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Quaest. 8

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio VIII: Utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio VIII. Utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate.

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia primitas in essentia excludit omnem aliam essentiam; impossibile enim est, duas esse essentias primas, quia sequeretur necessario, quod neutra esset prima4: ergo si primitas in essentia excludit pluralitatem essentiarum, pari ratione et primitas in persona excludit pluralitatem personarum: ergo impossibile est, quod simul se compatiantur circa Deum esse primum et esse trinum.

2. Item, primitas circa causalitatem excludit pluralitatem; necesse enim est, unam solam esse causam primam5.

3. Item, sicut se habet postremum esse productionis activae, ita primum esse productionis passivae; sed postremum, eo quod postremum, non

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admittit productionem activam, ut aliquid ipsius producat aliquid: ergo nec primum productionem passivam: ergo impossibile est, aliquid esse summe primum et habere esse productum: si ergo trinitas includit productionem passivam, ergo excludit primitatem perfectam.

4. Item, aut illae tres personae sunt aeque primae, aut non sunt aeque primae. Si sunt aeque primae: ergo una non magis producit alteram, quam e converso; si non sunt aeque primae: ergo non est summa ratio primitatis in omnibus personis.

5. Item, aut sunt aeque principiantes, aut non. Si sunt aeque principiantes: ergo qua ratione una est principium alterius, eadem ratione e converso; si non sunt aeque principiantes: ergo non est aequaliter in eis ratio principii, ac per hoc nec ratio primitatis.

6. Item, unitas prior est re et intellectu quam pluralitas1: ergo summa primitas non convenit nisi ei, in quo est unitas absque pluralitate; sed trinitas includit pluralitatem veram: ergo excludit primitatem perfectam.

7. Item, quanto aliquid prius est, tanto magis tenet rationem fontalitatis in producendo: ergo ex eo quod est simpliciter primum necessario manat quidquid producitur: si ergo nulla persona potest manare a se ipsa, impossibile est, quod aliqua persona manet sive producatur et simul stet cum primitate perfecta.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Idem est primum et principium2: ergo si ab aeterno fuit primum, ab aeterno fuit et principium; sed principium secundum completissimam rationem est, quando est principians et producens secundum modum productionis perfectae: si ergo ab aeterno fuit in Deo ratio primitatis perfectae, fuit et veritas productionis intrinsecae. Sed hoc ponitur per trinitatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, quanto aliquid prius, tanto potentius et actualius3: ergo primum principium necessario fuit actualissimum et potentissimum; sed actus primi principii, secundum quod principium, est principiare; ergo si in primo principio, hoc ipso quod primum, necessario ponitur ratio summae actualitatis et potentiae, necessario ponetur veritas productionis aeternae, ac per hoc et completio trinitatis perfectae.

3. Item, prius est omnino aequale quam jnaequale et re et intellectu4; ergo impossibile est intelligere productionem inaequalis, quin primo intelligatur productio aequalis: si ergo productio creaturae est productio in inaequalitatem, productio autem secundum aequalitatem non potest esse nisi in Trinitate beata; ergo productio creaturae omnis de necessitate praesupponit Trinitatem aeternam.

4. Item, prius est illud quod potest re vel intellectu ab aeterno intelligi, quam illud quod non re nec intellectu potest intelligi fuisse ab aeterno; sed productio alicuius de aliquo potest intelligi fuisse ab aeterno, productio autem alicuius de nihilo non potest fuisse aeternaliter5: ergo ante productionem omnis creaturae necessario est productio alicuius de aliquo praeintelligenda secundum rationem primitatis perfectae. Sed hoc non potest intelligi nisi in Trinitate increata: ergo etc.

5. Item, actus primi principii est primo principiare seu producere: ergo cum prius principians sit quam principiatum6, ergo prior est principiatio seu productio principii principiantis quam solum rei principiatae; ergo si productio principii non est nisi in illa trinitate Dei, necesse est, quodsi illud principium sit primum, quod sit etiam trinum.

6. Item, primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum, est simplicissimum et spiritualissimum: ergo necesse est, quod intellectus7; sed omnis intellectus principians principiat per verbum et donum amoris intrinsecum; omne autem principians per verbum et amorem prius concipit verbum et spirat amorem, quam producat effectum exteriorem: ergo necessario est, quodsi primum principium est productivum esse extrinsecorum, quod prius producat8. Sed haec duplex productio ponit, Deum esse trinum: ergo necessario sequitur, quodsi primum principium est primum, quod etiam sit trinum.

7. Item, prius est principiare9 naturale et intrinsecum quam voluntarium et extrinsecum; sed primo principio competit productio voluntaria et extrinseca: ergo necessario competit ei naturalis et intrinseca, et hoc non est nisi ponatur trinitas: ergo etc.

8. Item, prius est perfectum quam imperfectum et re et intellectu10, completum quam diminutum,

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unum quam multum, simplex quam compositum, infinitum quam finitum, actus quam potentia, immutabile quam mutabile, aeternum quam temporale, necessarium quam possibile: si ergo omnis creatura producta est imperfecta, est deficiens ab unitate summa, est composita, est finita, est ens in potentia, est quodam modo temporalis, est variabilis, est possibilis, deficiens ab actualitate et necessitate summa: necesse est igitur, quod ante productionem creaturae sit productio rei perfectissimae, summae, indivisae, simplicissimae, infinitissimae, aeternae, immutabilis et necessariae; hoc autem non potest esse per productionem essentiae diversae: ergo necesse est, quod illud sit per productionem personae habentis unitatem essentiae cum persona producente et aequalis in potentia, in sapientia, in bonitate; hoc autem est ponere beatissimam Trinitatem.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

Primitas non solum non excludit trinitatem, verum etiam eam includit.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod primitas non tantum non excludit trinitatem, verum etiam includit in tantum, ut primum principium eo ipso sit trinum, quo etiam est primum; quod sic manifestum est.

Nam primitas summa in summo et altissimo principio ponit summam actualitatem, summam fontalitatem et summam fecunditatem. Primum enim principium, hoc ipso quod primum, est perfectissimum in producendo, fontalissimum in emanando, fecundissimum in pullulando. Quoniam ergo perfecta productio, emanatio et pullulatio attenditur tantum secundum duos modos intrinsecos, scilicet per modum naturae et per modum voluntatis, verbi scilicet et amoris; hinc est, quod necesse est, ibi poni ratione summae perfectionis, fontalitatis et fecunditatis duplicem modum emanandi respectu duplicis hypostasis productae, emanantis a prima persona tanquam a primo principio producente; ac per hoc necesse est, ponere personas tres. — Et quia perfectissima productio1 non est nisi respectu aequalium, fontalissima emanatio non est nisi respectu coaeternalium, fecundissima pullulatio non est nisi respectu consubstantialium: necesse est intelligere, quod primum principium includat intra se tres hypostases coaequales, coaeternales et consubstantiales. Ponit igitur primitas circa primum principium trinitatem perfectissimam secundum rationem ordinis, originis et distinctionis, coaequalitatis et coaeternitatis et consubstantialitatis; ponit etiam summam unitatem, simplicitatem, immensitatem, aeternitatem, immutabilitatem et actualitatem: ponit igitur primi principii trinitatem cum essentialibus conditionibus supradictis.

Quoniam igitur primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum, est summe unum, et hoc ipso summe simplex est et immensum, et hoc ipso est aeternum, incommutabile et necessarium, sicut ex praecedentibus2 colligitur; et rursus, hoc ipso quod primum, est perfectissimum in producendo, fontalissimum in emanando et fecundissimum in pullulando, et hoc respectu aequalium, coaeternalium et consubstantialium, distinctorum, orientium et ordinatorum: hinc est, quod primum principium, quia primum, est aeternum cum plenitudine omnium nobilium conditionum; quare in ipso, in quantum primum, status est rerum et comprehensionum. — Ac per hoc Rachel, quae vitam designat contemplativam, interpretatur visum principium3, quia qui illud videt in quantum primum principium, habet suae conditionis statum et desiderium terminatum; quod non terminabitur, nisi cum clare videbitur primum principium, ubi et trinum et summe unum. — Et rationes istae concedendae sunt, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur.

1. 2. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod primitas circa essentiam excludit pluralitatem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia plures essentiae essentialiter differentes non possunt habere ordinem ad invicem nisi secundum rationem prioris et posterioris; sed plures personae, quia unam habent essentiam et unum esse, possunt ad invicem ordinari, ita quod, quamvis sit in eis ratio originis, nulla tamen interventio posterioritatis: et ideo haec pluralitas non tollit primitatem summam, quia nullam posterioritatem includit, quae directe primitati repugnat. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de causalitate; quia ordo causarum per essentialem diversitatem attenditur secundum comparationem posterioris ad primum, quod quidem non est reperire in origine4 personarum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod postremo non convenit productio activa; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cum postremum non possit habere comparationem, quae sit idem quod ipsum, nec producatur aliquid sibi per omnia adaequatum propter suam imperfectionem; ideo in ipso necessario repugnat, quod sit postremum et quod sit productivum, quia aliquid haberet post se posterius. Secus autem

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est ex parte principii, quia propter summam completionem tam in producente quam in producto non repugnat productio1 activa et passiva, nulla interveniente posterioritate, per quam minuatur completio unitatis perfectae

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt aut aeque primae aut non; dicendum, quod primae dicit privationem anterioris; alio modo dicit privationem originis. Si ergo dicatur primum per privationem anterioris; sic sunt aeque primae, quia nihil est ibi ante et post. Si autem dicatur primum per privationem originis, quia scilicet a nullo oritur; sic ratio primitatis principaliter residet circa personam Patris, ratione cuius est in ipso fontalis plenitudo ad productionem omnium personarum. Unde et quia innascibilitas hanc proprietatem includit, ideo dicitur esse proprietas, quae est notio Patris; quod quidem non esset, nisi simul et nobilitatem diceret et innotescendi rationem, diceretur etiam relative2.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut sunt aeque principiantes, aut non; dicendum, quod aeque principiantes essentialiter, sed non aeque personaliter, quia Pater est principium duorum, Filius unius, et Spiritus sanctus nullius. Quoniam ergo ratio primitatis, quae convenit essentialiter primo principio, est aequaliter in omnibus illis personis tribus; ideo simul stat trinitas cum primitate summa: quia, sicut non posse generare in Filio non ponit impotentiam3, sic non esse a se, sed a Patre non ponit aliquam posterioritatem, ac per hoc non diminuit de ratione primitatis perfectae.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas prior est re et intellectu quam pluralitas; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa pluralitate, quae est ex aggregatione unitatum; de illa autem pluralitate, in qua eadem est unitas trium, veritatem non habet, quia una est in eis veritas, una lux, una ratio intelligendi ex parte ipsius Dei intellecti4. Quod autem nos prius intelligamus unitatem quam trinitatem, hoc est propter defectum intelligentiae ex parte nostra.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quanto aliquid est fontalius, tanto prius in producendo; dicendum, quod, sicut iam tactum est, primum, secundum quod dupliciter accipitur, et per privationem anterioritatis essentialis et privationem originis personalis, sic duplicem includit fontalitatem, secundum quod dicit anterioritatis privationem essentialis et privationem originis personalis5. Secundum quod dicit privationem anterioritatis essentialis, sic includit fontalitatem respectu effectuum et essentiarum producendarum; et sic, cum ista conditio aequaliter conveniat omnibus personis, aequaliter convenit eis ratio fontalitatis in esse creatorum productione, quia non sunt tria, sed unum principium creaturae. Secundum autem quod dicit privationem originis personalis, sic competit soli personae innascibili, scilicet Patri, in qua est plenitudo fontalitatis ad productionem Filii et Spiritus sancti. — Haec autem fontalitas quodam modo origo est alterius fontalitatis. Quia enim Pater producit Filium et per Filium et cum Filio producit Spiritum sanctum; ideo Deus Pater per Filium cum Spiritu sancto est principium omnium creatorum; nisi enim eos produceret ab aeterno, non per illos producere posset ex tempore; et ideo ratione illius productionis in Trinitate recte dicitur esse fons vitae6. Sicut enim habet vitam in semetipso, sic dat Filio vitam habere in semetipso etc. Hinc est, quod vita aeterna haec sola est, ut spiritus rationalis, qui manat a beatissima Trinitate et est imago Trinitatis, per modum cuiusdam circuli intelligibilis redeat per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, per deiformitatem gloriae in beatissimam Trinitatem.

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English Translation
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Question VIII. Whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy.

Lastly it is asked whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. Because primacy in essence excludes every other essence; for it is impossible that there be two first essences, because it would follow necessarily that neither would be first4: therefore if primacy in essence excludes a plurality of essences, by equal reason primacy in person also excludes a plurality of persons: therefore it is impossible that being first and being threefold be compatible with each other together in God.

2. Likewise, primacy in causality excludes plurality; for it is necessary that there be one sole first cause5.

3. Likewise, as the last being stands to active production, so the first being stands to passive production; but the last, by the fact that it is last, does not

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admit active production, such that something of it should produce something: therefore neither does the first admit passive production: therefore it is impossible that something be supremely first and have a produced being: if therefore trinity includes passive production, it therefore excludes perfect primacy.

4. Likewise, either those three persons are equally first, or they are not equally first. If they are equally first: then one does not produce another more than the converse; if they are not equally first: then the highest reason of primacy is not in all the persons.

5. Likewise, either they are equally principiating, or not. If they are equally principiating: then by the same reason by which one is the principle of another, the converse holds; if they are not equally principiating: then the reason of principle is not equally in them, and on this account neither is the reason of primacy.

6. Likewise, unity is prior to plurality in reality and in understanding1: therefore supreme primacy belongs only to that in which there is unity without plurality; but trinity includes true plurality: therefore it excludes perfect primacy.

7. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more it holds the reason of fontality in producing: therefore whatever is produced necessarily flows from that which is simply first: if therefore no person can flow from itself, it is impossible that any person should flow or be produced and at the same time stand with perfect primacy.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. The first and the principle are the same2: therefore if from eternity there was a first, from eternity there was also a principle; but a principle is according to its most complete reason when it is principiating and producing according to the mode of perfect production: if therefore from eternity there was in God the reason of perfect primacy, there was also the truth of intrinsic production. But this is posited through trinity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more powerful and the more actual3: therefore the first principle was necessarily most actual and most powerful; but the act of the first principle, according as it is a principle, is to principiate; therefore if in the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, there is necessarily posited the reason of supreme actuality and power, there will necessarily be posited the truth of eternal production, and on this account also the completion of a perfect trinity.

3. Likewise, the altogether equal is prior to the unequal both in reality and in understanding4; therefore it is impossible to understand the production of the unequal without the production of the equal being understood first: if therefore the production of the creature is a production into inequality, while production according to equality can be only in the blessed Trinity, then every production of a creature of necessity presupposes the eternal Trinity.

4. Likewise, that which can be understood from eternity, in reality or in understanding, is prior to that which can be understood to have been from eternity neither in reality nor in understanding; but the production of something from something can be understood to have been from eternity, while the production of something from nothing cannot have been eternally5: therefore before the production of every creature there is necessarily to be understood beforehand the production of something from something, according to the reason of perfect primacy. But this cannot be understood except in the uncreated Trinity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the act of the first principle is first to principiate or to produce: therefore, since the principiating is prior to the principiated6, the principiation or production of a principiating principle is prior to that of a merely principiated thing; therefore if the production of a principle is only in that trinity of God, it is necessary that, if that principle is first, it is also threefold.

6. Likewise, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple and most spiritual: therefore it is necessary that it be an understanding7; but every understanding that principiates principiates through a word and an intrinsic gift of love; and everything that principiates through a word and love first conceives the word and breathes forth love before it produces an exterior effect: therefore it is necessarily so that, if the first principle is productive of the being of extrinsic things, it first produces8. But this twofold production posits that God is threefold: therefore it follows necessarily that, if the first principle is first, it is also threefold.

7. Likewise, to principiate9 naturally and intrinsically is prior to doing so voluntarily and extrinsically; but voluntary and extrinsic production belongs to the first principle: therefore natural and intrinsic production necessarily belongs to it, and this is not so unless trinity is posited: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the perfect is prior to the imperfect both in reality and in understanding10, the complete to the diminished,

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the one to the many, the simple to the composite, the infinite to the finite, act to potency, the immutable to the mutable, the eternal to the temporal, the necessary to the possible: if therefore every produced creature is imperfect, falls short of supreme unity, is composite, is finite, is a being in potency, is in a certain way temporal, is variable, is possible, falling short of supreme actuality and necessity: it is therefore necessary that before the production of the creature there be the production of a thing most perfect, supreme, undivided, most simple, most infinite, eternal, immutable and necessary; but this cannot be through the production of a different essence: therefore it is necessary that it be through the production of a person having unity of essence with the producing person and equal in power, in wisdom, in goodness; and this is to posit the most blessed Trinity.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

Primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but even includes it.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but even includes it, to such a degree that the first principle is threefold by the very thing by which it is also first; which is made manifest thus.

For supreme primacy in the supreme and most high principle posits supreme actuality, supreme fontality and supreme fecundity. For the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most perfect in producing, most fontal in emanating, most fecund in burgeoning. Since, therefore, perfect production, emanation and burgeoning are reckoned only according to two intrinsic modes, namely by the mode of nature and by the mode of will, that is, of word and of love; hence it is that it is necessary to posit there, by reason of supreme perfection, fontality and fecundity, a twofold mode of emanating with respect to a twofold hypostasis produced, emanating from the first person as from a first producing principle; and on this account it is necessary to posit three persons. — And because the most perfect production1 is only with respect to equals, the most fontal emanation only with respect to coeternals, the most fecund burgeoning only with respect to consubstantials: it is necessary to understand that the first principle includes within itself three hypostases, coequal, coeternal and consubstantial. Primacy therefore posits in the first principle a most perfect trinity, according to the reason of order, of origin and of distinction, of coequality and coeternity and consubstantiality; it posits also supreme unity, simplicity, immensity, eternity, immutability and actuality: it posits therefore the trinity of the first principle together with the essential conditions spoken of above.

Since, therefore, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is supremely one, and by this very fact is supremely simple and immense, and by this very fact is eternal, unchangeable and necessary, as is gathered from the preceding2; and again, by the very fact that it is first, is most perfect in producing, most fontal in emanating and most fecund in burgeoning, and this with respect to equals, coeternals and consubstantials, distinct, arising and ordered: hence it is that the first principle, because it is first, is eternal with the fullness of all noble conditions; wherefore in it, inasmuch as it is first, is the stopping-point of things and of comprehensions. — And on this account Rachel, who designates the contemplative life, is interpreted the principle seen3, because whoever sees it inasmuch as it is the first principle has the stopping-point of his condition and his desire brought to its term; which will not be brought to its term except when the first principle shall be clearly seen, where it is both threefold and supremely one. — And these reasons, which are brought forward for this side, are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that primacy in essence excludes plurality, it must be said that it is not alike: because several essences essentially differing cannot have order to one another except according to the reason of prior and posterior; but several persons, because they have one essence and one being, can be ordered to one another in such a way that, although there is in them the reason of origin, there is nevertheless no intervention of posteriority: and therefore this plurality does not take away supreme primacy, because it includes no posteriority, which is what is directly repugnant to primacy. — And by this the answer is plain to the following objection, which is made concerning causality; because the order of causes is reckoned through essential diversity, according to the comparison of the posterior to the first, which indeed is not to be found in the origin4 of the persons.

3. To the objection that active production does not belong to the last, it must be said that it is not alike: because, since the last cannot have a comparison which is the same as itself, nor is anything produced wholly adequate to it, on account of its imperfection; therefore in it it is necessarily repugnant that it be last and that it be productive, because it would have something posterior after itself. But it is otherwise

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on the part of the principle, because, on account of the supreme completion both in the producer and in the produced, active and passive production1 are not repugnant, no posteriority intervening by which the completion of perfect unity would be lessened

4. To the objection that they are either equally first or not, it must be said that first signifies the privation of anything anterior; in another way it signifies the privation of origin. If, therefore, first is said by privation of anything anterior; thus they are equally first, because there is nothing there before and after. But if first is said by privation of origin, namely because it arises from none; thus the reason of primacy resides principally in the person of the Father, by reason of whom there is in him the fontal plenitude for the production of all the persons. Whence also, because innascibility includes this property, it is therefore said to be a property which is a notion of the Father; which indeed would not be so unless it signified at once both nobility and the reason of making known; it would be said also relatively2.

5. To the objection that either they are equally principiating or not, it must be said that they are equally principiating essentially, but not equally personally, because the Father is the principle of two, the Son of one, and the Holy Spirit of none. Since, therefore, the reason of primacy which belongs essentially to the first principle is equally in all those three persons; therefore trinity stands together with supreme primacy: because, just as not being able to generate does not posit impotence in the Son3, so not being from himself, but from the Father does not posit any posteriority, and on this account does not diminish anything of the reason of perfect primacy.

6. To the objection that unity is prior to plurality in reality and in understanding, it must be said that this is true of that plurality which is from an aggregation of unities; but of that plurality in which there is the same unity of the three it has no truth, because in them there is one truth, one light, one reason of understanding on the part of God himself as understood4. That we understand unity before trinity, however, is on account of a defect of intelligence on our part.

7. To the objection: the more fontal something is, the more prior it is in producing; it must be said that, as has already been touched on, first, according as it is taken in two ways, both by privation of essential anteriority and by privation of personal origin, so includes a twofold fontality, according as it signifies the privation of essential anteriority and the privation of personal origin5. According as it signifies the privation of essential anteriority, it thus includes fontality with respect to effects and essences to be produced; and thus, since this condition belongs equally to all the persons, the reason of fontality belongs equally to them in the production of the being of created things, because they are not three, but one principle of the creature. But according as it signifies the privation of personal origin, it thus belongs to the innascible person alone, namely to the Father, in whom is the plenitude of fontality for the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit. — This fontality, moreover, is in a certain way the origin of the other fontality. For because the Father produces the Son, and through the Son and with the Son produces the Holy Spirit; therefore God the Father through the Son with the Holy Spirit is the principle of all created things; for unless he produced them from eternity, he could not produce through them in time; and therefore, by reason of that production in the Trinity, he is rightly said to be the fountain of life6. For as he has life in himself, so he gives the Son to have life in himself, etc. Hence it is that eternal life is this alone: that the rational spirit, which flows from the most blessed Trinity and is the image of the Trinity, should return, by the manner of a certain intelligible circle, through memory, intelligence and will, through the deiformity of glory, into the most blessed Trinity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 4
    Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 6. — Superius post Quia primitas codicis lacunam supplevimus addendo in essentia.
    Compare above, q. 2, a. 1, fundamentum 6. — Above, after Quia primitas ("Because primacy"), we have filled a gap in the codex by adding in essentia ("in essence").
  2. 5
    Hoc arg., in quo apposuimus pluralitatem, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. arg. 4. ad oppos. a S. Doctore sic proponitur: Si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio, et status est in unitate: ergo primitas non ponit pluralitatem, sed unitatem: ergo videtur, quod una tantum sit persona.
    This argument, in which we have added pluralitatem ("plurality"), is put forward by the Holy Doctor in I Sentences, d. 2, q. 2, argument 4 for the opposite, thus: If there is supreme primacy there; then, since the stopping-point is in the first principle, and the stopping-point is in unity: therefore primacy posits not plurality but unity: therefore it seems that there is only one person.
  3. 1
    Vide supra pag. 64, nota 4. — Inferius pro nisi ei D, terminis non bene transpositis, ei nisi.
    See above, p. 64, note 4. — Below, for nisi ei ("only to that"), D, with the terms not well transposed, has ei nisi.
  4. 2
    Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2: Idem enim dico primum et principium.
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2: For I call the first and the principle the same.
  5. 3
    Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. 1, ubi exponitur, quod causa prima plus influat in causatum quam secunda. Vide tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3.
    Compare the Book of Causes, proposition 1, where it is set out that the first cause flows more into what is caused than the second does. See tome I, p. 471, note 3.
  6. 4
    Quia habitus, ut docet Aristot. II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3; cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 4.), est ante privationem. Lib. VI. Topic. c. 4. (c. 9.) ipse ait: Quoniam autem quaedam contrariorum privatione alterius dicuntur, ut inaequalitas privatio aequalitatis videtur esse; inaequalia enim quae non aequalia sunt dicuntur: perspicuum, quoniam quod secundum privationem quidem dicitur contrarium, necessarium est definire per alterum; reliquum vero non iam oportet per id quod secundum privationem dicitur.
    Because the habit, as Aristotle teaches in II On the Heaven and the World, text. 18 (c. 3; compare tome III, p. 720, note 4), is before the privation. In book VI of the Topics, c. 4 (c. 9), he himself says: But since some contraries are spoken of by the privation of the other, as inequality seems to be the privation of equality — for those things are called unequal which are not equal — it is plain that the contrary which is spoken of according to privation must be defined through the other; but the remaining one need no longer be defined through that which is spoken of according to privation.
  7. 5
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.
    Compare II Sentences, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.
  8. 6
    Sicut etiam Aristot. II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14) ait: Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa.
    As Aristotle also says in Posterior Analytics II, c. 17 (c. 14): For the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause.
  9. 7
    Supple: sit. Vide Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39. (XI. c. 7.). — Maior ostensa est supra q. 3. a. 1. — De seqq. cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12. seqq.
    Supply: sit ("it be"). See Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, text. 39 (XI, c. 7). — The major was shown above, q. 3, a. 1. — On what follows, compare Augustine, IX On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 12 ff.
  10. 8
    Supple: Verbum et Amorem.
    Supply: the Word and Love.
  11. 9
    Cod. noster perperam scribit privare.
    Our codex wrongly writes privare ("to deprive").
  12. 10
    Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 75. (c. 9.): Prius autem et natura et ratione et tempore quod perfectum quidem est imperfecto est, corruptibili autem incorruptibile. De seqq. cfr. supra pag. 12, nota 9. in fine et q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 12. seqq.
    Aristotle, VIII Physics, text. 75 (c. 9): But the perfect is prior to the imperfect in nature and in reason and in time, and the incorruptible to the corruptible. On what follows, compare above, p. 12, note 9, at the end, and q. 1, a. 1, fundamentum 12 ff.
  13. 1
    Supplevimus: productio. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 2. ad 3.
    We have supplied: productio ("production"). — Compare I Sentences, d. 19, p. I, q. 2, reply to 3.
  14. 2
    Quaest. 2-7. Etiam hic respiciuntur praecedentes quaest.
    Questions 2–7. Here too the preceding questions are in view.
  15. 3
    August., I. de Consensu Evangelist. c. 5. n. 8: Hae duae virtutes [activa et contemplativa] in duabus uxoribus Iacob figuratae intelliguntur. De quibus adversus Faustum Manichaeum lib. XXII. c. 52. seq.] pro modulo meo... disserui. Lia quippe interpretatur laborans, Rachel autem visum principium [contra Faustum, loc. cit., additur: sive verbum, ex quo videtur principium. Cfr. Hieron., Lib. de Nominibus hebraicis, de Genesi, ubi legitur: Rachel ovis, vel videns principium, aut visio sceleris, sive videns Deum]. — Post pauca pro habet D habere.
    Augustine, I On the Harmony of the Evangelists, c. 5, n. 8: These two virtues [the active and the contemplative] are understood to be figured in the two wives of Jacob. Of which, against Faustus the Manichaean, book XXII, c. 52 f.] I have discoursed according to my small measure... For Lia is interpreted labouring, but Rachel the principle seen [in Against Faustus, at the place cited, there is added: or the word, from which the principle is seen. Compare Jerome, Book of Hebrew Names, on Genesis, where one reads: Rachel, a sheep, or seeing the principle, or a vision of wickedness, or seeing God]. — A little after, for habet ("has"), D has habere ("to have").
  16. 4
    Propter scriptionem compendiosam legi potest sive origine sive ordine. — Cfr. supra q. 5. a. 2. ad 2. et 7.
    On account of the abbreviated writing, one can read either origine ("origin") or ordine ("order"). — Compare above, q. 5, a. 2, replies to 2 and 7.
  17. 1
    Manifestum omissionem codicis (per saltum, a producto ad activa) supplevimus verbis non repugnat productio.
    The manifest omission of the codex (by a leap, from producto to activa) we have supplied with the words non repugnat productio ("production is not repugnant").
  18. 2
    Cfr. supra q. 5. a. 2. ad 3. et 6, ac I. Sent. d. 28. q. 1. seqq.
    Compare above, q. 5, a. 2, replies to 3 and 6, and I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1 ff.
  19. 3
    Vide I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2.
    See I Sentences, d. 7, q. 2.
  20. 4
    Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. ad 2. et a. 2. ad 16.
    Compare above, q. 2, a. 1, reply to 2, and a. 2, reply to 16.
  21. 5
    D perperam repetit sic duplicem includit fontalitatem.
    D wrongly repeats sic duplicem includit fontalitatem ("so includes a twofold fontality").
  22. 6
    Psalm. 35, 10: Apud te est fons vitae. — Seq. locus est Joan. 5, 26: Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio etc. — Superius pro nisi enim eos... non per illos D non enim eos... nisi per illos; et in fine beatissima Trinitate.
    Psalm 35:10: With thee is the fountain of life. — The following place is John 5:26: For as the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also, etc. — Above, for nisi enim eos... non per illos ("for unless… them… not through them"), D has non enim eos... nisi per illos ("for not… them… except through them"); and at the end beatissima Trinitate ("the most blessed Trinity", ablative).