← Back to Quaestio V: Utrum anima Christi fuerit sapiens tantum sapientia increata, an etiam sapientia creata cum increata

Quaest. 5

Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio V: Utrum anima Christi fuerit sapiens tantum sapientia increata, an etiam sapientia creata cum increata

Textus Latinus
p. 27

Quaestio V. Utrum anima Christi fuerit sapiens tantum sapientia increata, an etiam sapientia creata cum increata.

Postquam habitum est de sapientia Christi secundum quod Verbum, quaeritur de sapientia animae Christi. Et primo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi fuerit sapiens sapientia increata tantum, an etiam sapientia creata cum increata. Et quod sapiens fuerit sapientia increata tantum, videtur.

1. Ecclesiastici primo2: Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est et cum illo fuit semper et est ante aevum; sed omne, quod est ante aevum, est aeternum: ergo omnis sapientia est aeterna: ergo si anima Christi non est sapiens nisi aliqua sapientia, non est sapiens nisi sapientia aeterna. — Si dicas, quod sapientia dicitur fuisse cum Deo sicut in causa; pari ratione potest dici de qualibet creatura, et hoc non multum reddit laudabilem sapientiam ipsam. — Si dicas, quod omnis sapientia, id est perfecta sapientia; cum hoc non concordat sequens littera3, quia loquitur de illa sapientia, ad quam acquirendam invitat, sicut ex consequentibus manifeste colligitur.

2. Item, Augustinus, secundo de Libero Arbitrio4: « Veritate atque sapientia, quae communis est omnibus, omnes sapientes fiunt inhaerendo illi; beatitudine autem alterius non fit alter beatus, nec iustitia alterius fit alter iustus, sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum, quae incommutabiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaque communi ». Si ergo una est sapientia omnium sapientium, et non est una beatitudo omnium beatorum; cum, causaliter loquendo, utrobique sit reperire unitatem, necesse est ponere, quod formaliter et proprie una sit sapientia, qua omnes sunt sapientes; et haec non potest esse sapientia creata: ergo si anima Christi est sapiens, est sapiens sapientia increata.

3. Item, Augustinus, libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quaestione de modis habendi5: « Sapientia, cum accedit homini, non ipsa mutatur, sed hominem mutat, quem de stulto sapientem facit »; sed si sapientia diceret habitum creatum, tunc utique mutaretur, quia introduceretur de non-esse in esse: ergo dicit solum quid increatum: ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, Hugo, in tractatu de Sapientia animae Christi6: « Una est sapientia, qua omnes sapiunt, nec tamen uno modo sapiunt; multo magis sapuit hac sapientia illa anima, quae ipsi sapientiae unita fuit, quae non sorte participationis ex illa viguit, sed privilegio unitatis plenitudinem possedit »: ergo si plenitudo sapientiae non est nisi sapientia increata, videtur etc.

5. Item, Hugo arguit sic7: Si sapientia est accidens; cum sapientia sit id quo sapientes fiunt beati, beatitudo nostra in accidente consistet; sed accidentia mutabilia sunt: ergo et beatitudo nostra erit maxime mutabilis.

6. Item, quod dat aliquid alicui aliquo modo illud habet8; sed sapientia dat sapere sapienti: ergo sapientia sapit. Sed si sapit, non alio quam se ipsa sapit: ergo omnis sapientia, qua sapiens sapit, est

p. 28

sapientia, quae se ipsa sapit. Sed talis sapientia non est nisi sapientia increata: ergo si anima Christi est sapiens tali sapientia, manifestum est etc.

7. Item, perfectio nobilior est perfectibili, et sapiens nobilius non sapiente, et intelligens non intelligente: ergo cum sapientia sit perfectio sapientis, et sapientia sapiens sapiat et intelligat; necesse est ergo, sapientiam sapere et intelligere. Sed non potest sapere nisi se ipsa, et talis est sapientia increata: ergo etc.

His rationibus et auctoritatibus ostenditur, quod anima Christi sit sapiens solum sapientia increata, et non solum ipsa, sed etiam quaelibet alia, quae habet sapientiam.

Sed specialius de anima Christi ostenditur sic.

8. Sapientia facit eum cui unitur sapientem; sed sapientia increata unitur animae Christi: ergo sapientia increata anima Christi fit sapiens. — Si dicas, quod non unitur nisi mediante sapientia creata, quae disponit ipsam animam ad unionem; contra: dispositio intermedia est prior et immediatior et essentialior, quam illud, ad quod disponitur, quia tenet rationem medii introductivi; sed anima Christi prius et immediatius et essentialius comparatur ad hypostasim quam ad aliquod accidens, quod est in ipsa: ergo si Verbum aeternum et sapientia Dei est hypostasis et persona respectu divinae naturae et humanae, priorem et immediatiorem et essentialiorem comparationem habet anima Christi ad sapientiam increatam quam ad creatam: ergo etc.

9. Item, quanto sapientia maior est, tanto magis est cognoscibilis et faciens cognoscere; sed sapientia creata minor est quam sapientia increata et facit animam, cui praesens est, esse cognoscentem: ergo multo fortius sapientia increata. Sed talis sapientia erat animae Christi praesentissima: ergo etc.

10. Item, nihil plus requiritur ad cognitionem nisi sciens et scibile et ratio cognoscendi praesens; sed hoc totum erat in illa anima, in quantum erat Verbo aeterno unita: ergo sapiens erat sapientia increata, omni sapientia1 creata circumscripta.

11. Item, « sicut anima est vita corporis, ita Deus est vita animae2 », et multo excellentius; sed anima se ipsa potest vivificare corpus: ergo multo fortius ipse Deus se ipso vivificabit animam, et maxime illam, cui maxime est unitus; sed talis erat anima Christi: ergo etc.

12. Item, si Deus cognosceret per aliud a se, vilesceret eius cognitio, quia aut ratio cognoscendi esset nobilior, aut minus nobilis; quocumque autem horum dato, esset vilificata divina cognitio: ergo si anima Christi cognoscit per aliud a se creatum, vilificatur eius cognitio; quia illud aut est minus nobile, et sic perficitur ab ignobiliori; aut est magis nobile, et tunc anima Christi non est nobilissima omnium creaturarum: si ergo nobilissima est in fine totius nobilitatis creatae3, impossibile est, quod cognoscat aliquid nisi per se, vel per sapientiam increatam.

13. Item, quanto aliquis intellectus immediatius accedit ad fontem sapientiae, tanto sapientior est; sed anima Christi est sapientissima: ergo immediatissime accedit ad sapientiam increatam: ergo omni alia sapientia circumscripta, est sapiens illa aeterna sapientia.

14. Item, anima Christi sic est unita aeternae maiestati, quod eodem honore est honoranda, quo honoratur aeterna maiestas4; ergo pari ratione sic est unita aeternae luci, quod eadem sapientia sapit, qua lux sempiterna; sed haec est sapientia increata tantum: ergo anima Christi est sapiens tantum sapientia increata.

15. Item, ubi est plenitudo sapientiae, superfluum est ponere quod est ex parte; sed in Christo est plenitudo sapientiae, quia in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, ad Colossenses primo5: ergo si omnis sapientia creata est ex parte, superfluum est ponere in Christo vel eius anima sapientiam creatam.

16. Item, natura non facit per plura quod potest facere per pauciora6, et hoc spectat ad laudem naturae creatae: ergo si quidquid laudis attribuitur naturae creatae potest attribui naturae increatae; cum sapientia increata sit per se sufficientissima, quia ex omni parte completa et plena; ergo videtur, quod sapientia creata in Christo sit superflua. Sed nihil tale ponendum est in Christo: ergo etc.

17. Item, quandocumque7 lumina materialia concurrunt ad idem medium, ita quod unum excedit reliquum, unum offuscat aliud, non propter repugnantiam, sed propter superexcellentiam: ergo si multo plus superexcellit sapientia increata creatam, quam aliquod lumen materiale excedat reliquum quantumcumque modicum, sapientia increata offuscabit aliam. Sed non est ponere in Christo aliquam sapientiam offuscatam: ergo etc.

18. Item, plus distat cognitio creata ab increata, quam opinio a scientia, vel fides a visione aperta; sed in eodem non potest simul esse opinio et scientia, nec fides et visio aperta8: ergo nec sapientia creata cum increata.

p. 29

Sed contra: 1. Iesus proficiebat sapientia et aetate et gratia apud Deum et homines1; sed hoc non poterat esse per sapientiam increatam: ergo propter illam habebat sapientiam creatam.

2. Item, Damascenus2 dicit, quod in Christo propter duas naturas necesse est ponere, in eo duas fuisse voluntates: ergo pari ratione et duas cognitiones, ergo et duas scientias, ergo et duas sapientias.

3. Item, nullus est bonus nisi bonitate informante, ergo nullus est sapiens nisi sapientia informante; sed sapientia increata nullius creaturae potest esse informativa, sed tantum exemplativa: ergo si anima Christi est sapiens aliqua sapientia informante ipsam; necesse est, quod praeter sapientiam increatam habeat etiam creatam informantem ipsam.

4. Item, sapientia accidit sapienti creato, qui non est sapiens se ipso; sed sapientia increata, cum sit Deus, nulli potest accidere: ergo necesse est, quod praeter illam sapientiam ponatur in anima Christi sapientia aliqua creata, cum ei3 non sit essentialis, sed accidat sapientia.

5. Item, est perfectio esse et bene esse; sed Deus nullius creaturae est forma perfectiva quantum ad esse: ergo nec quantum ad bene esse. Sed sapientia est forma perfectiva ipsius animae Christi sapientis quantum ad bene esse: ergo huiusmodi sapientia non potest esse sapientia increata4: ergo etc.

6. Item, anima Christi non est sapiens per essentiam, cum sit sapiens per aliud a se: ergo si est sapiens, est sapiens per participationem; sed non capit partem aeternae sapientiae secundum essentiam, cum sit simplex: ergo necesse est, quod capiat secundum influentiam. Sed talis influentia est creata: ergo necesse est, quod anima Christi sit sapiens per sapientiam creatam.

7. Item, anima Christi est de natura aliarum animarum; sed nulla anima plene attingit ad fontem sapientiae aeternae, nisi sit deiformis; sed deiformis non potest esse nisi per aliquid sibi datum, quod eam informet et conformet Deo; tale autem est gratia et sapientia creata: ergo necesse est, quod anima Christi sit sapiens per sapientiam creatam.

8. Item, Deus, cum sit lux et sapientia, diversimode cognoscitur a diversis, et ab anima Christi excellentius quam ab aliis: aut ergo hoc est ratione ipsius Dei cogniti, aut ratione potentiae cognoscentis, aut ratione alicuius disponentis5. Non ratione ipsius Dei, cum ipse in se nullam habeat varietatem; nec ratione potentiae cognoscentis solum, quia tunc qui meliora haberent naturalia sapientiores et meliores essent; quod est falsum: ergo hoc erit ratione alicuius habitus intermedii disponentis. Sed talis habitus non est nisi sapientia creata: ergo etc.

9. Item, sapientia Dei increata per sui essentiam est omnibus intellectibus praesentissima: ergo si sola sui praesentia faceret sapientes, quilibet intellectus esset sapiens; quod si manifeste falsum est, ergo ultra praesentiam ipsius necessario requiritur ipsius influentia. Ergo si anima Christi est sapiens, patet etc.

10. Item, Verbum Dei, quod est sapientia, est unitum oculo, et tamen oculus non est sapiens: ergo ad hoc, quod anima sit sapiens, non sufficit ei unio in hypostasi: ergo necesse est, quod uniatur sicut cognoscens cognoscibili. Omnis autem talis unio est per assimilationem6; sed omnis assimilatio est secundum aliquam qualitatem: ergo necesse est, quod ipsi animae detur qualitas spiritualis creata, per quam sit ad cognoscendum idonea. Hanc autem vocamus sapientiam creatam: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Anima Christi, cum sit creatura, sapiens fuit utraque sapientia, creata scilicet et increata.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut ex quaestione praecedenti apparet, ad certitudinalem cognitionem non sufficit lucis aeternae influentia sine sui praesentia7, pro eo quod nihil creatum potest animam perfecta certitudine stabilire, quousque pertingat ad veritatem immutabilem et infallibilem lucem. Sic est intelligendum, quod ad sapientialem cognitionem non sufficit illius lucis aeternae praesentia sine sui influentia, non propter defectum ex parte sui, sed propter defectum ex parte nostri, pro eo quod intelligentia creata non pertingit ad illam fontalem sapientiam, nisi sit deiformis effecta, ac per hoc elevata et habilitata: elevata supra se, et habilitata in se. Ideo necessarium est, quod detur aliquid ei veniens desuper8, quod tamen sit proportionale et ei inhaerens; hanc autem vocamus lucis aeternae influentiam; et quia animam ad sapientiam habilitat, vocatur sapientia creata. Quia tamen ipsa influentia non habilitat nec elevat, nisi continuetur cum luce aeterna tanquam cum principio movente et ratione dirigente et fine quietante; ideo non sortitur rationem

p. 30

sapientiae ex se, sed ratione eius a quo fluit, secundum quod dirigit et ad quod ducit; et haec est sapientia increata. — Et ideo secundum illos sapientes, quibus datum est supra se ipsos ascendere, nomen sapientiae principaliter et proprie attribuitur soli sapientiae fontali et increatae1; sed secundum communiter loquentes et intelligentes non solum ei attribuitur, sed etiam suae influentiae, quae est habilitativa mentis humanae ad perfectam cognitionem. Et secundum hoc concedendum est, quod anima Christi, cum sit creatura, sapiens fuerit utraque sapientia, creata scilicet et increata: increata sicut principaliter movente et regulante et quietante; creata vero sicut informante, habilitante et elevante, ut ad illam increatam possit plene pertingere.

Et quod utraque simul concurrat, patet per illud quod dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo septimo2: « In illa aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam, secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus, nec a nobis nascendo discedit ». Ex quo apparet, quod ad sapientiam concurrit aeterna veritas et concepta apud nos veritatis notitia, quae quidem est ipsius animae nostrae informativa3.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est; dicendum, quod sapientia ibi non accipitur pro habitu, quo informatur anima sapientis, et quo habilitatur ad cognoscendum, sed pro ratione cognoscendi incommutabili. Omnis autem talis ratio est in arte divina, pro eo quod est sempiterna, et sine illa non potest esse sapientia creata, sicut ostensum est supra4. Unde ex illa auctoritate non potest concludi, quod sapientia creata non debeat poni.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de duplici auctoritate Augustini, dicendum, quod utraque intelligenda est de sapientia increata, quae tamen, sicut ex praemissis patet, non excludit creatam. Verumtamen Augustinus, loquendo de sapientia, semper vel ut in pluribus fert intellectum suum ad illam sapientiam increatam, pro eo quod comparatione illius non reputat sapientiam creatam nomine sapientiae dignam; vel quia ad modum influentiae totaliter pendet ex illa, unde magis est entis quam ens5, et magis effectus et irradiatio sapientiae quam sapientia nuncupanda. — Et si tu quaeras, quare non similiter de beatitudine potest dici, cum ipsa omnino fluat a beatitudine aeterna; dicendum, quod beatitudo aeterna dicit affectionem inhaerentem summo bono, sapientia vero dicit cognitionem contemplantem summum bonum; affectio autem dicit ut ab anima, cognitio vero ut ad animum6; et propterea, quia diversarum affectionum diversae sunt origines, ideo formaliter et originaliter diversae ponuntur beatitudines. Non sic autem est in sapientia, quae, quantum est de se, respicit originem unam; lucem scilicet sempiternam, a qua et secundum quam est omnis cognitio certa.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Hugone, dicendum, quod verba Hugonis concordant verbis Augustini, quia ipse tanquam homo excedens7 et sapiens intellectum suum fert potissime ad ipsum sapientiae fontem. — Unde et quod obiicit, quod in accidentibus non potest esse beatitudo nostra, non intelligit, quin per aliquod accidens ad beatitudinem disponamur, sed quod quidquid est accidens habet potius rationem viae conductivae8 in alterum quam quietativi et consummativi. Et hoc modo ponimus sapientiam creatam in anima Christi et in alia quacumque anima, non sicut illud, in quo quiescat illa beata anima, sed sicut illud, quo reducitur et disponitur ad sapientiam increatam, qua principaliter et potissime fit beata.

6. 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia dat sapere, et quod sapientia nobilior est sapiente; dicendum, quod ipsa sapientia creata non dicitur proprie dare sapere, sed magis ipsa sapientia increata dat nobis sapere in se ipsa, disponendo nos per illam sapientiam creatam; et ideo non sequitur de illa sapientia creata, quod sit sapiens vel habeat actum sapiendi, pro eo quod non tenet rationem entis completi, sed potius rationem viae et cuiusdam medii dispositivi, sicut manifeste habetur ex praedictis.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia facit illum cui unitur sapientem; dicendum, quod sapientia potest alicui uniri multipliciter, vel sicut hypostasis unitur naturae substantificatae in ipsa, vel sicut ratio et lux cognoscendi unitur cognoscenti illuminato per ipsam. Primo modo non facit sapientem, quia tunc corpus Christi, cum uniatur sapientiae, esset sapiens, sed secundo modo. Hoc autem modo non unitur animae Christi nisi mediante dono sapientiae creatae, quae est tanquam lux informativa ipsius animae, reddens eam deiformem et habilem ad contuendam lucem sapientiae increatae9.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia, quanto maior est, tanto magis est cognoscibilis et faciens cognoscere; dicendum, quod verum est per modum influentis; sed per modum informantis non est verum, nisi sit talis sapientia, quae sit nata informare

p. 31

et perficere et uniri alteri per modum formae. Talis autem non est sapientia increata, sed creata, et ideo non concludit ratio illa.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil plus requiritur nisi sciens et scibile et ratio cognoscendi; dicendum, quod sciens potest nominare potentiam cognoscendi, vel potentiam cum habitu. Si potentiam cum habitu; veritatem habet, et tunc includitur ibi scientia creata, quae est animae habilitativa. Si autem nominet potentiam tantum; tunc illa est falsa, et respondendum est per interemptionem1 ad rationem praemissam.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est vita animae, sicut anima est vita corporis; dicendum, quod anima dicitur vita corporis dupliciter, scilicet vel per modum informantis, vel per modum influentis, quia anima comparatur ad corpus dupliciter, videlicet per modum perfectionis et per modum motoris2. Cum ergo ostendit, quod anima in vivificando assimilatur Deo; dicendum, quod ista intelligitur de ipsa, in quantum est motor, non in quantum est perfectio. Movet autem anima corpus mediante potentia et mediante dispositione corporis, quae reddit corpus idoneum ad animae influentiam; et hoc modo divina lux et amor movet et vivificat ipsam animam mediante gratia et sapientia sibi infusa.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Deus cognoscit per aliud a se, quod vilescet eius cognitio; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia Deus, cum sit nobilissimus, nihil potest se ipso habere nobilius, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid, nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad bene esse, quia ipsum esse est sibi bene esse; anima vero Christi licet sit nobilior ceteris creaturis ratione gratiae unionis, tamen differunt in ipsa esse et bene esse, substantia et dispositio accidentalis. Et quia per illam dispositionem aliquam acquirit completionem, ideo non repugnat nobilitati suae in genere creaturae, quod habeat aliquid nobilius se saltem secundum quid; nam ultima completio et perfectio, ad quam terminatur illius animae appetitus, est sapientia increata, et ad illam disponitur per creatam influentiam, sicut patet ex his quae supra dicta sunt.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur de intellectu accedente ad fontem sapientiae immediate; dicendum, quod est medium disponens et est medium deducens3. Primum est intrinsecum, secundum extrinsecum; primum facit magis approximare, secundum vero facit distare. Praedicta autem propositio veritatem habet de medio deducente; sapientia autem creata, quae ponitur in Christo, tenet rationem medii disponentis ad hoc, quod perfecte et immediate hauriat de fonte sapientiae aeternalis. Et sic patet, quod illa ratio non procedit.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi adoratur latria propter unionem cum maiestate etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia adoratio est actus, qui debetur ipsi naturae ratione personae. Honor enim, qui exhibetur Christo, nec animae per se nec corpori exhibetur, sed personae, in qua illa duo subsistunt; cognitio autem est actus exiens a potentia ipsius animae. Et sicut natura divina et humana in Christo distinctae sunt, sic habent diversas virtutes et operationes, ac per hoc diversas sapientias et cognitiones, non sic diversos honores. Et ideo non est simile.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi est ponere plenitudinem sapientiae, superfluit ponere quod est ex parte; dicendum, quod verum est in eodem et secundum idem. Cum autem dicitur, quod Christus habuit plenitudinem sapientiae, hoc est secundum naturam increatam, si intelligatur de plenitudine simpliciter et extra genus; si vero intelligatur de plenitudine in genere, sic competere potest naturae creatae, et haec quodam modo est4 ex parte respectu plenitudinis simpliciter; nec est superflua, quia magis proportionalis est ipsi animae, quia per se nudam capere non poterat illam sapientiae increatae immensitatem.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non facit per plura etc.; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si aeque bene et ordinate per unum fiat, sicut per plura; sic autem non est hic, et hoc non est propter defectum ipsius sapientiae illustrantis, sed propter naturam ipsius animae suscipientis, sicut patet ex iis quae dicta sunt supra5.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur de luminibus materialibus, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia unum illorum luminum non disponit ad aliud, immo unumquodque per se habet proprium esse et distinctum; et ideo operatio unius minus apparet quam operatio alterius, quae6 pro sua excellentia sibi vindicat dominium. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia sapientia creata disponit ad increatam, nec creata lucet nisi per increatam, nec ad increatam attingitur, nisi disponente creata.

18. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia inter scientiam creatam et increatam, et opinionem et scientiam; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia opinio et scientia sunt in eodem et secundum idem et respectu eiusdem, habentes diversas et oppositas

p. 32

conditiones; sapientia autem creata et increata, licet differant in natura, non tamen secundum idem insunt, nec sic oppositas et incompossibiles habent conditiones, immo necessario concomitantes1, quia nihil creatum subsistit nisi per increatum. Et sic patet responsio omnium obiectorum.

---

English Translation
p. 27

Question V. Whether the soul of Christ was wise by uncreated wisdom alone, or also by created wisdom together with the uncreated.

After what has been established concerning the wisdom of Christ in so far as he is the Word, it is asked concerning the wisdom of the soul of Christ. And first it is asked whether the soul of Christ was wise by uncreated wisdom alone, or also by created wisdom together with the uncreated. And that it was wise by uncreated wisdom alone, it seems.

1. Ecclesiasticus, the first chapter2: All wisdom is from the Lord God, and hath been always with him, and is before all time; but everything which is before all time is eternal: therefore all wisdom is eternal: therefore if the soul of Christ is not wise except by some wisdom, it is not wise except by eternal wisdom. — If you say that wisdom is said to have been with God as in a cause; by parity of reasoning this can be said of any creature whatever, and this does not much render that wisdom praiseworthy. — If you say that all wisdom means perfect wisdom; the following text does not agree with this3, because it speaks of that wisdom to the acquiring of which it invites, as is manifestly gathered from what follows.

2. Again, Augustine, in the second book On Free Choice4: « By the truth and wisdom which is common to all, all the wise become wise by cleaving to it; but by the blessedness of another no other becomes blessed, nor by the justice of another does another become just, but by fitting the mind to those unchangeable rules and lumenstr. of the virtues, which live unchangeably in that very truth and common wisdom ». If therefore the wisdom of all the wise is one, and the blessedness of all the blessed is not one; since, speaking causally, a unity is to be found on both sides, it is necessary to posit that there is formally and properly one wisdom by which all are wise; and this cannot be a created wisdom: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise, it is wise by uncreated wisdom.

3. Again, Augustine, in the book Of Eighty-three Questions, in the question on the modes of having5: « Wisdom, when it comes to a man, is not itself changed, but changes the man, whom it makes wise from foolish »; but if wisdom named a created habit, then it would certainly be changed, because it would be brought from non-being into being: therefore it names only something uncreated: therefore the same as before.

4. Again, Hugh, in the treatise On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ6: « There is one wisdom by which all are wise, and yet they are not wise in one mode; much more was that soul wise by this wisdom, which was united to wisdom itself, which flourished from it not by the lot of participation, but possessed its fullness by the privilege of unity »: therefore if the fullness of wisdom is nothing but uncreated wisdom, it seems etc.

5. Again, Hugh argues thus7: If wisdom is an accident; since wisdom is that by which the wise become blessed, our blessedness will consist in an accident; but accidents are changeable: therefore our blessedness too will be in the highest degree changeable.

6. Again, what gives something to another has it in some mode8; but wisdom gives being-wise to the wise: therefore wisdom is wise. But if it is wise, it is not wise by anything other than itself: therefore all wisdom by which one who is wise is wise is

p. 28

a wisdom which is wise by itself. But such wisdom is nothing but uncreated wisdom: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise by such a wisdom, it is manifest etc.

7. Again, a perfection is nobler than what is perfectible, and one who is wise is nobler than one who is not wise, and one who understands than one who does not understand: therefore since wisdom is the perfection of the wise, and the wise man is wise and understands by wisdom; it is necessary therefore that wisdom be wise and understand. But it cannot be wise except by itself, and such is uncreated wisdom: therefore etc.

By these reasons and authorities it is shown that the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom alone, and not it alone, but also any other whatever which has wisdom.

But more specially concerning the soul of Christ it is shown thus.

8. Wisdom makes him to whom it is united wise; but uncreated wisdom is united to the soul of Christ: therefore by uncreated wisdom the soul of Christ becomes wise. — If you say that it is not united except by the mediation of a created wisdom, which disposes the soul itself to the union; on the contrary: an intermediate disposition is prior and more immediate and more essential than that to which it disposes, because it holds the account of an introducing middle; but the soul of Christ is compared to the hypostasis prior and more immediately and more essentially than to any accident which is in it: therefore if the eternal Word and the wisdom of God is a hypostasis and person in respect of the divine nature and the human, the soul of Christ has a prior and more immediate and more essential comparison to uncreated wisdom than to created: therefore etc.

9. Again, the greater wisdom is, the more it is knowable and the more it makes to know; but created wisdom is less than uncreated wisdom, and it makes the soul to which it is present to be knowing: therefore much more strongly does uncreated wisdom. But such wisdom was most present to the soul of Christ: therefore etc.

10. Again, nothing more is required for cognition than a knower and a knowable and a present account of knowing; but this whole was in that soul, in so far as it was united to the eternal Word: therefore it was wise by uncreated wisdom, all created wisdom1 being set aside.

11. Again, « as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul2 », and much more excellently; but the soul can by itself give life to the body: therefore much more strongly will God himself by himself give life to the soul, and most of all to that soul to which he is most united; but such was the soul of Christ: therefore etc.

12. Again, if God knew through something other than himself, his cognition would be cheapened, because the account of knowing would be either nobler or less noble; but whichever of these be granted, the divine cognition would be made cheap: therefore if the soul of Christ knows through something created other than itself, its cognition is made cheap; because that thing is either less noble, and so it is perfected by something baser; or it is more noble, and then the soul of Christ is not the noblest of all creatures: if therefore it is the noblest, at the very limit of all created nobility3, it is impossible that it should know anything except through itself, or through uncreated wisdom.

13. Again, the more immediately any understanding approaches the fountain of wisdom, the wiser it is; but the soul of Christ is the wisest: therefore it approaches uncreated wisdom most immediately: therefore, all other wisdom being set aside, it is wise by that eternal wisdom.

14. Again, the soul of Christ is so united to the eternal majesty that it is to be honoured with the same honour with which the eternal majesty is honoured4; therefore by parity of reasoning it is so united to the eternal light that it is wise by the same wisdom by which the everlasting light is wise; but this is uncreated wisdom alone: therefore the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom alone.

15. Again, where there is a fullness of wisdom, it is superfluous to posit what is in part; but in Christ there is a fullness of wisdom, because in him it hath well pleased all fullness to dwell, in the first chapter to the Colossians5: therefore if all created wisdom is in part, it is superfluous to posit a created wisdom in Christ or in his soul.

16. Again, nature does not do through many things what it can do through fewer6, and this belongs to the praise of created nature: therefore if whatever of praise is attributed to created nature can be attributed to uncreated nature; since uncreated wisdom is of itself most sufficient, because complete and full on every side; therefore it seems that created wisdom in Christ is superfluous. But nothing such is to be posited in Christ: therefore etc.

17. Again, whenever7 material lumens come together upon the same medium, so that one exceeds the other, the one obscures the other, not on account of repugnance, but on account of superexcellence: therefore if uncreated wisdom superexceeds created wisdom much more than any material lumen exceeds the other by however small a measure, uncreated wisdom will obscure the other. But no obscured wisdom is to be posited in Christ: therefore etc.

18. Again, created cognition is further from uncreated than opinion is from knowledge, or faith from open vision; but opinion and knowledge cannot be in the same subject at once, nor faith and open vision8: therefore neither created wisdom together with the uncreated.

p. 29

Sed contra: 1. Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men1; but this could not be through uncreated wisdom: therefore on account of it he had a created wisdom.

2. Again, the Damascene2 says that in Christ, on account of the two natures, it is necessary to posit that there were in him two wills: therefore by parity of reasoning two cognitions also, therefore also two knowledges, therefore also two wisdoms.

3. Again, no one is good except by a goodness informing him, therefore no one is wise except by a wisdom informing him; but uncreated wisdom cannot be informative of any creature, but only exemplative: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise by some wisdom informing it, it is necessary that besides the uncreated wisdom it have also a created one informing it.

4. Again, wisdom is an accident to a created wise being, who is not wise by himself; but uncreated wisdom, since it is God, can be an accident to nothing: therefore it is necessary that besides that wisdom there be posited in the soul of Christ some created wisdom, since to it3 wisdom is not essential, but befalls it as an accident.

5. Again, there is a perfection of being and of well-being; but God is the perfective form of no creature as regards being: therefore neither as regards well-being. But wisdom is the perfective form of the soul of Christ itself, which is wise, as regards well-being: therefore a wisdom of this kind cannot be uncreated wisdom4: therefore etc.

6. Again, the soul of Christ is not wise by essence, since it is wise through something other than itself: therefore if it is wise, it is wise by participation; but it does not take a part of eternal wisdom according to essence, since that is simple: therefore it is necessary that it take according to an influence. But such an influence is created: therefore it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise through a created wisdom.

7. Again, the soul of Christ is of the nature of other souls; but no soul fully attains to the fountain of eternal wisdom unless it be deiform; but it cannot be deiform except through something given to it which informs it and conforms it to God; but such is grace and created wisdom: therefore it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise through a created wisdom.

8. Again, God, since he is light and wisdom, is known diversely by diverse beings, and by the soul of Christ more excellently than by others: either therefore this is by reason of God himself as known, or by reason of the knowing power, or by reason of something disposing5. Not by reason of God himself, since he has in himself no variety; nor by reason of the knowing power alone, because then those who had better natural endowments would be wiser and better; which is false: therefore this will be by reason of some intermediate disposing habit. But such a habit is nothing but created wisdom: therefore etc.

9. Again, the uncreated wisdom of God is through its own essence most present to all understandings: therefore if by its presence alone it made men wise, every understanding would be wise; and if this is manifestly false, then beyond its presence its influence is necessarily required. Therefore if the soul of Christ is wise, it is plain etc.

10. Again, the Word of God, which is wisdom, is united to the eye, and yet the eye is not wise: therefore for a soul to be wise, union in the hypostasis does not suffice for it: therefore it is necessary that it be united as a knower to a knowable. But every such union is through assimilation6; but every assimilation is according to some quality: therefore it is necessary that a created spiritual quality be given to the soul itself, through which it be fit for knowing. And this we call created wisdom: therefore etc.

Conclusion. The soul of Christ, since it is a creature, was wise by both wisdoms, the created namely and the uncreated.

I answer: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as appears from the preceding question, for certitudinal cognition the influence of the eternal light does not suffice without its presence7, because nothing created can establish the soul in perfect certitude until it reach the unchangeable truth and the infallible light. So it is to be understood that for sapiential cognition the presence of that eternal light does not suffice without its influence, not on account of a defect on its side, but on account of a defect on our side, because created intelligence does not attain to that fontal wisdom unless it be made deiform, and through this raised and made able: raised above itself, and made able in itself. Therefore it is necessary that something be given to it coming from above8, which nevertheless is proportional to it and inhering in it; and this we call the influence of the eternal light; and because it makes the soul able for wisdom, it is called created wisdom. Since, however, that influence neither makes able nor raises unless it be continued with the eternal light as with a moving principle and a directing account and a quieting end; therefore it does not obtain the account

p. 30

of wisdom from itself, but by reason of that from which it flows, according to which it directs and to which it leads; and this is uncreated wisdom. — And therefore, according to those wise men to whom it is given to ascend above themselves, the name of wisdom is attributed principally and properly to the fontal and uncreated wisdom alone1; but according to those who speak and understand in the common way it is attributed not only to it, but also to its influence, which makes the human mind able for perfect cognition. And according to this it is to be conceded that the soul of Christ, since it is a creature, was wise by both wisdoms, the created namely and the uncreated: by the uncreated as principally moving and regulating and quieting; by the created as informing, making able and raising, so that it might be able fully to attain to that uncreated one.

And that both concur together is plain from what Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity, chapter seven2: « In that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the sight of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which we do anything either in ourselves or in bodies by true and right reason, and thence we have with us, as a word, a truthful knowledge of things conceived, and by speaking within we beget it, nor does it depart from us by being born ». From which it appears that to wisdom there concur the eternal truth and the knowledge of truth conceived within us, which indeed is informative of our soul itself3.

1. To that which is objected first, that all wisdom is from the Lord God; it is to be said that wisdom is not there taken for the habit by which the soul of the wise man is informed, and by which it is made able for knowing, but for the unchangeable account of knowing. But every such account is in the divine art, because it is everlasting, and without it there can be no created wisdom, as was shown above4. Whence from that authority it cannot be concluded that a created wisdom is not to be posited.

2. 3. To that which is objected from the twofold authority of Augustine, it is to be said that both are to be understood of uncreated wisdom, which nevertheless, as is plain from what has been set down, does not exclude the created. Nevertheless Augustine, in speaking of wisdom, always, or for the most part, carries his understanding to that uncreated wisdom, because in comparison with it he does not reckon created wisdom worthy of the name of wisdom; or because in the manner of an influence it depends wholly upon it, whence it is rather of a being than a being5, and is rather to be called an effect and an irradiation of wisdom than wisdom. — And if you ask why the like cannot be said of blessedness, since it too flows wholly from eternal blessedness; it is to be said that eternal blessedness names an affection inhering in the highest good, whereas wisdom names a cognition contemplating the highest good; but affection names something as from the soul, while cognition names something as to the soul6; and therefore, because of diverse affections there are diverse origins, therefore formally and originally diverse blessednesses are posited. But it is not so in wisdom, which, so far as lies in itself, looks to one origin, namely the everlasting light, from which and according to which is all certain cognition.

4. 5. To that which is objected from Hugh, it is to be said that the words of Hugh agree with the words of Augustine, because he, as a man going beyond7 and wise, carries his understanding above all to the fountain of wisdom itself. — Whence also, as to what he objects, that our blessedness cannot lie in accidents, he does not mean that we are not disposed to blessedness through some accident, but that whatever is an accident has rather the account of a conducting way to something else8 than of something quieting and consummating. And in this mode we posit created wisdom in the soul of Christ and in any other soul whatever, not as that in which that blessed soul rests, but as that by which it is led back and disposed to uncreated wisdom, by which it is principally and above all made blessed.

6. 7. To that which is objected, that wisdom gives being-wise, and that wisdom is nobler than the wise; it is to be said that created wisdom itself is not properly said to give being-wise, but rather uncreated wisdom itself gives us being-wise in itself, by disposing us through that created wisdom; and therefore it does not follow of that created wisdom that it is wise or has the act of being-wise, because it does not hold the account of a complete being, but rather the account of a way and of a certain disposing middle, as is manifestly had from what has been said.

8. To that which is objected, that wisdom makes him to whom it is united wise; it is to be said that wisdom can be united to something in many modes, either as a hypostasis is united to a nature substantified in it, or as the account and light of knowing is united to a knower illumined by it. In the first mode it does not make wise, because then the body of Christ, since it is united to wisdom, would be wise, but in the second mode. But in this mode it is not united to the soul of Christ except by the mediation of the gift of created wisdom, which is as it were a light informative of the soul itself, rendering it deiform and able to contuit the light of uncreated wisdom9.

9. To that which is objected, that wisdom, the greater it is, the more it is knowable and the more it makes to know; it is to be said that this is true in the manner of something influencing; but in the manner of something informing it is not true, unless it be such a wisdom as is born to inform

p. 31

and to perfect and to be united to another in the manner of a form. But uncreated wisdom is not such, but created wisdom, and therefore that reason does not conclude.

10. To that which is objected, that nothing more is required than a knower and a knowable and an account of knowing; it is to be said that knower can name the power of knowing, or the power together with a habit. If it names the power together with a habit, it holds truth, and then there is included there created knowledge, which makes the soul able. But if it names the power alone, then that proposition is false, and the answer is to be made by destruction1 to the premised reason.

11. To that which is objected, that God is the life of the soul as the soul is the life of the body; it is to be said that the soul is called the life of the body in two ways, namely either in the manner of something informing, or in the manner of something influencing, because the soul is compared to the body in two ways, namely in the manner of a perfection and in the manner of a mover2. When therefore he shows that the soul in giving life is assimilated to God; it is to be said that this is understood of it in so far as it is a mover, not in so far as it is a perfection. But the soul moves the body by the mediation of a power and by the mediation of a disposition of the body, which renders the body fit for the influence of the soul; and in this mode the divine light and love moves and gives life to the soul itself by the mediation of the grace and wisdom infused into it.

12. To that which is objected, that if God knows through something other than himself, his cognition will be cheapened; it is to be said that it is not alike: because God, since he is the noblest, can have nothing nobler than himself, neither simply nor in a certain respect, neither as regards being nor as regards well-being, because being itself is well-being to him; but the soul of Christ, although it is nobler than other creatures by reason of the grace of the union, nevertheless in it being and well-being, substance and accidental disposition, differ. And because through that disposition it acquires some completion, therefore it is not repugnant to its nobility in the genus of creature that it should have something nobler than itself at least in a certain respect; for the ultimate completion and perfection at which the appetite of that soul is terminated is uncreated wisdom, and it is disposed to it through a created influence, as is plain from what has been said above.

13. To that which is objected concerning an understanding approaching the fountain of wisdom immediately; it is to be said that there is a disposing middle and there is a deducing middle3. The first is intrinsic, the second extrinsic; the first makes one come nearer, but the second makes one stand apart. Now the aforesaid proposition holds truth of the deducing middle; but created wisdom, which is posited in Christ, holds the account of a disposing middle to this, that it may perfectly and immediately draw from the fountain of eternal wisdom. And so it is plain that that reason does not proceed.

14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is adored with latria on account of the union with the majesty, etc.; it is to be said that it is not alike, because adoration is an act which is owed to the nature itself by reason of the person. For the honour which is shown to Christ is shown neither to the soul through itself nor to the body, but to the person, in whom those two subsist; but cognition is an act going out from a power of the soul itself. And just as the divine and the human nature in Christ are distinct, so they have diverse powers and operations, and through this diverse wisdoms and cognitions, but not so diverse honours. And therefore it is not alike.

15. To that which is objected, that where a fullness of wisdom is to be posited it is superfluous to posit what is in part; it is to be said that this is true in the same subject and according to the same. But when it is said that Christ had a fullness of wisdom, this is according to the uncreated nature, if it be understood of a fullness simply and outside a genus; but if it be understood of a fullness within a genus, thus it can belong to a created nature, and this in a certain mode is4 in part in respect of the fullness simply; nor is it superfluous, because it is more proportional to the soul itself, since of itself, bare, it could not take in that immensity of uncreated wisdom.

16. To that which is objected, that nature does not act through many things etc.; it is to be said that this is true if through one thing it be done as well and as orderly as through many; but it is not so here, and this is not on account of a defect of the illuminating wisdom itself, but on account of the nature of the receiving soul itself, as is plain from what has been said above5.

17. To that which is objected concerning material lumens, it is to be said that it is not alike: because one of those lumens does not dispose to another, but rather each one has through itself its own and distinct being; and therefore the operation of the one appears less than the operation of the other, which6 on account of its excellence claims dominion for itself. But it is not so in the matter proposed, because created wisdom disposes to the uncreated, nor does the created shine except through the uncreated, nor is the uncreated attained except with the created disposing.

18. To that which is objected concerning the distance between created and uncreated knowledge, and between opinion and knowledge; it is to be said that it is not alike: because opinion and knowledge are in the same subject and according to the same and in respect of the same, having diverse and opposed

p. 32

conditions; but created and uncreated wisdom, although they differ in nature, are nevertheless not present according to the same, nor have they conditions so opposed and incompossible, but rather necessarily concomitant ones1, because nothing created subsists except through the uncreated. And so the answer to all the objections is plain.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. 2
    Vers. 1. — Cfr. III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1, ubi eadem quaestio solvitur.
    Verse 1. — Compare III Sentences, d. 14, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 1, where the same question is solved.
  2. 3
    Vers. 10. seqq. — Paulo superius pro reddit laudabilem H redderet laudabilem.
    Verse 10 and following. — A little above, for reddit laudabilem H reads redderet laudabilem.
  3. 4
    Cap. 19. n. 52. Textus originalis vocibus sapientes fiunt interserit et beati, post alter beatus addit plura et circa finem pro incommutabiliter ponit incorruptibiliter.
    Chapter 19, n. 52. The original text inserts et beati into the words sapientes fiunt, adds more after alter beatus, and near the end puts incorruptibiliter for incommutabiliter.
  4. 5
    Quaest. 73. n. 1: Sapientia, cum accidit homini etc.
    Question 73, n. 1: Wisdom, when it befalls a man etc.
  5. 6
    Circa medium. Textus originalis post uno modo sapiunt addit quia participando sapiunt. Quodsi omnes hac sapientia sapiunt quicumque sapiunt, et subinde pro sapuit substituit sapit, quod etiam F exhibet.
    About the middle. The original text, after uno modo sapiunt, adds quia participando sapiunt. Quodsi omnes hac sapientia sapiunt quicumque sapiunt, and thereupon substitutes sapit for sapuit, which F also exhibits.
  6. 7
    Loc. cit., ubi etiam plura seqq. argg. insinuantur.
    In the place cited, where several of the following arguments are also intimated.
  7. 8
    Nihil dat quod non habet; cfr. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Pro quod dat D F G qui dat. Inferius pro non alio quam F non ergo nisi.
    Nothing gives what it does not have; compare Aristotle, II Sophistical Refutations, c. 3 (c. 22). — For quod dat D F G read qui dat. Below, for non alio quam F reads non ergo nisi.
  8. 1
    F omni scientia sive sapientia.
    F reads omni scientia sive sapientia.
  9. 2
    Ut docet August. locis tom. II. pag. 633, nota 5. allatis.
    As Augustine teaches in the places adduced in vol. II, p. 633, note 5.
  10. 3
    Vide Glossam August. adductam III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1.
    See the Augustinian Gloss adduced at III Sentences, d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, fundamentum 1.
  11. 4
    Scil. honore latriae; cfr. III. Sent. d. 9. a. 1. q. 1.
    Namely with the honour of latria; compare III Sentences, d. 9, a. 1, q. 1.
  12. 5
    Vers. 19. — I. Cor. 13, 9: Ex parte enim cognoscimus etc. — Superius post Item F legit ubicumque est ponere plenitudinem sapientiae etc.; pro in Christo H in anima Christi.
    Verse 19. — I Cor. 13:9: For we know in part etc. — Above, after Item, F reads ubicumque est ponere plenitudinem sapientiae etc.; for in Christo H reads in anima Christi.
  13. 6
    Vide tom. III. pag. 277, nota 1. locos ex Aristot. allegatos.
    See vol. III, p. 277, note 1, for the passages alleged from Aristotle.
  14. 7
    F bene addit diversa.
    F rightly adds diversa.
  15. 8
    Cfr. I. Cor. 13, 9. seqq. et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.). — Superius voci cognitio B praemittit sapientia.
    Compare I Cor. 13:9 and following, and Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 26 (c. 33). — Above, B prefixes sapientia to the word cognitio.
  16. 1
    Luc. 2, 52.
    Luke 2:52.
  17. 2
    Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 13. seq. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1.
    Book III On the Orthodox Faith, c. 13 and following. Compare III Sentences, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1.
  18. 3
    Pro cum ei F quae; idem F cum A pro accidat substituit accidentalis.
    For cum ei F reads quae; the same F, with A, substitutes accidentalis for accidat.
  19. 4
    D F H addunt et est creata vel increata.
    D F H add et est creata vel increata.
  20. 5
    D F H alicuius gratiae disponentis.
    D F H read alicuius gratiae disponentis.
  21. 6
    Cfr. supra pag. 7, nota 1. et 2. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 1: Si quidem ex similitudine quadam atque affinitate cognitio existit ipsis (potentiis animae).
    Compare above, p. 7, notes 1 and 2. Aristotle, VI Ethics, c. 1: If indeed cognition arises in them (the powers of the soul) from a certain likeness and affinity.
  22. 7
    G addit non propter defectum ex parte sui, sed propter defectum ex parte nostri.
    G adds non propter defectum ex parte sui, sed propter defectum ex parte nostri.
  23. 8
    Iac. 1, 17: Omne datum optimum... desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum etc. — Inferius pro ad sapientiam D F H ad sapiendum.
    James 1:17: Every best gift... is from above, coming down from the Father of lumens etc. — Below, for ad sapientiam D F H read ad sapiendum.
  24. 1
    Cfr. infra solut. ad 2-5.
    Compare below, the solution to 2–5.
  25. 2
    Num. 12.
    N. 12.
  26. 3
    Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 5. et d. 17. p. I. q. 4. — Vocibus veritatis notitia A B E interserunt vel mentis.
    See I Sentences, d. 3, p. I, q. 1, ad 5, and d. 17, p. I, q. 4. — A B E insert vel mentis into the words veritatis notitia.
  27. 4
    Hic in corp. et quaest. praeced.
    Here in the body of the question, and in the preceding question.
  28. 5
    Sicut secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), accidentia non tam sunt entia, quam quid entis (substantiae).
    As according to Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, text 2 (VI, c. 1), accidents are not so much beings as something of a being (of the substance).
  29. 6
    Cfr. tom. I. pag. 562, nota 10. — In fine solut. pro certa cod. F creata.
    Compare vol. I, p. 562, note 10. — At the end of the solution, for certa codex F reads creata.
  30. 7
    Sensus huius vocis explicatur infra q. 6. in corp., ubi agitur de cognitione excessiva.
    The sense of this word is explained below in q. 6 in the body of the question, where excessive cognition is treated.
  31. 8
    Codd. A B viae et conducere.
    Codices A B read viae et conducere.
  32. 9
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3. et 4.
    Compare III Sentences, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 3 and 4.
  33. 1
    Sive per negationem; cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 55. seq. (c. 5.), ubi similis distinctio insinuatur.
    That is, by negation; compare vol. I, p. 87, note 4. — See Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 55 and following (c. 5), where a similar distinction is intimated.
  34. 2
    Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 5 seqq., text. 13. seqq. et text. 36. seq. (c. 1. 2. et 4.). — Mox pro ostendit D F G dicitur. Inferius post ista G supplet assimilatio. In nostra lectione post ista supple: propositio.
    Compare Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 5 and following, text 13 and following, and text 36 and following (c. 1, 2 and 4). — Presently, for ostendit D F G read dicitur. Below, after ista G supplies assimilatio. In our reading, after ista supply propositio.
  35. 3
    Vide II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 7. — Ita D, alii adducens (sive ut loc. cit. dicitur, contemperans).
    See II Sentences, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad 7. — So D; others read adducens (or, as it is put in the place cited, contemperans).
  36. 4
    Codd., exceptis D H, omittunt est, et plerique habent hoc pro haec. Inferius pro quia per se D F H quae per se.
    The codices, except D H, omit est, and most have hoc for haec. Below, for quia per se D F H read quae per se.
  37. 5
    Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 14. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. Ibid. ad 4. et 5. insinuatur seq. et praeced. solutio.
    Compare also III Sentences, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3. In the same place, at ad 4 and 5, the following and the preceding solution are intimated.
  38. 6
    In codd. incongrue omittitur quae.
    In the codices quae is incongruously omitted.
  39. 1
    A B G communicantes.
    A B G read communicantes.
Translator’s Notes
  1. tr.
    Translator’s note: "lights of the virtues" is what English would say here, and it would hide the word Augustine chose. Lux is light in its source, the thing that shines; lumen is that light as it goes out and is had by something else, and the whole force of the sentence is that the unchangeable rules come to a mind from outside it and fit it, so that men are made wise by cleaving to a wisdom not their own — which is the position this question has to test. The distinction is not a figure of speech in this chunk: argument 17 and its reply argue from lumina materialia, two ordinary lights meeting in one medium, where lumen is the technical word for the light in the medium and lux would be wrong. So lumen is left as it stands wherever it occurs and lux is rendered "light"; the transliteration is the accepted cost of keeping the pair visible. ---
Cited by

1 place in the Opera Omnia citesthis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology
De reductione artium ad theologiam · De reductione artium ad theologiam
supra pag. 29, nota 6

1 further reference addresses the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.