Pars 5, Cap. 4
Breviloquium · Pars V: De gratia Spiritus sancti
Capitulum IV. De ramificatione gratiae in habitus virtutum.
Tertio restat agere de gratia in comparatione ad habitus virtutum, circa quam consideranda sunt tria. Primum est, qualiter gratia una ramificatur in habitus virtutum; secundum est, qualiter ramificatur in habitus donorum; tertium est, qualiter ramificatur in habitus beatitudinum1.
De ramificatione igitur gratiae in habitus virtutum haec tenenda sunt, quod cum una sit gratia gratificans animam, septem tamen sunt virtutes gratuitae, quibus regitur vita humana: tres quidem theologicae, scilicet fides, spes et caritas; et quatuor cardinales, scilicet prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo et iustitia, quae uno modo est virtus communis et generalis, alio modo specialis et propria. — Hae autem septem virtutes, licet sint distinctae et proprias excellentias habentes, sunt tamen connexae et aequales ad invicem in eodem; et licet sint gratuitae per gratiam informatae, possunt tamen fieri informes per culpam, sola caritate excepta, et iterum informari per poenitentiam, adveniente gratia, quae est habituum virtualium origo, finis et forma2.
Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia, sicut principium productivum sua summa perfectione in dando vitam naturae non tantum dat vivere quantum ad actum primum, verum etiam quantum ad actum secundum, qui est operari; sic necesse est, quod principium reparativum vitam tribuat spiritui in esse gratuito et in quantum ad esse et quantum ad operari. Et quoniam unius viventis secundum unam vitam primam multae sunt operationes vitales ad illius vitae perfectam manifestationem; cum actus diversificentur per obiecta, et diversitas actuum requirat distinctionem habituum3: hinc est, quod licet una sit gratia vivificans, ramificari tamen necessario habet in varios habitus propter varias operationes. — Et quoniam quaedam sunt opera moralia primaria, sicut credere; quaedam media, sicut intelligere credita; quaedam vero postrema, sicut videre intellecta; et in primis anima rectificatur, in secundis expeditur, in tertiis perficitur: ideo gratia gratum faciens ramificatur in habitus virtutum, quorum est animam rectificare; in habitus donorum, quorum est animam expedire; et in habitus beatitudinum, quorum est animam perficere4.
Rursus, quoniam rectitudo animae perfecta requirit, quod ipsa rectificetur secundum duplicem faciem, scilicet superiorem et inferiorem, et respectu finis, et respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem; ideo necesse est, animam quantum ad superiorem faciem, in qua consistit imago Trinitatis aeternae, rectificari per tres theologicas virtutes, ut, sicut imago creationis consistit in trinitate potentiarum cum unitate essentiae, sic imago recreationis in trinitate habituum cum unitate gratiae, per quos anima fertur recte in summam Trinitatem secundum tria appropriata tribus personis5; ita quod fides dirigit in summe verum credendo et assentiendo, spes in summe arduum innitendo et exspectando, caritas in summe bonum desiderando et diligendo.
Necesse est etiam, quantum ad inferiorem faciem animam rectificari per quatuor cardinales virtutes. Nam prudentia rectificat rationalem, fortitudo irascibilem, temperantia concupiscibilem, iustitia vero rectificat omnes has vires in comparatione ad alterum. — Et quia illud alterum determinate potest esse proximus, potest etiam idem homo comparari ad se ipsum ut ad alterum, potest etiam esse ipse Deus; hinc est, quod iustitia circuire dicitur6 omnes vires. Dicitur etiam non tantum virtus cardinalis, verum etiam generalis, comprehendens totius animae rectitudinem, cum ipsa dicatur « rectitudo voluntatis ». Unde ipsa non tantum comprehendit virtutes ordinantes ad proximum, sicut est aequitas et liberalitas; verum etiam ad se ipsum, sicut est poenitentia et innocentia; nec non ad Deum, sicut est latria, pietas et obedientia.
Postremo, quoniam omnis rectitudo virtutum secundum esse gratuitum manat a gratia tanquam ab origine et radice; et secundum esse meritorium comparatur ad caritatem sicut ad originem, formam et finem: hinc est, quod ceterae virtutes gratuitae quoad habitus sunt connexae et quoad actus meritorios sunt aequales. — Hinc est etiam, quod ceteri habitus virtutum possunt esse informes, sola caritate excepta, quae est virtutum forma. Cum enim habentur sine gratia et caritate, in quibus consistit vita virtutum, tunc sunt informes. Cum autem superinfunditur gratia, tunc formantur et decorantur et Deo acceptabiles fiunt; sicut et colores absque luce sunt invisibiles, superveniente autem lumine, fiunt lucidi, pulcri et aspectui complacentes. Unde quemadmodum ex luce et coloribus fit unum in ratione motivi, et una lux sufficit ad multos colores illuminandos; sic ex gratia et habitibus informibus, cum formantur, fit unum secundum rationem meritorii et gratuiti; et una nihilominus gratia sufficit ad informationem et gratificationem habituum diversorum1.
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Chapter IV. On the branching of grace into the habits of the virtues.
Third, it remains to treat of grace in comparison with the habits of the virtues, concerning which three things are to be considered. The first is, in what way the one grace branches out into the habits of the virtues; the second is, in what way it branches out into the habits of the gifts; the third is, in what way it branches out into the habits of the beatitudes1.
Concerning the branching of grace, then, into the habits of the virtues, these things are to be held: that although the grace making the soul gracious is one, there are nevertheless seven gratuitous virtues by which human life is governed — three indeed theological, namely faith, hope and charity; and four cardinal, namely prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, which in one way is a common and general virtue, in another way special and proper. — But these seven virtues, although they are distinct and have their own proper excellences, are nevertheless connected and equal to one another in the same subject; and although they are gratuitous, informed through grace, they can nevertheless be made unformed through fault — charity alone excepted — and be informed again through penance, when grace comes, which is the origin, end and form of the virtual habits2.
Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since, just as the productive principle, by its supreme perfection in giving life to nature, gives not only to live as regards the first act, but also as regards the second act, which is to operate; so it is necessary that the reparative principle bestow life upon the spirit in gratuitous being, and both as regards being and as regards operating. And since, for one living thing, according to one first life there are many vital operations for the perfect manifestation of that life; since acts are diversified through their objects, and the diversity of acts requires a distinction of habits3: hence it is that, although the vivifying grace is one, it must nevertheless necessarily branch out into various habits on account of the various operations. — And since certain moral works are primary, such as to believe; certain intermediate, such as to understand what is believed; and certain last, such as to see what is understood; and in the first the soul is set right, in the second set free, in the third perfected: therefore grace making gracious branches out into the habits of the virtues, whose office is to set the soul right; into the habits of the gifts, whose office is to set the soul free; and into the habits of the beatitudes, whose office is to perfect the soul4.
Again, since the perfect rectitude of the soul requires that it be set right according to a twofold face, namely the higher and the lower, and in respect of the end, and in respect of those things which are toward the end; therefore it is necessary that the soul, as regards its higher face, in which consists the image of the eternal Trinity, be set right through the three theological virtues, so that, as the image of creation consists in a trinity of powers with a unity of essence, so the image of re-creation consists in a trinity of habits with a unity of grace, through which the soul is borne rightly into the supreme Trinity according to the three attributes appropriated to the three persons5; in such wise that faith directs it into the supremely true by believing and assenting, hope into the supremely arduous by leaning upon and awaiting, charity into the supremely good by desiring and loving.
It is necessary also that, as regards its lower face, the soul be set right through the four cardinal virtues. For prudence sets right the rational power, fortitude the irascible, temperance the concupiscible, while justice sets right all these powers in relation to another. — And because that other can determinately be one's neighbor, and the same man can also be compared to himself as to another, and it can also be God himself; hence it is that justice is said to go around6 all the powers. It is said also to be not only a cardinal virtue, but also a general one, comprehending the rectitude of the whole soul, since it is itself called « the rectitude of the will ». Hence it comprehends not only the virtues that order us toward our neighbor, such as equity and liberality, but also those toward ourselves, such as penance and innocence; and likewise those toward God, such as worship, piety and obedience.
Lastly, since all rectitude of the virtues, according to gratuitous being, flows from grace as from its origin and root; and according to meritorious being is compared to charity as to its origin, form and end: hence it is that the other gratuitous virtues, as regards their habits, are connected, and as regards their meritorious acts, are equal. — Hence it is also that the other habits of the virtues can be unformed, charity alone excepted, which is the form of the virtues. For when they are had without grace and charity, in which the life of the virtues consists, then they are unformed. But when grace is poured in over them, then they are formed and adorned and made acceptable to God; just as colors also are invisible without light, but when light supervenes they become bright, beautiful and pleasing to the sight. Hence, just as out of light and colors there comes to be one thing in the character of a motive, and one light suffices for the illumination of many colors; so out of grace and unformed habits, when they are formed, there comes to be one thing according to the character of the meritorious and the gratuitous; and one grace nonetheless suffices for the informing and gracing of diverse habits1.
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- 1De his agitur hic et 2 seqq. capp.These matters are treated here and in the 2 following chapters.
- 2De unitate gratiae eiusque diversitate a virtutibus cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq.; de virtutibus theologicis et cardinalibus vide III. Sent. d. 23-33; de connexione virtutum earumque forma (caritate) agitur ibid. d. 36. — Supra pro gratiam informatae O P Q U satis bene gratiam informantem.On the unity of grace and its diversity from the virtues cf. II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 1 and following; on the theological and cardinal virtues see III Sent., d. 23–33; on the connection of the virtues and their form (charity) the matter is treated in the same place, d. 36. — Above, for gratiam informatae O P Q U have, well enough, gratiam informantem.
- 3Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 69, nota 8. — Idem etiam II. de Anima, text. 36. seq. (c. 4.) insinuat distinctionem inter actum vitae primum et secundum. — In hac propositione voci multae edd. cum paucis codd. praefigunt membrorum. Aliquanto superius post actum primum B H addunt qui est vivere. Inferius pro vivificans S gratificans.According to Aristotle; see above, p. 69, note 8. — The same author also, in II On the Soul, text 36 and following (c. 4), intimates the distinction between the first and the second act of life. — In this proposition, before the word multae the editions, with a few codices, prefix membrorum. Somewhat above, after actum primum B H add qui est vivere. Below, for vivificans S has gratificans.
- 4Cfr. III. Sent. d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. III Sent., d. 34, part I, a. 1, q. 1.
- 5Vide supra p. I. c. 6. — Pro innitendo, quod recte exhibent B M (cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 4, ubi inter actus spei recensentur confidere, inniti [summae largitati] et exspectare), edd. imitando, Q in vincendo, I K O V in laudando. Superius verbo rectificari G H N addunt a Deo.See above, part I, c. 6. — For innitendo, which B M rightly exhibit (cf. III Sent., d. 36, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 4, where among the acts of hope are reckoned confidere, inniti [summae largitati] and exspectare), the editions have imitando, Q in vincendo, I K O V in laudando. Above, to the word rectificari G H N add a Deo.
- 6Ab August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 10. n. 14. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 11. — Seq. locus est Anselm., de Conceptu virg. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12: Iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata. — Post omnes vires 1 prosequitur: est enim non tantum virtus cardinalis specialis, verum etiam etc. Superius pro potest etiam idem homo comparari I K M O V potest esse idem homo comparatus.From Augustine, II On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 10, n. 14. Cf. tom. III, p. 720, note 11. — The following passage is Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 3, and the Dialogue on Truth, c. 12: Justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. — After omnes vires edition 1 continues: est enim non tantum virtus cardinalis specialis, verum etiam etc. Above, for potest etiam idem homo comparari I K M O V have potest esse idem homo comparatus.
- 1Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. — Superius post motivi B addit ad videndum.Cf. III Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 5. — Above, after motivi B adds ad videndum. ---