Scholion
Itinerarium mentis in Deum · Scholion
SCHOLION
Aurei huius opusculi doctrina a viris etiam doctis non raro vel imperfecte, vel omnino perperam intellecta est. Nonnulli enim aliquas eiusdem propositiones non in rigore verborum intelligendas, sed benigna quadam interpretatione exponendas sive excusandas esse censuerunt, utpote dictas in libro mystico, non scientifice theologico. Alii non pauci quibusdam loquendi modis ibi occurrentibus abusi sunt ad confirmandas proprias suas opiniones falsas. — Considerata huius libelli sublimitate et expositionis brevitate, non est mirum, quod erroneae interpretationes elapsae sint sive parum versatis in doctrina seraphici Doctoris, sive specialem indolem totumque contextum huius scripti non attendentibus. Attamen a sapientissimis viris ultimorum saeculorum hic libellus recte celebratus est ut prorsus in genere suo singularis, mira arte compositus et nunquam satis laudandus. Reapse continet documenta sana, altissima, saluberrima et diligenti verborum electione expressa; totaque doctrina omnino consentanea est ei quam Sanctus in scriptis suis theologicis profitetur et diffusius exponit. Hoc satis constare potest iam per testimonia a nobis in notis allegata; quoad pauca quaedam difficiliora remittimus lectorem ad Quaestionem disputatam supra pag. 47 denuo impressam et cum aliis auctorum scholae Bonaventurianae quaestionibus primo in opusculo de Humanae Cognitionis ratione a nobis typis Collegii S. Bonaventurae 1883 publicatam, praesertim ad praeambulam Dissertationem (ibid. pag. 1-47).
In commodum tamen lectoris visum est opportunum breves quasdam observationes hic subiicere, ut via paretur facilior ad rectam difficiliorum locorum intelligentiam. p. 314
1. Quoad indolem opusculi peculiarem notamus, quod recte quidem recensetur inter opera mystica, quin tamen suo loco inter opera ad scientiam theologicam et etiam philosophicam spectantia privandum sit. Est opus mysticum, spectatis tum fine ab auctore intento tum animi dispositionibus, quas idem in legentibus requirit; quod manifeste constat ex Prologo et initio 1. capituli. Non enim auctor eo consilio scripsit, ut more scholarum doceat scientiam pure theoreticam, vel confutet errores, sed ut directe promoveat devotionem et divinorum contemplationem. Dicit enim: « Vacare volentibus ad Deum magnificandum, admirandum et etiam degustandum speculationes subiectas propono » (Prolog. n. 4.). Pro dispositione autem lectoris non sufficere dicitur intellectus humanus, quantumvis acutus et excultus, ne adiunctis quidem principiis, quae fides omnibus Christianis proponit; sed ipse sit « vir desideriorum », sit praeventus gratia, humilis, pius, compunctus, devotus et contemplationi addictus; quia, ut observatur, « parum aut nihilum est speculum exterius propositum, nisi speculum mentis nostrae tersum fuerit et politum ». Immo, quasi eventus futuros praesagiens, auctor praemonet, deficiente illa ad contemplationem dispositione, et mentis oculo male disposito, cavendum esse, « ne forte ex ipsa radiorum speculatione in graviorem incidas foveam tenebrarum » (ibid. n. 4.). Requiritur igitur ad bene hoc libello fruendum ille oculus contemplationis, de quo, agens de triplici oculo, Sanctus loquitur supra Breviloq. p. II. c. 12. (cfr. de dono contemplationis II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. et ad 6.).
Nihilominus pars, ut ita dicam, materialis huius opusculi, quae proponit ipsa obiecta consideranda, sumta est ex disciplinis theologicis et philosophicis; et haec docte ac profunde exhibet recondita quaedam philosophiae christianae documenta de multiplici relatione tum naturalis tum supernaturalis ordinis, quam res creatae habent ad primam causam efficientem, exemplarem et finalem. Omnia enim a Deo in ordine naturali et supernaturali, reali et ideali causata quasi specula quaedam oculo mentis purgato et illuminato proponuntur ad contemplanda divina attributa et Trinitatis et incarnationis mysteria. Dum igitur vulgares libri meditationum ipsa fidei mysteria plurima meditanda utiliter exhibent; hic proponit arcanum illum nexum, quo ordo creaturarum naturalis et supernaturalis coniungitur cum primo principio, quod, teste Augustino, est omnium « causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi ». Ita fieri potest, ut « secundum statum conditionis nostrae ipsa rerum universitas sit scala ad ascendendum in Deum » (c. 1. n. 2.).
2. Notandae sunt tres distinctiones. — a. Triplex est creaturarum comparatio et dependentia ad Deum: « aut sicut ad principium creativum, aut sicut ad obiectum motivum, aut sicut ad donum inhabitativum. Primo modo comparatur ad ipsum omnis eius effectus, secundo modo omnis intellectus, tertio modo omnis spiritus iustus et Deo acceptus. Omnis enim effectus, quantumcumque parum habens de esse, habet Deum sicut principium. Omnis intellectus, quantumcumque parum habens de lumine, natus est per cognitionem et amorem capere Deum. Omnis autem spiritus iustus et sanctus habet donum Spiritus S. sibi infusum » (Breviloq. p. II. c. 12.). — Cum hac distinctione cohaeret alia de quatuor gradibus eius cognitionis Dei, quae haberi potest in via. « Cognoscitur enim Deus in vestigio, cognoscitur in imagine, cognoscitur et in effectu gratiae, cognoscitur etiam per intimam unionem Dei et animae; iuxta quod dicit Apostolus [I. Cor. 6, 17.]: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est. Et haec est cognitio excellentissima, quam docet Dionysius, quae quidem est in ecstatico amore et elevat supra cognitionem fidei secundum statum communem » (III. Sent. d. 24. dub. 4.).
b. Triplex est modus existentiae rerum. « Res tripliciter habent esse, scilicet in materia vel natura propria, in intelligentia creata et in arte aeterna; secundum quae tria dicit Scriptura: Dixit Deus: fiat; fecit, et factum est » (Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; cfr. ibi Prolog. § 3; I. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 6; Quaest. disp. de scientia Christi, q. 4. in corp.).
c. Triplici modo intellectus se vertere potest ad considerandum creaturarum speculum tum exterius tum interius; quia « sensus carnis [et idem valet de sensu interiore] aut deservit intellectui rationabiliter investiganti, aut fideliter credenti, aut intellectualiter contemplanti » (hic c. 1. n. 10.). Unde triplici modo intellectus transire potest ab effectibus ad causas, a creatura ad Deum, scilicet vel sola vi luminis naturalis et modo philosophico, vel adiunctis fidei principiis, vel etiam donis Spiritus S. illuminantibus.
3. Circa modum, quo intellectus rationabiliter investigans transit, praesertim ab imagine interiore ad Deum, notanda est alia distinctio inter intellectum apprehendentem et resolventem, et resolventem vel semiplene, vel plene; qua distinctione etiam intelligitur ratio cognitionis explicitae et implicitae, et quo sensu verum sit, quod ens creatum non possit cognosci ab intellectu plene resolvente, nisi iuvetur ab intellectu primi entis (c. 3. n. 3. et c. 5. n. 3. cum notis.). — Dicit igitur de hoc S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1.): « Quantum ad intellectum apprehendentem non potest intelligi aliquid sine aliquo, quod est ei ratio intelligendi, sicut Deus praeter deitatem et homo praeter humanitatem; potest tamen intelligi effectus, non intellecta causa, et inferius, non intellecto superiori, quia potest quis apprehendere hominem, non intellecto aliquo superiorum. Et sic dicit Philosophus, quod qui unum dicit quodam modo multa dicit, non simpliciter, sed quodam modo, quia implicite. — Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligere praeter alterum intellectu resolvente; et iste intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia, sicut potest intelligi subiectum sine propria passione. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut intellectu resolvente plene et perfecte, aut intellectu deficiente et resolvente semiplene. Intellectu resolvente semiplene potest intelligi, aliquid esse, non intellecto primo ente. Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non intellecto ». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. dub. 2, ubi docetur, quod esse, abstracta bonitate, « potest intelligi intellectu apprehendente et intellectu semiplene resolvente; sed intellectu plene ad causas comparante non potest intelligi, non intellecto illo ».
4. Licet « omnis creatura magis ducat in Deum quam in aliquod aliud » (I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2.), tamen, cum cognitio actualis incipiat a sensu et ab exteriore ad interius, ab imperfecto ad perfectius progrediatur; intellectui adhuc rudiori vix alia via rationabiliter investigandi Deum aperta est, nisi ascendendo a mundo sensibili sive a vestigio Dei. Hinc dicitur: « Primum gradum ascensionis collocemus in imo, ponendo totum istum mundum sensibilem nobis tanquam speculum, per quod transeamus ad Deum, opificem summum » (c. 1. n. 9.). Porro umbrae creaturarum et vestigia sunt « proposita mentibus adhuc rudibus et sensibilibus, ut per sensibilia, quae vident, transferantur ad intelligibilia, quae non vident, tanquam per signa ad signata » (c. 2. n. 11.). — Tamen auctor parum moratur in describendis rebus particularibus mundi sensibilis (c. 1.), sed continuo transit (c. 2.) a mundo materiali (reali) ad mundum idealem sive ad illud esse non physicum, sed metaphysicum, quod mundus habet in mente humana. Ipse enim intellectus apprehendens naturaliter et necessario supergreditur ordinem existendi concretum rerum particularium et contingentium, quarum species abstrahendo et depurando in se concipit, et ita res super ordinem materialem quasi elevat et induit quodam spiritualis ordinis vestimento, id est quibusdam proprietatibus idealibus, scilicet universalitatis, immutabilitatis, aeternitatis et necessitatis, quae ipsi ordini reali rerum materialium minime conveniunt. Porro, ordo ille idealis supremam radicem et ultimum fundamentum habet in Deo et ducit in ipsum. « Veritates intellectae fundantur in aliquo aeterno. Fundantur autem in ipsa prima Veritate sicut in causa universali, contentiva omnis veritatis » (S. Thom., S. c. Gent. II. c. 84.). « Regulae (intellectus) incommutabiles radicantur in luce aeterna et ducunt in eam » (S. Bonav., Hexaëm. collatio 2.). « Hinc ipse intellectus, considerans conditiones entis secundum relationem causae ad causatum, transfert se ab effectu ad causas et transit ad rationes aeternas » (ibid. coll. 5.). Hic transitus p. 315 fieri potest arguendo et resolvendo ab intellectu rationabiliter investigante; perfectius autem fit ab eodem illuminato et intellectualiter contemplante. — Ordo hic idealis, vulgari intellectui obscurus et fere ignotus, a S. Bonaventura, duce S. Augustino, praecipuo studio in capp. 2. 3. 5. 6. proponitur, ut oculus contemplativus transeat ad divina contemplanda. Supposito triplici illo esse eiusdem rei, talis transitus non difficulter intelligitur; attamen bene attendendum est, quod alia est ratio et via, qua intellectus transit ab ordine reali ad idealem, et alia, qua ab hoc ascendit ad ordinem divinum (cfr. de hoc Dissertatio cit. pag. 22-25).
5. Communiter antiqui Scholastici cum S. Thoma (de Verit. q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.) docuerunt, « quod omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt implicite Deum in quolibet cognito » (cfr. cit. Dissert. pag. 17. 18); et secundum hanc implicitam et confusam qualemcumque cognitionem dici posse asserunt, naturaliter notam esse existentiam Dei (S. Thom., S. I. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1.). « Motus ergo nostri intellectus, dum intelligit, dum ratiocinatur, a cognitione implicita Dei incipit et in cognitionem explicitam Dei terminatur »; ita cl. P. Lepidi O. Praed. (Period. Divus Thomas 1881, n. 11. seqq.).
6. Inter mentem humanam et Deum, quatenus est suprema « causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi », nulla creatura est intermedia; hoc tamen non impedit, quominus creaturae sint medium disponens et quasi manuducens ad cognitionem Dei, ut bene explicat S. Bonav. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. ad 1. et II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. — Licet igitur intellectus humanus in statu viae minime Deum cognoscat immediate, sed tantum in speculo creaturarum; recte tamen dicitur in se ipso coniunctus Deo, Deo proximus, vel pertingens ad Deum, ut passim occurrit hic c. 2. et 3. et apud Augustinum docentem, naturam intelligibilem connecti non solum intelligibilibus, verum etiam immutabilibus rebus (I. Retract. c. 8. n. 2.). Monet tamen Seraphicus (Quaest. disp. de scientia Christi, q. 4. ad 19.): « Pauci sunt, qui isto modo illas rationes sciant se attingere; immo, quod plus est, pauci sunt, qui velint hoc credere, quia difficile videtur intellectui ad aeterna contemplanda nondum elevato, quod ita habeat Deum praesentem et propinquum, cum tamen dicat Paulus (Act. 17, 27.), quod non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum ».
7. Communis item sententia ut certum docet concursum Dei generalem, activum et immediatum ad quaslibet actiones creaturarum; unde « lumen creatum non potest perficere operationem suam absque aliqua cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis homo, qui venit in hunc mundum » (S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.). Nam « in hoc continuo Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et ipsum dirigit ad videndum; et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in suam operationem procedit » (S. Thom., Opusc. 63, sive in librum Boethii de Trin. q. 1. a. 1. ad 6.). Haec immediata cooperatio primae lucis vocatur ab Augustino et Scholasticis quaedam mentium irradiatio sive illuminatio, quae praeter intellectum creatum suo modo est quoddam supremum principium, quo cognoscitur; sive, ut S. Bonav. dicit, ipsa est ratio motiva, in aliud ductiva, sive regulans; et hoc sensu « ad modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae mentis » (c. 3. n. 1.); tamen prima lux non est principium, quod (directe) cognoscitur, sive obiectum terminans, quietans et in se ducens. De hoc agit tota q. 4. inter Qq. disput. de scientia Christi, quae magis explicatur a Matth. ab Aquasparta (de Hum. Cognitionis ratione, pag. 87-108; cfr. ibid. Dissert. cit. pag. 26-44). Summi momenti est tum haec distinctio inter cognitionis principium quo et principium quod, sive inter medium (ratio) et obiectum cognoscendi, tum doctrina omnium Scholasticorum, quod aliquid potest esse medium quo sive ratio cognoscendi, quin ipsum sit obiectum cognitionis, ita ut « lateat ut obiectum cognitionis, sed pateat ut ratio cognoscendi » (sic Matth. ab Aquasparta, q. disp. 3. ad 4; cfr. ibid. ad 6. et S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 4. ad 5.). Praecipue propter neglectam hanc distinctionem et doctrinam exortae sunt falsae Itinerarii interpretationes, de quibus continuo agimus.
8. His suppositis, genuinus sensus aliquorum loquendi modorum, qui ex Augustino sumti sunt, patere potest, simulque falsitas quarundam interpretationum, quae duplicem errorem seraphico Doctori imposuerunt.
Primo enim dictum est, eum consentire ontologismo Malebranchii, quasi docuerit, veritates intellectuales cognosci formaliter in rationibus aeternis. Attamen eiusdem testimoniis irrefragabilibus iam toties demonstratum est, ab ipso admitti pro hac vita ne « exilem » quidem gradum immediatae Dei cognitionis, nec in altissima contemplatione (saltem ordinarie), nec ullum transitum ad rationes aeternas, nisi eum quo intellectus « transfert se ab effectu ad causas ». « Unde si quae auctoritates id dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videtur in sua essentia, sed quod in aliquo effectu inferiori cognoscitur » (II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.). Ipsi Angeli naturali cognitione non poterant Deum cognoscere nisi « per effectus. Cognoscitur autem Deus per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei, non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura, sicut dicit Augustinus » (IX. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16). Ita II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. Plura vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. scholion et cit. Dissert. pag. 7-12. — Mirum videtur, quod de genuina doctrina S. Bonaventurae propter quasdam male intellectas formulas huius Itinerarii potuerit dubitari, cum in eodem clarissime (c. 1. 2. 3.) non nisi ascensionem a creaturis ad Deum doceat; et quando adhibet verba videre Deum, se explicet additis aliis verbis, ut: « conari debemus per speculum videre Deum » (c. 3. n. 1.) et « videre poteris Deum per te tanquam per imaginem, quod est videre per speculum in aenigmate » (ibid.).
9. Alius error impositus est auctori nostro per falsam capituli 5. interpretationem, quasi docuerit, tum quod primum cognitum intellectus apprehendentis sit esse divinum, tum quod esse commune confuderit cum esse divino. Perversa haec interpretatio prorsus aliena est a mente S. Doctoris et manifeste excluditur irrefragabilibus doctrinae capitibus, quae constanter et passim asserit. Nam docet verbis peremptoriis, quod divinum esse in se nec ante nec post primum peccatum immediate cognosci possit; quod non percipiatur nisi in speculo creaturarum et per ordinem, quem effectus habent ad causam (I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. 2; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. et passim); item, quod actualis intellectio incipiat a sensu, ita ut ab intellectione imperfecta et confusa progrediatur ad perfectiorem et explicitam (cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. et scholion, n. II, d. 25. p. II. q. 6; I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. dub. 4; II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2; III. Sent. d. 37. dub. 1.). Denique toties affirmat, esse divinum non esse in genere, sed supra omne genus, nec univocum, sed tantum analogum cum omnibus mentis conceptibus, etiam transcendentalibus.
Insuper ex hoc Itinerario et ex ipso cap. 5. genuinus sensus auctoris satis apparet. — Nam primo clarissime docet ordinem et gradus cognitionis et contemplationis, per quos a creaturis ascendimus ad perfectam, quantum fas est, Dei cognitionem (c. 1. n. 2.). Primum enim gradum ponit in imo, incipiendo a mundo sensibili, ut supra (n. 4.) notavimus; scilicet « ut perveniamus ad Deum, oportet nos transire per vestigium » (c. 1. n. 2. et 5.). — Superiores autem gradus ab ipso deinde explicati supponunt praecedentes.
Secundo, de conceptu τοῦ esse iam in tertio gradu (c. 3. n. 3.) auctor locutus est secundum intellectum apprehendentem et resolventem (vide supra n. 3.); ubi dicitur, quod « non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum, nisi iuvetur ab intellectu entis purissimi » etc. Non igitur nisi ascendendo a causatis rebus et resolvendo, immo resolvendo non semiplene, sed plene, intellectus concipit ens purissimum et absolutissimum.
Hoc supposito, etiam in c. 5. n. 3. triplex distinguit esse, scil. in rebus (extra nos) « esse particulare, quod est esse arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia »; in intellectu (intra nos) « esse analogum, quod minime habet de actu, eo quod minime p. 316 est »; denique esse supra nos. Sed breviter commemoratis duobus prioribus, totus versatur in contemplatione illius esse, quod est « supra nos » nec attingitur nisi ab oculo contemplativo. Ne igitur lector a genuino huius capituli sensu aberret, ea quae in cap. 3. dicta sunt et nexus gradus quinti cum tertio mente retinenda sunt.
Tertio, contemplatio huius 5. gradus fundatur in axiomate Avicennae communiter a Scholasticis recepto, quod « ens (esse) est quod primo cadit in intellectu ». Haec sententia intelligitur proprie de illo ente communi, primo actu intellectus concepto, quod nullo modo manifestari nobis potest per aliquid notius illo. Hoc tamen ens, quatenus concipitur ab intellectu apprehendente, « non est aliquid determinatum, nec actu nec potentia, nec praesens nec futurum, nec homo vel equus et huiusmodi, sed ens, quod est superius ad omnia ista; et ego dico, quod quidditas illa est ens in intellectu… licet non sit ens in actu, quia nec hoc est de intellectu suo » (Matth. ab Aquasparta, in cit. Opusc. de Hum. Cognitionis ratione, pag. 120; sive in quaest. disp.: Utrum ad cognitionem rei requiratur ipsius rei existentia etc., ad 4; cfr. ad 5. 6. 7. et corp., ubi etiam alia sunt ad rem spectantia). S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 94. a. 2. corp.) dicit: « Illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit; et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est, quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur super rationem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur » (cfr. idem de Potentia q. 9. a. 7. ad 15. et in fine; S. I. q. 11. a. 2. ad 4.).
Hoc esse analogum, ab intellectu apprehendente primo cognitum, non est nisi tenuissima umbra divini esse, a quo ratione realitatis toto caelo distat eique quasi est oppositum; nihilominus ratione suae maximae universalitatis, primitatis et simplicitatis aptum est contemplativo oculo fieri speculum ad divina contemplanda. Observat etiam Richardus a Med. (I. Sent. d. III. p. I. a. 3. q. 3.): « Cum intelligimus ens in communi, non descendendo ad ens creatum vel increatum, intelligimus Deum intellectione generalissima, in quantum intelligimus aliquid commune sibi et cuilibet creaturae, non communitate univoca, sed analoga. Et haec naturalis cognitio de Deo prior est quam Dei cognitio [propria] per vestigium; quia ista praesupponit in intellectu alicuius alterius cognitionem, sed illa non. Unde secundum Avicennam… ens commune omnibus rebus nullo modo potest manifestari nobis per aliquid notius illo. Alio modo cognoscitur Deus a nobis in generali, in quantum cognoscimus, esse aliquod ens increatum, cuiuslibet entis creati causam efficientem et finalem; et hanc cognitionem habemus de Deo per naturam primo per vestigium ». — Omnia haec confirmari possunt testimoniis nostri auctoris, quorum unum insigne iuvat transcribere, in quo loquitur de genere generalissimo et specie specialissima et sic concludit: « Et hinc est, quod genus in aliquo assimilatur Deo magis quam species, in aliquo e converso. Deus enim, quia nobilissimus est in fine totius nobilitatis, simul habet in se omnem perfectionem, ita quod ipse est simplicissimus et omnino incorruptibilis, est etiam perfectus et in omnimoda actualitate constitutus. Creatura vero, secundum quod potest, semiplene assimilatur Deo; et quantum ad rationem simplicitatis et incorruptibilitatis magis assimilatur magis universale, quantum ad rationem actualitatis magis assimilatur minus universale » (II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. circa finem). Eo fortius hoc valet de universalibus transcendentalibus, quorum primum et generalissimum est esse.
Quarto, ipsa verba auctoris in cap. 5. satis manifestant, quod bene distinguat ab esse divino, quod est actus purus, illa duo alia. Dicit enim: « Sed hoc non est esse particulare [extra nos realiter existens], quod est esse arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia; nec esse analogum [in intellectu intra nos], quia minime habet de actu, eo quod minime est ». De esse analogo sive communissimo, quod est quasi infimum inter omnia, quibus competit esse, auctor hic non loquitur, nisi quatenus occasionem dat contemplandi ipsum esse (supra nos). Unde monet: « Volens contemplari Dei invisibilia quoad essentiae unitatem defigat aspectum in ipsum esse et videat » etc. (n. 3.). Item: « Vide igitur ipsum purissimum esse, si potes, et occurrit tibi » etc. (n. 5.). Haec verba de « ipso esse » manifeste non intelliguntur de primo illo actu intellectus apprehendentis, qui naturaliter et necessario exercetur, et cuius obiectum est tenuissimum illud esse, quod non est primum et purum esse, sed potius eiusdem longinqua umbra. Intellectus autem reflectens et resolvens, et praecipue oculus contemplativus facile advertere potest, ipsum esse per se, quod est primum a parte rei essendi et cognoscendi principium, esse aliquid supra nos et ante nos, in quo omne esse creatum et etiam illud communissimum primi universalis esse radicatur, et in quod omnia ducunt intellectum resolventem. Hoc sensu etiam S. Thomas (S. I. q. 3. a. 5, sed contra) proclamat: « Nihil prius est Deo, nec secundum rem nec secundum intellectum ». Quod manifeste dictum est non ex parte intellectus humani, qui in caecitate sua prius umbram veritatis quam ipsam veritatem in se apprehendit, sed ex parte rei vel intellectus superioris, qui bene videt, ipsum esse praecedere umbram ipsius. — Hoc sensu accipienda sunt illa verba, quae multis fuerunt lapis offensionis: « Esse igitur est, quod primo cadit in intellectu; et illud esse est, quod est purus actus » (n. 3.). Sensus igitur genuinus hic est: ipsum esse non est in rebus particularibus nisi per participationem et modo arctato et imperfecto, nec ab intellectu humano primo suo actu apprehenditur in sua puritate et distinctione, sed tantum imperfectissime in illa communissimi esse umbra; idem tamen ab oculo contemplativo cognoscitur distincte ut illud esse, quo revera « nihil prius est, nec secundum rem nec secundum intellectum ». Quia autem intellectus apprehendens propter suam caecitatem illud esse purissimum « non videt », « nec advertit », immo « videtur sibi nihil videre » (ut inculcatur, ibid. n. 4.); S. Doctor miro acumine secundum intellectum reflectentem et resolventem ex ipso conceptu τοῦ esse per se evolvit praecipua attributa divina.
In toto autem Itinerario suo Seraphicus innititur doctrinae S. Augustini; ad cuius profunditatem intelligendam simul optimam quasi clavem praebet. Qui igitur sublime hoc opusculum bene vult intelligere legat vel potius meditetur S. Augustini libros de Vera Religione, VI. de Musica et II. et III. de Libero Arbitrio, vel saltem conferat locos a nobis in notis allegatos.
---
SCHOLION
The teaching of this golden little work has not rarely been understood, even by learned men, either imperfectly or altogether wrongly. For some have judged that certain of its propositions are not to be understood in the strict sense of the words, but to be expounded or excused by a kindly interpretation, as having been said in a mystical book and not in a scientifically theological one. Others, not a few, have abused certain manners of speaking that occur there to confirm their own false opinions. — Considering the sublimity of this little book and the brevity of its exposition, it is no wonder that erroneous interpretations should have slipped in, whether among those little versed in the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, or among those not attending to the special character and the whole context of this writing. Nevertheless this little book has been rightly celebrated by the wisest men of the last centuries as altogether singular in its kind, composed with marvellous art, and never sufficiently to be praised. It contains in fact teachings sound, most lofty, most wholesome, and expressed with a careful choice of words; and the whole doctrine is wholly consonant with that which the Saint professes in his theological writings and there expounds more at large. This can already be sufficiently established from the testimonies we have adduced in the notes; as to a few of the more difficult matters, we refer the reader to the Disputed Question reprinted above at page 47, and published, together with other questions of authors of the Bonaventurian school, first in the little work On the Manner of Human Cognition, brought out by us from the press of the College of St. Bonaventure in 1883 — and especially to the introductory Dissertation (ibid. pp. 1–47).
For the reader's convenience, however, it has seemed opportune to subjoin here a few brief observations, so that an easier way may be prepared toward the right understanding of the more difficult passages. p. 314
1. As to the peculiar character of the little work, we note that it is rightly reckoned among the mystical works, without its being on that account deprived of its place among the works pertaining to theological and even philosophical science. It is a mystical work, regard being had both to the end intended by the author and to the dispositions of soul which he requires in his readers; which is manifestly established from the Prologue and the beginning of chapter 1. For the author did not write with the design of teaching, after the manner of the schools, a purely theoretical science, or of refuting errors, but in order directly to promote devotion and the contemplation of divine things. For he says: « To those willing to be at leisure for magnifying, admiring, and even tasting God, I propose the speculations set forth below » (Prolog. n. 4.). But for the disposition of the reader the human intellect is said not to suffice, however acute and cultivated, not even with the addition of those principles which faith sets before all Christians; rather let him be « a man of desires », let him be prevented by grace, humble, pious, compunct, devout, and given to contemplation; because, as is observed, « of little or no avail is the mirror set outwardly before us, unless the mirror of our mind has been wiped clean and polished ». Indeed, as though presaging events to come, the author forewarns that, when that disposition to contemplation is wanting and the mind's eye is ill disposed, one must beware « lest perchance from the very speculation of the rays you fall into a graver pit of darkness » (ibid. n. 4.). There is required therefore, for enjoying this little book well, that eye of contemplation of which, treating of the threefold eye, the Saint speaks above in Breviloq. p. II. c. 12. (cf. on the gift of contemplation II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. and ad 6.).
Nevertheless the, so to speak, material part of this little work, which sets forth the very objects to be considered, is drawn from the theological and philosophical disciplines; and this learnedly and profoundly exhibits certain recondite teachings of Christian philosophy concerning the manifold relation, of the natural as well as of the supernatural order, which created things have to the first efficient, exemplar, and final cause. For all things caused by God in the natural and supernatural order, the real and the ideal, are set forth as so many mirrors to the purified and illumined eye of the mind, for contemplating the divine attributes and the mysteries of the Trinity and of the incarnation. While therefore ordinary books of meditations usefully set forth the very mysteries of faith, many of them, to be meditated upon, this one sets forth that hidden bond by which the natural and supernatural order of creatures is joined with the first principle, which, on Augustine's testimony, is of all things the « cause of being, the ground of understanding, and the order of living ». Thus it can come about that « according to the state of our condition the very universality of things is a ladder for ascending into God » (c. 1. n. 2.).
2. Three distinctions are to be noted. — a. Threefold is the creatures' comparison and dependence upon God: « either as to a creative principle, or as to a motive object, or as to an indwelling gift. In the first mode every effect of his is compared to him, in the second mode every intellect, in the third mode every spirit just and acceptable to God. For every effect, however little it has of being, has God as its principle. Every intellect, however little it has of light, is born to lay hold of God through cognition and love. And every just and holy spirit has the gift of the Holy Spirit infused into it » (Breviloq. p. II. c. 12.). — With this distinction coheres another, concerning the four degrees of that knowledge of God which can be had on the way. « For God is known in a vestige, he is known in an image, he is known also in the effect of grace, he is known too through the intimate union of God and the soul; according to which the Apostle says [I. Cor. 6, 17.]: He who adheres to God is one spirit. And this is the most excellent knowledge, which Dionysius teaches, which indeed lies in ecstatic love and raises above the knowledge of faith according to the common state » (III. Sent. d. 24. dub. 4.).
b. Threefold is the mode of existence of things. « Things have being in three ways, namely in matter or their proper nature, in created intelligence, and in the eternal art; according to which three Scripture says: God said: let it be made; he made it, and it was made » (Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; cf. there Prolog. § 3; I. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. and II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 6; Quaest. disp. de scientia Christi, q. 4. in corp.).
c. In a threefold mode the intellect can turn itself to considering the mirror of creatures, both outward and inward; because « the sense of the flesh [and the same holds of the interior sense] either serves the intellect rationally investigating, or faithfully believing, or intellectually contemplating » (here c. 1. n. 10.). Whence in a threefold mode the intellect can pass over from effects to causes, from creature to God, namely either by the sole force of the natural light and in the philosophical mode, or with the principles of faith adjoined, or even with the illuminating gifts of the Holy Spirit.
3. Concerning the mode by which the intellect rationally investigating passes over, especially from the interior image to God, another distinction is to be noted, between the apprehending and the resolving intellect, and the resolving either half-fully or fully; by which distinction is also understood the account of explicit and implicit cognition, and in what sense it is true that a created being cannot be known by the fully resolving intellect unless it be helped by the understanding of the first being (c. 3. n. 3. and c. 5. n. 3. with the notes.). — The holy Doctor therefore says of this (I. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1.): « As regards the apprehending intellect, nothing can be understood without something which is to it the ground of understanding, as God apart from deity and man apart from humanity; yet an effect can be understood without the cause being understood, and an inferior without the superior being understood, because one can apprehend man without any of the superiors being understood. And so the Philosopher says that he who says one in a certain manner says many, not simply, but in a certain manner, because implicitly. — In another way it happens that something is understood apart from another by the resolving intellect; and this intellect considers those things which are essential to the thing, just as a subject can be understood without its proper attribute. And this can be in two ways: either by the intellect resolving fully and perfectly, or by the intellect falling short and resolving half-fully. By the intellect resolving half-fully it can be understood that something is, without the first being being understood. But by the intellect resolving perfectly nothing can be understood without the first being being understood ». Cf. II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. dub. 2, where it is taught that being, with goodness abstracted, « can be understood by the apprehending intellect and by the intellect half-fully resolving; but by the intellect fully comparing to causes it cannot be understood without that being understood ».
4. Although « every creature leads more into God than into anything else » (I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2.), nevertheless, since actual cognition begins from sense and advances from the exterior to the interior, from the imperfect to the more perfect, scarcely any other way of rationally investigating God lies open to a still ruder intellect than by ascending from the sensible world or from the vestige of God. Hence it is said: « Let us place the first step of the ascent at the bottom, setting this whole sensible world before us as a mirror, through which we may pass over to God, the supreme craftsman » (c. 1. n. 9.). Further, the shadows and vestiges of creatures are « set before minds still rude and sensible, so that through the sensible things which they see they may be carried over to the intelligible things which they do not see, as through signs to the things signified » (c. 2. n. 11.). — Yet the author lingers little over describing the particular things of the sensible world (c. 1.), but passes over at once (c. 2.) from the material (real) world to the ideal world, or to that being, not physical but metaphysical, which the world has in the human mind. For the apprehending intellect itself naturally and necessarily transcends the concrete order of existing of particular and contingent things, whose species it conceives within itself by abstracting and purifying, and thus as it were raises things above the material order and clothes them with a certain garment of the spiritual order, that is, with certain ideal properties, namely of universality, immutability, eternity, and necessity, which by no means belong to the real order itself of material things. Further, that ideal order has its supreme root and ultimate foundation in God, and leads into him. « Truths understood are founded upon something eternal. And they are founded upon the first Truth itself as upon a universal cause, containing all truth » (S. Thom., S. c. Gent. II. c. 84.). « The unchangeable rules (of the intellect) are rooted in the eternal light and lead into it » (S. Bonav., Hexaëm. collation 2.). « Hence the intellect itself, considering the conditions of being according to the relation of cause to caused, carries itself over from the effect to the causes and passes over to the eternal grounds » (ibid. coll. 5.). This passage p. 315 can be made by arguing and resolving on the part of the intellect rationally investigating; but it is made more perfectly by the same intellect illumined and intellectually contemplating. — This ideal order, obscure and almost unknown to the ordinary intellect, is set forth by St. Bonaventure, under the lead of St. Augustine, with special care in chapters 2, 3, 5, 6, so that the contemplative eye may pass over to contemplating divine things. That threefold being of the same thing being supposed, such a passage is not understood with difficulty; yet it must be well attended to that one is the account and the way by which the intellect passes from the real order to the ideal, and another that by which from this it ascends to the divine order (cf. on this the Dissertation cited, pp. 22–25).
5. The ancient Scholastics commonly, with St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.), taught « that all knowing things know God implicitly in whatever is known » (cf. the Dissert. cited, pp. 17, 18); and according to this implicit and confused cognition of whatever sort they assert that it can be said that the existence of God is naturally known (S. Thom., S. I. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1.). « The motion therefore of our intellect, while it understands, while it reasons, begins from an implicit cognition of God and terminates in an explicit cognition of God »; so the distinguished Fr. Lepidi O. Praed. (the periodical Divus Thomas 1881, n. 11. ff.).
6. Between the human mind and God, inasmuch as he is the supreme « cause of being, ground of understanding, and order of living », no creature is intermediate; this however does not prevent creatures from being a disposing medium and, as it were, one leading by the hand to the knowledge of God, as St. Bonaventure well explains, I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. ad 1. and II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. — Although therefore the human intellect in the state of the way by no means knows God immediately, but only in the mirror of creatures, it is nevertheless rightly said in itself to be joined to God, near to God, or reaching unto God, as occurs throughout here in cc. 2 and 3, and in Augustine, who teaches that the intelligible nature is connected not only with intelligible but also with immutable things (I. Retract. c. 8. n. 2.). Yet the Seraphic Doctor warns (Quaest. disp. de scientia Christi, q. 4. ad 19.): « Few there are who know that they attain to those grounds in that manner; nay, what is more, few there are who are willing to believe this, because it seems difficult to an intellect not yet raised to contemplating eternal things that it should have God so present and near, although Paul says (Acts 17, 27.) that he is not far from every one of us ».
7. The common opinion likewise teaches as certain the general concurrence of God, active and immediate, in any actions whatever of creatures; whence « created light cannot perfect its own operation without some cooperation of the uncreated light, by which every man is illumined who comes into this world » (S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.). For « in this God works continually in the mind, that he causes in it the natural light and directs it to seeing; and thus the mind does not proceed to its operation without the operation of the first cause » (S. Thom., Opusc. 63, or on Boethius's book de Trin. q. 1. a. 1. ad 6.). This immediate cooperation of the first light is called by Augustine and the Scholastics a certain irradiation or illumination of minds, which besides the created intellect is in its own way a certain supreme principle, by which knowledge is had; or, as St. Bonaventure says, it is itself the motive ground, leading into another, or regulating; and in this sense « after the manner of a candlestick the light of truth shines back in the face of our mind » (c. 3. n. 1.); yet the first light is not the principle which is (directly) known, or the object terminating, bringing to rest, and leading into itself. Of this the whole q. 4 among the Disputed Questions de scientia Christi treats, which is more fully explained by Matthew of Aquasparta (de Hum. Cognitionis ratione, pp. 87–108; cf. ibid. the Dissert. cited, pp. 26–44). Of the highest moment is both this distinction between the principium quo and the principium quod of cognition, or between the medium (ground) and the object of knowing, and the teaching of all the Scholastics that something can be the medium by which, or the ground of knowing, without its being itself the object of cognition, so that « it lies hidden as an object of cognition, but lies open as a ground of knowing » (so Matthew of Aquasparta, q. disp. 3. ad 4; cf. ibid. ad 6. and S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 4. ad 5.). Chiefly because this distinction and teaching were neglected did the false interpretations of the Itinerarium arise, of which we treat immediately.
8. These things being supposed, the genuine sense of certain manners of speaking which are taken from Augustine can be clear, and at the same time the falsity of certain interpretations which have imputed a twofold error to the Seraphic Doctor.
For first it has been said that he agrees with the ontologism of Malebranche, as though he had taught that intellectual truths are known formally in the eternal grounds. Yet from his own irrefragable testimonies it has already so often been demonstrated that he admits for this life not even a « slender » degree of immediate cognition of God, not even in the highest contemplation (at least ordinarily), nor any passage to the eternal grounds except that by which the intellect « carries itself over from the effect to the causes ». « Whence if any authorities be found to say this, that God is in the present seen and discerned by man, they are not to be understood as though he were seen in his essence, but that he is known in some inferior effect » (II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.). The Angels themselves by natural cognition could not know God except « through effects. And God is known through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of the light connatural to the knowing power, which is a certain likeness of God, not abstracted but infused, inferior to God, because in an inferior nature, as Augustine says » (IX. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16). So II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. See more, I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. scholion and the Dissert. cited, pp. 7–12. — It seems astonishing that the genuine teaching of St. Bonaventure could have been doubted on account of certain ill-understood formulas of this Itinerarium, since in the same work he most clearly (cc. 1, 2, 3) teaches nothing but an ascent from creatures to God; and when he employs the words to see God, he explains himself by adding other words, as: « we must strive through a mirror to see God » (c. 3. n. 1.) and « you will be able to see God through yourself as through an image, which is to see through a mirror in an enigma » (ibid.).
9. Another error has been imputed to our author through a false interpretation of chapter 5, as though he had taught both that the first thing known by the apprehending intellect is the divine being, and that he confounded common being with the divine being. This perverse interpretation is utterly foreign to the mind of the holy Doctor and is manifestly excluded by irrefragable heads of doctrine which he constantly and everywhere asserts. For he teaches in peremptory words that the divine being in itself can neither before nor after the first sin be known immediately; that it is not perceived except in the mirror of creatures and through the order which effects have to their cause (I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. 2; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. and everywhere); likewise, that actual understanding begins from sense, so that from an imperfect and confused understanding it advances to a more perfect and explicit one (cf. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. and scholion, n. II, d. 25. p. II. q. 6; I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. dub. 4; II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2; III. Sent. d. 37. dub. 1.). Finally he so often affirms that the divine being is not in a genus, but above every genus, nor univocal, but only analogous with all the concepts of the mind, even the transcendental ones.
Moreover, from this Itinerarium and from chapter 5 itself the genuine sense of the author sufficiently appears. — For first he most clearly teaches the order and the degrees of cognition and contemplation, through which we ascend from creatures to a perfect knowledge of God, so far as is permitted (c. 1. n. 2.). For he places the first degree at the bottom, beginning from the sensible world, as we noted above (n. 4.); namely « that we may come to God, it behoves us to pass through the vestige » (c. 1. n. 2. and 5.). — And the higher degrees thereafter explained by him presuppose the preceding ones.
Secondly, concerning the concept of τοῦ esse the author has already spoken in the third degree (c. 3. n. 3.) according to the apprehending and the resolving intellect (see above n. 3.); where it is said that « our intellect does not come as fully resolving to the understanding of any one of created beings unless it be helped by the understanding of the purest being » etc. Not therefore except by ascending from caused things and by resolving — nay, by resolving not half-fully but fully — does the intellect conceive the purest and most absolute being.
This being supposed, in c. 5. n. 3. also he distinguishes a threefold being, namely in things (outside us) « particular being, which is being constricted, because it is mingled with potency »; in the intellect (within us) « analogous being, which has least of act, in that it least p. 316 is »; finally being above us. But having briefly recalled the two former, he is wholly occupied in the contemplation of that being which is « above us » and is not attained except by the contemplative eye. Lest therefore the reader stray from the genuine sense of this chapter, the things which were said in chapter 3 and the connection of the fifth degree with the third must be kept in mind.
Thirdly, the contemplation of this fifth degree is founded on the axiom of Avicenna commonly received by the Scholastics, that « a being (being) is what first falls into the intellect ». This opinion is properly understood of that common being, conceived by the first act of the intellect, which can in no way be manifested to us through anything better known than it. This being, however, inasmuch as it is conceived by the apprehending intellect, « is not anything determinate, neither in act nor in potency, neither present nor future, neither man nor horse and the like, but a being which is superior to all these; and I say that that quiddity is a being in the intellect… although it is not a being in act, since neither is this part of its understanding » (Matthew of Aquasparta, in the cited Opusc. de Hum. Cognitionis ratione, p. 120; or in the disputed question: Whether for the cognition of a thing the existence of the thing itself is required etc., ad 4; cf. ad 5. 6. 7. and corp., where there are also other things pertaining to the matter). St. Thomas (S. I. II. q. 94. a. 2. corp.) says: « That which first falls into apprehension is a being, the understanding of which is included in all things whatsoever anyone apprehends; and therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that it is not possible at once to affirm and to deny, which is founded upon the account of being and non-being, and upon this principle all others are founded » (cf. the same, de Potentia q. 9. a. 7. ad 15. and at the end; S. I. q. 11. a. 2. ad 4.).
This analogous being, first known by the apprehending intellect, is nothing but the slenderest shadow of the divine being, from which by reason of reality it stands as far as heaven is wide and is as it were opposed to it; nevertheless by reason of its greatest universality, priority, and simplicity it is fitted to become for the contemplative eye a mirror for contemplating divine things. Richard of Middleton also observes (I. Sent. d. III. p. I. a. 3. q. 3.): « When we understand being in common, not descending to created or uncreated being, we understand God by a most general understanding, inasmuch as we understand something common to him and to any creature whatever, not by a univocal community, but by an analogous one. And this natural cognition of God is prior to the [proper] cognition of God through a vestige; because the latter presupposes in the intellect the cognition of some other thing, but the former does not. Whence according to Avicenna… being common to all things can in no way be manifested to us through anything better known than it. In another way God is known by us in general, inasmuch as we know that there is some uncreated being, the efficient and final cause of any created being whatever; and this cognition of God we have by nature first through a vestige ». — All these things can be confirmed by the testimonies of our author, one notable one of which it is well to transcribe, in which he speaks of the most general genus and the most special species and concludes thus: « And hence it is that genus in something is likened to God more than species, and in something conversely. For God, since he is most noble at the term of all nobility, has at once in himself every perfection, so that he is most simple and altogether incorruptible, and is also perfect and constituted in every mode of actuality. But a creature, according as it can, is half-fully likened to God; and as regards the account of simplicity and incorruptibility the more universal is the more likened, while as regards the account of actuality the less universal is the more likened » (II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. near the end). So much the more strongly does this hold of the transcendental universals, of which the first and most general is being.
Fourthly, the very words of the author in chapter 5 sufficiently make manifest that he well distinguishes from the divine being, which is pure act, those two others. For he says: « But this is not particular being [existing really outside us], which is being constricted, because it is mingled with potency; nor analogous being [in the intellect within us], because it has least of act, in that it least is ». Of analogous or most common being, which is as it were the lowest among all the things to which being belongs, the author does not here speak, except inasmuch as it gives occasion for contemplating being itself (above us). Whence he admonishes: « Let him who wishes to contemplate the invisible things of God as regards the unity of the essence fix his gaze upon being itself and see » etc. (n. 3.). Likewise: « See therefore the purest being itself, if you can, and it occurs to you » etc. (n. 5.). These words about « being itself » are manifestly not understood of that first act of the apprehending intellect, which is exercised naturally and necessarily, and whose object is that slenderest being which is not the first and pure being, but rather the far-off shadow of the same. But the intellect reflecting and resolving, and especially the contemplative eye, can easily advert that being per se itself, which is the first principle on the part of the thing both of being and of knowing, is something above us and before us, in which every created being and also that most common being of the first universal is rooted, and into which all things lead the resolving intellect. In this sense also St. Thomas (S. I. q. 3. a. 5, sed contra) proclaims: « Nothing is prior to God, neither according to the thing nor according to the intellect ». Which is manifestly said not on the part of the human intellect, which in its blindness apprehends the shadow of truth before truth itself in itself, but on the part of the thing or of the superior intellect, which sees well that being itself precedes the shadow of it. — In this sense are to be taken those words which to many have been a stone of stumbling: « Being therefore is what first falls into the intellect; and that being is what is pure act » (n. 3.). The genuine sense therefore is this: being itself is not in particular things except by participation and in a constricted and imperfect mode, nor is it apprehended by the human intellect in its first act in its purity and distinctness, but only most imperfectly in that shadow of most common being; yet the same is known distinctly by the contemplative eye as that being than which in truth « nothing is prior, neither according to the thing nor according to the intellect ». But because the apprehending intellect on account of its blindness « does not see », « nor advert to » that purest being, nay « seems to itself to see nothing » (as is inculcated, ibid. n. 4.); the holy Doctor with marvellous acumen, according to the reflecting and resolving intellect, unfolds from the very concept of τοῦ esse per se the chief divine attributes.
In his whole Itinerarium, moreover, the Seraphic Doctor leans upon the teaching of St. Augustine; and to understanding the profundity of that teaching he at the same time furnishes as it were the best key. Whoever therefore wishes rightly to understand this sublime little work, let him read, or rather meditate upon, St. Augustine's books de Vera Religione, VI. de Musica, and II. and III. de Libero Arbitrio, or at least let him compare the passages adduced by us in the notes.
---