For vindicante, H M O Q and edition 2 have iudicante. Shortly after, for sed solum, the editions together with one or another codex have nisi solum.
- 9Edd., excepta 2, dicitur respectu praecedentis culpae.The editions, except edition 2, read dicitur respectu praecedentis culpae. ---