Pars 4, Cap. 2
Breviloquium · Pars IV: De incarnatione Verbi
Capitulum II. De incarnatione quantum ad unionem naturarum.
Circa ipsum autem Verbum incarnatum tria nobis consideranda occurrunt, scilicet unio naturarum, plenitudo charismatum et perpessio passionum propter redimendum genus humanum3. — Circa naturarum unionem haec tria consideranda sunt ad intelligendum incarnationis mysterium, scilicet opus, modus et tempus.
De opere autem incarnationis haec tenenda sunt secundum fidem christianam, quod incarnatio est operatio Trinitatis, per quam fit assumtio carnis a Deitate et unio Deitatis cum carne; ita quod assumtio non tantum est carnis sensibilis, sed etiam spiritus rationalis secundum potentiam vegetandi, sentiendi et intelligendi; ita etiam, quod unio non fit in unitate naturae, sed personae, non humanae, sed divinae, non assumtae, sed assumentis; non personae cuiuslibet, sed personae solius Verbi; in qua tanta fit unio, ut quidquid dicitur de Filio Dei dicatur de filio hominis, et e converso, his tamen exceptis, in quibus exprimitur unio, vel clauditur negatio4.
Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia incarnationis opus non solum est a primo principio, in quantum est effectivum in producendo, verum etiam, in quantum est reparativum remediando, satisfaciendo et reconciliando. Quoniam ergo incarnatio, in quantum dicit aliquem effectum, est a primo principio, quod omnia facit ratione summae virtutis; et substantia, virtus5 et operatio unita est et indivisa omnimode in tribus personis: hinc est, quod necesse est, incarnationis operationem a tota Trinitate manare.
Quia vero est a primo principio, in quantum est reparativum remediando; et totum genus humanum lapsum fuerat et vitiatum, non solum ratione animae, verum etiam carnis: hinc est, quod necesse fuit, quod totum assumeretur, ut totum curaretur6. — Et quoniam nobis magis nota est pars carnis et magis a Deo distat; ut expressior fiat nominatio, et maior exprimatur humiliatio, et profundior explicetur dignatio: hinc est, quod opus illud non inanimatio, sed incarnatio nominatur.
Rursus, quia est a primo principio, in quantum est reparativum satisfaciendo, et satisfactio non fit, nisi ab eo qui debet et potest; et non debet nisi homo, nec potest nisi Deus: oportuit, quod in satisfactione simul esset concursus utriusque naturae, divinae scilicet et humanae. Et quia impossibile est, quod divina natura concurrat cum alia sicut pars ad constitutionem tertii; nec quod ipsa transeat in aliam naturam, nec alia natura transeat in ipsam, propter simplicitatem et immutabilitatem ipsius perfectissimam: hinc est, quod Deitas et humanitas non uniuntur in unitate naturae nec accidentis, uniuntur ergo in unitate personae et hypostasis. Et quoniam divina natura in nullo supposito potest subsistere praeterquam in propria hypostasi; ideo unio illa non potest esse in hypostasi seu persona hominis, sed Dei; ac per hoc per illam unionem primum principium in una suarum hypostasum fecit se ipsum suppositum humanae naturae: et ita una tantum est ibi personalitas et unitas personalis, ex parte scilicet assumentis.
Postremo, quia est a primo principio, ut est reparativum reconciliando; et reconcilians est mediator, mediatio autem proprie convenit Dei Filio: ideo et incarnatio. Mediatoris namque est esse medium inter hominem et Deum ad reducendum hominem ad divinam cognitionem, ad divinam conformitatem et ad divinam filiationem. Nullum autem magis decet esse medium quam personam, quae producit et producitur, quae est media trium personarum; nullumque magis decet reducere hominem ad divinam cognitionem quam Verbum, quo se Pater declarat, quod est unibile carni, sicut et verbum voci1; nullum etiam magis decet reducere ad divinam conformitatem, quam eum qui est imago Patris; nullum magis decet ad filiationem adoptivam reducere quam Filium naturalem: ac per hoc nullum magis decet fieri filium hominis quam ipsum Filium Dei2.
Quoniam ergo omnino idem est Filius hominis et Dei ratione incarnationis; et « quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem3 »: hinc est, quod necessario fit communicatio idiomatum, nisi sit vocabulum, in quo aliqua repugnantia includatur; sicut sunt illa, in quibus includitur respectus unionis unius naturae ad alteram, sicut unire, incarnari, assumere et assumi; vel negatio alicuius, cuius oppositum alteri competit, sicut incipere esse, creari et consimilia, in quibus instantia fertur contra regulam praehabitam propter causam praedictam.
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Chapter II. On the incarnation as regards the union of the natures.
Now concerning the incarnate Word itself three things present themselves for our consideration, namely the union of the natures, the fulness of the charisms and the endurance of the sufferings for the redeeming of the human race3. — Concerning the union of the natures these three things are to be considered for the understanding of the mystery of the incarnation, namely the work, the mode and the time.
Now concerning the work of the incarnation these things are to be held according to the Christian faith: that the incarnation is an operation of the Trinity, through which there comes about the assumption of flesh by the Deity and the union of the Deity with flesh; in such wise that the assumption is not only of sensible flesh, but also of the rational spirit according to the power of vegetating, of sensing and of understanding; and in such wise also that the union does not come about in a unity of nature, but of person, not of a human person, but of a divine one, not of the person assumed, but of the person assuming; not of any person whatever, but of the person of the Word alone; in which person so great a union comes about that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the son of man, and conversely — those things nevertheless excepted in which the union is expressed, or a negation is enclosed4.
Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since the work of the incarnation is not only from the first principle inasmuch as it is effective in producing, but also inasmuch as it is reparative by remedying, by making satisfaction and by reconciling. Since therefore the incarnation, inasmuch as it names some effect, is from the first principle, which makes all things by reason of its highest power; and since substance, power5 and operation are united and in every way undivided in the three persons: hence it is that the operation of the incarnation must necessarily flow from the whole Trinity.
But because it is from the first principle inasmuch as it is reparative by remedying; and the whole human race had fallen and been vitiated, not only by reason of the soul, but also of the flesh: hence it is that it was necessary that the whole be assumed, so that the whole might be healed6. — And since the part which is flesh is better known to us and stands further from God; in order that the naming might be more expressive, and the humiliation more greatly expressed, and the condescension more profoundly unfolded: hence it is that that work is named not inanimation, but incarnation.
Again, because it is from the first principle inasmuch as it is reparative by making satisfaction, and satisfaction is not made except by him who is bound to and is able to; and none is bound to but man, nor is able to but God: it behoved that in the satisfaction there should be at once a concurrence of both natures, the divine namely and the human. And because it is impossible that the divine nature should concur with another as a part toward the constitution of a third; nor that it should pass over into another nature, nor another nature into it, on account of its most perfect simplicity and immutability: hence it is that the Deity and the humanity are not united in a unity of nature nor of accident, and they are therefore united in a unity of person and of hypostasis. And since the divine nature can subsist in no supposit save in its own hypostasis; therefore that union cannot be in the hypostasis or person of a man, but of God; and through this, by that union the first principle in one of its hypostases made itself the supposit of the human nature: and so there is there only one personality and one personal unity, on the part namely of the one assuming.
Lastly, because it is from the first principle as it is reparative by reconciling; and the one reconciling is a mediator, and mediation properly befits the Son of God: therefore the incarnation too befits him. For it belongs to a mediator to be a middle between man and God, for the leading back of man to divine knowledge, to divine conformity and to divine sonship. But nothing more befits being a middle than a person who both produces and is produced, who is the middle of the three persons; and nothing more befits leading man back to divine knowledge than the Word, by which the Father declares himself, which is unitable to flesh, as a word also is to a voice1; nothing likewise more befits leading back to divine conformity than him who is the image of the Father; nothing more befits leading back to adoptive sonship than the natural Son: and through this nothing more befits becoming the son of man than the Son of God himself2.
Since therefore the Son of man and the Son of God are altogether the same by reason of the incarnation; and since « whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other3 »: hence it is that the communication of idioms necessarily comes about, unless there be a word in which some repugnance is enclosed; such as are those in which the respect of the union of one nature to the other is included, as to unite, to be incarnate, to assume and to be assumed; or the negation of something whose opposite belongs to the other, as to begin to be, to be created and the like — in which cases an instance is brought against the rule already laid down, for the reason aforesaid.
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- 3De primo agitur c. 2-4; de secundo c. 5-7; de tertio c. 8-10.The first is treated in capp. 2–4; the second in capp. 5–7; the third in capp. 8–10.
- 4Cfr. III, Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 2, ubi de operatione Trinitatis in incarnatione; d. 2. a. 2, ubi de natura assumta, scil. carne et spiritu; d. 5-7. de ipsa unione; d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, ubi de exceptis a communicatione idiomatum. — Pro his tamen 1, 2, 3 cum pluribus codd. his tantum. Superius vocibus ita quod A C S T et 2 interserunt tamen.Cf. III Sent., d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, where the operation of the Trinity in the incarnation is treated; d. 2, a. 2, where the nature assumed — namely flesh and spirit — is treated; d. 5–7, on the union itself; d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3, where the things excepted from the communication of idioms are treated. — For his tamen editions 1, 2 and 3, with several codices, have his tantum. Above, between the words ita quod A C S T and edition 2 insert tamen.
- 5Ed. 1, omisso substantia, legit et summa virtus. S. Doctor respicere videtur illam trimembrem divisionem superius pag. 205, nota 7. ex Dionysio allatam; de qua, I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2, docet, quod in omni creato, sed non in Deo, illa membra realiter differant. — T et summa substantia, virtus.Edition 1, omitting substantia, reads et summa virtus. The holy Doctor seems to have in view that threefold division adduced above on p. 205, note 7, from Dionysius; concerning which, in I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 2, he teaches that in every created thing — but not in God — those members really differ. — T has et summa substantia, virtus.
- 6Secundum loquendi modum Damasc.; cfr. tom. III. pag. 268, nota 2. — Inferius pro inanimatio fere omnes codd. et 2 animatio.According to the manner of speaking of the Damascene; cf. tom. III, p. 268, note 2. — Further below, for inanimatio nearly all the codices and edition 2 have animatio.
- 1Vide I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 4. Cfr. etiam supra p. I. c. 2. seq.See I Sent., d. 27, p. II, q. 4. Cf. also above, Pars I, c. 2 f.
- 2Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 3.Cf. III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 3.
- 3Aristot., I. Elench. c. 5. (c. 6.).Aristotle, I Elenchi, c. 5 (c. 6). ---